Full Opinion

In the Court of Appeals Second Appellate District of Texas at Fort Worth ___________________________ No. 02-25-00218-CV ___________________________ IN RE ESTATE OF STACY LYNN FUCHSMAN, DECEASED On Appeal from Probate Court No. 1 Denton County, Texas Trial Court No. PR-2022-00863-A Before Kerr, Birdwell and Wallach, JJ. Opinion by Justice Birdwell OPINION Appointed to act as the Dependent Administrator for the Estate of Stacy Lynn Fuchsman, Deceased, Appellant David M. Pyke sought the probate court’s approval and award of a five percent statutory commission on qualifying cash disbursements and receipts, including the net cash proceeds received from the sales of two residential properties comprising almost the entirety of the corpus of the Estate. See Tex. Est. Code § 352.002(a). Finding that the proposed commission would be unjust and unreasonable because the Estate had already paid sales commissions of five percent to real estate agents or brokers to sell these residential properties, see id. § 352.004, the probate court awarded Pyke a commission solely on qualifying cash disbursements; the court awarded no commission whatsoever on any qualifying cash receipts, including the net cash proceeds from the sales of these properties. The probate court thereafter entered an order (1) approving Pyke’s final account of the Estate, (2) authorizing payment of an administrator’s commission on qualifying cash disbursements only, (3) authorizing payment of attorney’s fees and expenses to Pyke and another law firm, and (4) ordering disbursement to the decedent’s heirs of all funds remaining in the Estate after such payments. Because we hold that, as a matter of law, the probate court abused its discretion by denying Pyke any commission on qualifying cash receipts due to the payment of real estate agent or brokerage commissions on the sales of the real property owned by the Estate, we reverse and render judgment awarding the statutory commission Pyke sought on all qualifying cash receipts. 2 I. Background Fuchsman died intestate on June 3, 2021. In June 2022, Appellee Alexis Wahlen filed for a determination of heirs, an independent administration, and for letters of administration, claiming to be the owner of all or part of her aunt’s estate and identifying herself, her brother Hunter Wahlen, and her sister Appellee Sabrina Wahlen as their aunt’s only heirs. 1 As part of the corpus of the Estate, the application identified two 1 For the sake of clarity, we will refer to the Wahlens by their given names. Alexis and Sabrina are nominal appellees due to their status as heirs, but they neither objected in the probate court to the commission sought by Pyke nor filed responsive briefs in opposition to his appeal. As will be discussed in more detail below, Hunter passed away during Pyke’s administration of the Estate, but Hunter’s father, Paul Wahlen, filed an objection to Pyke’s commission identifying himself as the dependent administrator of his son’s estate. Nevertheless, Paul has not filed a responsive brief in opposition to Pyke’s appeal, but that omission may be because, according to the order approving Pyke’s final account of his administration, the probate court ordered that a one-third share of the remaining funds in the Estate be disbursed by Pyke, as the Dependent Administrator of the Estate of Stacy Lynn Fuchsman, to Pyke, as the Dependent Administrator of the Estate of Hunter Thomas Wahlen, thereby leaving Pyke in the apparently conflicting positions of both appellant and appellee on the merits of this appeal. See Pine v. Deblieux, 405 S.W.3d 140, 142 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 2013, no pet.) (observing successor administrator who filed motion for summary judgment seeking declaration that certain assets of her father’s estate were not subject to administration demonstrated potential conflict by failing to respond to her own motion on behalf of the estate). Although we normally may accept as true all factual assertions in an appellant’s brief that remain unchallenged by an appellee, due to Pyke’s dual standing as both appellant and appellee, we will assume each factual statement in his appellant’s brief is contested. Cf. Lorant v. 2016 Parkview Condos. Dev. LLC, No. 02-22-00032-CV, 2022 WL 16845110, at *3 n.8 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth Nov. 10, 2022, no pet.) (citing Rancher v. Franks, 269 S.W.2d 926, 927–28 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth 1954, no writ) (“In her brief appellant says that appellees filed no motion for judgment non obstante veredicto. Since 3 pieces of real property—one in Carrollton, Texas, and one in Plano, Texas—and estimated their value at $335,900.00 and $369,200.00, respectively. The Carrollton