Modern Builders, LLC, Alicia Gonzalez, Betsy Darling, Callie Stevens, Grayson Buster, Jaime Cobb Tinsley, Tom Tinsley, Jesse Fox, Kelray LLC, Urban Legacy Properties, LLC, D/B/A Urban Legacy Properties Series a LLC, Lauren A. Brady, Lauren Barrett, Lesa Susi, Trustee of the Susi Living Trust, Lori Dugdale, M and M Pool House LLC, Martha Dominguez, Adulfo Dominguez, Sean Sullivan, Shannon Ross, Susan Harper, Smith-Wallace Properties, LLC, Theresa Riley, Trustee of the TK Riley Family Trust v. City of Fort Worth
CourtTexas Court of Appeals, 2nd District (Fort Worth)
Date FiledMay 28, 2026
Docket02-25-00275-CV
StatusPublished
📰 News Coverage: Read the LAWS.com news report on this case
Full Opinion
In the
Court of Appeals
Second Appellate District of Texas
at Fort Worth
___________________________
No. 02-25-00275-CV
___________________________
MODERN BUILDERS, LLC; ALICIA GONZALEZ; BETSY DARLING;
CALLIE STEVENS; GRAYSON BUSTER; JAIME COBB TINSLEY; TOM
TINSLEY; JESSE FOX; KELRAY LLC; URBAN LEGACY PROPERTIES, LLC,
D/B/A URBAN LEGACY PROPERTIES SERIES A LLC; LAUREN A. BRADY;
LAUREN BARRETT; LESA SUSI, TRUSTEE OF THE SUSI LIVING TRUST;
LORI DUGDALE; M AND M POOL HOUSE LLC; MARTHA DOMINGUEZ;
ADULFO DOMINGUEZ; SEAN SULLIVAN; SHANNON ROSS; SUSAN
HARPER; SMITH-WALLACE PROPERTIES, LLC; THERESA RILEY,
TRUSTEE OF THE TK RILEY FAMILY TRUST; TOM KRAUSE; TRACEY
AMAYA; EDUARDO AMAYA; BROOKVALE HOLDINGS, LLC; AND LUCAS
RUIZ, Appellants
V.
CITY OF FORT WORTH, Appellee
On Appeal from the 352nd District Court
Tarrant County, Texas
Trial Court No. 352-342969-23
Before Sudderth, C.J.; Kerr, J.; and Gonzalez, J.1
Opinion by Justice Kerr
1
The Honorable Ruben Gonzalez, Judge of the 432nd District Court of Tarrant County, sitting
by assignment of the Chief Justice of the Texas Supreme Court pursuant to Section 74.003(h) of the
Government Code. See Tex. Gov’t Code § 74.003(h).
2
OPINION
I. Introduction
Following lengthy evaluation, the City of Fort Worth decided in 2018 that
short-term rentals (STRs) are best confined to certain areas of the city, where they are
now expressly allowed, and in 2023, those lawful STRs became subject to registration
requirements.2 The appellants (Owners) own properties in single-family residential
districts where STRs are not—and never were—explicitly allowed under the City’s
zoning scheme.
Raising constitutional and other challenges to their inability to lawfully use their
properties as STRs, the Owners warn darkly of an “Orwellian surveillance apparatus”
deploying “neighborhood informants, police interrogations, and monitoring by city
employees” that is wholly at odds with “Cowtown, Where the West Begins.” Despite
this asserted dystopian hellscape, this case boils down to land uses versus police powers.
For the reasons that follow, we hold that the Owners have no vested right to
lease their properties short-term; that the City’s two STR Ordinances rationally relate
to legitimate government interests in preserving the character of single-family
residential neighborhoods; that those Owners who were operating STRs before the
2018 Ordinance was adopted had no settled and reasonable expectations that they could
so use their properties; and that the Owners’ ultra vires claim is not proper against the
2
We refer to the 2018 and 2023 ordinances collectively as the “STR Ordinances.”
3
City. We additionally hold that the trial court did not reversibly err by admitting the
testimony of the City’s expert and that its award of attorney’s fees to the City was not
an abuse of discretion.
II. Background
A. How the City historically viewed residential rentals of less than thirty days.
As Dana Burghdoff—the City’s Zoning Administrator between 2007 and
2019 and after that the Assistant City Manager—explained, since “at least 2007” the
City “consistently” determined that “STRs were prohibited in single-family residential
districts (and other residentially[ ]zoned districts).”3 When residents or property owners
asked, they would be told of this prohibition.
