Full Opinion

In the Court of Appeals Second Appellate District of Texas at Fort Worth ___________________________ No. 02-25-00177-CV ___________________________ HICKS AIRFIELD PILOTS ASSOCIATION, Appellant V. BARBARA ANN BRUNSON; KEVIN BRUNSON; RIO CONCHO AVIATION, INC.; SOUTHLAKE HOSPITALITY, INC. D/B/A WING IT CAFÉ!; AND BARBIE LAND DEVELOPMENT, INC., Appellees On Appeal from the 96th District Court Tarrant County, Texas Trial Court No. 096-316827-20 Before Bassel, Womack, and Wallach, JJ. Memorandum Opinion by Justice Womack MEMORANDUM OPINION I. INTRODUCTION This appeal follows an eight-day bench trial between Appellant Hicks Airfield Pilots Association (HAPA) and Appellees Barbara Ann Brunson; Kevin Brunson; Rio Concho Aviation, Inc.; Southlake Hospitality, Inc. d/b/a Wing it Café!; and Barbie Land Development, Inc. (collectively, Appellees). At the heart of the trial were issues relating to whether a restaurant (the Café) and an overnight facility and event center (the Lodge) located at Hicks Airfield (the Airfield) presented safety concerns at the Airfield, whether the Café and the Lodge constituted “airport-related commercial businesses” within the meaning of the governing covenants, and whether HAPA had tortiously interfered with various contracts and breached certain fiduciary duties by its actions concerning the Café and the Lodge. Following trial, the trial court issued numerous declarations related to the Café, the Lodge, and the parties’ respective rights; it granted permanent injunctions in favor of Appellees; it awarded damages to Appellees based on their tortious-interference claims and breach-of-fiduciary duty claims; and it awarded attorney’s fees to Appellees. In five issues on appeal, HAPA argues that the trial court erred by (1) issuing certain declarations as part of its declaratory judgment, (2) issuing permanent injunctive relief, (3) finding HAPA liable for tortious interference and breach of fiduciary duty, (4) making various findings of fact and conclusions of law, and (5) awarding attorney’s fees in favor of Appellees. 2 We will sustain some of HAPA’s complaints regarding the trial court’s declaratory-judgment rulings and the permanent injunction; we will sustain HAPA’s complaints regarding Appellees’ tortious-interference and breach-of-fiduciary duty claims; we will overrule HAPA’s complaints regarding the trial court’s findings of fact and conclusions of law, except its complaint regarding Finding of Fact No. 25, which we sustain; and we will sustain HAPA’s complaint regarding the award of attorney’s fees. Accordingly, we will affirm in part, reverse and render in part, and reverse and remand in part. II. BACKGROUND A. Factual Background1 The Airfield is a privately owned, public use airport in Tarrant County and is managed by HAPA, a nonprofit entity. HAPA is governed by its bylaws and by certain Covenants, Conditions, and Restrictions (CCRs). The original CCRs were executed in 1985, and they have been amended several times since that time. HAPA is itself managed by a board (the Board), the members of which serve two-year terms. The property on which the Airfield sits was originally owned by Hicks Airfield, Inc., who was the declarant (the Declarant) listed in the original CCRs—a fact that is relevant to an issue that will be addressed later. There are approximately 452 lots on 1 The majority of the facts will be discussed under the pertinent sections of the opinion analyzing HAPA’s complaints. See Tex. R. App. P. 47.1. 3 the Airfield. Various Airfield lots have been sold since the execution of the original CCRs. In 1995, Rio Concho—an entity owned by the Brunsons—purchased a lot on the Airfield from North Fort Worth Aviation, Inc. The lot purchased by Rio Concho—which is the largest lot on the Airfield—is also known as Area H. Article I, Section 9 of the original CCRs contained the following provision concerning Area H: The portions of the Property designated by the symbol H shall be maintained, owned[,] and operated by Declarant, its successors or assigns, at their option, as an area for the administration building for [the] Airfield, the sale of fuel . . . for aircraft and motor vehicles . . . , for parking of motor vehicles by Declarant, its agents, customers[,] and other invitees, and/or for any other lawful purpose. The water tank for [the] Airfield will also be maintained in this area. Rio Concho took the Area H lot subject to any and all restrictions, covenants, and conditions of record. Certain provisions in the then-applicable CCRs contained restrictions pertaining to a lot owner’s use of its property. They included the Fifth Amendment to the