Full Opinion

In the Court of Appeals Second Appellate District of Texas at Fort Worth ___________________________ No. 02-26-00110-CV ___________________________ DAWN KANE, Appellant V. GLOBAL LEGAL LAW FIRM, JAMES C. HUBER, AND CHRISTOPHER DRYDEN, Appellees On Appeal from the 236th District Court Tarrant County, Texas Trial Court No. 236-370585-25 Before Birdwell, Bassel, and Wallach, JJ. Memorandum Opinion by Justice Bassel MEMORANDUM OPINION I. Introduction and Brief Background In two issues that make abstract points rather than expressly attacking a specific trial-court ruling, Appellant Dawn Kane challenges the trial court’s grant of a special appearance filed by Appellees Global Legal Law Firm, a California law firm, and James C. Huber and Christoper Dryden, who are two lawyers within that firm.1 The factual background of this appeal is complicated due to each party’s alleging shifting loyalties on the part of the other. Appellees briefly represented Kane when she switched employment from one company to a company represented by Global Legal. Kane sued Appellees based on alleged misdeeds by them when she claims that they turned on her after she switched allegiances back to her former employer and provided affidavit evidence to support claims in a lawsuit filed by her then-and-now employer against Global Legal’s client. Kane’s suit alleged two causes of action: (1) a declaratory-judgment claim— alleged against all three Appellees and prompted by a cease-and-desist letter drafted by 1 Kane’s two issues are as follows: 1. Whether Texas courts may exercise jurisdiction over nonresident attorneys who, while representing parties in Texas litigation and invoking the privilege of appearing before Texas courts, tamper with witness testimony in the same action by demanding that a witness withhold, withdraw, or alter sworn testimony filed in that proceeding. 2. Whether the trial court erred by failing to treat Appellees’ conduct as an intentional effort to have a witness withhold testimony, withdraw evidence, or otherwise alter third-party conduct in an active Texas case. 2 Huber and sent by Global Legal—through which Kane sought declarations establishing that statements made in her affidavit and actions that she had taken are privileged; and (2) a claim that Dryden and Global Legal breached the fiduciary duty created by their brief representation of her. Appellees filed a special appearance challenging whether a Texas court could exercise specific personal jurisdiction to hear Kane’s claims. The trial court granted that motion and dismissed all the claims that she asserted against Appellees. We conclude that the trial court erred by dismissing the declaratory-judgment claim as to Huber and Global Legal but not as to Dryden. We also conclude that the trial court did not err by dismissing Kane’s fiduciary-duty claim. Accordingly, we reverse the trial court’s grant of Huber and Global Legal’s special appearance regarding Kane’s declaratory-judgment claims and remand those claims to the trial court, and we affirm the trial court’s order with respect to Kane’s declaratory- judgment claim against Dryden and with respect to her fiduciary-duty claims against Dryden and Global Legal. II. Factual and Procedural Background A. We set forth the cast of players and their interactions. This appeal turns on connections between the parties and the State of Texas. The focus of the relationship is Kane, a resident of Pennsylvania, and the two California lawyers and their California law firm. In turn, the tie that allegedly binds them to Texas is a lawsuit filed in this state. 3 Kane is employed in the electronic-payment-processing industry, which enables merchants “to accept electronic forms of payment, most notably credit[-] and debit[-] card transactions, from their customers.” Kane apparently functions as a cog in this industry by acting as an agent of businesses that arrange the processing service between the merchant and upstream processors and credit providers, with the intermediary receiving a “percentage of the transaction volume processed.” In the initial stages of the controversy, a Texas-based intermediary named Wholesale Payments had an agency relationship with Kane by which she acted as an account manager for that company. In June 2025, another company, Goal Line Payments, allegedly sought to lure Kane and the accounts that she controlled from Wholesale by conversations between representatives of Goal Line and Kane. During the conversations, the Goal Line