The City based its determination on existing provisions within its comprehensive
zoning ordinance. In particular, as part of its Chapter 9 “Definitions” section, the
zoning ordinance defined “bed and breakfast home” as an owner–operator’s homestead
or primary one-family residence providing overnight accommodation to transient
3
In one case, the City sued several residential-property owners who had been
leasing their properties on a short-term basis and obtained an agreed order in 2008 that
permanently enjoined the owners from having “more than one lessee per dwelling unit
during any thirty (30) day period.” The record suggests that this was the situation
mentioned in the summary-judgment affidavit of the City’s Deputy Code Compliance
Director, who recounted that “prior to the passage of the 2018 Ordinance, Code
Compliance staff shut down homes in the Arlington Heights neighborhood for hosting
‘transient or short term’ guests during rodeo season.” The street addresses of the
properties covered by the 2008 agreed order place the majority of them within Fort
Worth’s Arlington Heights neighborhood, which is close to the traditional venue for
the annual Fort Worth Stock Show & Rodeo.
4
guests and defined “transient or short[-]term resident” as an individual who occupies
or rents a home or room for less than 30 days.4 According to Burghdoff, because bed
and breakfasts were not a permitted use in single-family residential districts per the
“Residential District Use Table”—Section 4.603 of the City’s zoning ordinance and part
of its Chapter 4 “District Regulations”—neither were their analogs, STRs.
B. As online STR-booking platforms took off, the City took a closer look.
Beginning around a decade ago, such websites as VRBO and Airbnb became
wildly popular ways to book STRs.5 That popularity drove an influx of inquiries to the
City about whether STRs were allowed in residential districts—and a corresponding
increase in complaints from City residents about STRs and their guests, including
complaints about noise disturbances, loud parties, trash, and parking or traffic
congestion.
The City thus began a process in 2016 to research how other cities were dealing
with STRs and to clarify in the zoning ordinance those districts within which STRs were
or were not allowed. A November 2016 City Manager report noted that “[c]urrent
regulations”—presumably referring to those covering bed and breakfast homes—
4
At all relevant times, bed and breakfast homes have been a permitted use—by
special exception from the City’s Board of Adjustment—in two-family residential
districts under the comprehensive zoning ordinance.
5
In her 2024 deposition, one Owner agreed that, since 2016, platforms like
Airbnb have become “much more prevalent” and have “entered into the popular
zeitgeist,” noting that “‘Airbnb’ is a verb now.”
5
“prohibit[ed] the rental of residential property” for less than 30 days in single-family
residential districts, and the report outlined a plan to communicate that fact to
neighborhoods. A little over a year later, another report proposed adding the use
“transient or short-term rental”—already a defined term, as noted—to the use tables
“to clarify that the use is not allowed in residential districts outside of bed and breakfast
homes or inns, and is allowed in mixed-use, commercial, and industrial districts as a
commercial use.”
C. The City’s review yielded an amended zoning ordinance in 2018.
The preamble to the adopted Ordinance No. 23110-02-2018 (the
2018 Ordinance) noted that “short[-]term home rentals (homes rented for less than
30 consecutive days) are not specifically defined, expressly permitted[,] or listed in any
of the zoning use categories provided in the use tables for residential, non-residential[,]
or form-based districts”; that in determining whether a property is being used as an
STR, “if the duration of the stay is less than 30 days, that use is not allowed since it is
more analogous to a bed or breakfast home[,] which is allowed in a two-family zoning
district by special exception but is prohibited in one-family zoning districts”; and that
the Zoning Ordinance was being amended to “affirm” that STRs are prohibited in one-
and two-family zoning districts by adding a definition for short-term home rental and
by including that newly defined use in the land-use tables “to clarify that a short[-]term
home rental is not allowed in residential districts but is allowed in other districts as a
commercial use.” Burghdoff’s summary-judgment affidavit explained that STR use, as
6
“commercial,” “is inherently incompatible with a residentially[ ]zoned neighborhood
where there exists a sense of community and camaraderie (or, at least, familiarity)
between neighbors. STR guests, by definition, do not stay in a neighborhood or
community to build and maintain those relationships.”
The 2018 Ordinance defined a “Short[-]Term Home Rental”—which we have
shortened to STR—this way:
The rental for compensation of dwellings or accessory dwelling units for
the purpose of overnight lodging for a period of not less than one night
and not more than 30 consecutive days other than ongoing
month-to-month tenancy granted to the same renter for the same unit as
their primary residence. . . .