property was a rental property, and the Plano property was the decedent’s personal residence. Alexis represented that Hunter and Sabrina agreed that there was a need for an independent administration of their aunt’s estate and that she should be appointed the independent administrator. Hunter and Sabrina subsequently filed formal appearances confirming their agreement to the proposed administration and appointment. In June 2023, Alexis filed her First Amended Application seeking the appointment of Pyke as the dependent administrator for her aunt’s estate. Hunter and Sabrina contemporaneously confirmed their agreement with Pyke’s proposed appointment. The amended application made no changes to the estimated valuations of the Carrollton and Plano properties. On August 9, 2023, the probate court entered its Judgment Declaring Heirship, declaring Alexis, Hunter, and Sabrina as Fuchsman’s sole heirs and awarding each one- third shares in the real and personal property of the Estate. The same day, the court entered an order granting the requested dependent administration, appointing Pyke as the Estate’s dependent administrator and, upon the taking and filing of his oath and approval of his $400,000.00 bond, issuing him letters of dependent administration. that statement is unchallenged, this Court is not required to look to the record but may accept appellant’s statements as true.”)). 4 Critically, the order further expressly forbade Pyke from selling or disposing of estate assets “without the authorization and approval of the Court which, if granted, will be authorized by a separate written order of this Court.” Pyke thereafter filed the required oath and bond.2 In December 2023, Pyke filed an Inventory, Appraisement, and List of Claims in the probate court that appraised the Carrollton and Plano properties at $265,000.00 and $390,268.00, respectively, representing virtually one hundred percent of the value of the corpus of the Estate. The probate court approved the filing. In April 2024, Pyke filed applications with the probate court for authority to sell the Carrollton and Plano properties by listing them through a licensed real estate broker. The appraisals he filed with the applications valued the properties at $310,000.00 and $380,000.00, respectively. The next month, the probate court entered orders authorizing the sale of the properties, including approval of “a realtor’s commission rate not to exceed a total of 5%.” In July 2024, Pyke filed a report proposing the sale of the Carrollton property for $265,000.00 in cash, attaching for the probate court’s approval the proposed contract for sale and seller’s settlement statement. The seller’s settlement statement included a five percent commission for the listing agent of $13,250.00. The probate court thereafter entered a decree approving and confirming the sale of the Carrollton 2 Pyke subsequently filed a new bond in the amount of $520,000.00 to cover an anticipated increase in the value of the Estate due to the sale of the Plano property. 5 property as reported, finding that the sale was in the best interest of the Estate. See id. § 356.556(a) (authorizing approval of proposed sale of real property if proposed sale is “for a fair price, properly made, and in conformity with law”). In September 2024, Pyke filed his First Annual Account documenting his activities as dependent administrator. The accounting confirmed the sale of the Carrollton property for $265,050.00,3 the probate court’s approval thereof, including the payment of a five percent commission ($13,250.00) to the real estate agent who brokered the sale, and net cash proceeds from the sale—after payment of the commission, taxes, and title and closing costs—of $223,416.47. Pyke also notified the probate court that he would be seeking a statutory administrator’s commission on the net cash proceeds by separate filing. Contemporaneously with the First Annual Account filing, Pyke filed an application for an administrator’s commission pursuant to Section 352.002(a) of the Texas Estates Code. He sought a five percent commission on all cash received and paid out during the annual accounting period for a total commission of $12,298.13. This amount included, among other receipts and disbursements, a five percent commission on the net cash proceeds received from the sale of the Carrollton property ($223,416.47 x .05 = $11,170.82). In support of the total commission sought, Pyke recounted the The $50.00 difference between the report proposing the sale of the Carrollton 3 property for $265,000.00 and the accounting confirming the property’s sale for $265,050.00 is a “Non-Refundable Option Fee (retained by Seller).” 