Full Opinion

Opinion filed November 19, 2026 In The Eleventh Court of Appeals __________ No. 11-25-00132-CV __________ DANNY PRINE A/K/A DANNY LEE PRINE, Appellant V. THE ESTATE OF BETTY LOU CASEY, DECEASED AND SHEILA FISHER, INDIVIDUALLY AND AS INDEPENDENT EXECUTOR, Appellees On Appeal from the Probate Court No. 1 Tarrant County, Texas Trial Court Cause No. 2022-PR01255-1-A M E M O R A N D U M O P I N I O N1 This appeal concerns an ancillary proceeding to the probate of Betty Lou Casey’s last will and testament and the disposition of her estate—specifically, a tract of real property located in Tarrant County. Appellee, Sheila Fisher, sued Appellant, 1 Pursuant to Misc. Docket Order No. 25-9016 issued by the Texas Supreme Court on April 2, 2025, this appeal was transferred to us from the Second Court of Appeals. Therefore, as the transferee court, we must decide the issues raised in this appeal in accordance with the precedent of the Second Court of Appeals if its precedent conflicts with ours. See TEX. R. APP. P. 41.3. Danny Prine, 2 to recover possession of this property. Danny filed counterclaims against Sheila, alleging various causes of action related to Sheila’s management of Betty Lou’s estate. Sheila filed a no-evidence motion for summary judgment as to Danny’s counterclaims, which the probate court granted. Sheila’s claims against Danny thereafter proceeded to a bench trial. In four issues, Danny argues that the probate court erred when it: (1) granted Sheila’s no-evidence motion for summary judgment; (2) relied on medical testimony and concluded that Betty Lou was mentally incapacitated at the time she executed a durable power of attorney naming Danny as her agent; (3) “ignored” Sheila’s alleged breaches of her fiduciary duties and repeated failures to disclose important information to Betty Lou and the heirs of Betty Lou’s estate; and (4) deemed Danny’s warranty deeds invalid. We affirm. I. Factual Background Betty Lou died in Tarrant County on November 13, 2021, at the age of ninety- two, having been diagnosed in 2014 with Alzheimer’s disease. Betty Lou had three children—Sheila, Danny, and Sherry Neustupa. Sherry passed away during the pendency of the underlying litigation, and her estate is not a party to this case. Following Betty Lou’s death, Sheila probated Betty Lou’s last will and testament that was dated August 7, 2007, which named Sheila as independent executor of Betty Lou’s estate. On June 15, 2022, the probate court issued an Order Probating Will and Authorizing Letters Testamentary. When she executed this will, Betty Lou also executed a durable power of attorney, which designated Sheila as her agent. 2 While he was represented by counsel at trial, Danny is proceeding pro se on appeal. Although we liberally construe briefs and other filings that are submitted by pro se parties, we hold pro se litigants to the same standards as licensed attorneys and require them to comply with all applicable laws and rules of procedure and evidence. Mansfield State Bank v. Cohn, 573 S.W.2d 181, 184–85 (Tex. 1978); Barrientos v. Barrientos, 675 S.W.3d 399, 404 n.2 (Tex. App.—Eastland 2023, pet. denied); Aaron v. Fisher, 645 S.W.3d 299, 312 (Tex. App.—Eastland 2022, no pet.). 2 Betty Lou’s 2007 will that was admitted to probate bequeathed her Tarrant County residence, located at 918 Milby Road in Arlington (the Milby Road property)—the property that is the subject of this dispute—to Sheila. This will divided the remainder of Betty Lou’s estate equally between Sheila, Danny, and Sherry. While in the process of probating Betty Lou’s estate, Sheila became aware of a warranty deed that Danny executed on February 5, 2021, whereby he purportedly acted as power of attorney for Betty Lou; the deed conveyed the Milby Road property to himself and Betty Lou as joint tenants for the “valuable consideration of $10” (the February 5 deed). There was no survivorship language in the deed. It was later revealed that Betty Lou executed another durable power of attorney on November 21, 2014, which designated Danny as her agent and Sherry as the alternative agent (the Danny POA). When Betty Lou’s estate was probated, Danny resided at the Milby Road property, where he had lived on-and-off since 1977. On July 7, 2022, Sheila sent Danny a letter by certified mail demanding that he vacate the Milby Road property within thirty days, which he refused to do. On July 14, 2022, Danny re-recorded the February 5 deed. Then, on September 23, 2022, Sheila commenced the ancillary suit to the probate of Betty Lou’s estate and she sued Danny (1) to quiet title to the Milby Road property in her favor, (2) for trespass to try title, (3) for a declaratory judgment that the Danny POA and the February 5 deed were invalid, (4) for breach of fiduciary duty, in the event that the probate court determined that the Danny POA was valid, and (5) in the alternative, in the event the probate court determined that Danny owned an interest in the Milby Road property, for a partition by sale. Danny counterclaimed against Sheila on October 2, 2023, alleging that Sheila breached her fiduciary duties of loyalty, disclosure, and reasonable care to Danny as a beneficiary to Betty Lou’s estate and that Sheila engaged in self-dealing. 