Blake Vaughn v. Albert Li

In the Court of Appeals Second Appellate District of Texas at Fort Worth ___________________________ No. 02-25-00401-CV ___________________________ BLAKE VAUGHN, Appellant V. ALBERT LI, Appellee On Appeal from County Court at Law No. 3 Tarrant County, Texas Trial Court No. 2023-001902-3 Before Kerr, Bassel, and Wallach, JJ. Memorandum Opinion by Justice Bassel  MEMORANDUM OPINION I. Introduction In this landlord–tenant dispute, Appellant Blake Vaughn (Tenant)1 appeals the trial court’s judgment allowing Appellee Albert Li (Landlord) to retain $1,069.68 of Tenant’s $1,950.00 security deposit; awarding Tenant a judgment against Landlord for $880.32 for improper retention of Tenant’s security deposit but finding there was insufficient evidence that Landlord had acted in bad faith; and awarding Landlord a judgment against Tenant for court costs. In three issues, Tenant argues that the trial court improperly denied his attorney’s fees and court costs and improperly awarded Landlord court costs, that the trial court erred by finding in favor of Landlord on Tenant’s statutory-lockout counterclaim, and that Landlord did not rebut the presumption of bad-faith retention of Tenant’s security deposit. Because there is some evidence to support unchallenged findings of fact that are relevant to each of Tenant’s arguments, and because the trial court did not abuse its discretion by awarding costs solely to Landlord, we affirm. II. Background A. The Relevant Lease Terms The lease required the payment of a $1,950 security deposit, which Tenant paid prior to his brothers’ and his mother’s moving into the premises owned by Landlord. 1 For ease of reference, we use the term Tenant even though he did not live at the premises. As demonstrated by the record, Tenant paid the security deposit and the rent for his mother and his two brothers to reside at the premises. 2 The lease began on March 25, 2021, and pursuant to an extension, Tenant was permitted to remain at the premises until the end of the day on April 30, 2022. Other relevant terms in the lease included the following: 13.1 Damage in the Dwelling. You must promptly pay or reimburse us for loss, damage, consequential damages, government fines or charges, or cost of repairs or service in the dwelling because of a Lease or rules violation; improper use; negligence; other conduct by you, your invitees, your occupants, or your guests; or any other cause not due to our negligence or fault as allowed by law, except for damages by acts of God to the extent they couldn’t be mitigated by your action or inaction. .... 24.3 Alarm and Detection Devices. (A) What we’ll do. We’ll furnish smoke alarms or other detection devices required by law or city ordinance. . . . (B) Your duties. . . . Neither you nor others may disable alarms or detectors. If you damage or disable the smoke alarm, or remove a battery without replacing it with a working battery, you may be liable to us under Texas Property Code [S]ec. 92.2611 for $100 plus one month’s rent, actual damages, and attorney’s fees. You’ll be liable to us and others if you fail to report malfunctions, or fail to report any loss, damage, or fines resulting from fire, smoke, or water. .... 25.2 Standards and Improvements. You must use customary diligence in maintaining the dwelling and not damaging or littering the outside areas. Unless authorized by law or by us in writing, you must not do any repairs, painting, wallpapering, carpeting, electrical changes, or otherwise alter our property. No holes or stickers are allowed inside or outside the dwelling. Unless our rules state otherwise, we’ll permit a reasonable number of small nail holes for hanging pictures on sheetrock walls and grooves of wood-paneled walls. No water furniture, washing machines, extra phone or television outlets, alarm systems, or lock 3 changes, additions, or rekeying is permitted unless allowed by law or we’ve consented in writing. . . . You must not alter, damage, or remove our property, including alarm systems, detection devices, furniture, telephone and television wiring, screens, locks, and security devices. . . . .... 32.5 Other Remedies. . . . A prevailing party may recover reasonable attorney’s fees and all other litigation costs from the nonprevailing parties, except a party may not recover attorney’s fees and litigation costs in connection with a party’s claims seeking personal-injury, sentimental, exemplary[,] or punitive damages. We may recover attorney’s fees in connection with enforcing our rights under this Lease. All unpaid amounts you owe, including judgments, bear 18% interest per year from the due date, compounded annually. . . . .... 