Full Opinion

NUMBER 13-24-00461-CV COURT OF APPEALS THIRTEENTH DISTRICT OF TEXAS CORPUS CHRISTI – EDINBURG CITY OF PALMVIEW, Appellant, v. RAMON SEGOVIA, Appellee. ON APPEAL FROM THE 332ND DISTRICT COURT OF HIDALGO COUNTY, TEXAS MEMORANDUM OPINION Before Justices Peña, West, and Fonseca Memorandum Opinion by Justice Fonseca Appellant the City of Palmview (the City) appeals the trial court’s denial of its plea to the jurisdiction seeking dismissal of a suit brought by appellee Ramon Segovia. The City argues on appeal that the trial court erred because the employment contract at issue was not “properly executed” and the City therefore did not waive its governmental immunity. Because we agree, we reverse and render. I. BACKGROUND Segovia was appointed interim City Manager for the City in October 2013. Subsequently, the City Council held a special meeting on October 22, 2013. The minutes for the meeting state in relevant part as follows: IV. Discussion & Possible Action Items: .... 6.) Discussion & Possible Action To Name/Contract City Manager For The City Of Palmview. City attorney Jerry Munoz recommended that this item be deliberated in executive session. Commissioner Perez made the motion to approve and seconded by Commission[er] Flores. .... VII. Executive Session Pursuant to Texas Govt. Code Section 551.071-551.072 .... Commissioner Perez made the motion to go into executive session and seconded by Commissioner Flores. Motion carried[.] VIII. Return to Open Session .... Mayor Pro-Tem Villarreal made the motion to return to open session and seconded by Commissioner Munoz at 7:00 p.m. .... City Attorney Munoz entertained for a motion for item #6 appointing Ramon Segovia as city manager. Commissioner Garcia made the motion and seconded by Commissioner Perez. Motion carried. Segovia testified in his deposition that after this City Council meeting, the City Attorney presented him with a written employment agreement that set forth terms of 2 employment regarding salary, benefits, annual renewal provisions, annual performance evaluations, and severance benefits upon termination. The agreement was signed by Perez, which Segovia said was due to the Mayor’s unavailability. Segovia signed the agreement and testified that he provided a copy to the City Secretary for placement in his personnel file. Segovia’s employment was automatically renewed annually, and he served as City Manager until June 2017 when the City terminated his employment. He filed suit alleging the City breached the employment agreement by refusing to pay severance compensation. The City filed a plea to the jurisdiction asserting its governmental immunity had not been waived because the employment agreement was not “properly executed” on behalf of the City as required by Chapter 271 of the Texas Local Government Code. See TEX. LOC. GOV’T CODE § 271.152. The trial court denied the City’s plea to the jurisdiction and this interlocutory appeal followed. See TEX. CIV. PRAC. & REM. CODE § 51.014(a)(8). II. DISCUSSION A. Standard of Review Whether a court has subject matter jurisdiction is a question of law subject to de novo review. Tex. Nat. Res. Conservation Comm'n v. IT-Davy, 74 S.W.3d 849, 855 (Tex. 2002). Whether a plaintiff has alleged facts affirmatively demonstrating a trial court’s subject matter jurisdiction is also a question of law we review de novo. Tex. Dep’t of Parks & Wildlife v. Miranda, 133 S.W.3d 217, 226 (Tex. 2004). “[I]n a case in which the jurisdictional challenge implicates the merits of the plaintiff’s cause of action and the plea to the jurisdiction includes evidence, the trial court reviews the relevant evidence to determine if a fact issue exists.” Id. at 227. “If the evidence creates a fact question 3 regarding the jurisdictional issue, then the trial court cannot grant the plea to the jurisdiction, and the fact issue will be resolved by the fact finder.” Id. at 227–28. This procedure generally mirrors that of a summary judgment. See id. at 228. However, when the defendant “asserts and supports with evidence that the trial court lacks subject matter jurisdiction,” a plaintiff, when the facts underlying the merits and subject matter jurisdiction are intertwined, must show that there is a disputed material fact regarding the jurisdictional issue. Id. “When reviewing a plea to the jurisdiction in which the pleadings requirement has been met and evidence has been submitted to support the plea that implicates the merits of the case, we take as true all evidence favorable to the nonmovant” and indulge every reasonable inference and resolve any doubts in the nonmovant’s favor. Id. B. Applicable Law When performing governmental functions, political subdivisions derive governmental immunity from the state’s sovereign immunity. City of Houston v. Williams, 353 S.W.3d 128, 134 (Tex. 2011). Under the common-law doctrine of sovereign immunity, the sovereign cannot be sued without its consent. Id. Section 271.152 of the Texas Local Government Code waives a local governmental entity’s immunity to suit for purposes of adjudicating certain claims for breach of contract. TEX. LOC. GOV’T CODE § 271.152; see City of Houston, 353 S.W.3d at 134. For the waiver of immunity under section 271.152 to apply, three elements must be established: (1) the party against whom the waiver is asserted must be a local governmental entity as defined by the local government code, (2) the entity must be authorized by statute or the Constitution to enter into contracts, and (3) the entity must in fact have entered into a “contract subject to this subchapter” as defined by local 4 government code section 271.151(2). See TEX. LOC. GOV’T CODE §§ 271.151(2), 271.152; City of Houston, 353 S.W.3d at 135. A “contract subject to this subchapter” is defined as (1) “a written contract,” (2) “stating the essential terms of the agreement for providing goods or services to the local governmental entity,” (3) “that is properly executed on behalf of the local governmental entity.” TEX. LOC. GOV’T CODE § 271.151(2)(A). C. Analysis The City first argues the employment agreement was never “properly executed” on its behalf because the official City Council minutes do not expressly reflect a vote approving the agreement. See City of Bonham v. Sw. Sanitation, Inc., 871 S.W.2d 765, 767 (Tex. App.