6 valuable administration services he had provided to the Estate during the accounting period. On November 5, 2024, the probate court entered an order approving Pyke’s First Annual Account and, having audited the accounting, finding it in compliance “with the law in every respect.” Later that month, Pyke filed a report proposing the sale of the Plano property for $315,000.004 in cash, attaching for the probate court’s approval the proposed contract for sale and seller’s settlement statement. The seller’s settlement statement included a three percent commission for the listing agent of $9,600.00 and a two percent commission for the selling agent of $6,400.00—representing a five percent overall sales commission of $16,000.00. After deducting these commissions, taxes, title and closing costs, and certain homeowners’ association (HOA) fees, the net cash proceeds to the Estate on the seller’s settlement statement amounted to $254,010.04. On November 25, 2024, the probate court entered a decree approving and confirming the sale of the Plano property as proposed, finding that the sale was in the best interest of the Estate. The very same day, the probate court entered an order denying the five percent administrator’s commission sought by Pyke on the net cash proceeds from the sale of the Carrollton property, finding that “the administrator [had already] paid a five percent 4 Pyke’s Report of Sale of Real Property concerning the Plano property states that “[t]he sales price of the Property to be sold is $320,000.00, but a seller’s concession of $5,000 makes the effective purchase price $315,000.” 7 commission to a realtor acting as an agent of the estate for the sale of the subject real property.” The court’s order did not, however, address the commission sought on all other cash receipts and disbursements during the first annual accounting period, nor did it reference any objection from Alexis, Hunter, or Sabrina. In January 2025, after the sale of the Plano property, Pyke filed an amended report and seller’s settlement statement of the sale explaining that, due to an administrative error by the title agent, the seller’s settlement statement had not included a payoff amount for outstanding fees owed to the HOA in the amount of $17,309.00, which had been paid by Pyke out of the cash proceeds received by the Estate, reducing the projected net recovery from the transaction from $250,010.04 to $236,810.82. As a result, Pyke sought the probate court’s approval of the HOA payment as an expense of the Estate. Shortly thereafter, the court entered an order approving and authorizing the HOA payment. On February 21, 2025, Pyke filed his Final Account for his administration of the Estate. The accounting confirmed the sale of the Plano property, including the receipt of $254,119.82 in “net proceeds received,” and the subsequent payment of the $17.309.00 outstanding HOA fees as a cash disbursement. With no outstanding debts or taxes to be paid and absent any remaining property in the Estate’s corpus, Pyke reported the total value of the Estate on final accounting to be $469,326.60 in cash on hand. 8 On the same day he filed his Final Account, Pyke filed an application for an administrator’s commission (1) asking the probate court to reconsider its denial of his previous application for $12,298.13; (2) seeking a five percent commission on the net cash proceeds received from the sale of the Plano property in the amount of $12,705.99; and (3) requesting a five percent commission on the net disbursements made during the final accounting period in the amount of $1,105.43, for a total administrator’s commission of $26,109.55. Given that this amount did not exceed, in the aggregate, five percent of the gross fair market value of the Estate ($657,728.00 x .05 = $32,866.40), Pyke observed that the total commission sought did not violate the cap on commissions imposed by Section 352.002(b)(1). See id. § 352.002(b)(1). Pyke also argued that the probate court’s denial of the statutory commission on the net cash proceeds from the sales of the Carrollton and Plano properties due to the payment of realtor’s commissions approved by the court was a misinterpretation or misapplication of Section 352.002(a), which does not grant the courts such discretion. And alternatively, Pyke argued that, even if the court’s interpretation of the code was correct, his efforts on behalf of the Estate warranted a commission more than the statutory cap. On March 4, 2025, Hunter’s father, Paul, identifying himself as the Dependent Administrator of the Estate of Hunter Thomas Wahlen,5 filed an objection to Pyke’s Although Paul had previously sought reimbursement from the Estate for the 5 expense of retaining the services of a forensic genealogist, this is the first indication that 9 application for an administrator’s commission urging the