The residential-use table was correspondingly amended to add “Short[-]Term
Home Rental” to the “Other” category of uses, with an empty cell in the use table
underneath all the types of residential zoning districts to visibly signal that STRs were
not allowed there (but were an allowed use in non-residential areas). 6
According to Burghdoff, the deliberative process surrounding the
2018 Ordinance generated little in the way of public comment.
D. The City delved further into the STR issue between 2019 and 2022.
Although the 2020 COVID pandemic rekindled the debate over STRs, with the
City’s being asked to consider allowing STRs in residentially zoned districts and
6
See Fort Worth, Tex., Code of Ordinances, app. A, ch. 4, art. 6, § 4.601(d) (“Uses
not allowed. An empty cell [in a table designation] indicates that a use is not allowed in
the respective zoning district.”).
7
receiving more outcry in opposition, the City’s Development Services Department had
already begun, in 2019, to investigate more closely whether STRs could have any place
in residential districts. Over a roughly three-year period, the City—
• researched other cities’ STR ordinances;
• contacted other cities to ask about their STR-regulating experiences;
• consulted organizations in the field of city planning and zoning about STR
regulations;
• reviewed scholarly articles about STRs’ negative impacts on residential
neighborhoods;
• analyzed how the City could ensure that legally operating STRs were paying the
City’s Hotel Occupancy Tax; and
• tracked and compiled STR complaints and violations within the City.
The City received several presentations and reports concerning STRs and
possible regulations between September 2019 and March 2022, after which it opened
up the STR issue for public debate.
E. Further research and public input solicited during 2022 led to the
2023 Ordinance.
During multiple meetings in 2022, the City Council heard public comment both
for and against STRs in residential neighborhoods. The City also set up a publicly
accessible webpage to house STR-related information and created surveys and
questionnaires so that all interested constituencies could share their thoughts and
concerns. Additionally, the City engaged a data-mining company to collect details about
existing STR activity in Fort Worth; that company reported its findings in August 2022.
8
The upshot of the City’s multiyear investigation and community engagement was
(1) feedback from full-time residents and neighborhood associations that, in
Burghdoff’s words, “overwhelmingly” supported continuing to ban STRs by right in
residential districts and (2) consensus that lawful STRs should be subject to a
registration ordinance.
So in February 2023, the City Council adopted Ordinance
No. 26005-02-2023 (the 2023 Ordinance). The 2023 Ordinance did not change the
2018 Ordinance’s prohibition of STRs in residential districts but added regulations
covering those STRs that could lawfully operate in the City’s commercial and mixed-use
districts.7 An owner in a residential district who wants to rent out property for less than
30 days can apply for a zoning change.8
Among the City’s findings underpinning the 2023 Ordinance was that regulating
STRs in the areas where they were allowed was “necessary for the health, safety[,] and
welfare of the general public, the promotion of consistent land uses and development,
and the protection of landowners and residents of” the City. Recognizing the
importance of “support[ing] tourism in a balanced way,” the City Council “determined
7
Those regulations include ones requiring registration with and approval by the
City so that the City can pinpoint STR locations, ensure that all taxes are being paid,
and have contact information for STR owners and agents for any complaints and
emergencies.
The City has approved at least one such requested change by rezoning a duplex
8
and two adjacent single-family dwellings from residential to low-intensity mixed use.
9
that enacting a registration program for STRs will serve to balance the rights of all
stakeholders through a fair and balanced regulatory framework and ensure that the
STRs do not become a nuisance.”
F. This litigation
In June 2023, more than one hundred9 Owners sued for declaratory and
permanent injunctive relief10 against the City over the STR Ordinances, alleging
(1) unconstitutional deprivation of property rights, see Tex. Const. art. I, § 19;
(2) unconstitutionally retroactive deprivation of settled property rights, see Tex. Const.
art. I, § 16; 11 (3) arbitrary discrimination that violates equal protection, see Tex. Const.
art. I, § 3; and (4) ultra vires acts exceeding the City’s authority under the Zoning
Enabling Act, Tex. Loc. Gov’t Code §§ 211.001–.058.
Not all of them are parties to this appeal.
9
The Owners did not seek interim injunctive relief to halt enforcement of the
10
City’s Ordinances while the case was pending.
Twenty-one of the original plaintiffs had purchased their properties before
11
2018; seven are among the appellants, and we will refer to these seven as Retroactivity
Owners for purposes of the Article I, Section 16 claim.
