Full Opinion

In the Court of Appeals Second Appellate District of Texas at Fort Worth ___________________________ No. 02-25-00275-CV ___________________________ MODERN BUILDERS, LLC; ALICIA GONZALEZ; BETSY DARLING; CALLIE STEVENS; GRAYSON BUSTER; JAIME COBB TINSLEY; TOM TINSLEY; JESSE FOX; KELRAY LLC; URBAN LEGACY PROPERTIES, LLC, D/B/A URBAN LEGACY PROPERTIES SERIES A LLC; LAUREN A. BRADY; LAUREN BARRETT; LESA SUSI, TRUSTEE OF THE SUSI LIVING TRUST; LORI DUGDALE; M AND M POOL HOUSE LLC; MARTHA DOMINGUEZ; ADULFO DOMINGUEZ; SEAN SULLIVAN; SHANNON ROSS; SUSAN HARPER; SMITH-WALLACE PROPERTIES, LLC; THERESA RILEY, TRUSTEE OF THE TK RILEY FAMILY TRUST; TOM KRAUSE; TRACEY AMAYA; EDUARDO AMAYA; BROOKVALE HOLDINGS, LLC; AND LUCAS RUIZ, Appellants V. CITY OF FORT WORTH, Appellee On Appeal from the 352nd District Court Tarrant County, Texas Trial Court No. 352-342969-23 Before Sudderth, C.J.; Kerr, J.; and Gonzalez, J.1 Opinion by Justice Kerr 1 The Honorable Ruben Gonzalez, Judge of the 432nd District Court of Tarrant County, sitting by assignment of the Chief Justice of the Texas Supreme Court pursuant to Section 74.003(h) of the Government Code. See Tex. Gov’t Code § 74.003(h). 2 OPINION I. Introduction Following lengthy evaluation, the City of Fort Worth decided in 2018 that short-term rentals (STRs) are best confined to certain areas of the city, where they are now expressly allowed, and in 2023, those lawful STRs became subject to registration requirements.2 The appellants (Owners) own properties in single-family residential districts where STRs are not—and never were—explicitly allowed under the City’s zoning scheme. Raising constitutional and other challenges to their inability to lawfully use their properties as STRs, the Owners warn darkly of an “Orwellian surveillance apparatus” deploying “neighborhood informants, police interrogations, and monitoring by city employees” that is wholly at odds with “Cowtown, Where the West Begins.” Despite this asserted dystopian hellscape, this case boils down to land uses versus police powers. For the reasons that follow, we hold that the Owners have no vested right to lease their properties short-term; that the City’s two STR Ordinances rationally relate to legitimate government interests in preserving the character of single-family residential neighborhoods; that those Owners who were operating STRs before the 2018 Ordinance was adopted had no settled and reasonable expectations that they could so use their properties; and that the Owners’ ultra vires claim is not proper against the 2 We refer to the 2018 and 2023 ordinances collectively as the “STR Ordinances.” 3 City. We additionally hold that the trial court did not reversibly err by admitting the testimony of the City’s expert and that its award of attorney’s fees to the City was not an abuse of discretion. II. Background A. How the City historically viewed residential rentals of less than thirty days. As Dana Burghdoff—the City’s Zoning Administrator between 2007 and 2019 and after that the Assistant City Manager—explained, since “at least 2007” the City “consistently” determined that “STRs were prohibited in single-family residential districts (and other residentially[ ]zoned districts).”3 When residents or property owners asked, they would be told of this prohibition. The City based its determination on existing provisions within its comprehensive zoning ordinance. In particular, as part of its Chapter 9 “Definitions” section, the zoning ordinance defined “bed and breakfast home” as an owner–operator’s homestead or primary one-family residence providing overnight accommodation to transient 3 In one case, the City sued several residential-property owners who had been leasing their properties on a short-term basis and obtained an agreed order in 2008 that permanently enjoined the owners from having “more than one lessee per dwelling unit during any thirty (30) day period.” The record suggests that this was the situation mentioned in the summary-judgment affidavit of the City’s Deputy Code Compliance Director, who recounted that “prior to the passage of the 2018 Ordinance, Code Compliance staff shut down homes in the Arlington Heights neighborhood for hosting ‘transient or short term’ guests during rodeo season.” The street addresses of the properties covered by the 2008 agreed order place the majority of them within Fort Worth’s Arlington Heights neighborhood, which is close to the traditional venue for the annual Fort Worth Stock Show & Rodeo. 