probate court to deny the requested commission on the proceeds from the sales of the Carrollton and Plano properties because the commission request, in addition to the realtor’s commissions already paid, was unreasonable. Ten days later, Pyke, also identifying himself as the Dependent Administrator of the Estate of Hunter Thomas Wahlen, filed a Waiver of Service for the Account for Final Settlement he had filed as the Dependent Administrator for the Estate of Stacy Lynn Fuchsman. The probate court conducted a hearing on the Final Account and Pyke’s application for an administrator’s commission on April 7, 2025. During the hearing, Pyke urged the probate court to reconsider its previous ruling that disallowed any award of a statutory commission because he had hired a realtor to sell the properties, arguing that nothing in the language of the statute provided the court with the discretion to disallow the commission and that in doing so in this instance “virtually the entire statutory calculation would be eliminated.” He also observed that the heirs had expressly requested that he hire a realtor and noted that having access to list the properties “on MLS” required hiring a realtor.6 Pyke further testified that certain Hunter had died. There is no suggestion of death in the record reflecting when Hunter died, however, or any documentation demonstrating Paul’s appointment as the dependent administrator of his son’s estate. 6 “MLS stands for ‘Multiple Listing Service,’ a tool to facilitate real estate transactions nationwide developed and maintained by real estate professionals.” Harris Cnty. Appraisal Dist. v. Integrity Title Co., 483 S.W.3d 62, 65 n.1 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 2015, pet. denied) (citing Nat’l Ass’n of Realtors, Multiple Listing Service (MLS): 10 difficult aspects of his administration would go uncompensated by disallowing the commission he sought: This estate consisted of some cash that I had to endeavor to locate, personal property of very little value other than a vehicle. The houses had to be cleaned out and prepared to sell, exhaustive search through business records at the house that were in no organized format whatsoever, dealing with tax issues, seeking information from the IRS to find bank accounts, and then selling the two pieces of real property which were far and away the gross value of the estate. So if those were deducted -- if the proceeds of those sales were deducted, the commission would be significantly unfair to me and not represent fair compensation for an estate where there’s been no allegation that I’ve mishandled the estate in any way. In response, counsel for Paul did not contest Pyke’s representation that the heirs had requested a realtor to facilitate the sales of the properties and expressly stated that neither she nor her client was asserting any allegation of mismanagement of the Estate by Pyke; indeed, counsel thanked Pyke for “all of his work” in the case.7 Instead, What Is It, http://www.realtor.org/topics/nar-doj-settlement/multiple-listing-service- mls-what-is-it (last visited July 27, 2026)); see Tucker v. Bedgood, No. 13-16-00433-CV, 2016 WL 7011584, at *5 n.4 (Tex. App.—Corpus Christi–Edinburg Dec. 1, 2016, no pet.) (describing a Multiple Listing Service (MLS) as “a service used by realtors . . . to facilitate real estate transactions and publicly document the details of those transactions”), disapproved on other grounds by Agar Corp. v. Electro Circuits Int’l, LLC, 580 S.W.3d 136 (Tex. 2019); Pleasant v. Bradford, 260 S.W.3d 546, 550 (Tex. App.—Austin 2008, pet. denied) (“An MLS listing contains a variety of information about a house and notifies fellow realtors that the house is for sale.”); Newman v. McClure, 459 S.W.2d 703, 704 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth 1970, no writ) (describing MLS as an organization of local realtors entitling members “to render broker services upon property under otherwise exclusive listings of fellow members”). 7 Counsel even extended her appreciation and gratitude to Pyke’s dependent administration of Hunter’s estate, confirming that Pyke had already been so appointed by the time of this hearing. 