37. Move-out Procedures. The move-out date can’t be changed unless we and you both agree in writing. You won’t move out before the Lease term or renewal period ends unless all rent for the entire Lease term or renewal period is paid in full. Early move-out may result in reletting charges and acceleration of future rent under Par. 10 and 32. You’re prohibited by law from applying any security deposit to rent. You can’t stay beyond the date you’re supposed to move out. All residents, guests, and occupants must surrender or abandon the dwelling before the 30-day period for deposit refund begins. You must give us and the U.S. Postal Service, in writing, each resident’s forwarding address. 38. Cleaning. You must thoroughly clean the dwelling, including doors, windows, furniture, bathrooms, kitchen appliances, patios, balconies, garages, carports, and storage rooms. You must follow move- out cleaning instructions if they have been provided. If you don’t clean adequately, you’ll be liable for reasonable cleaning charges—including charges for cleaning carpets, draperies, furniture, walls, etc.[,] that are soiled beyond normal wear (that is, wear or soiling that occurs without negligence, carelessness, accident, or abuse). .... 4  40. Security Deposit Deductions and Other Charges. You’ll be liable for the following charges, if applicable: . . . repairs or damages caused by negligence, carelessness, accident, or abuse, including stickers, scratches, tears, burns, stains, or unapproved holes; replacement cost of our property that was in or attached to the dwelling and is missing; replacing dead or missing alarm or detection-device batteries at any time; utilities for repairs or cleaning; . . . removing or rekeying unauthorized security devices or alarm systems; . . . and other sums due under this Lease. You’ll be liable to us for: (A) charges for replacing any keys and access devices referenced in Par. 5 if you don’t return them all on or before your actual move-out date; (B) accelerated rent if you’ve violated Par. 32; and (C) a reletting fee if you’ve violated Par. 10. We may also deduct from your security deposit our reasonable costs incurred in rekeying security devices required by law if you vacate the apartment in breach of this Lease. [Underlined emphasis added.] With those lease provisions in mind, we turn to the problems that occurred during moveout. B. Landlord’s Perspective on the Moveout Around 9:00 or 10:00 a.m. on April 30, 2022, Landlord went to the premises and found the door open. Even though there were boxes in the kitchen and the garage was “full of stuff,” he saw that there were tall weeds in the yard and concluded that Tenant had moved out one to two weeks prior. In addition to the front door being open, Landlord discovered that all four locks had been changed. Landlord texted Tenant and Tenant’s mother regarding the changed locks and received no response. Landlord waited for a bit to see if anyone would come pick up the remaining belongings. When no one came, he began working on the premises. In order to secure the premises when he left at 7:00 p.m., Landlord changed the lock and keyed it 5 to work with the key that he had previously given Tenant. Landlord moved some of the items that were left in the kitchen to the backyard so that potential tenants would not see a mess inside. At 8:50 p.m., Tenant’s mother texted Landlord that she could not get into the property to retrieve her remaining items because she did not have the old key. Landlord set a date when Tenant could retrieve the items; he did not keep any of Tenant’s items. Landlord testified that several rooms had to be recarpeted after Tenant moved out due to various types of damage. Additionally, Landlord filled holes and painted walls to repair damage that he claimed was beyond normal wear and tear. Landlord also had to replace a smoke detector that Tenant had removed. Based on the damage to the home, Landlord emailed Tenant a list of itemized charges showing a total of $1,649.35 in damages beyond the security deposit: 6 Tenant acknowledged receiving the email. Landlord testified that he did not mail the itemized-charges list because he and Tenant had agreed that email was acceptable. C. Tenant and His Mother’s Perspective on the Moveout Tenant’s mother testified that Landlord came to the property on Friday, April 29, 2022, and raved about the cleaning job that she had done to prepare the home for new tenants. 