representatives allegedly told Kane that Wholesale was a “sinking ship” and that Goal Line would provide her with “‘downside’ protection” and legal representation should legal issues arise if she became an agent of Goal Line. B. Kane moved from working for Wholesale to working for Goal Line. The allurements made by Goal Line’s agents were apparently successful because Kane stated in the affidavit central to this controversy that “[i]n reliance on [Goal Line’s] assurances, I flipped approximately nine merchant accounts to their group.” But she also apparently became concerned about the legal liability from her actions; her affidavit states that “[a]fter installing six payment processing terminals, I 4 requested to speak with Goal Line’s attorney to ensure that I was protected if Wholesale filed a suit against me.” C. Kane consulted with one of the California lawyers whom she has now sued. Based on a referral by Goal Line, Kane consulted with Dryden of Global Legal, which provided legal services for Goal Line. On August 14, 2025, Kane signed an engagement letter with Global Legal that required a $1,2002 retainer and described the engagement as follows: “We are pleased that you have chosen our firm to represent you, Dawn Kane, (referred to herein as []Client[]) for [a] paid consultation call with Christopher R. Dryden regarding Client dispute with Wholesale Payments, Inc.” The engagement between Global Legal and Kane was short lived. The day after the date of the engagement letter, Wholesale sued Goal Line and its agents in Texas for a host of business torts, including misappropriation of merchant accounts, raiding Wholesale’s workforce, and violating restrictive covenants. Kane was joined as a defendant in that suit. The suit’s filing produced another engagement letter dated August 18, 2025, between Global Legal and Kane that described the proposed engagement as follows: “We are pleased that you have chosen our firm to represent you, Dawn Kane (referred to herein as []Client[]) for legal services related to Client litigation Wholesale Payments v. Dawn Kane, et al.” Dryden notified Kane by email that 2 Kane’s brief is apparently in error where it states that the retainer was $1,000. 5 Global Legal would need “a new fee agreement to reflect the below action if you want us to represent you.” The engagement to represent Kane in the Texas litigation never came to fruition because it required a waiver of the conflict created by Global Legal’s representation of both Goal Line and Kane and the payment of an additional $10,000 retainer. Kane did not execute the waiver, and the retainer was not paid. Two days after the date of the second engagement letter, Dryden emailed Kane, “Until you get things squared away with Goal Line and execute a conflict waiver[,] I need to stop giving you legal advice. Sorry to draw a line[,] but I am required to do so by my professional duties.” Kane’s affidavit does not dispute the timeline of Global Legal’s representation of her or that the representation ended but contends that Dryden—the Global Legal lawyer she consulted—made statements to her critical of Goal Line and that he allegedly criticized Goal Line and intimated that Kane could sue the company: I was referred to Chris Dryden by [a Goal Line agent] and was informed that he would be the attorney representing me. . . . . . . At [the direction of Goal Line’s agents], I paid Chris Dryden $1,[2]00 for legal representation. Chris Dryden informed me [that] he was aware of [Goal Line agents] and Ricky Hoffman (collectively, the []Goal Line Defendants[]) flipping accounts from Wholesale to Goal Line. Moreover, Mr. Dryden informed me that, despite the Goal Line Defendants’ statements to me, he was not in possession of any evidence to support the claim that Wholesale stole from its agents. Ultimately, Mr. Dryden advised me that he could no longer “represent me” because 6 “Goal Line placed me in a horrible situation” and [that] I could potentially file suit against them. D. Kane returned to work for Wholesale and provided evidence to support Wholesale’s effort to enjoin Goal Line in the Texas suit, and Goal Line’s lawyers sent Kane a cease-and- desist letter. By mid-September, Kane had changed camps again and had executed the affidavit quoted above; that affidavit was filed in support of an injunction request made by Wholesale in its Texas suit against Goal Line, and it identified Kane as once again being an account manager for Wholesale. The filing of the affidavit triggered the act