3 On January 2, 2025, Sheila filed a no-evidence motion for summary judgment that challenged Danny’s counterclaims which, after Danny filed no response, the probate court granted. The probate court subsequently held a two-day bench trial on the claims that Sheila had asserted against Danny. A. Testimony of Dr. Joe Perryman III Dr. Perryman is an internal medicine physician, and he testified by deposition that he treated Betty Lou for several years, beginning in 2013 until 2020. Betty Lou was diagnosed with Alzheimer’s disease and dementia in 2014 and was prescribed Namenda, a medication for mild to moderate dementia. Betty Lou was also prescribed Aricept, another dementia medication. Betty Lou’s condition gradually deteriorated, and she was ultimately unable to care for herself. Dr. Perryman observed Betty Lou experiencing memory loss— her main symptom—and confusion. While Dr. Perryman did not remember any specific interactions with Betty Lou in 2014, he agreed that it was proper for her to take the above-described medications, which are only prescribed after some type of cognitive decline is recognized. B. Testimony of Jonathan Taylor Lee Fisher Jonathan Fisher, Betty Lou’s twenty-nine-year-old grandson, testified that he was aware that Betty Lou was suffering from dementia in 2014—when the Danny POA was executed. He first noticed signs of Betty Lou’s memory loss in 2011. However, in 2014 it became progressively worse—she would sometimes be confused about where she was, could not remember what she was doing the day before or where she had placed items, and was not managing her finances or preparing her own meals. C. Testimony of Sheila Fisher Sheila first observed signs of Betty Lou’s dementia around 2012. During that time, Betty Lou was forgetful, would lose things, forgot to pay her bills, and would 4 forget to eat. Sheila stated, “[S]he just got to where she couldn’t really function in life.” Around 2012 or 2013, Sheila began assuring that Betty Lou’s bills were paid; sometime in 2014 or 2015, Sheila had to take away Betty Lou’s car keys because she was worried she would get lost while driving. In 2014, Sheila began helping Betty Lou “[p]repar[e] her meals, buy[] her food, [go] to the grocery store [for her].” She also took Betty Lou to her appointments with Dr. Perryman; Betty Lou’s dementia was also exacerbated by an aneurysm, her pacemaker, and COPD. After 2014, Betty Lou’s dementia worsened, resulting in hallucinations that got “really bad” three to four years before her death in 2021. At the end of 2019 or early 2020, Betty Lou was moved to a nursing home. Betty Lou’s brother, Kenneth Charles Short, whom Betty Lou cared for, died on November 5, 2014. At that time, Betty Lou’s mind was “kind of coming and going,” and she had “significant” signs of dementia. Prior to his death, Sheila assumed Betty Lou’s responsibilities for Kenneth’s care. On November 21, 2014, Danny had filed an emergency application to intervene in Kenneth’s estate and stated that he handled all of Betty Lou’s business affairs because she was “incapacitated due to dementia.” That same day, November 21, 2014, Betty Lou executed the Danny POA. At the time of Betty Lou’s death, there was about $30 or $40 in her checking account and $200 or $300 in her T.D. Ameritrade account. D. Testimony of Danny Prine Danny testified that he included the language about Betty Lou’s mental incapacity in his application to intervene in Kenneth’s estate because she “could not handle [managing Kenneth’s estate].” However, Danny stated that the incapacity phrasing was prepared by his lawyer and that he did not read the document before signing it. Betty Lou signed the Danny POA at a local Bank of America branch 5 office on a form that Danny obtained from Fry’s Electronics, which Danny asked her to sign because his lawyer told him that he needed it. According to Danny, Betty Lou’s mental capacity when she executed the Danny POA was “as normal as you can get for her age,” and, to his knowledge, she was lucid, and not taking any medications. However, by the time that Betty Lou was