2 When she returned to the home on the evening of April 30, 2022, to remove her remaining items (including a medical device that she used daily), the locks had been changed, and half of her belongings were on the grass. She did not recall having left the door open and said that she always locked the door. Tenant testified that his mother texted him at approximately 8:00 p.m. and said that Landlord had thrown “everything on the side of the house” even though they had paid rent to stay until midnight. Tenant texted Landlord and asked when his mother could retrieve her belongings that were still inside the house. According to Tenant’s screenshots of his text messages, Landlord replied that he had “moved a lot of stuff outside” and said that he would not be back to the premises until Tuesday. Tenant texted Landlord, “You have illegally removed our contents from this house and blocked our entry. You potentially damaged our property. We also have a very expensive piece of medical equipment missing. This is serious.” Landlord responded 2 During rebuttal, Landlord admitted that he did a “very quick” walk-through of the property on April 29 and found that the carpet had been cleaned well except for several pink stains; he said that he changed his mind about the carpet’s condition after the new tenants raised concerns about the carpet once they had moved in. 7 by changing the subject. Landlord ultimately allowed the remaining belongings to be retrieved on May 3, 2022. Tenant later texted the address for Landlord to use when returning the security deposit; Landlord said that he would return the deposit, “less the applicable deductions,” within thirty days. Towards the end of May, Landlord texted Tenant that the new tenants had identified a marijuana odor and damaged carpets. When questioned about items on Landlord’s itemized-charges spreadsheet, Tenant’s mother said that Landlord had never mentioned a marijuana odor to her. She said that neither she nor her sons smoke anything. She did not recall whether she had removed any smoke detectors. Regarding holes in the walls and the damage to the carpet, Tenant’s mother claimed that there were “no holes anywhere except where the TV hung,” that the holes were there at move-in, that the carpet was not clean at move-in, and that she and her sons did not damage the carpet. At the time of the moveout, Tenant’s mother believed that the carpet was in good shape. But when asked if the carpet in the whole house needed to be replaced, she said not the whole house but that the carpet in one bedroom might not have been cleaned to Landlord’s standards. Tenant’s mother agreed that she had a locksmith change the locks and that she did not tell Landlord; she thought she was doing him a favor. She did not recall giving him a key and had not left her key under the mat on April 30 as instructed by Landlord because she still had items to retrieve. 8  After Tenant received the itemized-charges list, he put comments on it and sent it back to Landlord: • Tenant did not dispute the locks or the lock-replacement labor because he believed that when they had replaced the door, they had replaced the locks. Tenant did not know if a new key was given to Landlord but assumed that none was given “based on this situation.” • Tenant believed that the garage door had been repaired prior to moveout but that Landlord “was having some sort of difficulty with the remote not working for the door”; Tenant explained that he may have failed to give Landlord a new remote after the garage door was repaired. • Tenant disputed the charges for the yard and the bushes, claiming that there were no damages to those items and that he would not pay to upgrade the landscaping. • Tenant did not dispute the charge for the fire alarm and the door stoppers because the total was only $39, plus $100 for labor; he did not, however, acknowledge any damage to those items. • Tenant disputed the charges for the leaking shower head as “faulty infrastructure” because he did not believe his family members had caused the leak. • Tenant disputed the holes in the walls (claiming that there were already holes in the walls, though they “may have added some”) and the stained and damaged carpet, claiming that they were issues that predated Tenant. Tenant said that he had paid for carpet cleaning right after moving in and again upon moveout. He had not seen any obvious tears in the carpeting when he had visited his family members during the lease but was not present during the moveout. 