that produced Kane’s suit against Global Legal and its lawyers. Shortly after Kane’s affidavit was filed, Global Legal sent her a cease-and-desist letter that was signed by Global Legal attorney Huber. The letter accused Kane of making misstatements in her affidavit by attributing statements to lawyer Dryden that he denied making during his representation of Kane and by including other false statements. Specifically, the cease-and-desist letter claimed that Kane’s affidavit’s “misstatements include[d], but are not limited to, that Goal Line has no evidence in support of its defenses against [Wholesale], that Co-Defendant [in the Wholesale suit] Richard (Ricky) Hoffman ([]Hoffman[]) was ‘flipping accounts from Wholesale to Goal Line[,]” and that Dryden had told Kane that “Goal Line [had] placed [her] in a horrible situation.” Asserting that false statements in an affidavit are perjury, Global Legal requested that Kane cease disseminating misstatements and correct them. 7 The letter also accused Kane of making misstatements to a company involved in transferring accounts: On September 17, 2025, you sent an email to Merchant Lynx, an independent sales organization . . . , regarding alleged communications [that] you had with Goal Line during and after your brief employment with Goal Line. These statements include, but are not limited to, that you “flipped” certain accounts at Goal Line’s direction[;] that Dryden informed you [that] Goal Line [had] misled you, “causing [you] to nearly lose [your] livelihood[”;] and that “pursuant to the attached [c]ourt [o]rder,” accounts flipped from [Wholesale] “must be immediately closed without [early termination fees] being charged, without contacting the owners, and without financial loss.” The cease-and-desist letter denied that Dryden had made the statements that Kane’s affidavit claimed were made and that Kane’s statements in the affidavit accurately represented the terms of an injunction entered in the Wholesale suit. The letter characterized false statements in a “court-filed document” as perjury and told Kane that she must cease taking certain actions, withdraw the affidavit that she had filed, and file a corrected affidavit. The letter gave Kane two business days after its receipt to “confirm compliance with the directives and remedial measures outlined herein.” The letter was drafted in California and was sent to Kane in Pennsylvania. Shortly after the cease-and-desist letter was sent, Wholesale nonsuited Kane with prejudice from its Texas suit. 8 E. Kane sued the California lawyers. The cease-and-desist letter also prompted the almost immediate filing of a lawsuit by Kane against Appellees. The same law firm that represented Wholesale in its Texas suit represented Kane in the suit that she filed against Appellees. The petition in Kane’s suit tied a Texas court’s ability to litigate the asserted claims to connections created by the cease-and-desist letter: The [c]ourt has jurisdiction over [Appellees] pursuant to Texas Civil Practice & Remedies Code § 37.003[] and under its general subject[-] matter jurisdiction over civil claims exceeding the minimum jurisdictional limits. [Kane] seeks a declaration of her rights and potential legal exposure under Texas law in connection with her sworn testimony in [Wholesale’s Texas suit,] as well as damages and equitable relief for [Appellees’] breach of fiduciary duties. [Kane’s] claims arise directly from [Appellees’] forum contacts, including their delivery of a threatening cease-and-desist letter intended to deter her from providing truthful testimony in the pending [Wholesale suit]. In turn, the petition’s factual allegations focused on Kane’s recruitment by Goal Line, the representations made by Goal Line’s representatives to induce Kane to flip accounts from Wholesale to Goal Line, and how Kane had flipped accounts. Kane’s petition wove in Global Legal’s and its lawyers’ actions by alleging that [s]hortly after [Kane had] flipped nine accounts and [had] brought an additional one to Goal Line, [she] requested to speak with Goal Line’s counsel to ensure that she would be protected if Wholesale filed suit against her. [A Goal Line agent] then referred [Kane] to [Dryden], the attorney who would ‘represent’ her. 9 In essence, repeating the statements in her affidavit, Kane’s petition described the actions that she had taken and what she had been told by Dryden as follows: Pursuant to directions given by [Goal Line’s agents], [Kane] paid Dryden $1,[2]00 to represent