—Texarkana 1994, writ denied) (“A city or county may contract only upon express authorization of the city council or commissioners court by vote of that body reflected in the minutes.”). The absence of an express recitation in municipal minutes, however, does not necessarily mean there is no council approval such that the court lacks jurisdiction. See, e.g., Diaz v. City of Elsa, No. 13-16-00577-CV, 2018 WL 1192623, at *5 (Tex. App.—Corpus Christi–Edinburg Mar. 8, 2018, no pet.) (mem. op.) (concluding that evidence beyond the official minutes, including the written agreement itself and testimony concerning the City’s actions, raised a fact issue regarding whether the agreement had been properly executed on behalf of the governmental entity); S. Disposal, Inc. v. City of Blossom, 165 S.W.3d 887, 894 (Tex. App.—Texarkana 2005, no pet.) (holding that [w]hile the minutes for the March 19 meeting have no details on the terms of the written contract,” other jurisdictional evidence existed in the record that created a genuine issue of material fact regarding council approval). That said, it is Segovia’s burden to support his claim of immunity waiver with evidence. See Miranda, 133 S.W.3d at 228. 5 Segovia produced evidence that (1) the City Council agenda included discussion and possible action concerning “Appointment/Contract” of the City Manager; (2) the matter was referred to executive session; (3) the council approved a motion appointing Segovia as City Manager; (4) the City’s attorney subsequently presented Segovia with a written employment agreement that had not been previously produced; (5) the agreement bore the signature of Segovia and a City Council member; (6) Segovia executed the agreement; and (7) the agreement was placed in Segovia’s personnel file. As the minutes make clear, the only action item concerning Segovia was his appointment, not the approval of a contract. What’s more, there is no evidence that shows the proposed contract was even presented to the council, nor is there evidence that Commissioner Perez had authority to bind the City, and his signature does not establish that the contract was “properly executed on behalf” of the City. See TEX. LOC. GOV’T CODE § 271.151(2)(A). There is nothing from which a trier of fact could reasonably infer that the council itself voted to approve the contract. See City of Bonham, 871 S.W.2d at 767. Segovia acknowledges he saw the contract for the first time after the council’s meeting concerning his appointment, and he cannot remember how he received it. Segovia also acknowledges he was not present for the discussion in the City Council’s executive session and he did not know whether the contract was presented or discussed at that time. In response to the City’s argument, Segovia asserts via affidavit that “[he] was officially contracted as city manager by a vote of the City commissioners” but offers no more evidence than the contract and the minutes of the meeting which clearly show the action was taken on his appointment, not the approval of a contract. Segovia’s conclusory statement in his affidavit does not raise a genuine issue of fact. See McIntyre v. Ramirez, 109 S.W.3d 741, 749 (Tex. 2003); Ryland Grp., Inc. v. Hood, 924 S.W.2d 6 120, 122 (Tex. 1996) (“Conclusory affidavits are not enough to raise fact issues . . . . They are not credible, nor susceptible to being readily controverted.”). Without more, Segovia has failed to demonstrate the trial court’s jurisdiction. Here, even viewed in the light most favorable to Segovia, the evidence merely shows a contract was considered by the council and that one member approved it. A plaintiff must show more than this to create a fact issue as to council approval. See, e.g., City of Elsa, 2018 WL 1192623 (contract was signed by city manager in his official capacity and successor city manager acknowledged that previous city manager acted within his authority, that appellant had a written contract with the city, and that this was the understanding of both the council and the city attorney); City of Blossom, 165 S.W.3d at 894 (noting the minutes showed council approval of “[appellant]’s proposal on trash pick-up,” there were minutes from a prior meeting showing the council intended to table its decision on trash pick-up until “all written contracts are in hand,” and appellant’s proposed contract was in the record). For the foregoing reasons, we conclude the trial court erred by denying the City’s plea to the jurisdiction. The City’s issue is sustained. We need not address its other arguments. See TEX. R. APP. P. 47.1. III. CONCLUSION The trial court’s judgment is reversed. We render judgment granting the City’s plea to the jurisdiction and dismissing Segovia’s claims with prejudice. YSMAEL D. FONSECA Justice Delivered and filed on the 17th day of September, 2026. 7