Full Opinion

TEXAS COURT OF APPEALS, THIRD DISTRICT, AT AUSTIN NO. 03-25-00511-CV Demetrius Crockett, Appellant v. DG Auto Sales, LLC and Donavin Greenberg, Appellees FROM THE 250TH DISTRICT COURT OF TRAVIS COUNTY NO. D-1-GN-24-009976, THE HONORABLE DON R. BURGESS, JUDGE PRESIDING MEMORANDUM OPINION Pro se appellant Demetrius Crockett sued appellees DG Auto Sales, LLC, and Donavin Greenberg (collectively, DG Auto) under a variety of legal theories after DG Auto repossessed a vehicle Crockett purchased from DG Auto. The trial court granted DG Auto’s motion for summary judgment, implicitly denied Crockett’s motion for summary judgment, and denied Crockett’s request for sanctions. By four issues, Crockett contends that the trial court’s judgment was erroneous because: (1) genuine issues of material fact existed “concerning unlawful repossession, statutory violations, and deceptive practices”; (2) Crockett’s motion for summary judgment established DG Auto’s liability as a matter of law; (3) sanctions should have been imposed against DG Auto based on its litigation conduct; and (4) the trial court violated Crockett’s due process rights by “changing the cause number without notice or order, impairing [Crockett]’s right to file and seek review.” We affirm. I. BACKGROUND1 On December 13, 2024, Crockett sued DG Auto for the allegedly unlawful repossession of his vehicle and asserted that its conduct violated the Deceptive Trade Practices Act (DTPA); Finance Code Sections 348.507 and 348.508; Business and Commerce Code Sections 1.304, 9.609, and 521.053; and Occupations Code Section 2303.151.2 The parties filed competing motions for summary judgment seeking judgment as a matter of law on Crockett’s claims. DG Auto’s motion sought summary judgment on both traditional and no-evidence grounds. Crockett later sought sanctions against DG Auto on the basis that its motion for summary judgment was untimely and contained false statements. According to the summary-judgment evidence, Crockett leased a vehicle from DG Auto in August 2024. Based on his financial circumstances, Crockett was unable to timely make the first vehicle payment. Crockett and DG Auto agreed to extend the deadline for the first payment from October 1 to October 16. However, on October 16, Crockett reached out to DG Auto and proposed that the due date for his first payment be delayed to October 29 instead. According to Crockett, DG Auto never responded to this offer. But according to DG Auto, it denied Crockett’s second request to extend the payment deadline. On or around October 19, DG Auto allegedly repossessed the vehicle without notifying Crockett. Crockett attached evidence to his motion for summary judgment indicating that he reached out multiple times to DG Auto to determine whether it was aware of the vehicle’s whereabouts. Again, Crockett reportedly received no response from DG Auto. 1 We derive the factual background from the summary-judgment record. 2 In exhibits attached to his live pleading and in his motion for summary judgment, Crockett also alleged that DG Auto violated various provisions of the Penal Code and Transportation Code. 2 In its motion for summary judgment, DG Auto contended that the statutes on which Crockett relied, with the exception of the DTPA, did not create a private cause of action. As for Crockett’s DTPA claim, DG Auto asserted that Crockett’s claim sounded in contract liability and should not have been brought as a DTPA claim. It further asserted that DG Auto had fulfilled its contractual obligations. DG Auto also argued that there was no evidence of any false, misleading, or deceptive acts, and no evidence that any false, misleading or deceptive acts were a producing cause of Crockett’s injuries. The trial court granted DG Auto’s motion for summary judgment and dismissed Crockett’s claims. The trial court also denied Crockett’s request for sanctions against DG Auto. This appeal followed. II. SUMMARY JUDGMENT By his first and second issues, Crockett contends that the trial court abused its discretion by granting DG Auto’s motion for summary judgment and denying his motion. A. Standard of Review “We review summary judgment rulings de novo.” Privilege Underwriters Reciprocal Exch. v. Mankoff, 733 S.W.3d 1, 4 (Tex. 2026). When both sides move for summary judgment and the trial court grants one motion and denies the other, we review both sides’ summary-judgment evidence, determine all questions presented, and render the judgment that the trial court should have rendered. Sidetracked Bar, LLC v. Hegar, 665 S.W.3d 81, 87 (Tex. App.—Austin 2022, pet. denied). “On cross-motions for summary judgment, each party bears the burden of establishing that it is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” Mankoff, 733 S.W.3d at 4. “A genuine issue of material fact exists if the nonmovant produces more than a 3 scintilla of evidence establishing the existence of the challenged element.” J-W Power Co. v. Sterling Cnty. Appraisal Dist., 706 S.W.3d 553, 558 (Tex. App.—Austin 2024, pet. denied) (quoting Zeifman v. Nowlin, 322 S.W.3d 804, 807 (Tex. App.