her. Later, Dryden informed [Kane] that he was aware of [Goal Line’s agents’] flipping accounts from Wholesale to Goal Line. Goal Line also told [Kane] of Goal Line’s effort to recruit . . . Hoffman . . . , a previous employee at Wholesale—to flip accounts. [Kane] then inquired of Dryden what evidence he possessed of wrongdoing by Wholesale Payments. Dryden told [Kane] that he was unaware of any evidence that Wholesale [had] stole[n] from its agents. The petition again repeated what was said in the affidavit—that Dryden had informed Kane that Global Legal would not continue to represent her and that there might be consequences to her: “In the end, Dryden advised [Kane] that he could no longer represent her because of the predicament [that] Goal Line had created. He acknowledged that [Kane] might have valid claims against Goal Line arising from that situation.” The petition next described Kane’s affidavit: “On September 11, 2025, [Kane] executed a sworn affidavit in the [Wholesale suit]. In that affidavit, Ms. Kane described how Goal Line [had] recruited her, [had] lured her with false promises of ‘downside protection,’ [had] directed her to flip merchants, and [had] ultimately abandoned her when the scheme unraveled.” As an apparent predicate for challenging statements in the cease-and-desist letter, the petition goes on at length about the terms of the restraining and injunction orders entered in the Wholesale suit. The factual allegations conclude with a description of the cease-and-desist letter; a 10 conclusion that Kane’s statements were protected by “the absolute litigation privilege”; and a characterization of the letter as seeking “to pressure [Kane] to stop testifying and to withhold information in the case, which violates Texas public policy and law.” The petition then alleged two causes of action. The first sought declaratory relief and was directed at both lawyer defendants and their firm Global Legal. The pleading again outlined the background facts; outlined its conclusion why Kane’s statements in her affidavit were privileged; and requested declarations that, in essence, she was immune from any liability with respect to the statements made in the affidavit. The petition’s second cause of action alleged a breach of fiduciary duty by Dryden and Global Legal. The petition asserted that Dryden had entered into an attorney–client relationship with Kane that triggered a fiduciary duty under Texas law. Because Global Legal represented both Kane and Goal Line, the petition asserted that Global Legal was presumed to possess Kane’s confidential information, which created “a direct and impermissible conflict given their simultaneous representation of an adverse party—Goal Line.” The specific breaches of fiduciary duty that the petition alleged include the following: (1) failing to disclose a conflict of interest; (2) advancing Goal Line’s interests over Kane’s; (3) abandoning Kane at a critical moment; and (4) retaliating against Kane. 11 F. Appellees filed a special appearance in Kane’s suit challenging whether a Texas court has personal jurisdiction over them; the trial court granted the special appearance, which resulted in the interlocutory appeal now before us. Appellees responded to Kane’s suit by filing a special appearance challenging whether a Texas state court could exercise personal jurisdiction over them.3 The special appearance filed by Appellees emphasized that the locus of the relationships and activities alleged in Kane’s petition fell outside Texas, including that the individual lawyers reside in California, that the domicile of the law firm is in California, and that Kane’s residency is in Pennsylvania. The special appearance noted that the cease-and- desist letter originated in California and was directed to Pennsylvania. Appellees summed up their view that the contacts with Texas were too thin to warrant the exercise of jurisdiction because [t]his case presents a textbook example of improper forum shopping. Kane, a Pennsylvania resident, received a cease-and-desist letter at her Pennsylvania address from California attorneys located in California. The letter concerned false statements Kane made from Pennsylvania to third parties about[] (i) what a California attorney [had] told her during a California-to-Pennsylvania consultation, and (ii) Kane’s mischaracterization of a Texas court order to out-of-state recipients. Kane has no connection to Texas. [Appellees] have no connection to Texas except for representing a Texas client in separate litigation. The attorney–client consultation occurred entirely via California-to-Pennsylvania communications and terminated on August 20, 2025—nearly a month before the challenged cease-and-desist letter. 