10
After both sides moved for traditional summary judgment, the trial court entered
a final judgment in the City’s favor and awarded attorney’s fees to it. 12 This appeal
followed.
III. Issues on Appeal
The Owners raise these issues:
• Whether the trial court erred in dismissing, on summary judgment, the Owners’
constitutional and ultra vires claims;
• Whether the trial court erred in considering the City’s expert’s affidavit; and
• Whether the trial court erred in awarding attorney’s fees to the City.
IV. Constitutional Claims13
A. Standard of review and applicable law
We first address the Owners’ claims involving the Texas Constitution: due course
of law, retroactivity, and equal protection. See Tex. Const. art. I, §§ 3, 16, 19. Although
we examine the entire record in considering such claims, see Patel v. Tex. Dep’t of Licensing
& Regul., 469 S.W.3d 69, 87 (Tex. 2015), our review of these legal matters—as with our
review of summary judgments generally, see Travelers Ins. v. Joachim, 315 S.W.3d 860,
12
Before taking up the attorney’s-fee issue, the trial court first granted the
summary-judgment motion on unspecified grounds, a ruling that was subsumed within
its final judgment.
In this section we address the first three subparts of the Owners’ first issue.
13
Their fourth subpart, a nonconstitutional ultra vires claim, involves different
considerations that we address separately.
11
862 (Tex. 2010) 14—is de novo. See Mayhew v. Town of Sunnyvale, 964 S.W.2d 922,
932 (Tex. 1998) (noting that “ultimate question” of zoning ordinance’s constitutionality
is question of law, not fact).
A duly enacted statute or ordinance enjoys a “strong presumption” of
constitutional validity. State v. Loe, 692 S.W.3d 215, 227 (Tex. 2024); see Patel, 469 S.W.3d
at 87; City of Brookside Village v. Comeau, 633 S.W.2d 790, 792–93 (Tex. 1982). A party
challenging an ordinance’s constitutionality shoulders “an extraordinary burden to
show that no conclusive or even controversial or issuable fact or condition existed
which would authorize the municipality’s passage of the ordinance.” Comeau, 633 at
792–93 (citation modified).
A century ago, the United States Supreme Court established a municipality’s right
to enact zoning ordinances, using language that seems prescient in today’s fast-changing
world of the internet and online STR-booking platforms:
[P]roblems have developed, and constantly are developing, which require,
and will continue to require, additional restrictions in respect of the use
and occupation of private lands in urban communities. Regulations, the
wisdom, necessity, and validity of which, as applied to existing conditions,
are so apparent that they are now uniformly sustained, a century ago, or
And as always, we consider summary-judgment evidence in the light most
14
favorable to the nonmovant, crediting evidence favorable to the nonmovant if
reasonable jurors could and disregarding evidence contrary to the nonmovant unless
reasonable jurors could not. Mann Frankfort Stein & Lipp Advisors, Inc. v. Fielding,
289 S.W.3d 844, 848 (Tex. 2009). We indulge every reasonable inference and resolve
any doubts in the nonmovant’s favor. 20801, Inc. v. Parker, 249 S.W.3d 392, 399 (Tex.
2008).
12
even half a century ago, probably would have been rejected as arbitrary
and oppressive.
Village of Euclid v. Ambler Realty Co., 272 U.S. 365, 386–87, 47 S. Ct. 114, 118 (1926).
Accordingly, “no fixed constraints may be placed on the police power for the future.”
Maher v. City of New Orleans, 516 F.2d 1051, 1059 (5th Cir. 1975). Rounding up
then-current United States Supreme Court authority, the Maher court noted the “ample
and protean” boundaries of police power and a legislature’s “rich and flexible” power
to “essay new solutions to new problems.” Id. Although the Fifth Federal Circuit’s
comments came half a century ago, and hot on the heels of another high-court zoning
decision, 15 they apply with equal force today.
Texas recognizes that “[z]oning ordinances and land-use ordinances are valid
exercises of a city’s police power to safeguard the health, comfort, and general welfare
of its citizens.” City of Dickinson v. Crystal Cruise Invs., LLC, No. 01-24-00684-CV,
2026 WL 530391, at *5 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] Feb. 26, 2026, no pet. h.); see
Tex. Loc. Gov’t Code § 211.001 (reiterating bases for municipal zoning authority). As
we have explained, zoning ordinances evince “legitimate governmental interests” when
they relate to “(1) safeguarding the life, health, safety, welfare, and property of STR
occupants, neighborhoods, and the general public and (2) minimizing the adverse
15
Village of Belle Terre v. Boraas, 416 U.S. 1, 9, 94 S. Ct. 1536, 1541 (1974) (noting
that a city’s police power is “not confined to elimination of filth, stench, and unhealthy
places” but is “ample to lay out zones where family values, youth values, and the
blessings of quiet seclusion and clean air make the area a sanctuary for people”).
