Full Opinion

In the Court of Appeals Sixth Appellate District of Texas at Texarkana No. 06-25-00104-CV IN THE MATTER OF THE MARRIAGE OF CLAIRE NOEL CALLAHAN AND MATTHEW JOHN LEWIS AND IN THE INTEREST OF A.C.C., A CHILD On Appeal from the 467th District Court Denton County, Texas Trial Court No. 23-9077-467 Before Stevens, C.J., van Cleef and Rambin, JJ. Memorandum Opinion by Justice Rambin MEMORANDUM OPINION Claire Noel Callahan (Mother) appeals a final divorce decree.1 After nine months of marriage, Mother filed for divorce from Matthew John Lewis (Father). Mother became pregnant with A.C.2 before filing for divorce. Mother did not list Father on A.C.’s birth certificate, and listed A.C.’s last name as Callahan, even though neither parent’s last name at the time was Callahan. During the pendency of the divorce, Mother changed her last name to Callahan through a different judicial proceeding. After a bench trial, the trial court ordered, among other things, (1) that A.C.’s last name be changed from Callahan to Lewis; (2) that standard possession for Father during the last phase of the step-up schedule, even though that did not align the weekend- and summer- possession schedule with Mother’s older child from a different marriage; and (3) awarded Mother $45,000.00 in conditional-appellate attorney’s fees in the event of Father’s unsuccessful appeal. Mother challenges the trial court’s first two rulings, and Father cross-appeals the appellate attorney’s-fees award. We affirm the judgment of the trial court regarding the change of A.C.’s name and the custody arrangement. For that reason, the condition of the conditional award of attorney’s fees 1 This appeal was transferred to this Court from the Second Court of Appeals pursuant to a Texas Supreme Court docket equalization order. See TEX. GOV’T CODE ANN. § 73.001 (Supp.). Accordingly, we apply the precedent of the Second Court of Appeals in deciding this. See TEX. R. APP. P. 41.3. 2 “On the motion of the parties or on the court’s own motion, the appellate court in its opinion may identify the parties by fictitious names or by their initials only.” TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. § 109.002(d) (Supp.); see TEX. R. APP. P. 9.8(b)(2). Because this appeal concerns a dispute over the child’s last name, we use the initials A.C. for the child’s first and middle names. The child’s first name was never at issue. The trial court rejected Father’s request to change the middle name. Father does not appeal that aspect of the trial court’s ruling. 2 has not been triggered, and we need not and do not say anything else about that aspect of the trial court’s judgment. I. Background After nine months of marriage, Mother filed for divorce. Mother discovered she was pregnant before filing for divorce. Mother gave birth while the divorce case was pending, but before divorce was granted. When Mother filled out the form providing the information used to issue a birth certificate, she left the section regarding the father blank. Mother testified that she had initiated the process to change her last name to Callahan before A.C.’s birth and that the name change was finalized a month after A.C.’s birth in a separate judicial proceeding. Mother testified that, while she was pregnant with A.C., she had discussed using a different last name for the child, and for Mother and Father to take on a new last name as well. Mother testified that Father agreed to the last name Callahan for the child, and for himself. Father testified that he never agreed to change his last name to Callahan, never had input on A.C.’s name, and did not learn that he was not listed on the birth certificate until he requested a copy of the birth certificate to add A.C. to his insurance. A.C. was ten months old at the time of the bench trial. Mother and Father executed a partial mediated-settlement agreement regarding the property distribution. The trial court heard the child custody and possession issues at a bench trial. Mother testified that she felt it was appropriate to not list Father on the birth certificate even though, at the time of A.C.’s birth, Mother and Father were married and the divorce proceeding was still pending. 