3 Appellees also moved to dismiss Kane’s suit under Rule of Civil Procedure 91a.1. See Tex. R. Civ. P. 91a.1. That motion is not at issue in this appeal. 12 Most tellingly, Kane contractually agreed to arbitrate disputes like this in California under California law. By filing in Texas, she violated both her contractual obligations and constitutional limits on personal jurisdiction. Texas courts lack personal jurisdiction over [Appellees] under both the Due Process Clause and the Texas long-arm statute. Even if the [c]ourt had jurisdiction, Kane’s fiduciary[-]duty claim must be arbitrated in California pursuant to her signed agreement. The [c]ourt should sustain this [s]pecial [a]ppearance and dismiss this case. Predictably, Kane responded that there are sufficient ties to bind her litigation to Texas. Kane set the scene by claiming that Appellees represented her “in connection” with the Texas suit between Wholesale and Goal Line. The response described that litigation as Goal Line’s effort to “undermine Wholesale’s business from within” by its actions and those of the other defendants in the suit when they “misappropriated Wholesale’s proprietary information, absconded its workforce, and diverted its merchant accounts—actions expressly forbidden under the agreements [that prohibited such activities].” Kane then articulated a theme that her claims against Appellees should be litigated in Texas because they sought to manipulate her testimony in the Wholesale suit: [Kane] was one of said Agents subject to the Agent Agreement and, as a result, was named among the Wholesale Defendants. She is therefore a critical witness in Wholesale v. Clanton. This action is based on [Appellees’] attempt to harass and intimidate their former client into withdrawing her truthful[] testimony in that case. After Wholesale filed suit against the Wholesale Defendants, Mrs. Kane was fearful and sought legal counsel. Her search for assistance led her to [Appellees], who provided her with an engagement letter[] and[,] after receiving her retention fee, consulted with her regarding the matter 13 but ultimately terminated their representation because they could not simultaneously represent her and Goal Line. Thereafter, [Kane] submitted an affidavit recounting her recollection of the events at issue in Wholesale v. Clanton. However, in an effort to thwart the discovery of the truth, [Appellees] were determined to interfere with her testimony and force her to withdraw it. To accomplish this, [Appellees] sent the September 2025[] cease-and-desist letter, . . . which was designed to intimidate [Kane] by weaponizing their former relationship and the information obtained in connection therewith—a profound betrayal of her trust. Despite [Appellees’] contentions, [Appellees’] conduct was not merely related to a Texas lawsuit—it was expressly directed at influencing sworn testimony and third-party conduct in a pending Texas judicial proceeding, thereby invoking Texas law, Texas courts, and Texas ethical obligations. Accordingly, [Appellees’ s]pecial [a]ppearance should be denied. The trial court conducted a non-evidentiary hearing on Appellees’ special appearance and dismissed Kane’s suit. No findings of fact and conclusions of law were requested. This appeal followed. III. Analysis A. We set forth general applicable law and the standard of review. “[A personal-jurisdiction] analysis begins with some familiar boilerplate.” BRP- Rotax GmbH & Co. KG v. Shaik, 716 S.W.3d 98, 103 (Tex. 2025). “A court must have personal jurisdiction over a defendant to issue a binding judgment.” LG Chem Am., Inc. v. Morgan, 670 S.W.3d 341, 346 (Tex. 2023). Texas courts, specifically, exercise personal jurisdiction over litigants by reference to the Texas long-arm statute and federal constitutional due-process guarantees. See id.; see also Moncrief Oil Int’l Inc. v. 14 OAO Gazprom, 414 S.W.3d 142, 149 (Tex. 2013) (quoting Moki Mac River Expeditions v. Drugg, 221 S.W.3d 569, 574 (Tex. 2007)). While “[a]llegations that a tort was committed in Texas satisfy our long-arm statute,” those allegations “must also satisfy due-process requirements.” Luciano v. SprayFoamPolymers.com, LLC, 625 S.W.3d 1, 8 (Tex. 2021), (first citing Moncrief Oil, 414 S.W.3d at 149; and then citing Spir Star AG v. Kimich, 