moved into the nursing home, she was hallucinating badly and very incapacitated. Betty Lou wrote an unsigned holographic will in 2001 wherein she devised the Milby Road property to Danny. However, this will was not offered as evidence at trial. On June 27, 2022, Danny received a letter from Sheila’s probate attorney informing him that Betty Lou’s will had been probated and that he was a beneficiary. He claims that Sheila never showed him the will before it was probated. E. The Probate Court’s Ruling The probate court signed a final judgment on March 6, 2025, and found that (1) the Danny POA was not valid when executed, (2) the February 5 deed was invalid, and (3) one hundred percent of fee simple title to the Milby Road property vested in Sheila immediately upon Betty Lou’s death. II. Analysis A. No-Evidence Summary Judgment In his first issue, Danny argues that the probate court erred when it granted Sheila’s no-evidence motion for summary judgment on his counterclaims because genuine issues of material fact remain. 1. Legal Standard After adequate time for discovery has passed, a party may file a no-evidence motion for summary judgment seeking to establish that there is no evidence of an essential element of a claim or defense on which the nonmovant would have the 6 burden of proof at trial. TEX. R. CIV. P. 166a(i). 3 The motion “must state the elements as to which there is no evidence.” Id. We review a trial court’s grant of summary judgment de novo. Fort Worth Transp. Auth. v. Rodriguez, 547 S.W.3d 830, 837 (Tex. 2018). We review a no- evidence motion for summary judgment under the same legal sufficiency standard that we use when reviewing the grant of a directed verdict. Merriman v. XTO Energy, Inc., 407 S.W.3d 244, 248 (Tex. 2013). Pursuant to this standard, and “[t]o defeat a no-evidence motion, the nonmovant must produce at least a scintilla of evidence raising a genuine issue of material fact as to the challenged elements.” KMS Retail Rowlett, LP v. City of Rowlett, 593 S.W.3d 175, 181 (Tex. 2019); see TEX. R. CIV. P. 166a(i). A trial court must grant a no-evidence motion for summary judgment “when there is a complete absence of evidence of a vital fact, [or] the evidence offered to prove a vital fact is no more than a mere scintilla.” Lozada v. Posada, 718 S.W.3d 262, 266 (Tex. 2025) (per curiam) (quoting King Ranch, Inc. v. Chapman, 118 S.W.3d 742, 751 (Tex. 2003)); see TEX. R. CIV. P. 166a(i). When the evidence “is ‘so weak as to do no more than create a mere surmise or suspicion’ of a fact[,]” the evidence provided is less than a scintilla. Lozada, 718 S.W.3d at 266 (quoting Kindred v. Con/Chem, Inc., 650 S.W.2d 61, 63 (Tex. 1983)). To be more than a scintilla, “the evidence [must] ‘rise[] to a level that would enable reasonable and fair-minded people to differ in their conclusions.’” Id. at 266–67 (quoting Merrell Dow Pharms., Inc. v. Havner, 953 S.W.2d 706, 711 (Tex. 1997)). 3 We note that Rule 166a was amended to modify the rule’s deadlines effective March 1, 2026, after Shiela’s no-evidence motion for summary judgment was filed. However, “Rule 166a’s rewrite is not intended to substantively change the law.” TEX. R. CIV. P. 166a cmt. (2026). As such, Rule 166a, as cited in Danny’s brief, refers to the revised version of Rule 166a and does not change our substantive analysis. Here, we refer to the rule in effect at the time Sheila filed her motion. See id. 7 2. Application In his counterclaim, Danny asserted that Sheila, because of her position as executor of Betty Lou’s estate, (1) breached her fiduciary duties of loyalty, disclosure, and reasonable care, and (2) personally obtained benefits because of these breaches. Adequate time for discovery had passed when Sheila moved for summary judgment. In a level two discovery case, such as this, the discovery period ends thirty days before the commencement of trial or nine months after the first initial disclosures are due, whichever occurs first. TEX. R. CIV. P. 190.3(b)(1). Here, the case proceeded to trial on February 19, 2025, and the parties’ initial disclosures were due on January 31, 2024. Therefore, the discovery period closed on October 31, 2024. Sheila moved for summary judgment on January 2, 2025—about one and one- half months before the bench trial commenced and two months after the discovery period had closed. Additionally, the case had been pending since September 23, 2022. See Harmon v. Bank of West, No. 02-02-00056-CV, 2003 WL 1564826, at *2–3 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth Mar. 27, 2003, no pet.) (mem. op.) (holding that adequate time for discovery had passed when, by the time the motion for summary judgment