CCRs which stated that the relevant lots “may only be used for aircraft hangars, general office use, airport related commercial business, and Common Areas[2] related to the use thereof.” The Fifth Amendment acknowledged that certain owners of the relevant lots were “presently using their Lots for other than aircraft hangars, general office use[,] and airport related commercial business”; stated that “the existing Owners of those The CCRs indicated that the “Common Areas” included “the runway, the 2 grass[-]covered open area, the taxiway[s]/roadways, and the safety zone.” 4 Lots shall have the right to continue to operate or use their Lots for their present purposes”; and said that “this right shall be personal to the Owners of said Lots” and shall “no longer be valid” upon “the sale, lease, transfer[,] or other disposition . . . of such Lot.” The Fifth Amendment contained another provision stating that the owners of the relevant lots “shall have the right to use their Lots for general office use and for all airport related commercial businesses, provided, however, that such uses are consistent with the maintenance of the Property[3] as a first class private airfield.” A few months after purchasing its lot, Rio Concho leased4 the lot to individuals desiring to open a restaurant at the location. The restaurant was called the Beacon, and it began operating around November 1995. In June 2020, the Beacon ceased operations. During the almost twenty-five years that the Beacon operated as a restaurant, the Board did not send any notice of violation indicating that the Beacon was not an airport-related commercial business. In late 2019, Barbie Land—whose president is Ms. Brunson—began operating the Lodge near the Beacon.5 The Lodge is available to rent for overnight guests and The term “Property” has a convoluted meaning in the CCRs, which we need 3 not detail for purposes of our opinion. See Tex. R. App. P. 47.1. A witness at trial estimated that approximately forty percent of the businesses 4 located at the Airfield were operated by tenants. According to one witness at trial, the Lodge is located approximately a 5 hundred yards to the north of the Café. 5 also hosts “special events,” including things like seminars, rehearsal dinners, bridal showers, and birthday parties. Around February 2022, Rio Concho entered into a lease with Southlake Hospitality that allowed Southlake Hospitality to operate a restaurant in the location formerly occupied by the Beacon. Southlake Hospitality opened a new restaurant— the Café—in August 2022. Airfield lot owners—some of whom reside in their hangars—use the taxiways to drive to and from their respective lots, as do the lot owners’ customers. Due to the design of the Airfield, customers of the Café and the Lodge must drive on the taxiways to reach those locations. Due to safety concerns, Rio Concho submitted plans to the Board’s Architectural Control Committee (ACC) to construct a fence on Area H. Rio Concho ultimately put up the fence, although the Board maintained that the constructed fence differed from the planned fence that was submitted to the ACC.6 Rio Concho and the Café also placed signs around the Airport directing the public to the Café. The Board contended that these signs were placed without first seeking approval by the ACC. Michael Forseth, a pilot who runs a flight school at the Airfield, testified that 6 the fence improved safety at the Airfield, stating that “every instructor really appreciates it.” 6 The Airfield has two gates—a south gate (the South Gate) and a north gate (the North Gate). Customers of the Café use both the South Gate and the North Gate. Around May 1, 2020, HAPA placed access-control measures on the use of the South Gate.7 B. Procedural Background In May 2020, Rio Concho sued HAPA after HAPA began placing restrictions on the access to the South Gate. In its original petition, Rio Concho brought a tortious-interference claim alleging that HAPA was interfering with a lease between Rio Concho and the operators of the Beacon, and it also sought certain declaratory and injunctive relief relating to the South Gate access. In the same month the lawsuit was filed, the trial court entered a temporary restraining order that required HAPA to keep the South Gate open from 6:00 a.m. to 9:00 p.m. but allowed for access control from 9:00 p.m. to 6:00 a.m.8 HAPA answered Rio Concho’s lawsuit and later filed a counter-petition against Rio Concho and Southlake Hospitality. In its counter-petition—which was filed in July 2022, around one month before the Café opened—HAPA alleged that Rio Concho and Southlake Hospitality had violated the CCRs, and it sought certain In 2014, HAPA placed access-control measures on the use of the North Gate. 7 See Hicks Airfield Pilots Ass’n v. Hicks Asset Partners, LLC, No. 02-22-00291-CV, 2023 WL 4007353, at *2 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth June 15, 2023, no pet.) (mem. op.). Rio Concho and HAPA later entered into a Rule 11 Agreement to allow the 8 South Gate to remain open from 6:00 a.m. to 9:00 p.m. during the course of litigation. 