310 S.W.3d 868, 872 (Tex. 2010)). A party asserting personal jurisdiction over a defendant bears an initial burden tied to concomitant requirements: Texas courts may exercise personal jurisdiction over a nonresident if “(1) the Texas long-arm statute authorizes the exercise of jurisdiction, and (2) the exercise of jurisdiction is consistent with federal and state constitutional due-process guarantees.” Moki Mac . . . , 221 S.W.3d [at] 574 . . . . Under the Texas long-arm statute, the plaintiff bears the initial burden of pleading allegations sufficient to confer jurisdiction. Retamco Operating, Inc. v. Republic Drilling Co., 278 S.W.3d 333, 337 (Tex. 2009). The long-arm statute allows the exercise of personal jurisdiction over a nonresident defendant who “commits a tort in whole or in part in this state.” Tex. Civ. Prac. & Rem. Code § 17.042(2). Although allegations that a tort was committed in Texas satisfy our long-arm statute, such allegations do not necessarily satisfy the U.S. Constitution. Michiana Easy Livin’ Country, Inc. v. Holten, 168 S.W.3d 777, 788 (Tex. 2005). Moncrief Oil, 414 S.W.3d at 149. Should “the initial burden [be] met, the burden shifts to the defendant to negate all potential bases for personal jurisdiction the plaintiff ple[ade]d. Id. (citing Retamco, 278 S.W.3d at 337). “The ultimate question of whether a court has personal jurisdiction over a nonresident defendant is a question of law [that] we review de novo.” Id. at 150. If the trial court does not issue findings of fact and conclusions of law in determining a 15 personal-jurisdiction challenge, we infer all relevant facts necessary to support the judgment that are supported by evidence. Id. But when jurisdictional facts are undisputed, it is a question of law as to whether those facts establish jurisdiction; the reviewing court “need not consider any implied findings of fact” and must consider only the legal question of whether the undisputed facts establish Texas’s jurisdiction. Old Republic Nat’l Title Ins. v. Bell, 549 S.W.3d 550, 558 (Tex. 2018). B. We explain the overarching structure and constitutional underpinnings of a personal-jurisdiction analysis. In setting the stage for a jurisdictional analysis, the Texas Supreme Court recently explained the federal due-process principles that govern the personal- jurisdiction analysis: Adhering to the U.S. Supreme Court’s precedents, our primary concern in personal-jurisdiction cases is “the constitutional right to due process.” LG Chem, 670 S.W.3d at 346 (citing U.S. Const. amend. XIV, § 1); cf. Retamco Operating . . . , 278 S.W.3d [at] 337 . . . . [When applying the federal due-process analysis, w]e walk the path initially charted by International Shoe Co. v. Washington, in which the U.S. Supreme Court held that the exercise of personal jurisdiction is proper where the nonresident defendant has “certain minimum contacts” with the forum state “such that the maintenance of the suit” against it “does not offend ‘traditional notions of fair play and substantial justice.’” 326 U.S. 310, 316, 66 S. Ct. 154, [158] (1945) (quoting Milliken v. Meyer, 311 U.S. 457, 463, 61 S. Ct. 339, [343] (1940)). There are “two kinds of personal jurisdiction: general (sometimes called all-purpose) jurisdiction and specific (sometimes called case- linked) jurisdiction.” Ford[ Motor Co. v. Mont. Eight[h] Judicial Dist. Ct.], 592 U.S. [351,] 358, 141 S. Ct. 1017[, 1024 (2021)]. [The plaintiffs] contend . . . that Texas courts may exercise [only] specific personal jurisdiction, which “covers defendants less intimately connected with a State, but only as to a narrower class of claims” than general jurisdiction 16 would allow. Id. at 359, 141 S. Ct. [at 1025]. For Texas courts to do so here, the evidence must satisfy a well-established two-prong test. See LG Chem, 670 S.W.3d at 347. First, [the defendant] must have taken “some act by which [it] purposefully avail[ed] itself of the privilege of conducting activities within [Texas], thus invoking the benefits and protections of its laws.” Hanson v. Denckla, 357 U.S. 235, 253, 78 S. Ct. 1228, [1240] (1958). Second, the claims must “arise out of or relate to” [the defendants’] Texas-focused activities. Ford, 592 U.S. at 359, 141 S. Ct. [at 1025] (quoting Bristol-Myers Squibb Co. v. Super. Ct. of Cal., 582 U.S. 255, 262, 137 S. Ct. 1773, [1780] (2017)). Shaik, 716 S.W.3d at 103–04. Here, neither party analyzes whether the Texas long-arm statute has been satisfied and instead skip directly to a due-process