was heard, the suit had been on file for over two years, less than thirty days remained until trial, and the discovery period had expired). Therefore, given the expiration of the discovery period, the amount of time the case has been pending, and the proximity of the motion’s filing to when trial commenced, we conclude that adequate time for discovery had passed. In this setting, when the nonmovant fails to respond to a no-evidence motion for summary judgment, the trial court does not err by granting it—in fact, the Texas Supreme Court has indicated that it is mandatory for the trial court to grant a no- evidence motion that meets the rule’s requirements when no response to the motion 8 has been filed. See State v. Three Thousand, Seven Hundred Seventy-Four Dollars and Twenty-Eight Cents U.S. Currency, 713 S.W.3d 381, 391 n.8 (Tex. 2025) (“[U]nder Rule 166a(i), a trial court must grant a no-evidence motion for summary judgment that meets the rules requirements in the absence of a timely response.”). In this instance, Danny did not respond to Sheila’s no-evidence motion. Furthermore, the motion satisfied Rule 166a(i)’s requirements. “To prevail in a breach-of-fiduciary-duty claim, a plaintiff must prove that (1) there is a fiduciary relationship between the plaintiff and defendant, (2) the defendant breached his fiduciary duty to the plaintiff, and (3) the breach resulted in an injury to the plaintiff or benefit to the defendant.” Zhu v. Lam, 426 S.W.3d 333, 339 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 2014, no pet.). Sheila’s no-evidence motion stated the elements as to which there was no evidence to support Danny’s counterclaims, in that she owed no duty to Danny and, if she did, she did not breach any duty. Additionally, for Danny’s claim of her alleged breach of her duty to use reasonable care in administering Betty Lou’s estate, Sheila’s motion specified that there was no evidence that Danny suffered any damages because of her failure to maintain insurance on the property. Thus, because Danny did not produce any summary judgment evidence to raise a genuine issue of material fact, the probate court was required to grant Sheila’s motion as to Danny’s counterclaims. Thus, it did not err when it did so. Accordingly, we overrule Danny’s first issue. B. Capacity of Betty Lou to Execute Durable Power of Attorney In his second issue, Danny argues that the probate court erred when it impliedly determined that Betty Lou lacked the necessary mental capacity when she executed the Danny POA. We agree with Sheila that, while not expressly framed as such, Danny’s complaint is tantamount to a challenge to the sufficiency of the evidence. 9 1. Legal Standard In a nonjury trial, where the trial court does not make findings of fact and conclusions of law, 4 it is implied that the trial court made all necessary findings to support its judgment. Jistel v. Tiffany Trail Owners Ass’n, Inc., 215 S.W.3d 474, 479 (Tex. App.—Eastland 2006, no pet.) (citing Holt Atherton Indus., Inc. v. Heine, 835 S.W.2d 80, 83 (Tex. 1992)). When a reporter’s record is filed, as in this case, the trial court’s implied findings are not conclusive and may be challenged for legal and factual sufficiency. Id. (citing BMC Software Belg., N.V. v. Marchand, 83 S.W.3d 789, 795 (Tex. 2002)). The sufficiency review of implied findings is conducted under the same standard of review that we apply to express findings. Id. In the absence of findings, the judgment of the trial court must be affirmed if it can be upheld on any available legal theory that finds support in the evidence. Id. (citing Point Lookout W., Inc. v. Whorton, 742 S.W.2d 277, 278 (Tex. 1987)). In a legal sufficiency review after a bench trial, we consider all the evidence in the light most favorable to the trial court’s judgment and credit any favorable evidence if a reasonable factfinder would and disregard any contrary evidence unless a reasonable factfinder could not. SCS Builders, Inc. v. Searcy, 390 S.W.3d 534, 539 (Tex. App.—Eastland 2012, no pet.) (citing City of Keller v. Wilson, 168 S.W.3d 802, 821–22 (Tex. 2005)). In doing so, we must determine whether the evidence at trial would enable reasonable and fair-minded people to reach the decision under review. Jistel, 215 S.W.3d at 479 (citing City of Keller, 168 S.W.3d at 827). Sheila argues that Danny’s assertion amounts to a no-evidence challenge. As we have said, a no-evidence challenge will only be sustained when (1) the record discloses a complete absence of a vital fact, (2) the court is barred by the rules of evidence from giving weight to the only evidence offered to prove a vital fact, (3) the 4 On February 14, 2025, Sheila filed proposed findings of fact and conclusions of law; however, these findings and conclusions were neither signed nor adopted by the probate court. 