13
impacts resulting from increased transient rental uses in neighborhoods that were
planned, approved, and constructed for single-family residences.” Draper v. City of
Arlington, 629 S.W.3d 777, 786 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth 2021, pet. denied); see
Hignell-Stark v. City of New Orleans, 46 F.4th 317, 328 (5th Cir. 2022) (recognizing
“legitimate local purposes” of “preventing nuisances, promoting affordable housing,
and protecting neighborhoods’ residential character”).
With those principles in mind, we turn to the STR Owners’ constitutional
complaints.
B. Due-course-of-law claim
The Texas Constitution provides that “[n]o citizen of this State shall be deprived
of life, liberty, property, privileges[,] or immunities . . . except by the due course of the
law of the land.” Tex. Const. art. I, § 19. To date, the Texas Supreme Court has found
no meaningful distinction between federal due-process and state due-course-of-law
guarantees. E.g., Klumb v. Hous. Mun. Emps. Pension Sys., 458 S.W.3d 1, 15 (Tex. 2015)
(citing Univ. of Tex. Med. Sch. v. Than, 901 S.W.2d 926, 929 (Tex. 1995)); see also Patel,
469 S.W.3d at 86 (noting typical—but not mirror-image—federal–state alignment in
this area). 16
But see City of Grapevine v. Muns, 671 S.W.3d 675, 677 (Tex. 2023) (Young, J.,
16
concurring in denial of petition for review) (explaining that waiting for “better vehicle”
to address STR bans’ constitutionality could “allow advocates and scholars to more
fully develop the original—and perhaps distinct—meaning[ ]” of the Texas
due-course-of-law clause).
14
In reviewing due-course claims, we must determine (1) whether a plaintiff has a
property interest that warrants constitutional protection and (2) only if so, “whether the
defendant followed due course of law in depriving the plaintiff of that interest,” Loe,
692 S.W.3d at 227–28, or—put differently—“what process is due,” Tex. Dep’t of State
Health Servs. v. Crown Distrib. LLC, 647 S.W.3d 648, 653 n.16 (Tex. 2022) (quoting Mosley
v. Tex. Health & Hum. Servs. Comm’n, 593 S.W.3d 250, 264 (Tex. 2019)). Under Patel, a
plaintiff who has a constitutionally protected property interest must show that either
(1) the challenged ordinance’s purpose “could not arguably be rationally related to a
legitimate governmental interest; or (2) when considered as a whole, the [ordinance’s]
actual, real-world effect as applied to the challenging party could not arguably be
rationally related to, or is so burdensome as to be oppressive in light of, the
governmental interest.” 17 469 S.W.3d at 87.
1. The STR Owners have no vested right to lease short term.
“[T]o rise to the level of a due[-]process [or due-course] deprivation, [a plaintiff]
must first possess a vested property right.” Rancho De Los Arboles LLC v. Town of Cross
Roads, No. 02-25-00208-CV, 2026 WL 253459, at *6 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth Jan. 30,
2026, no pet.) (first citing Klumb, 458 S.W.3d at 17; and then citing City of Grapevine v.
Muns, 651 S.W.3d 317, 345 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth 2021, pet. denied) (op. on reh’g)).
17
Although the City argues that the “so burdensome” test is limited to
economic-regulation statutes, we assume without deciding that Patel’s second prong
could apply to the situation here but do not reach it. See n.21, infra.
15
A vested right must have “some definitive, rather than merely potential existence” and
be “something more than a mere expectancy based upon an anticipated continuance of
an existing law.” Id. (first quoting City of LaMarque v. Braskey, 216 S.W.3d 861, 864 (Tex.
App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 2007, pet. denied); and then quoting Klumb, 458 S.W.3d at
15). And a “bare contention that the right to use property as an STR is inherently vested
is unsupported . . . in the law.” Id. at *6 n.13.