analysis. No one claims that the lawyers and their firm had the extensive presence in Texas to trigger general jurisdiction; thus, we apply a specific-jurisdiction analysis.4 As noted, the first governing principle of that analysis is whether a defendant has purposefully availed itself of a relationship with Texas. Once more, the supreme court recently outlined the guideposts for determining when a defendant has acted with that necessary purpose: “The ‘touchstone of jurisdictional due process’ is ‘purposeful availment.’” “At its core, the purposeful[-]availment analysis . . . determine[s] whether a nonresident’s conduct and connection to a forum are such that it could reasonably anticipate being haled into court there.” Whether a nonresident defendant has “purposefully availed itself of the privilege of conducting activities in Texas” is guided by three considerations: 4 Appellees do not argue that traditional notions of fair play and substantial justice warranted the granting of their special appearance. 17 • “[O]nly the defendant’s contacts with the forum are relevant, not the unilateral activity of another party or a third person”; • “The contacts relied upon must be purposeful,” not “random, fortuitous, or attenuated”; and • The defendant “must seek some benefit, advantage[,] or profit by availing itself of [Texas’s] jurisdiction.” “This analysis assesses the quality and nature of the contacts, not the quantity.” State v. Volkswagen Aktiengesellschaft, 669 S.W.3d 399, 413–14 (Tex. 2023) (footnotes and citations omitted). Though somewhat overlapping with the principles that govern the question of purposeful availment, the relatedness requirement of specific jurisdiction is also closely circumscribed: “The ‘arise from or relate to’ requirement lies at the heart of specific jurisdiction by defining the required nexus between the nonresident defendant, the litigation, and the forum.” Moki Mac . . . , 221 S.W.3d at 579. “[F]or a nonresident defendant’s forum contacts to support an exercise of specific jurisdiction, there must be a substantial connection between those contacts and the operative facts of the litigation.” Id. at 585. Thus, “the relationship must arise out of contacts that the ‘defendant himself’ creates with the forum State,” and the “analysis looks to the defendant’s contacts with the forum State itself, not the defendant’s contacts with persons who reside there.” Walden v. Fiore, 571 U.S. 277, 284–85, 134 S. Ct. 1115, [1122] (2014). “[A] defendant’s relationship with a plaintiff or third party, standing alone, is an insufficient basis for jurisdiction.” Id. at 286, 134 S. Ct. [at 1123]. “Due process requires that a defendant be haled into court in a forum State based on his own affiliation with the State, not based on the ‘random, fortuitous, or attenuated’ contacts he makes by interacting with other persons affiliated with the State.” Id. 18 Little & Gorgeous, Inc. v. Wild Tribe Screen Prints, LLC, 717 S.W.3d 36, 45–46 (Tex. App.—San Antonio 2025, pet. denied). And under most circumstances, a specific-jurisdiction analysis applies its two prongs claim by claim: As an initial matter, specific jurisdiction requires us to analyze jurisdictional contacts on a claim-by-claim basis. See, e.g., Kelly v. Gen. Interior Constr., Inc., 301 S.W.3d 653, 660 (Tex. 2010) (separately analyzing jurisdictional contacts for fraud and trust[-]fund claims to determine specific jurisdiction). The Fifth Circuit has expressly held that a “plaintiff bringing multiple claims that arise out of different forum contacts of the defendant must establish specific jurisdiction for each claim.” Seiferth v. Helicopteros Atuneros, Inc., 472 F.3d 266, 275 (5th Cir. 2006). As the Court explained, This result flows logically from the distinction between general and specific jurisdiction and is confirmed by the decisions of our sister circuits. If a defendant does not have enough contacts to justify the exercise of general jurisdiction, the Due Process Clause prohibits the exercise of jurisdiction over any claim that does not arise out of or result from the defendant’s forum contacts. Id. at 274–75. Of course, a court need not assess contacts on a claim-by- claim basis if all claims arise from the same forum contacts. Moncrief Oil, 414 S.W.3d at 150–51 (footnote omitted). C. We conclude that the trial court erred by granting Huber and Global Legal’s special appearance with respect to Kane’s declaratory-judgment claim. In our view, there is enough difference between the