10 only evidence offered to prove a vital fact is no more than a mere scintilla, or (4) the evidence conclusively establishes the opposite of a vital fact. Id. at 479–80. When reviewing the trial court’s findings for factual sufficiency, we consider all the evidence and will uphold the trial court’s finding unless the evidence is too weak to support it or the finding is so against the overwhelming weight of the evidence as to be manifestly unjust. Id. 2. Application “Documents executed by one who lacks sufficient legal or mental capacity may be avoided.” Kinsel v. Lindsey, 526 S.W.3d 411, 419 (Tex. 2017). To set aside a power of attorney based on the executor’s lack of mental capacity, the party challenging the executor’s mental capacity must show “that the executor did not understand the nature or consequences of [her] act at the moment the power of attorney was executed.” In re Estate of Vackar, 345 S.W.3d 588, 597 (Tex. App.— San Antonio 2011, no pet.) (citing Tomlinson v. Jones, 677 S.W.2d 490, 492–93 (Tex. 1984)). “Mental capacity may be shown by circumstantial evidence of: (1) a person’s outward conduct that manifests an inward condition; (2) pre-existing external circumstances tending to produce a special mental condition; and (3) a prior or subsequent mental condition.” Id. (citing Bach v. Hudson, 596 S.W.2d 673, 676 (Tex. App.—Corpus Christi–Edinburg 1980, no writ)). The issue of the executor’s mental capacity when a power of attorney is executed is ordinarily a question of fact. Id. The mental capacity that is required to execute a power of attorney appears to be consistent with the capacity that one must have to execute a contract. See Dillon ex rel. Estate of Culpepper v. King, No. 05-20-00215-CV, 2022 WL 1401403, at *16 (Tex. App.—Dallas May 4, 2022, no pet.) (mem. op.). In this case, the probate court, as the factfinder, could have reasonably determined that Betty Lou lacked the mental capacity to execute the Danny POA. In Kinsel, the Texas Supreme Court held there was sufficient evidence to support the 11 jury’s finding that the testator lacked the mental capacity to execute trust amendments.5 Kinsel, 526 S.W.3d at 419. The testator was ninety-three, had a myriad of ailments, and needed assistance dressing and eating. Id. at 419–20. A physician also testified that the testator suffered from mild to moderate dementia when the documents were executed and had a documented medical history of being confused, forgetful, depressed, and agitated. Id. at 420. Others who were familiar with the testator testified that before she executed the documents, the testator was increasingly confused and forgetful. Id. at 419–20. Like the evidence and timing of the testator’s condition in Kinsel, Betty Lou’s grandson testified that in 2014—the year that the Danny POA was executed—her dementia had become “progressively worse” since 2011, that she was confused and would at times forget what occurred the day before and where she placed items, and was not managing her own finances or making her own meals. Sheila testified that beginning around 2012, Betty Lou was forgetful in several respects—such as not eating or paying her bills—and would lose items. In Sheila’s opinion, by November 2014, Betty Lou’s mind was “coming and going.” See In re Estates of Gomez, No. 04-05-00300-CV, 2005 WL 3115871, at *9 (Tex. App.—San Antonio Nov. 23, 2005, no pet.) (mem. op.) (finding that the evidence was sufficient to support a finding of incapacity when the evidence showed the testator was unable to make significant decisions, manage her daily or financial affairs, and a witness testified that the testator could not have understood what documents she was signing). Even as Danny concedes, Betty Lou’s condition continued to decline after 2014; she was experiencing hallucinations and it was necessary to eventually move her into a nursing home in late 2019 or early 2020. See Vackar, 345 S.W.3d at 597 5 While not analyzing the execution of a power of attorney or a contract, the competency standard stated by the court in Kinsel is the same as the capacity needed to execute a power of attorney. Kinsel, 526 S.W.3d at 419 (describing the standard as “lack[ing] sufficient mind and memory to understand the nature and effect of her acts at the time she executed the [document]”). 