9  D. The Trial-Court Proceedings3 In Landlord’s first amended original petition filed in the trial court, he alleged causes of action for breach of contract and unlawful removal of a smoke alarm 4 and sought to recover $3,699 in actual damages,5 $3,500 in attorney’s fees, and court costs. Tenant filed a supplemental answer seeking reasonable and necessary attorney’s fees “pursuant to the contract between the parties and the causes of action ple[aded].” Tenant also asserted a myriad of counterclaims by which he sought to recover approximately $19,000. 6 The trial, at which the trial court heard the testimony summarized above, took place on July 25, 2024, and October 24, 2024. Additionally, Landlord’s attorney testified to his fees, seeking $3,000, and Tenant’s attorney testified to his fees—$5,275 3 Landlord filed a small-claims petition in the justice court seeking $1,649, and Tenant filed “a variety of counterclaims” though his pleadings are not included in the record. Tenant prevailed in that court, and Landlord appealed to the county court at law (the trial court). 4 Landlord pleaded that Tenant had removed the smoke alarms without notice to Landlord in violation of Texas Property Code Section 92.2611 and that the Property Code provides for damages of $100 plus one month’s rent ($100 plus $1,950 equals $2,050). See Tex. Prop. Code § 92.2611(a), (e). 5 This amount is based on the $1,649 in damages that exceeded the security deposit plus the $2,050 for the smoke-alarm damages. 6 As noted above, Tenant’s other pleadings are not in the record. From what we can glean from the final judgment and other documents in the record, Tenant counterclaimed for improper retention of his security deposit, retaliation, and unlawful lockout. Tenant’s counterclaims for defamation, libel, and blackmail were dismissed for lack of subject-matter jurisdiction. 10 through trial; $7,500 for an appeal to this court; and $5,000 for an appeal to the Texas Supreme Court. At the conclusion of the trial, the trial court took the matter under advisement and later announced its ruling by email. 7 Before a final judgment was signed, Tenant filed a motion for clarification and reconsideration. In that motion, Tenant provided the following summary of the trial court’s ruling and his request for clarification: While the [c]ourt did not find that [Tenant] was entitled to recover on some of his counterclaims, the [c]ourt did find that [Tenant] was entitled to affirmative relief in the form of recovery of a portion of the security deposit and that [Landlord] would not recover for any of the additional alleged damages for which he sued beyond the amount of the deposit. However, the [c]ourt also ruled that [Landlord] was entitled to recover court costs and post[]judgment interest[] and that neither party was entitled to recover attorney’s fees from the opposing party. [Tenant] seeks clarification as to who[m] the [c]ourt has determined to be the prevailing or successful party in this cause[] and reconsideration of the award of costs and lack of award of attorney’s fees to [Tenant]. At the hearing on Tenant’s motion to clarify and for reconsideration, the trial court explained how it had determined to award Landlord costs but to not award either party attorney’s fees: I wrestled with this, and I ultimately came to the conclusion that [Tenant] was seeking $19,000 and won [$]800. And [Landlord] was seeking $8,000 and received [$]1,500 or thereabouts. And so I thought it didn’t make sense, since it was so piecemeal, to award attorney’s fees. And because [Landlord] had pl[ead]ed for less - - he recovered a higher proportion of what he was seeking, I decided The trial court’s email is not in the record before us. 7 11  that is how I would determine he was the prevailing party and award him court costs. . . . [Landlord], it was determined was entitled to retain a large portion of the security deposit, and it was determined that [Tenant] was entitled to recover a withheld portion of the security deposit. The trial court thereafter rendered a final judgment in which it ordered that Landlord was entitled to retain $1,069.68 of the security deposit, that Landlord was not entitled to recover on his smoke-alarm-removal claim, that Tenant was entitled to recover $880.32 of the security deposit but that there was insufficient evidence that Landlord had acted in bad faith in retaining the deposit, and that Landlord was entitled to court costs. This appeal followed. III. Tenant’s Counterclaim Challenges We first address Tenant’s second and third issues, which challenge the trial court’s rulings on two of his counterclaims, because