7 declaratory and injunctive relief regarding the operation of the Café. Specifically, HAPA alleged that the “[u]se of the subject lot as a restaurant does not constitute an ‘airport related commercial business’” as required by the CCRs and that the operation of the Café posed “a danger to the lives of HAPA’s members, lot owners, and potential patrons of the restaurant” given that such patrons will “drive or walk on runways, block taxiways, or impede aircraft takeoffs and landings.” HAPA sought a declaration that Southlake Hospitality’s operation of the Café violated the CCRs, and HAPA sought injunctive relief preventing Rio Concho and Southlake Hospitality from operating the Café. Through a later amended petition, the Brunsons were added as plaintiffs in the lawsuit against HAPA.9 In their live pleading, Rio Concho and the Brunsons sought, among other things, (1) various declarations regarding the parties and their rights, (2) damages stemming from HAPA’s alleged tortious interference with Rio Concho’s contract concerning the operation of the Café, (3) damages stemming from HAPA’s alleged breach of its fiduciary duty owed to Rio Concho, and (4) certain permanent injunctive relief. In February 2024, Barbie Land filed a petition in intervention. In that petition, Barbie Land brought claims against HAPA for tortious interference and breach of fiduciary duty and sought declaratory and injunctive relief pertaining to the access to 9 At that same time, the members of HAPA’s Board were named as defendants in their individual capacities, although they were later nonsuited. 8 the South Gate and HAPA’s authority to impose fines on Barbie Land and remove persons from the Lodge. A bench trial led to a final judgment, and later, an amended final judgment. In the amended final judgment, the trial court declared that • the Café and the Lodge are airport-related businesses consistent with the maintenance of the Airfield as a first-class private airfield and Rio Concho and Barbie Land are using their respective lots in accordance with the CCR provisions; • neither the Café nor the Lodge is an annoyance or a nuisance to other Airfield lot owners; • HAPA board members may not serve as members on the ACC and no valid ACC existed at the time of the design and construction of the safety barrier on Area H; • Rio Concho is the assignee of the Airfield’s “Declarant as to all rights and privileges of the Declarant on Area H as stated in the Original Declaration,” which limits HAPA’s authority over Area H; • certain signage restrictions in the CCRs apply only to lots with hangars or T- hangars, and because Area H has never had such a hangar or T-hangar, the signage restrictions do not apply to Area H; • HAPA abandoned its restriction that lots must be used only for aircraft hangars, general office use, or airport-related commercial businesses; • HAPA interpreted and applied the CCRs in an arbitrary, capricious, and discriminatory manner toward Rio Concho, Southlake Hospitality, and Barbie Land; and • the CCRs do not permit HAPA the authority to exclude the customers, invitees, or guests of the Airfield’s lot owners and tenants. 9 The trial court also permanently enjoined HAPA from changing or restricting access via the South Gate, permanently enjoined HAPA from assessing certain fines against Rio Concho or Southlake Hospitality, and ordered HAPA to “undertake a traffic safety study conducted by a qualified firm to recommend changes designed to prevent land vehicles from making dangerous incursions onto the runway.” In the amended final judgment, the trial court also found that HAPA had tortiously interfered with Rio Concho’s and Barbie Land’s “respective contracts with tenants, customers, or invitees.” It awarded Rio Concho damages of $34,276 and Barbie Land damages of $500 stemming from HAPA’s tortious interference. The trial court also found that HAPA had breached its fiduciary duty owed to Rio Concho and Barbie Land, awarding Rio Concho damages of $26,000 and Barbie Land damages of $16,000. The trial court awarded Rio Concho and Barbie Land their joint attorney’s fees in the amount of $396,628 and Southlake Hospitality its attorney’s fees in the amount of $19,418. The trial court also entered findings of fact and conclusions of law. This appeal followed.10 10 After HAPA filed its notice of appeal, Rio Concho filed a cross-notice of appeal. Rio Concho later moved to dismiss its cross-appeal, and we granted the motion and dismissed the cross-appeal. See Hicks Airport Pilots Ass’n v. Brunson, No. 02-25-00177-CV, 2025 WL 2626864, at *1 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth Sept. 11, 2025, no pet.) (mem. op.). 