Full Opinion

Opinion issued August 27, 2026 In The Court of Appeals For The First District of Texas ———————————— NO. 01-24-00896-CV ——————————— HARRIS CENTRAL APPRAISAL DISTRICT F/K/A HARRIS COUNTY APPRAISAL DISTRICT, Appellant V. PARK ON WESTVIEW APTS, LP, Appellee On Appeal from the 157th District Court Harris County, Texas Trial Court Case No. 2024-50252 OPINION In this ad valorem tax case, Appellant Harris Central Appraisal District f/k/a Harris County Appraisal District (HCAD) appeals the denial of its plea to the jurisdiction, arguing Appellee Park on Westview Apts, LP’s (POW) failure to exhaust administrative remedies deprived the trial court of jurisdiction. We reverse and render judgment dismissing POW’s claims for want of jurisdiction. Background POW owns a defunct apartment complex at 10157 Westview, Houston, Texas (the Property). In 2023, HCAD appraised the Property at $2.6 million. Regarding 2024, POW alleges HCAD did not comply with the deadlines for appraising the Property or submitting the appraisal record to the appraisal review board (ARB) and that the ARB did not hear and determine any protests of the appraised value. POW sued HCAD in district court.1 It asked the district court to value the Property in accordance with the Tax Code. HCAD answered and filed a plea to the jurisdiction, arguing the trial court lacks jurisdiction over POW’s claim for a valuation of the Property because POW did not exhaust its administrative remedies. In its response, POW argued the district court has jurisdiction because HCAD’s failure to comply with the Tax Code made it “impossible” for POW to exhaust administrative remedies. POW also filed a traditional motion for summary judgment, asking the district court to value the Property based on the evidence attached to its motion. 1 Two plaintiffs filed this suit, POW and Westview Drive Investments, LLC, which involves two distinct properties. This interlocutory appeal pertains only to POW’s claims regarding the Property. 2 After a hearing, the district court denied HCAD’s plea and granted POW’s summary-judgment motion. HCAD appeals the district court’s denial of its plea. See TEX. CIV. PRAC. & REM. CODE § 51.014(a)(8).2 Analysis A. Standard of review “We construe the Tax Code and address questions regarding the scope of a trial court’s subject-matter jurisdiction and the exclusivity of an agency’s jurisdiction de novo.” Oncor Elec. Delivery Co. NTU, LLC v. Wilbarger Cnty. Appraisal Dist., 691 S.W.3d 890, 901 (Tex. 2024). We also review the denial of a plea to the jurisdiction de novo. City of Houston v. Gomez, 716 S.W.3d 161, 164 (Tex. 2025). B. POW’s failure to exhaust its administrative remedies deprived the district court of jurisdiction over its tax protest The Tax Code establishes procedures by which property is valued and taxed, and by which property owners can dispute those valuations. See generally TEX. TAX CODE §§ 1.01–43.04; Morris v. Houston Indep. Sch. Dist., 388 S.W.3d 310, 313 (Tex. 2012). For properties that are not single-family residences, the Code generally requires the chief appraiser to deliver notice to property owners of their properties’ appraised values by May 1 or as soon thereafter as practicable if the 2 The district court’s grant of POW’s summary-judgment motion is not a subject of this interlocutory appeal. However, based on our disposition, that summary- judgment order is nullified. 3 appraised value of the property for that year is greater than the preceding year. TEX. TAX CODE § 25.19(a). The chief appraiser shall submit the completed appraisal records to the ARB for review and determination of protests by May 15 or as soon thereafter as practicable. Id. § 25.22(a). And by July 20, the ARB shall “hear and determine all or substantially all timely filed protests.” Id. § 41.12(a)(1).3 Chapter 41 gives a property owner the right to “protest” an appraisal district’s valuation of property before the ARB. Id. § 41.41(a)(1). If the owner is dissatisfied with the ARB’s decision, Chapter 42 gives the owner a right to judicial review. See id. §§ 42.01–.09. The Tax Code gives “exclusive” original jurisdiction to ARBs to hear taxpayer protests of the valuations of their properties. See Cameron Appraisal Dist. v. Rourk, 194 S.W.3d 501, 502 (Tex. 2006) (per curiam) (citing TEX. TAX CODE § 42.09(a)). There is “no question” the Legislature intended to “bestow exclusive original jurisdiction” over valuation protests upon ARBs. Id. “The property owner must exhaust its administrative remedies before filing its petition for judicial review.” Mansion Partners, Ltd. v. Harris Cnty. Appraisal Dist., No. 3 For counties where the population exceeds one million, the appraisal district’s board of directors can extend this July 20 deadline to August 30. TEX. PROP. CODE § 41.12(c)(1). 