4 guests and defined “transient or short[-]term resident” as an individual who occupies or rents a home or room for less than 30 days.4 According to Burghdoff, because bed and breakfasts were not a permitted use in single-family residential districts per the “Residential District Use Table”—Section 4.603 of the City’s zoning ordinance and part of its Chapter 4 “District Regulations”—neither were their analogs, STRs. B. As online STR-booking platforms took off, the City took a closer look. Beginning around a decade ago, such websites as VRBO and Airbnb became wildly popular ways to book STRs.5 That popularity drove an influx of inquiries to the City about whether STRs were allowed in residential districts—and a corresponding increase in complaints from City residents about STRs and their guests, including complaints about noise disturbances, loud parties, trash, and parking or traffic congestion. The City thus began a process in 2016 to research how other cities were dealing with STRs and to clarify in the zoning ordinance those districts within which STRs were or were not allowed. A November 2016 City Manager report noted that “[c]urrent regulations”—presumably referring to those covering bed and breakfast homes— 4 At all relevant times, bed and breakfast homes have been a permitted use—by special exception from the City’s Board of Adjustment—in two-family residential districts under the comprehensive zoning ordinance. 5 In her 2024 deposition, one Owner agreed that, since 2016, platforms like Airbnb have become “much more prevalent” and have “entered into the popular zeitgeist,” noting that “‘Airbnb’ is a verb now.” 5 “prohibit[ed] the rental of residential property” for less than 30 days in single-family residential districts, and the report outlined a plan to communicate that fact to neighborhoods. A little over a year later, another report proposed adding the use “transient or short-term rental”—already a defined term, as noted—to the use tables “to clarify that the use is not allowed in residential districts outside of bed and breakfast homes or inns, and is allowed in mixed-use, commercial, and industrial districts as a commercial use.” C. The City’s review yielded an amended zoning ordinance in 2018. The preamble to the adopted Ordinance No. 23110-02-2018 (the 2018 Ordinance) noted that “short[-]term home rentals (homes rented for less than 30 consecutive days) are not specifically defined, expressly permitted[,] or listed in any of the zoning use categories provided in the use tables for residential, non-residential[,] or form-based districts”; that in determining whether a property is being used as an STR, “if the duration of the stay is less than 30 days, that use is not allowed since it is more analogous to a bed or breakfast home[,] which is allowed in a two-family zoning district by special exception but is prohibited in one-family zoning districts”; and that the Zoning Ordinance was being amended to “affirm” that STRs are prohibited in one- and two-family zoning districts by adding a definition for short-term home rental and by including that newly defined use in the land-use tables “to clarify that a short[-]term home rental is not allowed in residential districts but is allowed in other districts as a commercial use.” Burghdoff’s summary-judgment affidavit explained that STR use, as 6 “commercial,” “is inherently incompatible with a residentially[ ]zoned neighborhood where there exists a sense of community and camaraderie (or, at least, familiarity) between neighbors. STR guests, by definition, do not stay in a neighborhood or community to build and maintain those relationships.” The 2018 Ordinance defined a “Short[-]Term Home Rental”—which we have shortened to STR—this way: The rental for compensation of dwellings or accessory dwelling units for the purpose of overnight lodging for a period of not less than one night and not more than 30 consecutive days other than ongoing month-to-month tenancy granted to the same renter for the same unit as their primary residence. . . . The residential-use table was correspondingly amended to add “Short[-]Term Home Rental” to the “Other” category of uses, with an empty cell in the use table underneath all the types of residential zoning districts to visibly signal that STRs were not allowed there (but were an allowed use in non-residential areas). 6 According to Burghdoff, the deliberative process surrounding the 2018 Ordinance generated little in the way of public comment. D. The City delved further into the STR issue between 2019 and 2022. Although the 2020 COVID pandemic rekindled the debate over STRs, with the City’s being asked to consider allowing STRs in residentially zoned districts and 6 See Fort Worth, Tex., Code of Ordinances, app. A, ch. 4, art. 6, § 4.601(d) (“Uses not allowed. An empty cell [in a table designation] indicates that a use is not allowed in the respective zoning district.”). 