3 Father testified that he wanted A.C. to bear the Lewis last name because he has a strong connection with that name and believes it is important for A.C. to share that connection. The trial court issued findings of fact and conclusions of law. The trial court found that Father discussed termination of the pregnancy with Mother, moved out of the marital home, and had minimal communication with Mother during the pregnancy. The trial court also found that Mother did not consult with Father before naming A.C. The trial court further found that Father attended most of A.C.’s doctor’s appointments after A.C.’s birth. The trial court’s conclusions of law state that it is in the best interest of the child to change her last name to Lewis. The final decree imposes a four-phase step-up-possession schedule. The trial court deviated from the standard-possession order for the first three phases and awarded Father possession of A.C. on the Saturday following the second and fourth Fridays of each month, with midweek visitation-periods on Tuesdays. In the last phase, the decree provides Father with the first, third, and fifth weekends and standard-summer possession. At the time of trial, Mother had an eleven-year-old child from a previous marriage. The older child’s modified-possession order placed her with Mother on the first and third weekends and with the older child’s father on the second and fourth weekends. Mother requested that A.C.’s last phase-possession schedule be aligned with her older child’s schedule where Father received the second and fourth weekends so that A.C. and her older sister could share regular weekend time together. Mother also requested that summer possession be alternated in two- week increments during June and July to allow the siblings to share summertime together. 4 The trial court awarded $45,000.00 in appellate attorney’s fees to Mother, conditioned upon Father’s unsuccessful appeal and awarded in increments depending on the phase of the appellate process. Mother appeals. Father cross-appeals the award of appellate attorney’s fees. II. Sufficient Evidence Supports Order Changing Child’s Last Name In her first point of error, Mother argues that the evidence is insufficient to support the trial court’s decision to order a change of the child’s last name. Mother also contends that the trial court abused its discretion and violated her constitutional rights by ordering that A.C.’s last name be changed from Callahan to Lewis. A. Constitutional, Statutory, and Decisional Law Regarding Name Changes Under the United States and Texas Constitutions, parents have a “fundamental right . . . to make decisions concerning the care, custody, and control of their children.” Stary v. Ethridge, 712 S.W.3d 584, 588 (Tex. 2025). Neither parent, though, has the sole constitutional right to name their child. See Newman v. King, 433 S.W.2d 420, 423 (Tex. 1968). “Texas does not grant an express right to name a child to either parent.” In re M.C.F., 121 S.W.3d 891, 897 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth 2003, no pet.) (citing In re Guthrie, 45 S.W.3d 719, 724 (Tex. App.—Dallas 2001, pet. denied)). “Texas has no statute giving the right to name a child to either parent.” In re Guthrie, 45 S.W.3d at 724. By statute, the name of a child may be changed if it is in the child’s best interests to do so. TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. § 45.004(a)(1); see also id. § 153.002(a) (Supp.) (“The best interest[s] of the child shall always be the primary consideration of the court in determining the issues of conservatorship and possession of and access to the child.”). 5 The Fort Worth Court of Appeals has recognized that “[t]his court and some of our sister courts have identified a nonexclusive list of factors to consider when determining whether the name change is in the best interest of a child . . . .” C.W. v. B.W., No. 02-19-00270-CV, 2020 WL 4517325, at *7 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth Aug. 6, 2020, no pet.) (mem. op.). As articulated by C.W., the list includes: (1) whether the changed name or original name would best avoid embarrassment, inconvenience, or confusion; (2) the length of time that the child has carried the original name; (3) the degree of community respect associated with the original and changed names; (4) whether the change will positively or adversely affect the bond between the child and the parent or the parent’s families; (5) the preference, maturity, and age of the child; and (6) whether the party seeking the name change is motivated by an attempt to alienate the child from a parent. Id. (quoting In re T.G.-S.L., No. 02-12-00391-CV, 2013 WL 43738, at *3 (Tex. App.— Fort Worth Jan. 4, 2013, no pet.) (mem. op.)) The list, however, varies from case to case, as can be seen by examining cases from three different courts of appeals cited by Mother regarding such factors. In re Guthrie, 45 S.W.3d at 725–26 (twelve factor list); In re H.S.B., 401 S.W.3d 77, 84 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 2011, no pet.) (six factor list); In re G.L.H., 630 S.W.3d 309, 314 (Tex. App.