Property rights are not “absolute,” Crown Distrib., 647 S.W.3d at 654, and
“[l]imitations on property rights may be by . . . appropriate government action under its
police power.” Severance v. Patterson, 370 S.W.3d 705, 710 (Tex. 2012). No
“constitutionally protected vested right” exists to “use real property in any certain way,
without restriction.” Braskey, 216 S.W.3d at 863 (citing City of Univ. Park v. Benners,
485 S.W.2d 773, 778 (Tex. 1972)); see Zaatari v. City of Austin, 615 S.W.3d 172, 191 (Tex.
App.—Austin 2019, pet. denied) (noting that right to lease for profit can be subject to
restriction under certain circumstances); Consumer Serv. All. of Tex., Inc. v. City of Dallas,
433 S.W.3d 796, 805 (Tex. App.—Dallas 2014, no pet.) (“Property owners do not have
a constitutionally protected, vested right to use property in any certain way.”).
In Rancho De Los Arboles—our most recent foray into the STR issue—we
remanded Rancho’s due-course claim for repleading because neither side had provided
the version of Cross Roads’ ordinance in effect when Rancho acquired the property it
had been using as an STR for many years before receiving Cross Roads’ notice that
STRs were prohibited in single-family residential areas. 2026 WL 253459, at *1, *6–7.
16
For that reason, “Rancho ha[d] not demonstrated that it had a vested property right to
use the property as an STR when it acquired the property and ha[d] not met its pleading
burden for this cause of action.” Id. at *7.
A few years before Rancho De Los Arboles, in Grapevine, we concluded on
interlocutory appeal that the STR owners there had a general vested right to lease as
part of their “bundle of rights” that was sufficient to support a viable due-course claim
challenging Grapevine’s outright ban on STRs anywhere within the city. 651 S.W.3d at
347. But we circumscribed that conclusion: “[w]hether the durational restrictions
imposed by the STR Ordinance violate[d] the Homeowners’ due-course-of-law rights
regarding their right to lease [went] to the case’s merits, an altogether improper inquiry
at [that] stage of the case.” Id. That is, we did not hold that what we viewed as a general
right to lease necessarily or even likely encompassed a vested right to lease on a
short-term basis; we did nothing more than permit the owners’ due-course claim to
proceed to a merits disposition in the trial court. Id. In so doing, we were agnostic about
its eventual fate.
Reading Rancho De Los Arboles and Grapevine together—and together with other
persuasive authority—suggests that a right to lease short-term, if it is to be called
“vested,” can be properly informed by whether that right was enshrined under a
17
preexisting ordinance. 18 See, e.g., Crystal Cruise, 2026 WL 530391, at *6 (holding that
because city’s vacation-rental ordinance had been in place for six years before STR
owner bought the property, the owner “[could not] show that it has any vested right to
use the property as a vacation rental as a matter of law.”); see also Marfil v. City of New
Braunfels, No. 6:20-CV-00248, 2021 WL 8082644, at *5 (W.D. Tex. July 29, 2021)
(agreeing that “the right to lease property for short durations is objectively out of place
on” list of traditionally protected interests as collected in Washington v. Glucksberg,
521 U.S. 702, 720 (1997)), report and recommendation adopted, 2022 WL 18034356 (W.D.
Tex. Sept. 15, 2022), vacated and remanded, 70 F.4th 893 (5th Cir. 2023); cf. Zaatari,
615 S.W.3d at 191 (noting city’s acknowledgement that under earlier ordinances
allowing STRs, “Austinites ha[d] long exercised their right to lease their property” as
STRs, which were “an ‘established practice’ and a ‘historically . . . allowable use’”);
Village of Tiki Island v. Ronquille, 463 S.W.3d 562, 587 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.]
2015, no pet.) (recognizing narrow vested right in particular use of property when new
law restricts an existing use).
Perhaps, then, a better way to look at the intersection of STRs and municipal
regulation is to view STRs as conditionally allowed uses rather than as having the sort
of “definitive, rather than merely potential existence,” Rancho De Los Arboles,
In Grapevine, we held that STRs had been allowed under the city’s preexisting
18
ordinance but that, under Benners, the owners did not thereby possess a vested right to
lease short-term. 651 S.W.3d at 346.
18
2026 WL 253459, at *6, that exalts them automatically to vested status. Certainly, as
online STR platforms have proliferated, more and more municipalities have responded
with various types of ordinances: banning them altogether (e.g., Grapevine); banning
them but grandfathering in those who had previously used their properties as STRs
(e.g., Marfil v. City of New Braunfels, No. 6:20-CV-00248, 2025 WL 243028, at *2 (W.D.