7 receiving more outcry in opposition, the City’s Development Services Department had already begun, in 2019, to investigate more closely whether STRs could have any place in residential districts. Over a roughly three-year period, the City— • researched other cities’ STR ordinances; • contacted other cities to ask about their STR-regulating experiences; • consulted organizations in the field of city planning and zoning about STR regulations; • reviewed scholarly articles about STRs’ negative impacts on residential neighborhoods; • analyzed how the City could ensure that legally operating STRs were paying the City’s Hotel Occupancy Tax; and • tracked and compiled STR complaints and violations within the City. The City received several presentations and reports concerning STRs and possible regulations between September 2019 and March 2022, after which it opened up the STR issue for public debate. E. Further research and public input solicited during 2022 led to the 2023 Ordinance. During multiple meetings in 2022, the City Council heard public comment both for and against STRs in residential neighborhoods. The City also set up a publicly accessible webpage to house STR-related information and created surveys and questionnaires so that all interested constituencies could share their thoughts and concerns. Additionally, the City engaged a data-mining company to collect details about existing STR activity in Fort Worth; that company reported its findings in August 2022. 8 The upshot of the City’s multiyear investigation and community engagement was (1) feedback from full-time residents and neighborhood associations that, in Burghdoff’s words, “overwhelmingly” supported continuing to ban STRs by right in residential districts and (2) consensus that lawful STRs should be subject to a registration ordinance. So in February 2023, the City Council adopted Ordinance No. 26005-02-2023 (the 2023 Ordinance). The 2023 Ordinance did not change the 2018 Ordinance’s prohibition of STRs in residential districts but added regulations covering those STRs that could lawfully operate in the City’s commercial and mixed-use districts.7 An owner in a residential district who wants to rent out property for less than 30 days can apply for a zoning change.8 Among the City’s findings underpinning the 2023 Ordinance was that regulating STRs in the areas where they were allowed was “necessary for the health, safety[,] and welfare of the general public, the promotion of consistent land uses and development, and the protection of landowners and residents of” the City. Recognizing the importance of “support[ing] tourism in a balanced way,” the City Council “determined 7 Those regulations include ones requiring registration with and approval by the City so that the City can pinpoint STR locations, ensure that all taxes are being paid, and have contact information for STR owners and agents for any complaints and emergencies. The City has approved at least one such requested change by rezoning a duplex 8 and two adjacent single-family dwellings from residential to low-intensity mixed use. 9 that enacting a registration program for STRs will serve to balance the rights of all stakeholders through a fair and balanced regulatory framework and ensure that the STRs do not become a nuisance.” F. This litigation In June 2023, more than one hundred9 Owners sued for declaratory and permanent injunctive relief10 against the City over the STR Ordinances, alleging (1) unconstitutional deprivation of property rights, see Tex. Const. art. I, § 19; (2) unconstitutionally retroactive deprivation of settled property rights, see Tex. Const. art. I, § 16; 11 (3) arbitrary discrimination that violates equal protection, see Tex. Const. art. I, § 3; and (4) ultra vires acts exceeding the City’s authority under the Zoning Enabling Act, Tex. Loc. Gov’t Code §§ 211.001–.058. Not all of them are parties to this appeal. 9 The Owners did not seek interim injunctive relief to halt enforcement of the 10 City’s Ordinances while the case was pending. Twenty-one of the original plaintiffs had purchased their properties before 11 2018; seven are among the appellants, and we will refer to these seven as Retroactivity Owners for purposes of the Article I, Section 16 claim. 