—Eastland 2021, pet. denied) (nine factor list).3 Searching in the abstract for a definitive answer to whether the factors to be considered are six, nine, ten, or twelve, or some other number is somewhat of a misguided quest, since the 3 Variation can be seen within the decisions of the Fort Worth Court of Appeals as well. Cf. C.W., 2020 WL 4517325, at *7 (six factor list); In re A.W.G., No. 02-10-00376-CV, 2011 WL 3795237, at *3 (Tex. App.— Fort Worth Aug. 25, 2011, no pet.) (mem. op.) (ten factor list). 6 cases are in general agreement on two things: the list is nonexclusive and it is case-dependent. In re Guthrie, 45 S.W.3d at 725–26 (“[f]actors that have been considered” bearing in mind that “the determination of the child’s best interest in a name change is fact specific”); In re H.S.B., 401 S.W.3d at 84 (“nonexclusive factors” to be considered bearing in mind that “[t]he relative importance of these factors, and other possible factors, will depend on the unique facts and circumstances of each case”); In re G.L.H., 630 S.W.3d at 315 (Courts are “not required to attribute equal weight to each factor,” and “the significance of each factor depends on the specific facts of the case.”). The courts of appeals are in agreement on another, more central thing: “The basic consideration is the best interest of the child.” C.W., 2020 WL 4517325, at *7; see In re Guthrie, 45 S.W.3d at 725 (“[f]actors that have been considered proper in a best interest test”); In re H.S.B., 401 S.W.3d at 84 (“when determining if a name change is in a child’s best interest”); In re G.L.H., 630 S.W.3d at 314 (“[T]he child’s best interest is the determinative issue.”). In sum, “[c]ourts do not mechanically apply multifactor tests to determine which parent provided evidence in support of the most factors; instead, courts rely on the factors to guide the analysis on the overarching question of which name is in the child’s best interest.” Werthwein v. Workman, 546 S.W.3d 749, 757 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 2018, no pet.); see C.W., 2020 WL 4517325, at *2 (citing Werthwein, 546 S.W.3d at 755). 7 B. Standard of Review A trial court’s ruling on a request to change the name of a minor child is reviewed for an abuse of discretion. C.W., 2020 WL 4517325, at *2 (citing Werthwein, 546 S.W.3d at 755). We use the standard of review as articulated by the Fort Worth Court of Appeals: We . . . review a trial court’s ruling on a request to change the name of a child for an abuse of discretion. A trial court abuses its discretion when it acts in an arbitrary or unreasonable manner or without reference to any guiding rules or principles. An abuse of discretion does not occur as long as some evidence of substantive and probative character exists to support the trial court’s decision. It is for the factfinder to determine the weight to be given to the testimony and to resolve any conflicts in the evidence. Legal and factual sufficiency are not independent grounds of error in this context, but they are relevant factors in deciding whether the trial court abused its discretion. Thus, in applying the abuse-of-discretion standard, we use a two-pronged analysis: whether the trial court had sufficient evidence upon which to exercise its discretion and whether the trial court erred in applying its discretion. The traditional sufficiency review is involved in answering the first question and whether the trial court made a reasonable decision in answering the second. Id. (citations omitted) (citing Werthwein, 546 S.W.3d at 755). Via the “two-pronged analysis” above, courts of appeals have incorporated sufficiency of the evidence into the abuse of discretion analysis, including both legal and factual sufficiency. See id. Under legal sufficiency, we apply the City of Keller v. Wilson approach. Werthwein, 546 S.W.3d at 755 n.1 (citing City of Keller v. Wilson, 168 S.W.3d 802, 822 (Tex. 2005)). Under that standard, a reviewing court “must credit” evidence “favorable” to a jury verdict “if reasonable jurors could, and disregard contrary evidence unless reasonable jurors could not.” City of Keller, 168 S.W.3d at 827. In other words, the reviewing court views the evidence “in 8 the light most favorable to the verdict.” Id. at 822. “The final test for legal sufficiency must always be whether the evidence at trial would enable reasonable and fair-minded people to reach the verdict under review.” Id. at 827. “Under traditional