they form part of the bases for the trial court’s decision to award Landlord costs as the prevailing party—a decision challenged in Tenant’s first issue. After setting forth the applicable standard of review, we discuss Tenant’s second and third issues in turn. A. Standard of Review A trial court’s findings of fact have the same force and dignity as a jury’s answers to jury questions. Anderson v. City of Seven Points, 806 S.W.2d 791, 794 (Tex. 1991); Robbins v. Robbins, 550 S.W.3d 846, 854 (Tex. App—Fort Worth 2018, no pet.). As with jury findings, a trial court’s fact-findings on disputed issues are not 12 conclusive, and when the appellate record contains a reporter’s record, an appellant may challenge those findings for evidentiary sufficiency. Catalina v. Blasdel, 881 S.W.2d 295, 297 (Tex. 1994); Super Ventures, Inc. v. Chaudhry, 501 S.W.3d 121, 126 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth 2016, no pet.). We review the sufficiency of the evidence supporting challenged findings using the same standards that we apply to jury findings. Catalina, 881 S.W.2d at 297. We may sustain a legal-sufficiency challenge—that is, a no-evidence challenge—only when (1) the record bears no evidence of a vital fact, (2) the rules of law or of evidence bar the court from giving weight to the only evidence offered to prove a vital fact, (3) the evidence offered to prove a vital fact is no more than a mere scintilla, or (4) the evidence establishes conclusively the opposite of a vital fact. Gunn v. McCoy, 554 S.W.3d 645, 658 (Tex. 2018). In determining whether legally sufficient evidence supports the challenged finding, we must consider evidence favorable to the finding if a reasonable factfinder could, and we must disregard contrary evidence unless a reasonable factfinder could not. Cent. Ready Mix Concrete Co. v. Islas, 228 S.W.3d 649, 651 (Tex. 2007); City of Keller v. Wilson, 168 S.W.3d 802, 827 (Tex. 2005). We indulge “every reasonable inference deducible from the evidence” in support of the challenged finding. Gunn, 554 S.W.3d at 658 (quoting Bustamante v. Ponte, 529 S.W.3d 447, 456 (Tex. 2017)). A party who “attacks the legal sufficiency of an adverse finding on an issue on which [the party] has the burden of proof . . . must 13 demonstrate on appeal that the evidence establishes, as a matter of law, all vital facts in support of the issue.” Dow Chem. Co. v. Francis, 46 S.W.3d 237, 241 (Tex. 2001). When reviewing an assertion that the evidence is factually insufficient to support a finding, we set aside the finding only if, after considering and weighing all the pertinent record evidence, we determine that the credible evidence supporting the finding is so weak, or so contrary to the overwhelming weight of all the evidence, that the finding should be set aside and a new trial ordered. Pool v. Ford Motor Co., 715 S.W.2d 629, 635 (Tex. 1986) (op. on reh’g); Cain v. Bain, 709 S.W.2d 175, 176 (Tex. 1986). When a party attacks the factual sufficiency of an adverse finding on an issue on which he has the burden of proof, he must demonstrate on appeal that the adverse finding is against the great weight and preponderance of the evidence. Dow Chem., 46 S.W.3d at 242. We review a trial court’s conclusions of law de novo. Hegar v. Am. Multi- Cinema, Inc., 605 S.W.3d 35, 40 (Tex. 2020). We may review conclusions of law to determine their correctness based upon the facts, but we will not reverse because of an erroneous conclusion if the trial court rendered the proper judgment. City of Austin v. Whittington, 384 S.W.3d 766, 779 n.10 (Tex. 2012) (citing BMC Software Belg., N.V. v. Marchand, 83 S.W.3d 789, 794 (Tex. 2002)); City of Forest Hill v. Benson, 555 S.W.3d 284, 289 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth 2018, no pet.). 14  B. Statutory-Lockout Counterclaim In his second issue, Tenant argues that the trial court erred by finding in favor of Landlord on Tenant’s statutory-lockout counterclaim. Specifically, Tenant argues that the evidence is legally and factually insufficient to support the trial court’s “finding” that Landlord did not commit a statutory lockout.8 Because Tenant ignores the trial court’s finding that Tenant had committed the initial lockout by changing the locks without Landlord’s permission, we rule against Tenant and uphold the trial court’s determination that Landlord did not commit a statutory lockout. 