12 (explaining how evidence of subsequent medical issues can be evidence of capacity at an earlier date). As in Kinsel and the case before us, there is evidence that Betty Lou, while suffering from dementia and other physical ailments, was often confused and forgetful around the time that the Danny POA was executed, and she required significant assistance with her daily and routine affairs. This is probative evidence that supports the probate court’s implied finding that Betty Lou lacked the capacity to understand the intent and consequences of executing the Danny POA. Dr. Perryman, while not able to point to 2014 specifically, testified that Betty Lou’s primary deficit was memory loss and agreed that it was proper for Betty Lou to take the medications that he prescribed for her in September 2014, medications that are only prescribed after a noticeable decline in one’s cognitive function is recognized. While Danny testified that Betty Lou appeared normal and lucid when she executed the Danny POA and asserts that Dr. Perryman’s testimony was “wrought with . . . uncertainty,” the probate court, as the factfinder, was entitled to resolve conflicting evidence in Sheila’s favor. See Cowan v. Worrell, 638 S.W.3d 244, 253–54 (Tex. App.—Eastland 2022, no pet.) (discussing how it is within the trial court’s province, as finder of fact, to resolve conflicting evidence). Moreover, in Kinsel, the court addressed how the party that challenged the testator’s capacity made statements indicating that the testator was mentally incapacitated, which supported the incapacity finding. See Kinsel, 526 S.W.3d at 421. Similarly, here, Danny, when he sought to intervene in the probate of Kenenth’s estate, stated under oath that Betty Lou was incapacitated because of her dementia and that she could not manage her affairs. Despite Danny’s testimony during trial about Betty Lou’s mental capacity, Danny’s sworn statement about Betty Lou’s incapacity was made, coincidently, the same day that he took her to the bank to execute the Danny POA— November 21, 2014. 13 We hold that the evidence presented at trial would enable reasonable and fair- minded people to reach the conclusion that Betty Lou did not understand that she was executing, or the consequences of executing, the Danny POA. We further hold that the evidence in support of this finding is not so weak or against the great weight of the evidence as to be manifestly unjust. See Harris Cnty. v. Coats, 607 S.W.3d 359, 380–81 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 2020, no pet.). Therefore, we conclude that the evidence is legally and factually sufficient to support the probate court’s implied finding that Betty Lou lacked the mental capacity to execute the Danny POA. Accordingly, we overrule Danny’s second issue. C. Sheila’s Alleged Breach of Fiduciary Duties In his third issue, that “the [probate] [c]ourt [e]rred by [i]gnoring [Sheila]’s [b]reaches of [f]iduciary [d]uty,” Danny makes several allegations that were neither raised in the probate court nor asserted in his counterclaim against Sheila. From what we can discern from his briefing, Danny appears to assert that: (1) Sheila did not show Betty Lou’s 2007 will to him or Sherry and did not provide notice of the intent to probate Betty Lou’s will until after it had been probated; (2) Betty Lou executed the 2007 will and power of attorney while under duress and undue influence; (3) Sheila did not make accurate disclosures regarding Betty Lou’s estate, namely, the Chase Bank and T.D. Ameritrade accounts; (4) Sheila breached her fiduciary duty to Betty Lou in managing her finances; and (5) Sheila did not adequately preserve Betty Lou’s estate in accordance with Betty Lou’s intentions. We first note that, in his brief, Danny relies heavily on Sherry’s deposition testimony. However, this evidence was neither offered at trial nor is it part of the appellate record. As such, we cannot consider this evidence or any other evidence that is not part of the appellate record. See Unger Tex. Stone, LP v. Deere Credit, Inc., 735 S.W.3d 917, 922 n.5 (Tex. App.—Eastland 2026, no pet.) (We may not 14 consider the evidence or other documents that appellants attach as exhibits to their appellate briefs or in their appendices that are not part of the appellate record.) (collecting cases). Additionally, Danny claims in his brief, without providing any supporting authority or argument, that the probate court erred by not allowing him to conduct discovery concerning Betty Lou’s bank and financial records. In the probate court, Danny sought to issue numerous subpoenas for Betty Lou’s financial records, both before and after he filed his counterclaims. Sheila objected to these requests on various grounds, and the probate court quashed the subpoenas and prohibited further discovery regarding Betty Lou’s financial information. Danny filed no response to Sheila’s motion to quash and took no action regarding the probate court’s order that quashed the subpoenas, other than filing a handwritten document, that was two sentences in length, stating that the subpoenas should be “honored” and “fulfilled.” After filing his counterclaims, Danny again filed an application for a subpoena of Betty Lou’s financial records but took no further action on it. As we have held, a general objection does not preserve an issue for review—a party must specifically state the grounds upon which it objects. See Baron Aviation Servs., Inc. v. Kitchen, 679 S.W.3d 330, 338–39 (Tex. App.