10 After both sides moved for traditional summary judgment, the trial court entered a final judgment in the City’s favor and awarded attorney’s fees to it. 12 This appeal followed. III. Issues on Appeal The Owners raise these issues: • Whether the trial court erred in dismissing, on summary judgment, the Owners’ constitutional and ultra vires claims; • Whether the trial court erred in considering the City’s expert’s affidavit; and • Whether the trial court erred in awarding attorney’s fees to the City. IV. Constitutional Claims13 A. Standard of review and applicable law We first address the Owners’ claims involving the Texas Constitution: due course of law, retroactivity, and equal protection. See Tex. Const. art. I, §§ 3, 16, 19. Although we examine the entire record in considering such claims, see Patel v. Tex. Dep’t of Licensing & Regul., 469 S.W.3d 69, 87 (Tex. 2015), our review of these legal matters—as with our review of summary judgments generally, see Travelers Ins. v. Joachim, 315 S.W.3d 860, 12 Before taking up the attorney’s-fee issue, the trial court first granted the summary-judgment motion on unspecified grounds, a ruling that was subsumed within its final judgment. In this section we address the first three subparts of the Owners’ first issue. 13 Their fourth subpart, a nonconstitutional ultra vires claim, involves different considerations that we address separately. 11 862 (Tex. 2010) 14—is de novo. See Mayhew v. Town of Sunnyvale, 964 S.W.2d 922, 932 (Tex. 1998) (noting that “ultimate question” of zoning ordinance’s constitutionality is question of law, not fact). A duly enacted statute or ordinance enjoys a “strong presumption” of constitutional validity. State v. Loe, 692 S.W.3d 215, 227 (Tex. 2024); see Patel, 469 S.W.3d at 87; City of Brookside Village v. Comeau, 633 S.W.2d 790, 792–93 (Tex. 1982). A party challenging an ordinance’s constitutionality shoulders “an extraordinary burden to show that no conclusive or even controversial or issuable fact or condition existed which would authorize the municipality’s passage of the ordinance.” Comeau, 633 at 792–93 (citation modified). A century ago, the United States Supreme Court established a municipality’s right to enact zoning ordinances, using language that seems prescient in today’s fast-changing world of the internet and online STR-booking platforms: [P]roblems have developed, and constantly are developing, which require, and will continue to require, additional restrictions in respect of the use and occupation of private lands in urban communities. Regulations, the wisdom, necessity, and validity of which, as applied to existing conditions, are so apparent that they are now uniformly sustained, a century ago, or And as always, we consider summary-judgment evidence in the light most 14 favorable to the nonmovant, crediting evidence favorable to the nonmovant if reasonable jurors could and disregarding evidence contrary to the nonmovant unless reasonable jurors could not. Mann Frankfort Stein & Lipp Advisors, Inc. v. Fielding, 289 S.W.3d 844, 848 (Tex. 2009). We indulge every reasonable inference and resolve any doubts in the nonmovant’s favor. 20801, Inc. v. Parker, 249 S.W.3d 392, 399 (Tex. 2008). 12 even half a century ago, probably would have been rejected as arbitrary and oppressive. Village of Euclid v. Ambler Realty Co., 272 U.S. 365, 386–87, 47 S. Ct. 114, 118 (1926). Accordingly, “no fixed constraints may be placed on the police power for the future.” Maher v. City of New Orleans, 516 F.2d 1051, 1059 (5th Cir. 1975). Rounding up then-current United States Supreme Court authority, the Maher court noted the “ample and protean” boundaries of police power and a legislature’s “rich and flexible” power to “essay new solutions to new problems.” Id. Although the Fifth Federal Circuit’s comments came half a century ago, and hot on the heels of another high-court zoning decision, 15 they apply with equal force today. Texas recognizes that “[z]oning ordinances and land-use ordinances are valid exercises of a city’s police power to safeguard the health, comfort, and general welfare of its citizens.” City of Dickinson v. Crystal Cruise Invs., LLC, No. 01-24-00684-CV, 2026 WL 530391, at *5 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] Feb. 26, 2026, no pet. h.); see Tex. Loc. Gov’t Code § 211.001 (reiterating bases for municipal zoning authority). As we have explained, zoning ordinances evince “legitimate governmental interests” when they relate to “(1) safeguarding the life, health, safety, welfare, and property of STR occupants, neighborhoods, and the general public and (2) minimizing the adverse 15 Village of Belle Terre v. Boraas, 416 U.S. 1, 9, 94 S. Ct. 1536, 1541 (1974) (noting that a city’s police power is “not confined to elimination of filth, stench, and unhealthy places” but is “ample to lay out zones where family values, youth values, and the blessings of quiet seclusion and clean air make the area a sanctuary for people”). 