1. Applicable Law Tenant’s counterclaim is based on Texas Property Code Section 92.0081(b), which provides that [a] landlord may not intentionally prevent a tenant from entering the leased premises except by judicial process unless the exclusion results from: (1) bona fide repairs, construction, or an emergency; (2) removing the contents of premises abandoned by a tenant; or (3) changing the door locks on the door to the tenant’s individual unit of a tenant who is delinquent in paying at least part of the rent. Tex. Prop. Code § 92.0081(b). If a violation is established, the tenant may recover from the landlord a civil penalty of one month’s rent plus $1,000, actual damages, Although Tenant refers to this as a finding, it was entered as a conclusion of 8 law. 15 court costs, and reasonable attorney’s fees in an action to recover property damages, actual expenses, or civil penalties, less any delinquent rent or other sums for which the tenant is liable to the landlord. Id. § 92.0081(h)(2). 2. Relevant Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law The findings of fact that are relevant to Tenant’s statutory-lockout counterclaim are as follows: 3. After the lease expired and [Tenant had] moved out, [Landlord] inspected the property and found it apparently (although not legally) abandoned with the front door open and realized that [Tenant] had changed the lock[s] to the property in violation of the Lease. Unable to otherwise secure the Premises[, Landlord] installed a new lock on the front door which was the action of a reasonable and prudent property owner. 4. [Landlord] was at the property from the morning of April 30, 2022[,] until well into the evening. When [Tenant] did not return in the evening[, Landlord] left the Premises with the new lock installed on the front door to which [Tenant] had no key. 5. Later in the evening of April 30, 2022, [Tenant] contacted [Landlord,] who agreed to meet with [Tenant] a few days later to allow [Tenant] to remove any additional personal property he may have left at the Premises. 6. [Landlord] found damage to the Premises beyond normal wear and tear and removed certain personal property from the Premises[,] which appeared to him to have been abandoned. .... 19. Although a reasonably prudent property owner would have considered the Premises abandoned, “abandonment” as defined by Paragraph 41.3 of the Lease did not occur as all elements required were not met. The Premises [were] left unsecured[,] and all parties acknowledge [Tenant had] changed the locks and [had] never provided 16  [Landlord] a copy of the key. [Landlord] spent most of the day inside the Premises. Because the property was unsecured[,] a reasonable owner would take action to secure it as [Landlord] did. .... 23. [Landlord] did not lock [Tenant] out of the Premises as [Tenant] had first breached the contract by changing the locks on the Premises without [Landlord]’s consent and did not provide a key to [Landlord]. [Emphasis added.] The trial court made the following conclusion of law related to the statutory- lockout counterclaim: “11. The conduct of [Landlord] did not rise to the level of a statutory lock[]out of [Tenant].” 3. Analysis Here, Tenant focuses his arguments on Section 92.0081(b)’s criteria, attempting to show that no repairs, construction, or emergencies had occurred on April 30; that the premises had not been legally abandoned; 9 and that he was not delinquent in paying rent. Tenant relies on Landlord’s admission that he had changed the locks while Tenant was moving out and did not give Tenant a new key. But Tenant failed to challenge Finding of Fact No. 23, which specifically finds that Tenant had breached the lease first by changing the locks prior to Landlord’s changing the locks. Both Tenant and his mother admitted at trial that prior to April 30, they had changed the locks without notice to Landlord and had not given him a key, thus locking out 9 Of the findings of fact and conclusions of law set forth above, Tenant specifically mentions only Findings of Fact Nos. 3 and 19, which are related to the abandonment criterion under Section 92.0081(b)(2). 17 Landlord. This is some evidence to support the trial court’s unchallenged finding of fact. See Tenaska Energy, Inc. v. Ponderosa Pine Energy, LLC, 437 S.W.3d 518, 523 (Tex. 2014) (“We defer to unchallenged findings of fact that are supported by some evidence.”); cf. Klekotka v. Deneve, No. 09-10-00255-CV, 2011 WL 550081, at *4 (Tex. App.