11 counsel argued that she agreed with the probate court’s earlier ruling disallowing the statutory commission Pyke sought in his annual account after the sale of the Carrollton property, suggesting that other statutory probate courts “around the state” similarly disallowed such commissions when the sale of real property included the payment of a realtor’s commission by an estate. Counsel conceded that she did not think Pyke “should not be compensated for his work” but simply thought the payment of a “double commission” on the sales of the Carrollton and Plano properties was not proper. The probate court thereafter clarified the distinct amounts paid for realtor commissions, for attorney’s fees and legal expenses incurred during the first annual reporting period, and for an administrator’s commission on cash disbursements— although Pyke informed the court that the latter had not yet been paid. The probate court also recalled its reasoning from the first hearing on Pyke’s original application in which it had declined to authorize the commission sought because “professional fees [had already been] paid out” on the Carrollton property transaction and the court’s standard permitted only one commission paid per transaction. When the probate court inquired whether any other jurisdiction awarded both realtor’s and administrator’s commissions on the same transaction, Pyke indicated that probate courts in Dallas County and Ellis County had done so. Pyke also clarified that the administrator’s commission he sought was distinct and separate from the attorney’s 12 fees and legal expenses he requested as well as from the brokerage commissions paid to the realtors: The reason I would quibble with how your Honor worded the issue, I don’t seek commission on a transaction. I seek commission as an administrator. The reason I don’t think -- that that’s an important distinction is there are all sorts of activities that an administrator does that are not compensable by the statutory calculation. For example, the fact that I had to search in this case for a bank account, finally find a bank account, and go sit in the office of the bank for hours to get control of that bank account is not a commissionable activity per the statute. Retrieving a bank account is not commissionable activity. There’s all sorts of activities like that. Tax compliance. Other than writing the check itself is not commissionable activities. So whether it is -- It’s not just related to the transaction. It is all of your services are compensated what could be considered an arbitrary formula, but it is the formula the statute gives us. And I think it’s important that the statute caps compensation so that that’s not abused. It cannot be more than five percent of the gross value of the estate. So that’s, I think, the check on compensation being fair. Thank you for the opportunity to clarify. Nevertheless, the probate court held that adding the realtor’s and administrator’s commissions together constituted a ten percent commission on the sales of the properties, depleting the Estate of approximately $53,000.00 in violation of the statute. On April 8, 2025, the probate court entered an order granting Pyke’s application for administrator’s commission in part and denying it in part. In its order, the court expressly found that Pyke had “taken care of and managed the Estate in compliance with the standards set forth in the Texas Estates Code.” Nevertheless, the court found good cause to sustain the objection of Paul—whom the court expressly recognized as the dependent administrator of Hunter’s estate—and found that the requested amount 13 of $26,209.55[8] was “unreasonable and unjust.” Observing that it had previously denied Pyke a statutory commission on the sale of the Carrollton property due to the payment of a five percent realtor’s commission on that transaction, the probate court denied Pyke a statutory commission on the sale of the Plano property for the same reason— finding that allowing such commission in addition to the five percent realtor’s commissions on these transactions “would result in total commissions paid on each transaction to be in excess of five percent (>5%)” and citing Section 352.002(b)(1) of the Estates Code for authority. Instead, the court approved and awarded Pyke an administrator’s commission of $2,027.74 solely on “actual disbursements” subject to commission, leaving cash receipts other than the real estate transactions—for example, for the sale of the decedent’s car—completely uncompensated. The probate court subsequently entered an order approving the final account of the Estate. In the order, the court ordered the payment of (1) $2,027.74 for the statutory commission on cash disbursements it had previously awarded to Pyke, (2) $5,713.27 in attorney’s fees and expenses for legal services provided by Pyke to the Estate separate and distinct from his administration, 9 and (3) $7,994.81 in attorney’s fees and expenses 8 This amount appears to be a typographical error in the trial court’s order, as Pyke had requested a total administrator’s commission of $26,109.55. 