Full Opinion

In the Court of Appeals Sixth Appellate District of Texas at Texarkana No. 06-25-00130-CV IN THE MATTER OF THE MARRIAGE OF DARSI RAE MYERS AND ANTONIE CHRIS VORSTER On Appeal from the 62nd District Court Franklin County, Texas Trial Court No. 13215 Before Stevens, C.J., van Cleef and Rambin, JJ. Memorandum Opinion by Chief Justice Stevens MEMORANDUM OPINION In this appeal, Darsi Rae Myers challenges the trial court’s property division in its final decree of divorce from her former husband, Antonie Chris Vorster. Myers’s points of error on appeal relate mostly to a parcel of land containing approximately fifty acres and two buildings located in Scroggins, Texas (“Scroggins Property”). Myers argues that the trial court erred (1) by finding that the Scroggins Property was community property, (2) by finding that that Myers was entitled to reimbursement for using her separate property to make the down payment to buy the Scroggins Property instead of giving her an interest in the Scroggins Property, (3) and by ordering Myers to either sell the Scroggins Property and split the proceeds or to pay Vorster $40,000.00. Myers also argues that the trial court erred by finding that her reimbursement claims were not recoverable under Texas law.1 We find that the Scroggins Property was not properly characterized but that Myers failed to prove her entitlement to reimbursement at trial. As a result, while we affirm the parties’ divorce, we reverse and remand the property division so that the trial court can reevaluate the just and right division of community property after the proper characterization of the Scroggins Property. I. Factual Background Myers and Vorster were married on July 3, 2020. In August 2024, Myers filed for divorce from Vorster, who filed a counterpetition for divorce and requested a disproportionate 1 Myers also raises a cumulative error complaint, but our resolutions of the remaining issues are dispositive of this matter. 2 share of community property. Myers sought reimbursement of her separate property estate for withdrawals made from her retirement account that were used to benefit the community estate. At trial, Myers testified that she purchased the Scroggins Property after the marriage in October 2020. The sales price for the Scroggins Property was $338,000.00, and it was undisputed that Myers paid the $17,000.00 down payment from her Thrift Savings Plan (TSP) retirement account, which had a balance of $585,000.00 at the time of the marriage, and took out a Promissory Note (Note) in her name only for the remaining amount.2 The warranty deed for the Scroggins Property shows that it was deeded only to Myers and was duly recorded in the Franklin County property records. The deed of trust also states that “[t]he funds advanced to Borrower under the Note were used to pay all or part of the purchase price of the [Scroggins] Property,” but Myers was the only Borrower under the terms of the Note. However, the deed of trust lists both Myers and Vorster as borrowers and was signed by both. Franklin County lists Myers as the sole “100%” owner of the Scroggins Property. Myers also testified that she pays the monthly mortgage on the Scroggins Property, along with taxes and insurance payments, from her USAA account, which had been opened since before the marriage.3 Myers testified that it was not her intention to co-own the Scroggins Property with Vorster and that he knew that. According to Myers, she closed on the Scroggins Property only after Vorster promised to sign a quitclaim deed to her “[b]ecause it was very, very clear [she] was not going to close on it because it was 100 percent intended to be [hers] and only [hers].” 2 Myers “retired from the federal government” before the marriage. 3 Myers testified that her USAA account had a balance of $27,923.00 on the date of the marriage. 3 Myers said that an attorney prepared a postnuptial agreement to that effect, but that Vorster refused to sign it. Myers testified that when “it became very apparent to [her] that [she] was being taken for a ride,” she filed for the “first divorce” in 2023. According to Myers, “Vorster had no income and no credit.” Myers testified that the community incurred debt of approximately $225,000.00 on credit cards during the marriage and that she withdrew that amount from her TSP retirement account to pay off the debt. However, later in her testimony, Myers testified that the money used to pay living expenses came from a commingled bank account. No bank statements from her USSA or TSP account were introduced by Myers at trial. Myers testified that she and Vorster reconciled in late 2023 with the understanding that Vorster would agree to let her have the Scroggins Property. Myers said she used ChatGPT to prepare a purported warranty deed in exchange for Myers absorbing “the debt” and flying Vorster’s son to the United States, to “sponsor[] him for immigration.” The purported warranty deed named Vorster as grantor and Myers as grantee of the Scroggins Property and purported to convey “the same property conveyed to the Grantor by the deed dated October 14, 2020, previously referenced as follows: Book/Volume 395, Page 22 of the Recorder of Franklin County.” However, Vorster was never listed as a grantee in the 2020 deed, since Myers was the only grantee in that deed. On April 9, 2024, Vorster signed the purported deed to the Scroggins Property, and the duly notarized document was filed with Franklin County. Myers admitted that Vorster did not 4 want to sign the purported deed and that the signing was uncomfortable, with “anger on both parts.” Vorster worked as a freelance movie “[s]pecial effect[s] in stunts” coordinator and testified that he was not employed and had no income at the time of the marriage. Vorster explained that he came to the United States on a B-1 visa. Vorster said that once he and Myers were married in July 2020, he applied for a green card in August of 2020 and was prohibited from legally working in the United States until he obtained permission to do so in August of 2021. As for the Scroggins Property, Vorster testified that “before marriage when [Vorster and Myers] spoke about getting a property, [they] spoke about getting land so that [they] . . . could divide [it] amongst all of [their] kids.”4 The Scroggins Property had a “two-bedroom cottage” and a “kind of two-bedroom metal house on it.” Because the condition of the buildings was subpar, Vorster testified that he renovated the kitchen, added a new room to one of the buildings, installed new flooring, changed a bedroom into a walk-in cupboard, and “moved doors around for [their] bedroom.” Vorster said that he also mowed and maintained the fifty-acre parcel. Vorster testified that he renovated the Scroggins house without pay, although the supplies for the renovations were put on Myers’s credit cards. Since the renovations, tenants began renting the Scroggins Property. Vorster agreed that the down payment for the Scroggins Property came from Myers’s separate property, but he still maintained that it was community property. Vorster testified that 4 The record shows that both Myers and Vorster had children before their marriage. 5 he never wanted to sign the purported deed and was forced to do so. Vorster explained that Myers had promised to sponsor his son to come to the United States in exchange for Vorster’s signature on the purported deed and said, “[i]t was either [he] sign it or [his] son [does not] get his green card.” Paivi Stone, a Senior Master Sergeant and the notary who served during the signing of the purported deed, testified that the signing was “very, very contentious,” which is why it stuck out in her memory. According to Stone, Vorster said that he was only signing the document because Myers was forcing him to do so, and that Myers’s response was “aggressive.” Stone testified that the atmosphere between Myers and Vorster was so contentious that she felt the need to pull Vorster aside to ask if he was physically and mentally safe and if he was signing the document of his own free will. Stone testified that Vorster told her “I’ll be fine, or I’m okay or something like that.” After hearing all of the evidence, the trial court took the matter under advisement. The trial court’s final decree of divorce states the following with respect to the Scroggins Property: IT IS ORDERED AND DECREED that Petitioner, DARSI RAE MYERS, is awarded the following as her sole and separate property, and Respondent, ANTONIE CHRIS VORSTER, is divested of all right, title, interest, and claim in and to that property: P-1. The following real property located in Franklin County, Texas, together with any insurance policies covering the property, any escrow funds, prepaid insurance, utility deposits, keys, house plans, home security access and code, garage door opener, warranties and services contracts, title and closing documents, rental proceeds, sales proceeds, and all the rights and appurtenances belonging to the property, subject to the obligation that Petitioner shall pay Respondent the sum of Forty Thousand Dollars ($40,000.00) within six (6) months from the date of this Order: 6 13218 FM 115 Scroggins, Texas 75480 Charles H. Sims Survey Abstract No. 417 Franklin County, Texas In the alternative, if Petitioner decides to sell the above-described property, then the net proceeds from the sale, after deduction of all reasonable and customary costs of sale including but not limited to realtor commissions, title policy, outstanding liens, and closing costs, shall be divided equally between the parties. Petitioner has the sole discretion to decide whether to retain or sell the property. Thus, it appears the trial court awarded Myers the Scroggins Property as her sole and separate property but ordered Myers either to pay Vorster $40,000.00 or sell the property and split the proceeds. The trial court denied Myers’s claims for reimbursement. Myers moved for findings of fact and conclusions of law, which the trial court entered. The trial court found that the Scroggins Property had a fair market value of $516,630.00 and that the outstanding mortgage was $293,760.00. The trial court also found that Myers made the $17,000.00 down payment for the home from her separate estate but also found that the Scroggins Property was community property and that its property division “accounted for the reimbursement of $17,000.00” to Myers’s separate estate. Further, the trial court found Vorster’s testimony about the execution of the purported deed credible and found it to be coerced. As for the claims for reimbursement, the trial court found that Myers’s claim for $225,000.00 in reimbursement was not supported by the evidence, which it characterized as “vague, lacking documentation, regarding commingled accounts, and consisted of estimates, at best.” 7 II. The Trial Court Did Not Properly Characterize the Scroggins Property In her first point of error, Myers argues that the trial court mischaracterized the Scroggins Property as community property. We sustain her point of error. A. Standard of Review “The Texas Family Code requires the trial court to divide a marital estate in a ‘just and right’ manner, considering the rights of the parties.” In re Marriage of Thomas, No. 06-22- 00048-CV, 2023 WL 1987947, at *1 (Tex. App.