10 III. DISCUSSION A. HAPA’s Complaints Regarding the Declaratory Judgment In its first issue, HAPA argues that the trial court erred by issuing certain declarations in the amended final judgment because the court either improperly interpreted the CCRs or its declarations were supported by legally or factually insufficient evidence. 1. Standard of Review When a declaratory judgment is rendered after a bench trial, we review the trial court’s conclusions of law de novo. City of Forest Hills v. Benson, 555 S.W.3d 284, 288 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth 2018, no pet.). We review a trial court’s findings of fact under the same legal and factual sufficiency standards that we use for jury questions. Walterscheid v. Walterscheid, 557 S.W.3d 245, 257 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth 2018, no pet.). We may sustain a legal-sufficiency challenge—that is, a no-evidence challenge—only when (1) the record bears no evidence of a vital fact, (2) the rules of law or of evidence bar the court from giving weight to the only evidence offered to prove a vital fact, (3) the evidence offered to prove a vital fact is no more than a mere scintilla, or (4) the evidence establishes conclusively the opposite of a vital fact. Gunn v. McCoy, 554 S.W.3d 645, 658 (Tex. 2018). In determining whether legally sufficient evidence supports the challenged finding, we must consider evidence favorable to the finding if a reasonable factfinder could, and we must disregard contrary evidence 11 unless a reasonable factfinder could not. Cent. Ready Mix Concrete Co. v. Islas, 228 S.W.3d 649, 651 (Tex. 2007); City of Keller v. Wilson, 168 S.W.3d 802, 827 (Tex. 2005). We indulge “every reasonable inference deducible from the evidence” in support of the challenged finding. Gunn, 554 S.W.3d at 658 (quoting Bustamante v. Ponte, 529 S.W.3d 447, 456 (Tex. 2017)). When we reverse the trial court’s judgment because the evidence is legally insufficient, we must explain our analysis with specificity; we cannot merely say that we have reviewed all the evidence and reached a conclusion contrary to the factfinder’s. Citizens Nat’l Bank in Waxahachie v. Scott, 195 S.W.3d 94, 96 (Tex. 2006). Generally, we must render judgment when the evidence is legally insufficient. Tex. R. App. P. 43.3; Vista Chevrolet, Inc. v. Lewis, 709 S.W.2d 176, 176 (Tex. 1986); Nat’l Life & Acc. Ins. v. Blagg, 438 S.W.2d 905, 909 (Tex. 1969). When reviewing an assertion that the evidence is factually insufficient to support a finding, we set aside the finding only if, after considering and weighing all the pertinent record evidence, we determine that the credible evidence supporting the finding is so weak, or so contrary to the overwhelming weight of all the evidence, that the finding should be set aside and a new trial ordered. Pool v. Ford Motor Co., 715 S.W.2d 629, 635 (Tex. 1986) (op. on reh’g); Cain v. Bain, 709 S.W.2d 175, 176 (Tex. 1986); Garza v. Alviar, 395 S.W.2d 821, 823 (Tex. 1965). 12 2. Applicable Law A restrictive covenant is a negative covenant that limits permissible uses of land. Tarr v. Timberwood Park Owners Ass’n, Inc., 556 S.W.3d 274, 279 (Tex. 2018). Restrictive covenants should be liberally construed to give effect to their purpose and intent. Tex. Prop. Code § 202.003(a); Buckner v. Lakes of Somerset Homeowner’s Ass’n, Inc., 133 S.W.3d 294, 297 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth 2004, pet. denied). But “[n]o construction, no matter how liberal, can construe a property restriction into existence when the covenant is silent as to that limitation.” Tarr, 556 S.W.3d at 285; see Hazel v. Lonesome Ranch Prop. Owners Ass’n, 656 S.W.3d 468, 491 (Tex. App.—El Paso 2022, no pet.) (“[T]o validly limit a property owner’s use, a covenant must plainly prohibit the use.”). Restrictive covenants are subject to the general rules of contract construction. Pilarcik v. Emmons, 966 S.W.2d 474, 478 (Tex. 1998); Hazel, 656 S.W.3d at 491. Our paramount concern when construing restrictive covenants is to give effect to the objective intent of the drafters of the covenant as it is reflected in the language chosen. Tarr, 556 S.W.3d at 280. The words in a restrictive covenant “may not be enlarged, extended, stretched[,] or changed by construction.” Wilmoth v. Wilcox, 734 S.W.2d 656, 657 (Tex. 1987). “If the covenant has a definite or certain meaning, it is unambiguous as a matter of law.” Raman Chandler Props., L.C. v. Caldwell’s Creek Homeowner’s Ass’n, Inc., 178 S.W.3d 384, 391 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth 2005, pet. denied). 