9 At the beginning of his administration, Pyke filed a notice with the probate court that, as a licensed attorney who anticipated providing legal services to the Estate in addition to his services as administrator, he intended to seek dual compensation as both attorney and administrator. Pyke then sought attorney’s fees and expenses in the amount of $12,794.21 during the first annual reporting period, which the court reduced 14 for legal services provided by another law firm to Alexis.10 Conditioned upon payment of these amounts, the probate court ordered the disbursement of the balance of the corpus of the Estate—all cash—in equal thirds to Alexis, Sabrina, and Pyke, now expressly identified by the court as the Dependent Administrator of the Estate of Hunter Wahlen, Deceased. Upon this final distribution to the heirs, the court ordered Pyke to file a Report of Compliance and Application to Close and Discharge the Administrator. Pyke timely filed a notice of appeal expressly complaining of the probate court’s April 8, 2025 order granting in part and denying in part his application for an administrator’s commission and contending that this was a final judgment “as no further orders granting or denying commissions will be entered.” II. Jurisdiction “At the outset, we take up a question of jurisdiction, because we must consider our jurisdiction sua sponte when it seems in doubt.” In re Est. of Banta, No. 02-21-00327- CV, 2022 WL 2526940, at *1 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth July 7, 2022, pet. denied). to an award of $10,451.71. Pyke subsequently sought $6,288.27 in attorney’s fees and legal expenses for the final accounting period, which the probate court reduced to an award of $5,713.27. In seeking an administrator’s commission for the first annual and final accounting periods, Pyke explained how his legal fees and commission represented separate forms of compensation for distinct services provided. 10 This amount represents the full amount of attorney’s fees and legal expenses sought by Alexis, who retained another law firm to represent the heirs before and during the administration. The probate court awarded the amount without reduction. 15 “‘Courts are empowered to note potential jurisdictional defects sua sponte,’ and by doing so, a court ‘discharges its duty to ensure that the court itself is functioning in an authorized and properly judicial capacity.’” Hidalgo Cnty. Water Improvement Dist. No. 3 v. Hidalgo Cnty. Irrigation Dist. No. 1, 669 S.W.3d 178, 185 (Tex. 2023) (quoting Rattray v. City of Brownsville, 662 S.W.3d 860, 867, 869 (Tex. 2023)). Stated differently, we are obligated to examine and resolve any question that arises concerning our jurisdictional authority to address and determine the merits of an appeal even when the parties to the appeal neither perceive its absence nor challenge its existence. See Pike v. Tex. EMC Mgmt., LLC, 610 S.W.3d 763, 774 (Tex. 2020); M.O. Dental Lab v. Rape, 139 S.W.3d 671, 673 (Tex. 2004); Eagle Gun Range, Inc. v. Bancalari, 495 S.W.3d 887, 889 (Tex. App.— Fort Worth 2016, no pet.) (“We are required to review sua sponte jurisdictional issues.”); St. Louis Sw. Ry. v. Elliston, 128 S.W. 675, 675 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth 1910, no writ) (“The court will of its own motion notice this fact of its want of jurisdiction.”). By way of his notice of appeal, Pyke asserted that the order made the subject of his appeal was the order the probate court entered granting in part and denying in part his application for administrator’s commission. After we sent a letter to Pyke questioning the finality and appealability of that order, see Tex. R. App. P. 42.3(a) (authorizing courts of appeals to dismiss for lack of jurisdiction sua sponte after providing the parties with ten days’ notice), he timely filed an amended notice of appeal adding the probate court’s order approving his final account—which incorporated the essential elements of the commission order—as the subject of his appeal and arguing 16 that these orders, viewed together, should be analogized to orders granting or denying requests for attorney’s fees that have been held to be final and appealable. See In re Est. of Harris, No. 02-19-00333-CV, 2021 WL 832721, at *4 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth Mar. 4, 2021, pet. denied) (holding that an order awarding attorney ad litem fees or terminating attorney ad litem’s representation “concludes a discrete phase of the probate proceeding” and is subject to appeal); Wittner v. Scanlan, 959 S.W.2d 640, 642 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 1995, writ denied) (“[W]e hold that the order awarding attorney’s fees to [the administrator of the decedent’s estate] is final for the purposes of appeal.”). But we have previously held that we lack jurisdiction to hear an appeal from an order approving an account for final settlement, interpreting the order as merely an intermediate step toward closing the estate and not a final, appealable order. In re Est. of Froehle, No. 02-18-00003-CV, 2018 WL 2440388, at *1 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth May 31, 2018, no pet.) (first citing In re Est. of Scott, 364 S.W.3d 926, 927–28 (Tex. App.