factual sufficiency standards,[4] a court determines if a finding is so against the great weight and preponderance of the evidence that it is manifestly unjust, shocks the conscience, or clearly demonstrates bias.” Sw. Bell Tel. Co. v. 4 A question pointed out by Justice Priscilla Owen has bearing on the standard of review regarding name changes. In re H.S.B., 401 S.W.3d at 82 n.3 (citing In re Doe 2, 19 S.W.3d 278, 289 (Tex.2000) (Owen, J., concurring)) (“Justice Owen has suggested that a factual sufficiency review is incompatible with the abuse of discretion standard.”). The Texas Supreme Court plainly has the ability to examine the factual record on abuse of discretion review. See In re J.J.R.S., 627 S.W.3d 211, 226 (Tex. 2021) (“[T]he trial court did not abuse its discretion.”). It seems odd, then, to incorporate factual sufficiency into the scope of abuse of discretion review. The reason being that the Texas Supreme Court lacks jurisdiction to conduct factual sufficiency review. Golden Eagle Archery, Inc. v. Jackson, 116 S.W.3d 757, 761 (Tex. 2003) (“[T]his Court does not have jurisdiction to conduct a factual sufficiency review . . . .”). However, the Texas Supreme Court has plainly endorsed this hybrid approach in at least one context. In re Marriage of Williams, 646 S.W.3d 542, 545 (Tex. 2022) (per curiam) (“[L]egal and factual sufficiency challenges do not constitute independent grounds for asserting error, but they are relevant factors in determining whether the trial court abused its discretion.”). The context there was an appeal from a judgment rendered based on a post-default petition for divorce. See id. Under that circumstance, [t]o determine whether a trial court abused its discretion because the evidence was legally or factually insufficient to support its decision, a court must consider (1) whether the trial court had sufficient evidence upon which to exercise its discretion and, if not, (2) whether the trial court’s division of the community estate was so unjust and unfair as to constitute an abuse of discretion. Id. In re J.J.R.S. was a conservatorship case: “The best interest of the child shall always be the primary consideration of the court in determining the issues of conservatorship and possession of and access to the child.” TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. § 153.002. As conservatorship determinations are “intensely fact driven,” the trial court is in the best position to “observe the demeanor and personalities of the witnesses and can ‘feel’ the forces, powers, and influences that cannot be discerned by merely reading the record . . . .” In re J.J.R.S., 627 S.W.3d at 218 (citations omitted). In that best-interest context, the Texas Supreme Court conducted abuse of discretion review while incorporating only legal sufficiency. Id. at 222 (“Legally sufficient evidence supported the terms of the trial court’s order here.”); see Est. of Brown, 704 S.W.3d 428, 433, 437 (Tex. 2024) (per curiam) (noting, without endorsing, the court of appeals’ use of this hybrid abuse of discretion approach in a probate case and ultimately reversing on other grounds). In re J.J.R.S., the Texas Supreme Court examined the trial court’s order for legal sufficiency alone, even though the court of appeals had reviewed the trial court’s order for both legal and factual sufficiency. In re J.J.R.S., 627 S.W.3d at 217 (“Here, the court concluded, the evidence was legally and factually sufficient to support the order.”). 9 Garza, 164 S.W.3d 607, 622 (Tex. 2004) (quoting In re J.F.C., 96 S.W.3d 256, 264 (Tex. 2002) (quoting In re C.H., 89 S.W.3d 17, 25 (Tex. 2002))). Further, the court in C.W. made no mention of findings of fact and conclusions of law by the trial court. See C.W., 2020 WL 4517325, at *2. Therefore, we add that “[a] trial court’s findings of fact issued after a bench trial have the same weight, and are judged by the same appellate standards, as a jury verdict.” Tex. Outfitters Ltd., LLC v. Nicholson, 572 S.W.3d 647, 653 (Tex. 2019) (citing Anderson v. City of Seven Points, 806 S.W.2d 791, 794 (Tex. 1991)).5 “When a party attacks the legal sufficiency of an adverse finding on an issue on which it did not have the burden of proof, it must demonstrate on appeal that no evidence supports the adverse finding.” Graham Cent. Station, Inc. v. Pena, 442 S.W.3d 261, 263 (Tex. 2014) (per curiam) (citing Croucher v. Croucher, 660 S.W.2d 55, 58 (Tex. 1983)). C. Analysis We find no abuse of discretion by the trial court in giving A.C. her father’s last name, while at the same time denying Father’s request to change