—Beaumont Feb. 17, 2011, pet. dism’d w.o.j.) (mem. op. on reh’g) (concluding that evidence sufficiently supported trial court’s decision denying tenants any recovery on their statutory claim related to the installation of keyless bolting devices because they had breached the lease first by failing to fully pay their rent and had failed to specifically challenge that finding). Moreover, even if Tenant had challenged Finding of Fact No. 23, he failed to carry his burden on his statutory-lockout counterclaim to show as a matter of law that he was not the first to breach the lease by locking out Landlord, as well as that the finding is against the great weight and preponderance of the evidence. Accordingly, we hold that the evidence is legally and factually sufficient to support the trial court’s statutory-lockout findings and that Conclusion of Law No. 11 is correct. We therefore overrule Tenant’s second issue. C. Security-Deposit-Retention Counterclaim In his third issue, Tenant argues that Landlord did not rebut the presumption of bad-faith retention of Tenant’s security deposit. Specifically, Tenant contends that Landlord did not present factually or legally sufficient evidence to rebut the bad-faith presumption because he sent the itemized-charges list to Tenant via email instead of 18 via mail. Because Tenant failed to challenge the trial court’s finding that the parties consented to the use of email, we rule against him on his third issue. 1. Applicable Law A landlord is required to refund a security deposit to a tenant within thirty days of the tenant’s surrendering the premises. Tex. Prop. Code § 92.103(a). But “[b]efore returning a security deposit, the landlord may deduct from the deposit damages and charges for which the tenant is legally liable under the lease or as a result of breaching the lease.” Id. § 92.104(a). The landlord, however, may not retain any portion of a security deposit to cover normal wear and tear. Id. § 92.104(b). “If the landlord retains all or part of a security deposit . . . , the landlord shall give to the tenant the balance of the security deposit, if any, together with a written description and itemized list of all deductions.” Id. § 92.104(c). “The landlord is not obligated to return a tenant’s security deposit or give the tenant a written description of damages and charges until the tenant gives the landlord a written statement of the tenant’s forwarding address for the purpose of refunding the security deposit.” Id. § 92.107(a). “A landlord who fails either to return a security deposit or to provide a written description and itemization of deductions on or before the thirtieth day after the date the tenant surrenders possession is presumed to have acted in bad faith.” Id. § 92.109(d). 2. Relevant Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law The findings of fact relevant to Tenant’s third issue are as follows: 19 8. [Landlord] timely provided [Tenant] a detailed move-out report of the damage he found during the post-lease inspection and withheld the full amount of the deposit. [Landlord] also sought damages to the Premises in addition to the deposit withheld. The communications were made via electronic mail[,] and the parties engaged in an extended exchange regarding the Premises via this medium. .... 20. Insufficient evidence was presented that [Landlord] acted in bad faith in determining the amount of [the] security deposit to be withheld. 21. [Landlord] and [Tenant] consented to the use of email to resolve the security[-]deposit issue[,] so there can be no presumption of bad faith with regard to the retention by [Landlord]. [Tenant] provided his forwarding address to [Landlord] only via email. [Landlord] provided an itemized list of deductions from the security deposit within 30 days of [Tenant]’s surrender of the Premises. The relevant conclusions of law are as follows: 5. The parties[’] consistent use of email to communicate regarding the security deposit was sufficient to satisfy the Property Code’s requirement of “writing[.”] 6. The parties[’] consistent use of email to communicate regarding the security deposit was sufficient to constitute a waiver of any complaint that such failed to satisfy the Property Code’s requirement of “writing[.”] .... 8. [Landlord] did not act in bad faith as that term is defined by the Property Code with regard to [Tenant]’s security deposit. 