— Dallas 2012, no pet.) (concluding that order approving account for final settlement that authorized distribution of the estate pursuant to a determination of heirship and that specified additional steps necessary to close the estate—including the filing of proper receipts and an application for discharge of the administrator and closure of the estate—was not final and appealable); then citing Bozeman v. Kornblit, 232 S.W.3d 261, 264 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 2007, no pet.) (determining that order approving account for final settlement and specifying additional steps for closing the estate—such 17 as payment of attorney’s fees awarded by a separate order, delivery of property and funds to the heirs according to a prior judgment of heirship, and filing an application to close the estate—was not final and appealable); then citing In re Est. of Aguilar, No. 04-16-00250-CV, 2016 WL 3944817, at *1 (Tex. App.—San Antonio July 20, 2016, no pet.) (concluding that order approving final account was not final and appealable but dismissing appeal for want of jurisdiction upon appellants’ motion); and then citing In re Est. of Waddell, No. 13-13-00202-CV, 2013 WL 1932173, at *1 (Tex. App.—Corpus Christi–Edinburg May 9, 2013, no pet.) (holding that order approving annual account and authorizing expenditures was not final and appealable)). But see Jarvis v. Feild, 327 S.W.3d 918, 930–32 (Tex. App.—Corpus Christi–Edinburg 2010, no pet.) (addressing “Order Approving Account for Final Settlement”—an order regarding both asset valuation and final distribution to heirs of estate—as final and appealable). Given the addition of the order approving Pyke’s final account as a subject of his amended notice of appeal, we sent a second letter to him questioning our jurisdiction considering Estate of Froehle. Pyke responded with additional briefing expounding on the authorities he previously cited and distinguishing the factual circumstances present in Estate of Froehle from those here because, unlike in Estate of Froehle, Pyke’s final account was found by the probate court’s order, after audit, to comply with the law, leaving only the distribution of the remaining assets of the Estate to the heirs, after which Pyke was to file a report confirming such distribution and a motion seeking discharge as the 18 dependent administrator and the closing of his administration. Based on this briefing, we opted to carry the question of our jurisdiction with the case and ordered the parties to include in their merits briefs arguments and authorities addressing the question. 11 “The general rule, with a few mostly statutory exceptions, is that an appeal may be taken only from a final judgment.” In re Est. of Tacke, No. 02-14-00400-CV, 2015 WL 1543912, at *2 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth Apr. 2, 2015, no pet.) (citing Lehmann v. Har– Con Corp., 39 S.W.3d 191, 195 (Tex. 2001)). A judgment is not ordinarily final for purposes of appeal unless the judgment disposes of all pending parties and claims in the record. Id. One of the statutory exceptions to this general rule, however, exists in probate cases. Tex. Est. Code § 32.001(c) (“A final order issued by a probate court is appealable to the court of appeals.”); see In re Est. of Wheatfall, 729 S.W.3d 788, 790–91 (Tex. 2026); De Ayala v. Mackie, 193 S.W.3d 575, 578 (Tex. 2006) (op. on reh’g); Crowson v. Wakeham, 897 S.W.2d 779, 781 (Tex. 1995). In probate proceedings, “multiple judgments final for purposes of appeal can be rendered on certain discrete issues.” De Ayala, 193 S.W.3d at 578; In re Est. of Heffner, No. 02-21-00419-CV, 2023 WL 3876760, at *2 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth June 8, 2023, pet. denied). 11 When Pyke filed his appellant’s brief, he did not provide the additional briefing requested. Nor did he file any responsive appellee’s brief as the dependent administrator of Hunter’s estate, let alone any briefing in opposition to our jurisdiction. By correspondence, Alexis declined to file a responsive brief to avoid additional legal fees. Sabrina simply did not respond. 19 “A probate proceeding consists of a continuing series of events, in which the probate court may make decisions at various points in the administration of the estate on which later decisions will be based.” Logan v. McDaniel, 21 S.W.3d 683, 688 (Tex. App.