jurisdictional contacts that support Kane’s two claims that we should apply a claim-by-claim analysis to them. We first examine whether a Texas court may exercise jurisdiction over Kane’s 19 declaratory-judgment claim. We resolve that question in Kane’s favor as to her declaratory-judgment claim against Huber and Global Legal. In our view, the act of seeking pro hac vice admission in Texas signaled to Huber and his firm that they might be haled into a Texas court to answer for acts in furtherance of that representation. And there is a close enough tie between that representation and the cease-and-desist letter to establish that Kane’s declaratory-judgment claim may be heard by a Texas court. That said, there is not the significant connection between Dryden and Texas to enable a Texas court to hale him into its jurisdiction on the declaratory-judgment claim. 1. We detail Kane’s claim and Huber’s and Global Legal’s connections. Kane’s declaratory-judgment claim sought declarations that (i) her September 11, 2025 affidavit and its contents are absolutely privileged and immune from civil liability; (ii) any threatened claims by Goal Line based on the affidavit are barred as a matter of law; (iii) any threatened claims by Goal Line based on litigation-related communications—including statements to Merchant Lynx or other industry participants regarding the pending injunction—are likewise barred under the litigation privilege and/or the [Texas Citizen Participation Act]; and (iv) [Kane] is entitled to recover her attorneys’ fees and costs incurred in pursuing this declaratory relief under Tex. Civ. Prac. & Rem. Code § 37.009. It is undisputed that Huber sent the cease-and-desist letter as counsel for Goal Line— the letter stated that “we represent Goal Line.” Again, the letter itemized the affidavit’s alleged misstatements that Kane’s affidavit had supposedly made as follows: “Your misstatements include, but are not limited to, that Goal Line has no evidence 20 in support of its defenses against [Wholesale], that Co-Defendant . . . Hoffman . . . was ‘flipping accounts from Wholesale to Goal Line,’ and that Dryden informed you ‘Goal Line placed me [sic] in a horrible situation.’” The letter directed Kane to cease and desist from “[m]aking any additional statements to third parties that contain misrepresentations related to Hoffman, Dryden, or [her] discussions with Dryden.” The letter directs Kane to immediately take specific actions in the Wholesale suit, including that she “withdraw [her a]ffidavit or file a corrected affidavit removing or accurately correcting the statements identified herein related to Hoffman, Goal Line, and Dryden.” Not only did Huber author the cease-and-desist letter, but he also sought admission pro hac vice to represent Goal Line and Hoffman in the Wholesale suit. Apparently, he was admitted pro hac vice as he signed an answer and counterclaim on behalf of Hoffman in the suit, and another Global Legal attorney signed the answer and counterclaim on behalf of Goal Line. Acknowledging that he had appeared as counsel in the Wholesale suit, Huber’s affidavit filed in support of the special appearance sought only to minimize his and Global Legal’s involvement in the suit: Global Legal’s representation of Goal Line Payments, LLC in the WPI v. Goal Line litigation pending in Texas has been conducted through association with local Texas counsel. Although I have pro hac vice’d in that case, I have not traveled to Texas for the case. All of my work on that matter has been performed from Global Legal’s California office. 21 2. Huber’s pro hac vice admission in the Wholesale suit is a substantial connection to Texas. Once again, as the first step in analyzing the application of specific jurisdiction to Kane’s declaratory-judgment claim, we analyze whether Huber and his firm purposefully directed their activities to Texas in such a way that they could have reasonably anticipated being haled into a Texas court to litigate actions related to those activities. With Huber’s having been admitted pro hac vice to represent Goal Line and other defendants and then communicating with a witness about evidence in the suit, it is logical to conclude that Huber and Global Legal could have reasonably anticipated being haled into a Texas court to litigate an action taken in carrying out that representation in the form of a communication that would impact the litigation. Huber tries to convince us otherwise, but we are unpersuaded. Kane emphasizes Huber’s ef