13 A party seeking to enforce a restrictive covenant has the burden at trial of demonstrating that the restriction is valid and enforceable. Gillebaard v. Bayview Acres Ass’n, Inc., 263 S.W.3d 342, 347 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 2007, pet. denied). A trial court’s interpretation of restrictive covenants is a legal question that we review de novo. Raman Chandler Props., L.C, 178 S.W.3d at 390. 3. The Trial Court’s Declarations Through its first issue, HAPA attacks eight different declarations made by the trial court in the amended final judgment. We will address each of the challenged declarations in turn. a. The Trial Court’s Declaration that the Café and the Lodge Are Airport-Related Businesses Consistent with the Maintenance of the Airfield as a First-Class Private Airfield In the amended final judgment, the trial court declared that the Café and the Lodge are “airport-related businesses consistent with the maintenance of [the] Airfield as a first-class private airfield.” In its brief, HAPA argues that the trial court erred by declaring that the Café and the Lodge are airport-related commercial businesses. HAPA’s complaint is one of factual insufficiency, as HAPA contends that “[t]he credible evidence admitted into evidence is too weak to support the court’s finding that [the Café] and [the Lodge] are airport-related commercial businesses consistent with [the] maintenance of [the] Airfield as a first-class private airfield and the finding is so against the great weight and preponderance of the credible evidence contrary to the finding that it should be 14 overturned.” Notably, neither “airport-related commercial business” nor “first-class private airfield” is defined in the CCRs. In addressing this issue, both sides point to the following CCR provisions that relate to the use of an Airfield lot: Use of the Silverado Tract and Phase I. [The relevant lots] may only be used for aircraft hangars, general office use, airport related commercial business, and Common Areas related to the use thereof. [HAPA] and Silverado acknowledge that certain Owners of [the relevant lots] are presently using their Lots for other than aircraft hangars, general office use[,] and airport related commercial businesses. With respect thereto, the existing Owners of those Lots shall have the right to continue to operate or use their Lots for their present purposes (i.e., the purposes for which said lots are presently being used as of the date of filing of this Fifth Amendment); however, this right shall be personal to the Owners of said Lots and upon the sale, lease, transfer[,] or other disposition of any nature by the present Owner of such Lot to any other person or entity, such use shall . . . no longer be valid or in accordance with the provisions of this Fifth Amendment, and [HAPA] shall have the right to require the new Owner or user of the Lot, as the case may be, to cease using the Lot for any purpose other than as herein permitted pursuant to this Section 6(c). .... Uses. All rights to use the Common Areas of [the] Airfield, including but not limited to the runway, are strictly reserved to [HAPA] and shall be restricted in accordance with the operation of a private airfield, with such uses being restricted to the owners of lots . . . and not to any other person or entity . . . . Notwithstanding anything contained in the [CCRs] to the contrary, the Owners of Lots . . . shall have the right to use their Lots for general office use and for all airport related commercial businesses, provided, however, that such uses are consistent with the maintenance of the Property as a first class private airfield. HAPA points to testimony from numerous witnesses to support its argument that the Café and the Lodge are not airport-related commercial businesses. First, 15 HAPA highlights testimony from its expert witness, Jeffrey Price, a professor of aviation at the Metropolitan State University of Denver. Price stated that he had around thirty years’ experience in the aviation industry and that he was “a commercial pilot with an instrument rating and a remote pilot certificate.” Price described the Airfield as a “general aviation public use airport.” He acknowledged that