Tex. Jan. 10, 2025) (order on remand), appeal docketed, No. 25-50025 (5th Cir. Jan. 17,
2025)); banning them without a special-use permit (e.g., Crystal Cruise); creating STR
zones and requiring operating permits (e.g., Draper); and other approaches.19 To us,
these evolving governmental responses are of a piece with the United States Supreme
Court’s recognition, in Village of Euclid, that problems are “constantly” developing that
“require, and will continue to require, additional restrictions in respect of the use and
occupation of private lands in urban communities.” 272 U.S. at 386–87, 47 S. Ct. at
118.
We are not insensitive to Lockean notions of and respect for private-property
rights, but communities have important interests, too, under which municipalities may
“essay new solutions to new problems.” Maher, 516 F.2d at 1059. We recognized as
much in Draper by labeling “legitimate” those governmental interests in
“(1) safeguarding the life, health, safety, welfare, and property of STR occupants,
We express no opinion about the constitutional validity of any ordinances other
19
than those at issue in this appeal.
19
neighborhoods, and the general public” and—equally important—“(2) minimizing the
adverse impacts resulting from increased transient rental uses in neighborhoods that
were planned, approved, and constructed for single-family residences.” 629 S.W.3d at
786.
Answering the question left open in Grapevine, then, we hold that the Owners do
not have a vested common-law right to use their properties as short-term rentals. 20 This
20
This conclusion is bolstered by the Texas Supreme Court’s post-Grapevine
decisions in Crown Distributing and Loe, both of which—unlike Patel—focused on the
critical threshold issue of carefully and narrowly defining the asserted interest. Crown
Distrib., 647 S.W.3d at 653 & n.16 (declining to reach step two because due-course
clause did not protect hemp companies’ asserted interest in manufacturing and
processing smokable hemp products as part of liberty right to “work and earn a living”
and noting that Patel did not engage step one because parties had assumed a protected
interest and focused only on second step); Loe, 692 S.W.3d at 231–33 (noting that
because “parental control and authority have never been understood as constitutionally
mandated absolutes,” “novel treatments for a novel condition [gender dysphoria] are
generally within the Legislature’s power to regulate without facing heightened scrutiny,”
so although challenged statute “limit[ed] the availability of novel medical treatments for
children diagnosed with a novel medical condition, it [did] not deprive those children’s
parents of any constitutionally protected right or undermine a custom embedded in our
history or traditions”).
In defining the interest at stake here, and narrowing it as we should, we thus
distinguish between a right to lease and a right to lease for less than 30 days; the former
is a core incident of property ownership, the latter a specific use carrying no
common-law categorical vested-right protection. See Crystal Cruise, 2026 WL 530391, at
*5–6 (holding no vested right to use property as STR). Although in contending that
“STRs have long been an unexceptional residential use of property in Texas” the
Owners point us to several old cases, e.g., Coalson v. Holmes, 240 S.W. 896 (Tex. 1922);
Williams v. State, 47 S.W.2d 298 (Tex. Crim. App. 1932), those cases merely mentioned
weekly rentals, and such references were incidental to the legal analysis. But STRs in
their current iteration are possible only because of the internet, driving both a qualitative
and quantitative leap from boarding-houses of yore and, it is fair to say, exponentially
accelerating occupant turnover—not to mention incentivizing a property owner to use
20
holding is enough to affirm judgment on the Owners’ due-course claim, but because
rational-basis review applies to the Owners’ equal-protection claim, we will explain here
why the STR Ordinances satisfy that test for due-course purposes as well. 21
2. The STR Ordinances have a rational basis.
Under highly deferential rational-basis review, 22 we uphold ordinances if a city
reasonably believes—if it is “at least fairly debatable”—that they promote a legitimate
governmental objective. See Mayhew, 964 S.W.2d at 938. An ordinance violates due
process if it “has no foundation in reason and is a mere arbitrary or irrational exercise
of power having no substantial relation to the public health, the public morals, the
public safety[,] or the public welfare in its proper sense.” Draper, 629 S.W.3d at
786 (quoting Mayhew, 964 S.W.2d at 938). Our concern is not “whether the ordinance
his property as an STR rather than lease it out for a longer term. Even the Owners, in
their petition, asserted that “[s]hort-term renting is, on a per-diem basis, more lucrative
than longer-term rentals.” Cf. Hogan v. S. Methodist Univ., 688 S.W.3d 852, 854–55,
863 (Tex. 2024) (noting that COVID-era statute “created new rules governing novel
litigation in the wake of a novel and previously unimaginable event”).