her middle name, which has a maternal connection, and leaving in place her first name, which was chosen solely by Mother. Applying the standard of review set out above leads to the conclusion that “some evidence of substantive and probative character supports the trial court’s decision.” C.W., 2020 WL 4517325, at *2 The trial court found, among other things, that (1) A.C. is the child of the marriage between Mother and Father; (2) Mother discovered she was pregnant on August 20 or 21, 2023; 5 This is not to say that jury verdicts and trial court findings are the same regarding all procedural dynamics. See TEX. R. CIV. P. 299; Ad Villarai, LLC v. Chan Il Pak, 519 S.W.3d 132, 135 (Tex. 2017) (per curiam). 10 (3) Mother and Father separated on or about September 26, 2023; (4) Mother filed for divorce on October 5, 2023, using the last name Dornak; (5) Mother has a child from a prior marriage with the last name Dornak; (6) A.C. was born on April 8, 2024; (7) on A.C.’s birth certificate, Mother did not identify any person as A.C.’s father; (8) Mother gave A.C. the last name Callahan without input from Father; (9) on the birth certificate, Mother listed her maiden name as Coleman; (10) after A.C.’s birth, and in a separate proceeding, Mother changed her last name to Callahan; (11) Father attended most of A.C.’s doctor’s appointments once she was born; (12) Father has the resources to pay, and should pay, child support in addition to the guidelines;(13) at the time of trial, A.C.’s health and dental insurance was already being provided by Father through his employer, and Father should continue providing insurance; (14) Mother and Father should be named joint managing conservators; (15) A.C.’s birth certificate should be amended to identify Father as A.C.’s father; and (16) changing A.C.’s last name to Lewis was in A.C.’s best interests. We first examine whether the trial court made an error of law. Mother asserts that the trial court failed to make findings providing a breakdown of enumerated factors, and that this alleged failure indicates that the trial court’s decision was “arbitrary” and “made without reference to guiding rules or principles.” As discussed above, Mother cited cases in her brief with varying factors. Further, Mother’s requested findings of fact submitted to the trial court did not seek a factor-by-factor breakdown.6 This is not to say that Mother failed to preserve a challenge to the trial court’s best-interests finding. She preserved the challenge, and we address 6 Nor, on appeal, did Mother assert under Rule 299 of the Texas Rules of Civil Procedure that the trial court had omitted a required finding. See TEX. R. CIV. P. 299. 11 it. But Mother has not shown that the trial court acted in an arbitrary fashion without reference to guiding rules or principles. As noted above, “[c]ourts do not mechanically apply multifactor tests to determine which parent provided evidence in support of the most factors; instead, courts rely on the factors to guide the analysis on the overarching question of which name is in the child’s best interest.” Werthwein, 546 S.W.3d at 757. The trial court’s ruling addressed the “overarching question”: best interest. See id.; TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. § 45.004(a)(1). Accordingly, we find no error of law. We turn, then, to whether the factual record contains legally and factually sufficient evidence to support the trial court’s ruling. It does. The trial court’s findings set forth above have support in the record. The trial court made findings that Callahan was not Mother’s last name at the time of A.C.’s birth, and that Mother selected the last name Callahan without input from Father. At the time of the trial court’s ruling, A.C. was ten months old and had a father who was involved in her life. Mother makes no argument that Father was likely to disappear from A.C.’s life. Mother’s arguments, in significant part, focus on what occurred during her pregnancy. Unfortunately, her pregnancy overlapped with the unwinding of the marriage. That was a contentious time for both parents. It was within the trial court’s discretion to place a greater emphasis on A.C.’s future. See In re H.S.B., 401 S.W.3d at 84 (emphasizing that the inquiry is “whether a name change is in the child’s best interest”). 12 Viewing the record in the light most favorable to the trial court’s ruling, we find that there was legally sufficient evidence7 in favor of A.C.’s name being changed to Lewis. We further find that the evidence was factually sufficient. These evidentiary findings are the first prong in the abuse of discretion analysis. See C.W., 2020 WL 4517325, at *2. As for the second prong, we are mindful that the question is not what this Court would do were it the fact-finder. See id. at *8 (citing In re T.G.