he did not personally visit the Airfield, stating that he had made observations of it using Google Earth. As it relates to the Café, Price maintained that the Café was “ill-placed on the [A]irfield” and that it was located near a “hotspot,” a location he described as “an area on the airport where an incident of some sort is likely to or has frequently occurred.” Price stated that “the location of the restaurant itself is [in] very close proximity to the active runway” and that “there does not seem to be any method to get to the restaurant that would not put somebody driving on a taxiway that an aircraft would also be taxiing on.” He also said that “the access to the taxiway is too close for where the restaurant is located” and that it is “too easy for somebody to inadvertently get out to the runway.” Price testified that he had never seen another airport in which “the general public had access to the airfield via its taxiways in order to get to a restaurant.” Price maintained that, in his opinion, the Airfield’s restaurant should be closed to public access as long as the public had to drive on the taxiways to reach it. Price acknowledged, however, that the public’s use of the taxiways was not unique to the 16 Café’s customers, noting that because of the way the Airfield is laid out, many lot owners have to use the Airfield’s taxiways to reach their locations. In Price’s view, an airport-related business was a business that “serve[d] the airport in some way, shape, or form.” He also believed that an airport-related business “really just means” a business that is located on an airport. He indicated that airport businesses are typically classified by their land use as either aeronautical land use or nonaeronautical land use. Nonaeronautical businesses included things like concessions, which he stated were “incidental to the operation of the airport but not essential.” Price testified that the Café was a concession. Price acknowledged, however, that “there’s nothing that says airport-related business must equal aeronautical business.” He said that the Café was an airport-related business “[o]nly in the sense that it’s located on an airport and the name of the business is associated with aviation, but it’s not essential to the operation of the airport.” He testified that the building where the Café is located is not consistent with an aeronautical need of the airport because “[it] provides no service that facilitates aviation.” As it relates to the Lodge, Price said that an event center that holds events for up to sixty people is not necessarily an airport-related business just because it is located at an airport. Price admitted, however, that he did not know where the Lodge was located on the Airfield. 17 HAPA next points to testimony from another of its experts, Randy Coller.11 Coller stated that he had been a licensed pilot since 1970, that he had previously managed five airports, and that he had worked as an airport inspector for thirty-seven years. Coller explained that he performed an inspection on the Airfield in 2022 and that he had made a report of his inspection. When talking about his report, Coller stated that he had “remark[ed] that there was a substantial amount of nonaeronautical vehicle traffic going to the restaurant.” Coller testified that he was aware that the only means of ingress and egress to “the restaurant” was via the Airfield’s taxiways and opined that this created a dangerous condition. He said that the Café was located at a hotspot, although he acknowledged that the Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) had not designated the area as a hotspot. Coller indicated that it was “not typical for the general public to drive on . . . taxiways to access [a] restaurant.” However, he admitted that customers of other businesses located at the Airfield use the Airfield’s taxiways to travel around the Airfield. Coller also stated that he was not aware of any accidents between planes and vehicles at the Airfield. HAPA also points to testimony from several lay witnesses in an attempt to prove that the Café and the Lodge are not “airport-related commercial businesses.” John Unangst—a licensed pilot, an Airfield lot owner, and the President of HAPA’s HAPA cites to Coller’s testimony at a 2023 temporary injunction hearing. A 11 transcript of that hearing was admitted into evidence at trial. 