We decline to reach Patel’s undue-burden prong, an analysis that is made
21
unnecessary by our holding that the Owners do not have a vested right to engage in
short-term renting.
22
The rational-basis test is “the most deferential of the standards of review that
courts use in due-process and equal-protection analysis.” Rational-basis test, Black’s Law
Dictionary (12th ed. 2024). We note that, in Zaatari, our sister court in Austin struck
down STR regulations not under rational-basis review but under a heightened standard
of review against the city. 615 S.W.3d at 199–202. Here, both sides agree that rational
basis is the appropriate framework.
21
was effective; we ask only if the City could rationally have believed at the time of
enactment that the ordinance would promote its objective.” Id. Framed in the negative,
“[w]e will not set aside an ordinance unless it is clearly arbitrary and unreasonable.” Id.
(citing Mayhew, 964 S.W.2d at 938).
The scope of what qualifies as a legitimate governmental objective embraces
police powers that include not just protecting health, safety, and morals but extend to
such broad concepts as “public welfare,” Mayhew, 964 S.W.2d at 938, and “quality of
life,” City of San Antonio v. TPLP Off. Park Props., 218 S.W.3d 60, 65–66 (Tex. 2007)
(holding that city’s legitimate interest in separating commercial traffic from residential
neighborhood by closing private business’s driveway access to public street both for
safety and to improve residents’ “quality of life” passed rational-basis review). And
precisely because “[t]he concept of the public welfare has a broad range,” an ordinance
must stand if reasonable minds could differ on whether it promotes such welfare. City
of College Station v. Turtle Rock Corp., 680 S.W.2d 802, 805 (Tex. 1984).
When it comes to STR regulations in particular, one court has noted that it could
“clearly understand”—as can we—“how short-term renters could affect the residential
character within neighborhoods, specifically those which are zoned for single[-] or
dual[-]family living.” Marfil, 2025 WL 243028, at *1 (granting summary judgment for
city and finding that “there exists a rational basis for this ordinance at least for the
preservation of residential character” and referring, among other things, to “numerous
statements from affected residents” expressing desire to preserve residential character).
22
We ourselves have said as much: the “residential character of a neighborhood is
threatened when a significant number of homes . . . are occupied not by permanent
residents but by a stream of tenants staying a weekend, a week, or even 29 days” whether
or not STRs have other, unmitigable “adverse impacts.” Draper, 629 S.W.3d at
792 n.21 (quoting Ewing v. City of Carmel-By-The-Sea, 286 Cal. Rptr. 382, 388 (Cal. Ct.
App. 1991)).
Here, the Owners contend that the City’s characterization of STRs as
“commercial” in the 2018 Ordinance is “inherently irrational” and contrary to
controlling authority that—according to the Owners—recognizes that short-term
renters do the same sorts of “residential” things that both long-term renters and
permanent residents do and that receiving rental income does not transform a
residential use into a commercial one.23 They also argue that “zoning-type regulations
must be based on harm”—an iffy proposition under rational-basis review—and that
the record does not show that harm occurs more often in STRs purely because of the
renters’ length of stay.
The Owners principally rely on cases involving restrictive covenants stating that
23
all properties were to be used solely for residential purposes. E.g., Tarr v. Timberwood
Park Owners Ass’n, 556 S.W.3d 274, 291 (Tex. 2018). “But a restrictive covenant is not
the same concept as a zoning regulation.” Villanueva v. Village of Volente,
No. 1:23-CV-1246, 2024 WL 2143596, at *11 (W.D. Tex. May 13, 2024) (denying STR
owners’ motion to preliminarily enjoin ordinance), appeal dism’d, No. 24-50396, 2024
WL 4815039 (5th Cir. June 13, 2024).
23
But the Owners do not refute the City’s other legitimate reason for the STR
Ordinances: preserving neighborhood character, which differs from addressing either
real or theoretical harms such as noise, traffic, and the like. They posit that
neighborhood character is already preserved by the simple fact that their properties are
and have been zoned residential and are used for that purpose, asserting that “[b]anning
a residential use to preserve ‘residential character’ is a contradiction in terms, not a
rational basis for a sweeping ban on STRs.” Even assuming that leasing a residence for
profit is inherently “residential,” as the Owners assert, we aren’t convinced that what
comes down to limiting a subset of an activity contradicts preserving the broader
character of that ac