—Austin 2000, pet. denied); see Christensen v. Harkins, 740 S.W.2d 69, 74 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth 1987, order) (“The nature of ‘administration’ contemplates decisions to be made on which other decisions will be based.”). As a result, “[t]he need to review controlling, intermediate decisions before an error can harm later phases of the proceeding justifies modifying the one[-]final[-]judgment rule with respect to probate cases.” Tacke, 2015 WL 1543912, at *2 (citing Logan, 21 S.W.3d at 688); see In re Est. of Romo, 469 S.W.3d 260, 262 (Tex. App.—El Paso 2015, no pet.) (same); Spies v. Milner, 928 S.W.2d 317, 318–19 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth 1996, no writ) (quoting Christensen, 740 S.W.2d at 74 (“There must be a practical way to review erroneous, controlling, intermediate decisions before the consequences of the error do irreparable injury.”)). To determine whether an order is final and appealable under Section 32.001(c), the Supreme Court of Texas has promulgated the following test: If there is an express statute . . . declaring the phase of the probate proceedings to be final and appealable, that statute controls. Otherwise, if there is a proceeding of which the order in question may logically be considered a part, but one or more pleadings also part of that proceeding raise issues or parties not disposed of, then the probate order is interlocutory. 20 Crowson, 897 S.W.2d at 783; see Wheatfall, 729 S.W.3d at 791 (reaffirming the Crowson test for finality in probate proceedings); De Ayala, 193 S.W.3d at 578 (same); In re Est. of Turnbow, No. 02-20-00243-CV, 2021 WL 4898663, at *2 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth Oct. 21, 2021, no pet.) (same). “An order that merely sets the stage for the resolution of proceedings is interlocutory and not appealable.” Tacke, 2015 WL 1543912, at *3 (citing De Ayala, 193 S.W.3d at 579). “To apply either part of the Crowson test, we must first identify the phase of the probate proceeding at issue.” In re Est. of Wilson, No. 02-06-00075-CV, 2006 WL 2986566, at *2 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth Oct. 19, 2006, no pet.); see In re Est. of Lynch, No. 07-26-00054-CV, 2026 WL 916625, at *2 (Tex. App.—Amarillo Mar. 31, 2026, no pet.) (“Applying that framework requires identification of the relevant phase of the probate proceeding.”). Unfortunately, “evaluating what constitutes a ‘particular phase’ of a probate proceeding is less straightforward than it appears.” Wheatfall, 729 S.W.3d at 791. But because the Crowson test does not limit the term “phase” to the completion of a mere timeframe or stage of a probate proceeding and clearly contemplates a substantive component, we must look not only to when the challenged ruling or order occurred during the probate proceeding but also to its substantive nature, i.e., whether future rulings and orders necessarily rely on its correct determination. See Tacke, 2015 WL 1543912, at *2 (observing probate exception to one-final-judgment rule permits appellate review and correction to avoid irreparable harm of mistaken ruling later in proceedings); Logan, 21 S.W.3d at 688 (same); Spies, 928 S.W.2d at 318–19 (same); 21 Christensen, 740 S.W.2d at 74 (same). With this understanding, a controlling, intermediate decision concerning what compensation should be awarded to an executor or administrator for the administration of a decedent’s estate, if any, appears to constitute a discrete or particular phase of probate proceedings subject to appeal pursuant to Section 32.001(c). See Lynch, 2026 WL 916625, at *2 (concluding determination of executor’s compensation is discrete phase of probate proceeding when coupled with executor’s removal for maladministration); see also Harris, 2021 WL 832721, at *4 (concluding determination of attorney ad litem’s compensation is discrete phase of probate proceeding when coupled with termination of ad litem’s representation). Section 352.002(a) authorizes a five percent commission to executors and administrators as compensation for their administration of an estate: An executor, administrator, or temporary administrator a court finds to have taken care of and managed an estate in compliance with the standards of this title is entitled to receive a five percent commission on all amounts that the executor or administrator actually receives or pays out in cash in the administration of the estate. Tex. Est. Code § 352.002(a). “The commission . . . may not exceed, in the aggregate, more than five percent of the gross fair market value of the estate subject to administration[.]” Id. § 352.002(b)(1). A commission is not allowed, however, for (A) receiving funds belonging to the testator or intestate that were, at the time of the testator’s or intestate’s death, either on hand or held for the testator or intestate in a financial institution or a brokerage firm, inc