13 impacts resulting from increased transient rental uses in neighborhoods that were planned, approved, and constructed for single-family residences.” Draper v. City of Arlington, 629 S.W.3d 777, 786 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth 2021, pet. denied); see Hignell-Stark v. City of New Orleans, 46 F.4th 317, 328 (5th Cir. 2022) (recognizing “legitimate local purposes” of “preventing nuisances, promoting affordable housing, and protecting neighborhoods’ residential character”). With those principles in mind, we turn to the STR Owners’ constitutional complaints. B. Due-course-of-law claim The Texas Constitution provides that “[n]o citizen of this State shall be deprived of life, liberty, property, privileges[,] or immunities . . . except by the due course of the law of the land.” Tex. Const. art. I, § 19. To date, the Texas Supreme Court has found no meaningful distinction between federal due-process and state due-course-of-law guarantees. E.g., Klumb v. Hous. Mun. Emps. Pension Sys., 458 S.W.3d 1, 15 (Tex. 2015) (citing Univ. of Tex. Med. Sch. v. Than, 901 S.W.2d 926, 929 (Tex. 1995)); see also Patel, 469 S.W.3d at 86 (noting typical—but not mirror-image—federal–state alignment in this area). 16 But see City of Grapevine v. Muns, 671 S.W.3d 675, 677 (Tex. 2023) (Young, J., 16 concurring in denial of petition for review) (explaining that waiting for “better vehicle” to address STR bans’ constitutionality could “allow advocates and scholars to more fully develop the original—and perhaps distinct—meaning[ ]” of the Texas due-course-of-law clause). 14 In reviewing due-course claims, we must determine (1) whether a plaintiff has a property interest that warrants constitutional protection and (2) only if so, “whether the defendant followed due course of law in depriving the plaintiff of that interest,” Loe, 692 S.W.3d at 227–28, or—put differently—“what process is due,” Tex. Dep’t of State Health Servs. v. Crown Distrib. LLC, 647 S.W.3d 648, 653 n.16 (Tex. 2022) (quoting Mosley v. Tex. Health & Hum. Servs. Comm’n, 593 S.W.3d 250, 264 (Tex. 2019)). Under Patel, a plaintiff who has a constitutionally protected property interest must show that either (1) the challenged ordinance’s purpose “could not arguably be rationally related to a legitimate governmental interest; or (2) when considered as a whole, the [ordinance’s] actual, real-world effect as applied to the challenging party could not arguably be rationally related to, or is so burdensome as to be oppressive in light of, the governmental interest.” 17 469 S.W.3d at 87. 1. The STR Owners have no vested right to lease short term. “[T]o rise to the level of a due[-]process [or due-course] deprivation, [a plaintiff] must first possess a vested property right.” Rancho De Los Arboles LLC v. Town of Cross Roads, No. 02-25-00208-CV, 2026 WL 253459, at *6 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth Jan. 30, 2026, no pet.) (first citing Klumb, 458 S.W.3d at 17; and then citing City of Grapevine v. Muns, 651 S.W.3d 317, 345 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth 2021, pet. denied) (op. on reh’g)). 17 Although the City argues that the “so burdensome” test is limited to economic-regulation statutes, we assume without deciding that Patel’s second prong could apply to the situation here but do not reach it. See n.21, infra. 15 A vested right must have “some definitive, rather than merely potential existence” and be “something more than a mere expectancy based upon an anticipated continuance of an existing law.” Id. (first quoting City of LaMarque v. Braskey, 216 S.W.3d 861, 864 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 2007, pet. denied); and then quoting Klumb, 458 S.W.3d at 15). And a “bare contention that the right to use property as an STR is inherently vested is unsupported . . . in the law.” Id. at *6 n.13. Property rights are not “absolute,” Crown Distrib., 647 S.W.3d at 654, and “[l]imitations on property rights may be by . . . appropriate government action under its police power.” Severance v. Patterson, 370 S.W.3d 705, 710 (Tex. 2012). No “constitutionally protected vested right” exists to “use real property in any certain way, without restriction.” Braskey, 216 S.W.3d at 863 (citing City of Univ. Park v. Benners, 485 S.W.2d 773, 778 (Tex. 1972)); see Zaatari v. City of Austin, 615 S.W.3d 172, 191 (Tex. App.—Austin 2019, pet. denied) (noting that right to lease for profit can be subject to restriction under certain circumstances); Consumer Serv. All. of Tex., Inc. v. City of Dallas, 433 S.W.3d 796, 805 (Tex. App.