—Austin 2010, no pet.)). B. Analysis For his first issue, as it pertains to DG Auto’s motion for summary judgment, Crockett summarily contends: [F]act issues exist regarding: • notice of default • legality of repossession • good-faith payment negotiations • statutory compliance • deceptive concealment For his second issue, as it pertains to his own motion for summary judgment, Crockett summarily contends: Undisputed evidence showed: • no repossession notice • no right-to-cure • no law-enforcement reporting • willful concealment Crockett does not refer us to any portion of the appellate record to assist us in determining whether a fact issue was raised or whether he proved his claims as a matter of law. See Tex. R. App. P. 38.1(i) (“The brief must contain a clear and concise argument for the contentions made, with appropriate citations to authorities and to the record.”); Nevarez Law Firm, P.C. v. Investor Land Servs., LLC, 645 S.W.3d 870, 884 (Tex. App.—El Paso 2022, no 4 pet.) (“Neither this Court nor the trial court are obligated to sift through the record to determine what evidence supports the Firm’s claim.”). Even if we were to conclude that Crockett’s inadequate briefing did not waive these issues, Crockett has not addressed all grounds presented by DG Auto’s motion for summary judgment. “When a trial court’s order granting summary judgment does not specify the grounds on which its order is based, the appealing party must negate each ground upon which the judgment could have been based.” Rosetta Res. Operating, LP v. Martin, 645 S.W.3d 212, 226 (Tex. 2022). First, Crockett does not address the argument DG Auto raised in its motion below that, with the exception of the DTPA, the statutes that Crockett alleged DG Auto violated do not create a private cause of action. Cf. Bickham v. Dallas County, 612 S.W.3d 663, 670 (Tex. App.—Dallas 2020, pet. denied) (“The fact that a statute has been violated and some person has been harmed does not automatically give rise to a private cause of action in favor of that person.”). Accordingly, because Crockett has not addressed a ground on which summary judgment could have been granted, we must affirm the summary judgment as to the various claims he brought not under the DTPA. See Martin, 645 S.W.3d at 226. And second, as it pertains to his DTPA claim, Crockett does not address DG Auto’s argument that his claim was one for breach of contract. “An allegation of a mere breach of contract, without more, does not constitute a ‘false, misleading or deceptive act’ in violation of the DTPA.” Tony Gullo Motors I, L.P. v. Chapa, 212 S.W.3d 299, 304 (Tex. 2006) (citing Ashford Dev., Inc. v. USLife Real Est. Servs. Corp., 661 S.W.2d 933, 935 (Tex. 1983)). Crockett does not discuss whether his DTPA claim rises above the level of a mere breach-of-contract claim. Thus, again, because Crockett failed to address a ground upon which 5 summary judgment may have been granted, we must uphold the summary judgment as to his DTPA claim. See Martin, 645 S.W.3d at 226. Because Crockett has failed to direct our attention to any relevant summary- judgment evidence to support the issues he raises on appeal, and because he has failed to challenge all grounds raised by DG Auto’s motion for summary judgment, we overrule his first and second issues. III. SANCTIONS By his third issue, Crockett argues that the trial court should have granted his motion for sanctions because DG Auto “submitted statements contradicted by documentary evidence and stonewalled discovery.” However, Crockett does not detail what statements DG Auto made that were allegedly false or how DG Auto thwarted his discovery requests. See Tex. R. App. P. 38.1(i). Moreover, Crockett does not explain why, even if DG Auto submitted false statements and abused the discovery process, the trial court would have had no discretion when ruling on his request for sanctions. We note, as have several of our sister courts, that there does not appear to be any authority holding that a trial court’s denial of sanctions constituted an abuse of discretion. See Higginbotham v. Bonilla, 727 S.W.3d 227, 237 (Tex. App.—Corpus Christi– Edinburg 2025, no pet.) (“We too have found no cases where a trial court was found to have abused its discretion when denying a request for sanctions.” (collecting cases noting absence of authority holding denial of sanctions was abuse of discretion)). We decline to be the first to hold otherwise, especially where, as here, Crockett has not explained: (1) which statements DG Auto 6 made that were false; (2) why the trial court was obliged to conclude the statements were false; and (3) what sort of discovery abuses occurred. We overrule Crockett’s third issue. IV. DUE PROCESS By his final issue, Crockett asserts that his due process rights were violated when the trial court sua sponte changed the cause number of the case after rendering its judgment, impairing his ability to file into the case. We are not entirely certain to what Crockett is referring. The record does not reflect that the trial court changed the cause number. We observe that we sent a notice early on in this appeal that mistakenly referred to the trial court cause number as “S-1-GN-24-009976” rather than “D-1-GN-24-009976.” However, in subsequent notices, we accurately referenced the correct trial court cause number. Regardless of whether this due process complaint stems from something that occurred in this Court or below, Crockett does not explain what he wanted to file that he was not able to. Because Crockett has failed to adequately explain how his due process rights may have been violated, we overrule his final issue. See Tex. R. App. P. 38.1(i). V. CONCLUSION We affirm the trial court’s judgment. __________________________________________ Maggie Ellis, Justice Before Justices Triana, Kelly, and Ellis Affirmed Filed: August 27, 2026 7