4 01-21-00306-CV, 2023 WL 8938405, at *4 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] Dec. 28, 2023, pet. denied) (mem. op.). POW acknowledges it has not exhausted administrative remedies but argues HCAD’s failure to value the Property made it “impossible” for POW to do so. However, the Tax Code specifically provides taxpayers the right “to protest before the [ARB] the failure of the chief appraiser . . . to provide or deliver any notice to which the property owner is entitled.” TEX. TAX CODE § 41.411(a). And once failure to provide the notice is established, “the [ARB] shall determine a protest made by the property owner on any other grounds of protest authorized by this title.” Id. § 41.411(b). Accordingly, POW’s lawsuit is an attempt to protest HCAD’s failure to provide notice of its valuation of the Property to the district court in the first instance, before exhausting the administrative remedy provided by section 41.411. See Brazoria Civic Club v. Brazoria Cnty. Appraisal Dist., 694 S.W.3d 854, 868– 69 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 2024, no pet.) (recognizing section 41.411 is the exclusive ground for protesting the chief appraiser’s failure to provide notice). Nevertheless, POW contends a taxpayer’s failure to exhaust administrative remedies under the Tax Code is no longer a jurisdictional limitation in light of two recent Supreme Court cases, Texas Disposal Systems Landfill, Inc. v. Travis Central Appraisal District, 694 S.W.3d 752 (Tex. 2024), and Oncor Electric 5 Delivery Co. NTU, LLC v. Wilbarger County Appraisal District, 691 S.W.3d 890 (Tex. 2024). Neither case supports this argument. In Texas Disposal Systems, the Supreme Court recognized that, when “the Legislature assigns exclusive or original jurisdiction to an administrative body,” and a statute provides for judicial review of the administrative body’s order, “ordinarily the trial court does not acquire jurisdiction until the party exhausts its administrative remedies.” 694 S.W.3d at 757–58. Turning to sections 42.01 and 42.02 of the Tax Code, the Court explained that a “taxpayer and the appraisal district each may appeal to the trial court an order determining a protest.” Id. at 759 (emphasis added). The Court then determined that limits on such an appeal to the trial court (specifically, limits regarding the bases raised in the taxpayer’s protest), although mandatory, are not jurisdictional. Id. at 759–63. In support of this conclusion, the Court held, “When a taxpayer raises a new basis to protest for the first time in the trial court,” provisions in section 42.231 allowing the taxpayer a remand to the ARB to exhaust administrative remedies and allowing the parties to agree for the trial court to consider the new basis indicate that limits on the appeal to the trial court are not jurisdictional. Id. at 759–60. In Oncor Electric, the Supreme Court similarly held that “although limitations on an ARB’s authority to review or reject a Section 1.111(e) agreement [which is a final agreement between a property owner and the chief appraiser on 6 certain matters] may restrict the scope of a court’s review [of an appeal filed under Chapter 42], they do not defeat its jurisdiction.” 691 S.W.3d at 896, 901–02, 909. In so ruling, the Court recognized that “a taxpayer’s failure to exhaust the Tax Code’s exclusive administrative remedies deprives the courts of jurisdiction to decide most matters relating to ad valorem taxes” and that “Chapter 42 provides for review of ARB decisions by trial de novo in district court.” Id. at 895–96 (emphasis added) (citing Cameron Appraisal Dist., 194 S.W.3d at 502). Further, the Court explained that section 42.01 lists the types of “ARB orders” a property owner is entitled to appeal to the court, and section 42.21(h) provides a court jurisdiction over an appeal “so long as the property was the subject of an [ARB] order.” Id. at 906–08. Common among the Chapter 42 judicial-review statutes cited by the Supreme Court is that they allow an appeal of an ARB order. See TEX. TAX CODE §§ 42.01, 42.02, 42.21, 42.231. Without an ARB order, the taxpayer has not exhausted the administrative remedies required for the trial court to have jurisdiction over the suit. See Starflight 50, L.L.C. v. Harris Cnty. Appraisal Dist., 287 S.W.3d 741, 745 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 2009, no pet.) (holding trial court had subject-matter jurisdiction over suit because taxpayer exhausted its administrative remedies by obtaining ARB order); Cooke Cnty. Tax Appraisal Dist. v. Teel, 129 S.W.3d 724, 729 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth 2004, no pet.) 7 (“Appellees met the jurisdictional requirement set forth in section 42.01 of the tax code. Appellees have obtained an order from the ARB, thereby exhausting their administrative remedies and establishing a right to appeal.”); see also Mansion Partners, 2023 WL 8938405, at *8 (“The administrative proceeding before the ARB is complete when the board determines the protest by written order.”).4 Texas Disposal Systems and Oncor Electric did not change this settled law but recognized it. In its plea to the jurisdiction, HCAD is not complaining about statutory limits to the scope of POW’s appeal of an ARB order but is correctly asserting that there is no ARB order being appealed. Because POW did not exhaust its administrative remedies by obtaining an ARB order, the district court lacks jurisdiction of this suit. See Cameron Appraisal Dist., 194 S.W.3d at 502; Fort Bend Cent. Appraisal Dist. v. McGee Chapel Baptist Church, 611 S.W.3d 443, 450–51 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 2020, no pet.) (concluding trial court lacked jurisdiction over suit because taxpayer had not exhausted administrative remedies by obtaining ARB order). We sustain HCAD’s appellate issue. 4 And without an ARB order, section 42.231’s procedure for remand to ARB to exhaust administrative remedies does not apply. See Holcim (US) Inc. v. Ellis Cnty. Appraisal Dist., 642 S.W.3d 840, 847 (Tex. App.—Texarkana 2021, no pet.) (section 42.231 “only applies when an appraisal review board has entered an order determining the protest”). 8 Conclusion We reverse the district court’s order denying HCAD’s partial plea to the jurisdiction and render judgment dismissing POW’s claims against HCAD for want of jurisdiction. Andrew Johnson Justice Panel consists of Justices Rivas-Molloy, Johnson, and Dokupil. 9