—Dallas 2014, no pet.) (“Property owners do not have a constitutionally protected, vested right to use property in any certain way.”). In Rancho De Los Arboles—our most recent foray into the STR issue—we remanded Rancho’s due-course claim for repleading because neither side had provided the version of Cross Roads’ ordinance in effect when Rancho acquired the property it had been using as an STR for many years before receiving Cross Roads’ notice that STRs were prohibited in single-family residential areas. 2026 WL 253459, at *1, *6–7. 16 For that reason, “Rancho ha[d] not demonstrated that it had a vested property right to use the property as an STR when it acquired the property and ha[d] not met its pleading burden for this cause of action.” Id. at *7. A few years before Rancho De Los Arboles, in Grapevine, we concluded on interlocutory appeal that the STR owners there had a general vested right to lease as part of their “bundle of rights” that was sufficient to support a viable due-course claim challenging Grapevine’s outright ban on STRs anywhere within the city. 651 S.W.3d at 347. But we circumscribed that conclusion: “[w]hether the durational restrictions imposed by the STR Ordinance violate[d] the Homeowners’ due-course-of-law rights regarding their right to lease [went] to the case’s merits, an altogether improper inquiry at [that] stage of the case.” Id. That is, we did not hold that what we viewed as a general right to lease necessarily or even likely encompassed a vested right to lease on a short-term basis; we did nothing more than permit the owners’ due-course claim to proceed to a merits disposition in the trial court. Id. In so doing, we were agnostic about its eventual fate. Reading Rancho De Los Arboles and Grapevine together—and together with other persuasive authority—suggests that a right to lease short-term, if it is to be called “vested,” can be properly informed by whether that right was enshrined under a 17 preexisting ordinance. 18 See, e.g., Crystal Cruise, 2026 WL 530391, at *6 (holding that because city’s vacation-rental ordinance had been in place for six years before STR owner bought the property, the owner “[could not] show that it has any vested right to use the property as a vacation rental as a matter of law.”); see also Marfil v. City of New Braunfels, No. 6:20-CV-00248, 2021 WL 8082644, at *5 (W.D. Tex. July 29, 2021) (agreeing that “the right to lease property for short durations is objectively out of place on” list of traditionally protected interests as collected in Washington v. Glucksberg, 521 U.S. 702, 720 (1997)), report and recommendation adopted, 2022 WL 18034356 (W.D. Tex. Sept. 15, 2022), vacated and remanded, 70 F.4th 893 (5th Cir. 2023); cf. Zaatari, 615 S.W.3d at 191 (noting city’s acknowledgement that under earlier ordinances allowing STRs, “Austinites ha[d] long exercised their right to lease their property” as STRs, which were “an ‘established practice’ and a ‘historically . . . allowable use’”); Village of Tiki Island v. Ronquille, 463 S.W.3d 562, 587 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 2015, no pet.) (recognizing narrow vested right in particular use of property when new law restricts an existing use). Perhaps, then, a better way to look at the intersection of STRs and municipal regulation is to view STRs as conditionally allowed uses rather than as having the sort of “definitive, rather than merely potential existence,” Rancho De Los Arboles, In Grapevine, we held that STRs had been allowed under the city’s preexisting 18 ordinance but that, under Benners, the owners did not thereby possess a vested right to lease short-term. 651 S.W.3d at 346. 18 2026 WL 253459, at *6, that exalts them automatically to vested status. Certainly, as online STR platforms have proliferated, more and more municipalities have responded with various types of ordinances: banning them altogether (e.g., Grapevine); banning them but grandfathering in those who had previously used their properties as STRs (e.g., Marfil v. City of New Braunfels, No. 6:20-CV-00248, 2025 WL 243028, at *2 (W.D. Tex. Jan. 10, 2025) (order on remand), appeal docketed, No. 25-50025 (5th Cir. Jan. 17, 2025)); banning them without a special-use permit (e.g., Crystal Cruise); creating STR zones and requiring operating permits (e.g., Draper); and other approaches.19 To us, these evolving governmental responses are of a piece with the United States Supreme Court’s recognition, in Village of Euclid, that problems are “constantly” developing that “require, and will continue to require, additional restrictions in respect of the use and occupation of private lands in urban communities.” 