-S.L., 2013 WL 43738, at *2). In light of the record as a whole, we find no abuse of discretion. III. The Trial Court Did Not Abuse its Discretion by Ordering a Standard-Possession Schedule in the Last Phase In her second point of error, Mother argues that the trial court abused its discretion in refusing to align A.C.’s last-phase weekend-visitation schedule and summer-possession schedule with her half-sibling’s schedule. A. Standard of Review For the child-custody aspect of the trial court’s ruling, we apply the standard of review set forth by the Texas Supreme Court: “The best interest of the child shall always be the primary consideration of the court in determining the issues of conservatorship and possession of and access to the child.” TEX. FAM. CODE [ANN.] § 153.002. As conservatorship determinations are “intensely fact driven,” Lenz v. Lenz, 79 S.W.3d 10, 19 (Tex. 2002), the trial court is in the best position to “observe the demeanor and personalities of the witnesses and can ‘feel’ the forces, powers, and influences that cannot be discerned by merely reading the record,” Echols v. Olivarez, 85 S.W.3d 475, 477 (Tex. App.—Austin 2002, no pet.). A trial court’s determination of what is in the child’s best interest, specifically the establishment of terms and 7 Because we find some evidence in support of the trial court’s finding, we do not reach Mother’s constitutional argument, which, by its terms, was based on there being an absence of evidence in favor of the trial court’s ruling. Mother also argues that the trial court failed to hyphenate A.C.’s last name. Mother did not request the trial court to hyphenate her last name. Therefore, Mother failed to preserve this issue for review. 13 conditions of conservatorship, is a discretionary function. MacCallum v. MacCallum, 801 S.W.2d 579, 582 (Tex. App.—Corpus Christ–Edinburg 1990, writ denied). The trial court’s judgment will be reversed only when it appears from the record as a whole that the court has abused its discretion. Gillespie v. Gillespie, 644 S.W.2d 449, 451 (Tex. 1982). A trial court abuses its discretion when it acts “without reference to any guiding rules or principles; or in other words, [when it acts] arbitrarily or unreasonably.” Worford v. Stamper, 801 S.W.2d 108, 109 (Tex. 1990) (per curiam). In re J.J.R.S., 627 S.W.3d at 218 (second alteration in original). The Fort Worth Court of Appeals has applied this standard on review of custody arrangements set forth in a divorce decree. See Algaissi v. Qamer, No. 02-25-00212-CV, 2026 WL 1449839, *5 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth May 21, 2026, no pet.) (mem. op.) (citing In re J.J.R.S., 627 S.W.3d at 218). In applying In re J.J.R.S., the Fort Worth Court of Appeals has imported the legal and factual sufficiency standard into the abuse of discretion analysis: “[I]f the trial court’s ruling is not supported by legally and factually sufficient evidence, then it abuses its discretion.” Id. (citing In re E.D., No. 02-20-00208-CV, 2022 WL 60781, at *10 (Tex. App.— Fort Worth Jan. 6, 2022, no pet.) (mem. op.); C.W., 2020 WL 4517325, *2).8 Ultimately, “[w]e give wide latitude to a trial court’s determinations on possession and visitation issues, reversing the court’s decision only if it appears that the court abused its discretion in light of the record as a whole.” In re B.M., No. 02-24-00035-CV, 2025 WL 211330, at *6 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth Jan. 16, 2025, no pet.) (mem. op.) (quoting In re G.M., No. 14-20-00044-CV, 2021 WL 1881048, at *4 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] May 11, 2021, no pet.) (mem. op.)). 8 See supra note 4. 14 B. Analysis The divorce decree has a phased-possession order concluding with an expanded- standard-possession order beginning April 8, 2027. See TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. § 153.317(a) (Supp.). Mother’s complaints are about that time period of the decree. Mother argues that the trial court’s deviation from “sibling unity considerations” was neither explained nor supported by substantial and probative evidence. Regarding Mother’s first contention, lack of explanation, Section 153.258(a) of the Texas Family Code provides that “on request by a party, the court shall state in writing the specific reasons for the variance from the standard order.” TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. § 