9. [Landlord] did not act in bad faith by sending an itemized list of deductions from the security deposit to [Tenant] via email, instead of in a paper form via United States Postal Service, as the parties had consented to communicate by email and email is sufficient to constitute “written” as that term is used in the Texas Property Code. 20  3. Analysis Tenant bases his challenge to the finding that Landlord did not act in bad faith solely on Landlord’s decision to send the itemized-charges list via email instead of via the United States Postal Service. Tenant cites no case law for his premise but instead relies on Property Code Section 92.1041: “A landlord is presumed to have refunded a security deposit or made an accounting of security deposit deductions if, on or before the date required under this subchapter, the refund or accounting is placed in the United States mail and postmarked on or before the required date.” Id. § 92.1041. 10 Tenant does not challenge any of the findings of fact or conclusions of law set forth above. In the unchallenged findings, the trial court specifically found that the parties had agreed to use email. See generally Tex. Bus. & Com. Code § 322.007(c) (stating that under the Uniform Electronic Transactions Act, “[i]f a law requires a record to be in writing, an electronic record satisfies the law”); id. § 322.005(b) (stating that Texas Business and Commerce Code Chapter 322 applies only to transactions between parties who have agreed to conduct transactions by electronic means and that whether the parties have made such agreement is determined from the context and As noted in Tenant’s brief, in 2025 the Texas Legislature added a new 10 provision to the Property Code chapter governing security deposits, and that section specifically allows required notices and communications to be sent by email if the tenant and the landlord or landlord’s agent have previously communicated by email. Tex. Prop. Code § 92.113(a). But as pointed out by Tenant, that provision was not in effect when the underlying lease was signed. 21 surrounding circumstances, including the parties’ conduct). Here, the record includes an email from Tenant to Landlord providing his forwarding address for the security- deposit refund. Additionally, Tenant submitted maintenance requests via email. See generally Tex. Prop. Code § 92.056(b), (c) (mentioning giving notice of needed maintenance by postal mail). Tenant therefore believed that his giving notice via email satisfied his “written” communication requirements under the Property Code.11 We conclude that there is some evidence to support the trial court’s unchallenged findings that the parties had consented to the use of email to resolve the security- deposit-retention issue and that there was thus no bad faith on Landlord’s part in using that medium of communication. See Tenaska Energy, 437 S.W.3d at 523. Moreover, Tenant did not establish that Landlord’s use of email to communicate the security-deposit deductions failed to satisfy the statute’s “written description” requirement, and therefore Tenant did not establish as a matter of law bad faith on the part of Landlord. In the absence of such evidence from Tenant, the bad-faith presumption was not triggered. Accordingly, we hold that legally and factually sufficient evidence supports the trial court’s finding of no bad faith on Landlord’s part in using email to send the list To the extent that it was error for Landlord to use email, Tenant cannot show 11 harm because Tenant admitted receiving the itemized-charges list and responding to it. 22 of itemized charges related to the security-deposit retention,12 and we overrule Tenant’s third issue. IV. Attorney’s Fees and Costs 13 In his first issue, Tenant argues that he was the prevailing or successful party in this case and that the trial court thus erred by finding (1) that he was not entitled to recover attorney’s fees and court costs and (2) that Landlord was entitled to recover court costs. Because the evidence is sufficient to support an unchallenged finding and because the challenged conclusion of law is correct, we cannot say that the trial court erred in solely awarding costs to Landlord. A. Standard of Review and Applicable Law The Dallas Court of Appeals has set forth the standard of review that we apply and the law applicable to determine prevailing-party status, including a prevailing- party example from the Texas Supreme Court: Whether a party is entitled to recover attorney’s fees under a contract is a question of law [that] we review de novo. Goldman v. Olmstead, 414 S.W.3d 346, 365–66 (Tex. App.—Dallas 2013, pet. denied) (applying de novo standard of review to order awarding fees based on prevailing[-] party provision of contract[] (citing Holland v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 1 S.W.3d 91, 94 (Tex. 1999)[ (op. on reh’g)])[)]; VSDH Vaquero Venture, 12 Tenant raises no other argument attempting to show that Landlord’s conduct triggered the bad-faith presumption.