272 U.S. at 386–87, 47 S. Ct. at 118. We are not insensitive to Lockean notions of and respect for private-property rights, but communities have important interests, too, under which municipalities may “essay new solutions to new problems.” Maher, 516 F.2d at 1059. We recognized as much in Draper by labeling “legitimate” those governmental interests in “(1) safeguarding the life, health, safety, welfare, and property of STR occupants, We express no opinion about the constitutional validity of any ordinances other 19 than those at issue in this appeal. 19 neighborhoods, and the general public” and—equally important—“(2) minimizing the adverse impacts resulting from increased transient rental uses in neighborhoods that were planned, approved, and constructed for single-family residences.” 629 S.W.3d at 786. Answering the question left open in Grapevine, then, we hold that the Owners do not have a vested common-law right to use their properties as short-term rentals. 20 This 20 This conclusion is bolstered by the Texas Supreme Court’s post-Grapevine decisions in Crown Distributing and Loe, both of which—unlike Patel—focused on the critical threshold issue of carefully and narrowly defining the asserted interest. Crown Distrib., 647 S.W.3d at 653 & n.16 (declining to reach step two because due-course clause did not protect hemp companies’ asserted interest in manufacturing and processing smokable hemp products as part of liberty right to “work and earn a living” and noting that Patel did not engage step one because parties had assumed a protected interest and focused only on second step); Loe, 692 S.W.3d at 231–33 (noting that because “parental control and authority have never been understood as constitutionally mandated absolutes,” “novel treatments for a novel condition [gender dysphoria] are generally within the Legislature’s power to regulate without facing heightened scrutiny,” so although challenged statute “limit[ed] the availability of novel medical treatments for children diagnosed with a novel medical condition, it [did] not deprive those children’s parents of any constitutionally protected right or undermine a custom embedded in our history or traditions”). In defining the interest at stake here, and narrowing it as we should, we thus distinguish between a right to lease and a right to lease for less than 30 days; the former is a core incident of property ownership, the latter a specific use carrying no common-law categorical vested-right protection. See Crystal Cruise, 2026 WL 530391, at *5–6 (holding no vested right to use property as STR). Although in contending that “STRs have long been an unexceptional residential use of property in Texas” the Owners point us to several old cases, e.g., Coalson v. Holmes, 240 S.W. 896 (Tex. 1922); Williams v. State, 47 S.W.2d 298 (Tex. Crim. App. 1932), those cases merely mentioned weekly rentals, and such references were incidental to the legal analysis. But STRs in their current iteration are possible only because of the internet, driving both a qualitative and quantitative leap from boarding-houses of yore and, it is fair to say, exponentially accelerating occupant turnover—not to mention incentivizing a property owner to use 20 holding is enough to affirm judgment on the Owners’ due-course claim, but because rational-basis review applies to the Owners’ equal-protection claim, we will explain here why the STR Ordinances satisfy that test for due-course purposes as well. 21 2. The STR Ordinances have a rational basis. Under highly deferential rational-basis review, 22 we uphold ordinances if a city reasonably believes—if it is “at least fairly debatable”—that they promote a legitimate governmental objective. See Mayhew, 964 S.W.2d at 938. An ordinance violates due process if it “has no foundation in reason and is a mere arbitrary or irrational exercise of power having no substantial relation to the public health, the public morals, the public safety[,] or the public welfare in its proper sense.” Draper, 629 S.W.3d at 786 (quoting Mayhew, 964 S.W.2d at 938). Our concern is not “whether the ordinance his property as an STR rather than lease it out for a longer term. Even the Owners, in their petition, asserted that “[s]hort-term renting is, on a per-diem basis, more lucrative than longer-term rentals.” Cf. Hogan v. S. Methodist Univ., 688 S.W.3d 852, 854–55, 863 (Tex. 2024) (noting that COVID-era statute “created new rules governing novel litigation in the wake of a novel and previously unimaginable event”). We decline to reach Patel’s undue-burden prong, an analysis that is made 21 unnecessary by our holding that the Owners do not have a vested right to engage in short-term renting. 