—Eastland 2023, pet. denied). Merely stating that the subpoenas should be honored and fulfilled was too general a statement and did not apprise the probate court of Danny’s complaint as to why it should not have quashed the subpoenas and limited discovery. See id. at 339. As a result, to the extent that Danny challenges the probate court’s order that denied discovery of Betty Lou’s financial records, we hold that Danny has not adequately preserved the issue for appellate review. 1. Claim that Sheila did not show Betty Lou’s will to Danny or Sherry Danny makes numerous assertions in his brief that Sheila failed to adequately disclose the existence of Betty Lou’s 2007 will and that she had been designated as 15 Betty Lou’s agent in the power of attorney that Betty Lou executed in 2007. Danny alleges that these failures constitute a breach of fiduciary duty to him as a beneficiary of Betty Lou’s estate; he also alleges that these nondisclosures are tantamount to fraud. First, this argument appears to mirror the claim that Danny alleged in his counterclaim against Sheila, which as discussed previously, was properly dismissed by the probate court when it granted Sheila’s no-evidence motion for summary judgment—by not filing a response, Danny did not produce any evidence to contest Sheila’s motion with regard to her duty or breach of duty on the disclosure claim. Second, as to the merits, Danny’s argument fails because an executor of a will is not required to inform the will’s beneficiaries of its existence before the testator dies. The fiduciary duties that an executor owes to the will’s beneficiaries, including the duty of disclosure, “arise[] from the executor’s status as trustee of the property of the estate.” Punts v. Wilson, 137 S.W.3d 889, 891 (Tex. App.—Texarkana 2004, no pet.) (citing Human Soc’y v. Austin Nat’l Bank, 531 S.W.2d 574, 577 (Tex. 1975)). Notably, this does not address the potential property of the estate, but rather only the administration of the estate. Given that the duty of disclosure relates to the administration of an estate, it follows that no such duty can attach before the estate exists. And because the estate does not exist until the testator passes, no fiduciary duties attach—as it relates to that person’s function as independent executor—while the testator is alive. See TEX. EST. CODE ANN. § 22.012 (West 2020) (defining “estate” as the decedent’s property); Mariner Health Care of Nashville, Inc. v. Robins, 321 S.W.3d 193, 200–01 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 2010, no pet.) (“When a person dies, all of the decedent’s real and personal property become part of an estate.”). As such, Danny cannot validly allege that Sheila breached her duty of disclosure by not showing him the 2007 will or power of attorney when executed, because at the relevant times Betty Lou’s estate was not yet in existence. 16 Therefore, Danny’s claim that Sheila did not show him the 2007 will or power of attorney is without merit. 2. Claims of Duress and Undue Influence Danny claims that Betty Lou’s 2007 will and power of attorney are invalid because they were executed by Betty Lou while under duress and undue influence. First, this claim is not properly before us because it was never raised in the probate court. Although parties “are free to construct new arguments in support of issues” that are properly before the appellate court, we “do not consider issues that were not [first] raised” in the trial court.” Rossa v. Mahaffey, 594 S.W.3d 618, 625– 26 (Tex. App.—Eastland 2019, no pet.) (quoting Greene v. Farmers Ins. Exch., 446 S.W.3d 761, 764 n.4 (Tex. 2014)); see also TEX. R. APP. P. 33.1(a)(1). Given that Danny did not raise the issues of duress and undue influence in his counterclaim or at any other time in the probate court, he cannot raise them for the first time on appeal. Nevertheless, even if asserted, this claim is barred by limitations. To contest the probate of a will, one must file the action within two years from the date the will is admitted to probate. See EST. § 256.204(a). Because Betty Lou’s will was admitted to probate on June 15, 2022, limitations barred any action to contest the will that were filed after June 15, 2024. Here, Danny did not seek to contest Betty Lou’s will until he filed his brief in this cause on July 28, 2025. Therefore, any contest that Danny could have asserted is barred by limitations. 