18 Board—testified that the Café and the Lodge were not airport-related commercial businesses. He stated that the Café was a concession and that it was not required for the operation and maintenance of the Airfield. In his opinion, the events held at the Lodge were not necessary for the operation of the Airfield. Unangst maintained that the operation of the Café and the Lodge were not consistent with the maintenance of the Airfield as a first-class private airfield.12 He indicated, however, that a first-class private airfield should have a community restroom for pilots, and he acknowledged that if the Café stopped operating, the Airfield would no longer have a community restroom. Ronald Wasson, a pilot and an Airfield lot owner, stated that the Café was not an airport-related commercial business and that the operation of the Café was not consistent with the maintenance of the Airfield as a first-class private airfield. Wasson also said that the operation of the Lodge as an event center and overnight lodging location was not consistent with the maintenance of the Airfield as a first-class private airfield. Wasson acknowledged, however, that an airport that does not offer restroom facilities is not a first-class airfield. Mike Olson—a HAPA Board member, an Airfield lot owner, and a pilot— testified that the Café was not an airport-related commercial business. He said that if 12 Unangst testified that, in his view, “a first-class private airfield would be an airfield [where] people . . . can enjoy their properties and use of their aircraft without fear of reprisal or having any undue safety issues or worries that they’re going to have a safety issue.” 19 the Café were used exclusively for “aviation-related people who are on the airport and have knowledge of airplanes and the risks that go along with [that],” the Café could be an airport-related commercial business. Olson also indicated that the operation of the Café was not consistent with the maintenance of the Airfield as a first-class private airfield. He stated that the Café was located near a hotspot and that he was unaware of any other airfield that had a restaurant open to the general public that was located near a hotspot. Thomas Boback—a licensed pilot, HAPA Board member, and Airfield lot owner—averred that the Café was not required for the operation of the Airfield. He also maintained that the Café was not an airport-related commercial business and that its operation and location on the Airfield was not consistent with the maintenance of the Airfield as a first-class private airfield. Boback believed that the operation of the Lodge as an event center and an overnight lodging facility and its location on the Airfield were not consistent with the maintenance of the Airfield as a first-class private airfield.13 Andrew Duff, a pilot and an Airfield lot owner, testified that the Café was not an airport-related commercial business. He also said that the operation of the Café and the Lodge and their respective locations on the Airfield were not consistent with the maintenance of the Airfield as a first-class private airfield. Boback acknowledged that the CCRs do not define the term “airport-related 13 commercial business,” nor do they define the term “first-class private airfield.” 20 Other witnesses, however, suggested that the Café and the Lodge were important to other Airfield lot owners and to those visiting the Airfield. Eric Faulkner, the owner of Southlake Hospitality, stated that in May 2023, approximately eighty percent of the Café’s weekday customers resided or worked on the Airfield and that approximately fifty percent of the Café’s weekend customers resided or worked on the Airfield. By the time of the August 2024 trial, Faulkner believed that those numbers had changed, noting that the Café had been receiving less customers “off the Airfield.” He indicated that around eighty percent of the Café’s total customers were comprised of “airport people.” Faulkner testified that pilot schools had used the Café for meetings, as had a “senior pilot group.” Faulkner stated that feeding pilots and members of the Airfield community was essential to airport operations. According to Faulkner, if the Café were not allowed to operate on the Airfield, pilots and lot owners would have to leave the Airfield to get food, which would necessitate them driving on the Airfield’s taxiways. Ms. Brunson testified that people who live on the Airfield use the Lodge for special events. As an example, she mentioned that an aircraft mechanic had his birthday party at the Lodge, that the Lodge had been used by “FAA officials,” and that it had “hosted safety committee meetings.” Ms. Brunson maintained that “[a] lot” of the Lodge’s customers were people who had an aviation background or who were “fond of general aviation.” She stated that several of the Lodge’s overnight 21 guests had flown into the Airfield for their visit, although