153.258(a) (Supp.). The trial court ruled from the bench that it was entering an “expanded[-]standard schedule.” Mother’s proposed findings of fact and conclusions of law did not invoke Section 153.258, nor did she assert that the trial court’s order was a variance requiring an explanation. Mother contends that the expanded standard-possession order constituted an abuse of discretion because the weekend-visitation schedule and the summer-visitation schedule are such that Mother’s weekends and period of summer possession regarding A.C. are not aligned with Mother’s possession of A.C.’s half-sibling from Mother’s prior marriage. The Texas Family Code provides that “[i]t is preferable for all children in a family to be together during periods of possession.” TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. § 153.251(c). This, however, is not a statutory mandate. See id. (“preferable”). At least one court has found that “[t]he policy of keeping the children of a marriage together does not apply to half-siblings.” In re J.M.W., No. 09-08-00295-CV, 2009 WL 6031287, at *12 (Tex. App.—Beaumont Mar. 11, 2010, pet. denied) (mem. op.). We need 15 not rely on that premise, however, because an overarching principle applies: “The best interest of the child shall always be the primary consideration of the court in determining the issues of conservatorship and possession of and access to the child.” TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. § 153.002(a); see Gardner v. Gardner, 229 S.W.3d 747, 754 (Tex. App.—San Antonio 2007, no pet.) (“The policy favoring keeping children together during periods of possession is simply a factor the trial court considers in deciding what is in the child’s best interest.”). Mother testified that under her “current schedule,” her weekend-possession periods with A.C.’s older half-sibling are on the first, third, and fifth weekends. Mother requested that Father have A.C. on the second and fourth weekends. On appeal, Father notes that Mother’s request excluded the fifth weekend, and for that reason Father points to “minimum” in another provision in Section 153.251 of the Texas Family Code. See TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. § 153.251(a) (“The guidelines established in the standard[-]possession order are intended to guide the courts in ordering the terms and conditions for possession of a child by a parent named as a possessory conservator or as the minimum possession for a joint[-]managing conservator.”). Regarding summer schedules, Mother’s motion for reconsideration in the trial court alleges dates for A.C.’s half-sibling’s summer schedule, but Mother provided no testimony regarding her summer schedule with A.C.’s half-sibling. Weekends and summers notwithstanding, the extended standard-possession order provides significant time together for A.C. and her half-sibling. We are not prepared to say that the trial court abused its discretion. See In re J.J.R.S., 627 S.W.3d at 218. 16 IV. The Conditional Attorney’s-Fee Award Has Not Been Triggered In his cross-appeal, Father argues the trial court abused its discretion by awarding conditional appellate-attorney’s fees to Mother. Mother responds that the Father’s cross-appeal is moot because the trial court’s condition (unsuccessful appeal by Father) has not been triggered. Mother goes on to assert, though, that the trial court’s conditional award could have vitality if Mother were to prevail in this Court, and Father were to appeal such a result to the Texas Supreme Court and lose. By the rulings above, Mother did not prevail. But we will not go so far as to say that there is no possibility whatsoever of conditional attorney’s fees somehow being triggered, however conjectural such future possibility may be at this moment. For today, Father is not facing an actual award of attorney’s fees. For today, then, Father’s cross-appeal on the issue of attorney’s fees is moot. “[A] moot issue does not necessarily moot the case.” Tex. Dep’t of Fam. & Protective Servs. v. Grassroots Leadership, Inc., 717 S.W.3d 854, 877 (Tex. 2025). We dismiss Father’s cross-appeal as moot. See id. at 878 (“[M]ootness poses a practical test, not one that turns on speculative, theoretical, contingent, or unlikely events that might happen.”). 17 V. Conclusion We affirm the trial court’s judgment regarding the name change and possession schedule of A.C. We dismiss Father’s cross-appeal regarding the issue of conditional attorney’s fees as moot. Jeff Rambin Justice Date Submitted: March 11, 2026 Date Decided: September 21, 2026 18