22 The rational-basis test is “the most deferential of the standards of review that courts use in due-process and equal-protection analysis.” Rational-basis test, Black’s Law Dictionary (12th ed. 2024). We note that, in Zaatari, our sister court in Austin struck down STR regulations not under rational-basis review but under a heightened standard of review against the city. 615 S.W.3d at 199–202. Here, both sides agree that rational basis is the appropriate framework. 21 was effective; we ask only if the City could rationally have believed at the time of enactment that the ordinance would promote its objective.” Id. Framed in the negative, “[w]e will not set aside an ordinance unless it is clearly arbitrary and unreasonable.” Id. (citing Mayhew, 964 S.W.2d at 938). The scope of what qualifies as a legitimate governmental objective embraces police powers that include not just protecting health, safety, and morals but extend to such broad concepts as “public welfare,” Mayhew, 964 S.W.2d at 938, and “quality of life,” City of San Antonio v. TPLP Off. Park Props., 218 S.W.3d 60, 65–66 (Tex. 2007) (holding that city’s legitimate interest in separating commercial traffic from residential neighborhood by closing private business’s driveway access to public street both for safety and to improve residents’ “quality of life” passed rational-basis review). And precisely because “[t]he concept of the public welfare has a broad range,” an ordinance must stand if reasonable minds could differ on whether it promotes such welfare. City of College Station v. Turtle Rock Corp., 680 S.W.2d 802, 805 (Tex. 1984). When it comes to STR regulations in particular, one court has noted that it could “clearly understand”—as can we—“how short-term renters could affect the residential character within neighborhoods, specifically those which are zoned for single[-] or dual[-]family living.” Marfil, 2025 WL 243028, at *1 (granting summary judgment for city and finding that “there exists a rational basis for this ordinance at least for the preservation of residential character” and referring, among other things, to “numerous statements from affected residents” expressing desire to preserve residential character). 22 We ourselves have said as much: the “residential character of a neighborhood is threatened when a significant number of homes . . . are occupied not by permanent residents but by a stream of tenants staying a weekend, a week, or even 29 days” whether or not STRs have other, unmitigable “adverse impacts.” Draper, 629 S.W.3d at 792 n.21 (quoting Ewing v. City of Carmel-By-The-Sea, 286 Cal. Rptr. 382, 388 (Cal. Ct. App. 1991)). Here, the Owners contend that the City’s characterization of STRs as “commercial” in the 2018 Ordinance is “inherently irrational” and contrary to controlling authority that—according to the Owners—recognizes that short-term renters do the same sorts of “residential” things that both long-term renters and permanent residents do and that receiving rental income does not transform a residential use into a commercial one.23 They also argue that “zoning-type regulations must be based on harm”—an iffy proposition under rational-basis review—and that the record does not show that harm occurs more often in STRs purely because of the renters’ length of stay. The Owners principally rely on cases involving restrictive covenants stating that 23 all properties were to be used solely for residential purposes. E.g., Tarr v. Timberwood Park Owners Ass’n, 556 S.W.3d 274, 291 (Tex. 2018). “But a restrictive covenant is not the same concept as a zoning regulation.” Villanueva v. Village of Volente, No. 1:23-CV-1246, 2024 WL 2143596, at *11 (W.D. Tex. May 13, 2024) (denying STR owners’ motion to preliminarily enjoin ordinance), appeal dism’d, No. 24-50396, 2024 WL 4815039 (5th Cir. June 13, 2024). 23 But the Owners do not refute the City’s other legitimate reason for the STR Ordinances: preserving neighborhood character, which differs from addressing either real or theoretical harms such as noise, traffic, and the like. They posit that neighborhood character is already preserved by the simple fact that their properties are and have been zoned residential and are used for that purpose, asserting that “[b]anning a residential use to preserve ‘residential character’ is a contradiction in terms, not a rational basis for a sweeping ban on STRs.” Even assuming that leasing a residence for profit is inherently “residential,” as the Owners assert, we aren’t convinced that what comes down to limiting a subset of an activity contradicts preserving the broader character of that ac