3. Claim of Inaccurate or Incomplete Disclosures Danny claims that Sheila did not make accurate disclosures to him concerning the probate of Betty Lou’s will. This claim, like others he asserts, appears to re-urge the disclosure claim that Danny brought against Sheila in his counterclaim, all of which, as we have 17 discussed, were properly dismissed when the probate court granted Sheila’s no- evidence motion for summary judgment. However, even considering the merits, Danny received notice on June 27, 2022, that Betty Lou’s will would be probated, along with a copy of the will. Executors are required to provide notice to all known beneficiaries of a will’s existence within sixty days of the will being admitted to probate. See EST. § 308.002(a) (West Supp. 2026). Here, Sheila provided such notice to Danny twelve days after Betty Lou’s will was admitted to probate. Furthermore, there was no evidence presented at trial indicating that this notice was inaccurate, incomplete, or insufficient. 4. Claim of Breach of Fiduciary Duty to Betty Lou Danny claims that Sheila breached her fiduciary duty to Betty Lou while acting as her agent under the 2007 power of attorney. Again, this claim was not raised in the probate court and cannot be made for the first time on appeal. See Rossa, 594 S.W.3d at 625–26. As such, this claim is not properly before us and is not subject to appellate review. 5. Claim that Sheila did not adequately preserve Betty Lou’s Estate Finally, Danny claims that Sheila did not adequately preserve Betty Lou’s estate in accordance with her wishes in a way that would have given Danny a larger share of the estate. To support his argument, he cites to Section 751.122 of the Estates Code, which provides that “[a]n agent shall preserve to the extent reasonably possible the principal’s estate plan to the extent the agent has actual knowledge of the plan if preserving the plan is consistent with the principal’s best interest.” EST. § 751.122. Again, this claim was not made in the probate court and is not properly before us. The only claim made by Danny in the probate court regarding the preservation 18 of Betty Lou’s estate was a claim that she failed to insure the Milby Road property, which was properly disposed of by summary judgment. Accordingly, we overrule Danny’s third issue. D. Warranty Deed Validity In his fourth issue, Danny argues that the probate court erred when it found that the February 5 deed that Danny executed as power of attorney for Betty Lou is invalid. When a party lacks the mental capacity to manage her affairs when she executed a power of attorney, a subsequent deed executed by the agent designated in the power of attorney is voidable. Cole v. McWillie, 464 S.W.3d 896, 900 (Tex. App.—Eastland 2015, pet. denied) (citing Williams v. Sapieha, 61 S.W. 115, 116 (Tex. 1901)). As we have discussed, the probate court did not err when it found, by implication, that Betty Lou did not have the mental capacity on November 21, 2014, to execute the Danny POA. Therefore, the deed that Danny executed pursuant to the Danny POA that conveyed the Milby Road property to himself and Betty Lou as joint tenants was voidable. And while the deed is voidable rather than void, Sheila, as independent executor, filed suit one and one-half years later to invalidate the February 5 deed. See Cole, 464 S.W.3d at 900 (“[T]he right to disaffirm is subject to a four-year statute of limitations.” (citing TEX. CIV. PRAC. & REM. CODE ANN. § 16.051 (West 2015))). Moreover, given that Danny deeded the Milby Road property to himself while acting as Betty Lou’s agent, the law presumes that this transaction was unfair. See Hrdy v. Second St. Props. LLC, 649 S.W.3d 522, 539 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 2022, pet. denied) (“The law presumes transactions between a fiduciary and a party to whom he owes a duty of disclosure are unfair, which places the burden on the fiduciary to show the transactions were fair.”). 19 Considering these circumstances, we hold that the probate court did not err when it found that the February 5 deed is invalid. Accordingly, we overrule Danny’s fourth issue. III. This Court’s Ruling We affirm the judgment of the probate court. W. STACY TROTTER JUSTICE November 19, 2026 Panel consists of: Bailey, C.J., Trotter, J., and Williams, J. 20