she admitted that the majority of customers had driven into the Airfield. Ms. Brunson believed that the Lodge was an airport-related commercial business because it “provides a place for a pilot to park his plane and to stay the night.” In her opinion, a first-class private airfield would provide a place for food and restrooms, as well as a place for pilots to stay and hangar their airplanes. Ms. Brunson stated that she opened the Lodge after receiving phone calls from out-of-state pilots who wanted to use the Airfield’s hangars and who would ask her for information about the closest hotel. She thought “it would be nice to put in an Airbnb where pilots could fly, keep their plane there, do their business, and then take off the next day.” Ms. Brunson testified that the Lodge helps maintain the Airfield as a first-class private airfield. Mr. Brunson acknowledged that the CCRs do not contain a definition of the phrase “airport-related business.” In his opinion, the phrase means a business “that supports the primary functions of the airport.” He said that the definition would include businesses that “provide a place for people to meet,” ones that provide “a place for pilots or visitors to the airport to have a place to use the restroom,” and ones that “have a place for [pilots or visitors to the airport] to have refreshments or food.” He maintained that the Café was the “heart of the airport,” explaining that numerous lots had been bought and sold at the restaurant and that “it was the de facto meeting place for a lot of the respective owners of lots at the airport.” Mr. 22 Brunson also indicated that other private airfields utilized a similar design to the Airfield whereby vehicles and airplanes shared roadways and taxiways. Tim Bero, a lot owner and former Board member, testified that the Café added value to the Airfield and the people who live on the Airfield. He maintained that the Café was an airport-related commercial business, noting that the Airfield needs a place for fuel, a restaurant, and restrooms. Bero said that if the definition of airport-related commercial business meant that the business had to be essential for the operation of the Airfield, he did not think that any business at the Airfield met that definition. Bero also indicated that he had visited multiple airports in other states that utilized a design where visitors had to drive on the airport’s taxiways to navigate around the airport. Forseth, the pilot who runs the flight school at the Airfield, testified that the Café helps the Airfield’s “representation” and “prestige.” He maintained that the Café was a convenient place for his flight instructors to meet with students and that the operation of the Café improved his enjoyment of the Airfield. Forseth stated that, just as the Café’s customers use the Airfield’s taxiways to reach the Café, his students use the Airfield’s taxiways to reach his hangar. Philip Perez—a pilot, retired air-traffic controller, and long-time Airfield resident—testified that the Café added “value” to the Airfield, noting that “it gives pilots an opportunity to gather together, to actually interact” and that it helped attract pilots to the Airfield. 23 As noted above, the CCRs do not define the phrase “airport-related commercial business.” There does not seem to be any dispute that the Café and the Lodge are “commercial businesses.” Rather, the dispute centers around whether they are “airport related.” We thus look to the common definitions of the words “airport” and “related” so that we can give effect to the objective intent of the drafters of the language. See Tarr, 556 S.W.3d at 280; see also Pharr-San Juan-Alamo Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Tex. Pol. Subdivisions Prop./Cas. Joint Self Ins. Fund, 642 S.W.3d 466, 474 (Tex. 2022) (“To determine the common, ordinary meaning of undefined terms used in contracts, statutes, and other legal documents, we typically look first to their dictionary definitions.” (internal quotation omitted)); In re Davenport, 522 S.W.3d 452, 457 (Tex. 2017) (orig. proceeding) (“Courts may look to dictionaries to discern the meaning of a commonly used term that the contract does not define.”). “Airport” is defined as “a place from which aircraft operate that usually has paved runways and maintenance facilities and often serves as a terminal.” Airport, Merriam-Webster.com, https://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/airport (last visited June 9, 2026). “Related” is defined as “connected by reason of an established or discoverable relation.” Related, Merriam-Webster.com, https://www.merriam- webster.com/dictionary/related (l