—Texarkana Feb. 14, 2023, no pet.) (mem. op.) (quoting Scott v. Scott, 805 S.W.2d 835, 841 (Tex. App.—1991, writ denied)) (citing TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. § 7.001; In re Marriage of Moncey, 404 S.W.3d 701, 706 (Tex. App.—Texarkana 2013, no pet.)). “Trial courts can only divide community property, and the phrase ‘estate of the parties’ encompasses the community property of a marriage.” Id. (quoting Pearson v. Fillingim, 332 S.W.3d 361, 363 (Tex. 2011) (per curiam)). “Property possessed by either spouse during or on dissolution of marriage is presumed to be community property.” Landry v. Landry, 731 S.W.3d 630, 633 (Tex. 2026) (per curiam) (quoting TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. § 3.003(a)). “To overcome the community property presumption, a party must establish by clear and convincing evidence that the property is separate.” Id. (citing TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. § 3.003(b)). “Separate property is the property owned before marriage as well as ‘property acquired . . . during marriage through gift, devise, or descent.’” In re Marriage of Nash, 644 S.W.3d 683, 692 (Tex. App.—Texarkana 2022, no pet.) (quoting TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. § 3.001). “All other property [belonging to the parties] that is not separate property is community property.” Id. at 692–93 (citing TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. 8 § 3.002). “Any doubt as to the character of property should be resolved in favor of the community estate.” Id. at 693 (quoting In re Marriage of Moncey, 404 S.W.3d at 706). “We determine whether property is separate or community by its character at the time of inception.” Id. at 696 (quoting see Marriage of Taylor, No. 06-14-00061-CV, 2015 WL 428121, at *3 (Tex. App.—Texarkana Feb. 3, 2015, no pet.) (mem. op.) (citing Barnett v. Barnett, 67 S.W.3d 107, 111 (Tex. 2001))). “Inception of title occurs when a party first has a right of claim to the property by virtue of which title is finally vested.” Id. (quoting Marriage of Taylor, 2015 WL 428121, at *3). “Further, to overcome the community property presumption, the spouse claiming property as separate ‘must clearly trace the original separate property into the particular assets on hand during the marriage.’” Id. (quoting Marriage of Taylor, 2015 WL 428121, at *3 (quoting Cockerham v. Cockerham, 527 S.W.2d 162, 167 (Tex. 1975))). “Tracing involves establishing the separate origin of the property through evidence showing the time and means by which the spouse originally obtained possession of the property.” In re Marriage of Thomas, 2023 WL 1987947, at *2 (quoting In re Marriage of Price, No. 10-14-00260-CV, 2015 WL 6119457, *7 (Tex. App.—Waco Oct. 15, 2015, no pet.) (mem. op.)). B. Analysis Myers argues that only her name was on the 2020 deed to the Scroggins Property. Yet, “[t]he community presumption is not contradicted by legal title in just one spouse.” Tipps v. Chinn Expl. Co., No. 06-13-00033-CV, 2014 WL 4377813, at *2 (Tex. App.—Texarkana Sept. 5, 2014, pets. denied) (mem. op.) (‘“Where the grant or deed to community lands is in the name of the husband, the legal title to the lands is in him.’ But legal title in the husband’s name 9 does not, alone, alter the community nature of the property, and the wife still can have an equally absolute estate or interest in the property.” (citation omitted) (quoting Burnham v. Hardy Oil Co., 195 S.W. 1139, 1143 (Tex. 1917))). Applying the inception-of-title rule, the Scroggins Property was acquired after the marriage. As a result, it “was presumed to be community property, and it was [Myers’s] burden to rebut that presumption by clear and convincing evidence.” In re Marriage of Nash, 644 S.W.3d at 699. However, it was also undisputed at trial that Myers made the $17,000.00 down payment for the home from her separate funds, and the trial court found that the down payment came from Myers’s separate property. The remaining funds for the purchase of the Scroggins Property were secured by a Note taken out by Myers during the marriage that was secured by a deed of trust signed by both Myers and Vorster.5 The Texas rule is well established that where property is purchased partly with community and partly with separate funds of one of the spouses, it has the effect of creating a kind of tenancy in common between the community and separate estates, each owning an interest in the proportion that it supplies the consideration. Carter v. Grabeel, 341 S.W.2d 458, 460 (Tex. App.—Amarillo 1960, no writ); see Huval v. Huval, No. 09-06-00023-CV, 2007 WL 1793771, at *2 (Tex. App.—Beaumont 2007, no pet.) (mem. op.) (“Marital property may be mixed property, consisting of part separate property and 5 “It is well established that debts contracted during marriage are presumed to be on the credit of the community and thus are joint community obligations, unless it is shown the creditor agreed to look solely to the separate estate of the contracting spouse for satisfaction.” In re Marriage of Nash, 644 S.W.3d at 700 (quoting Cockerham, 527 S.W.2d at 168). Because the Note was secured by a deed of trust in which Vorster was listed as a borrower, we cannot determine that the creditor agreed to look solely to Myers’s separate estate for satisfaction in case of default. This is because “all property acquired on credit during marriage is community property, unless that property is acquired by a separate-property-secured non-recourse loan.” Id. (quoting Goyal v. Hora, No. 03-19-00868-CV, 2021 WL 2149628, at *11 (Tex. App.—Austin May 27, 2021, no pet.) (mem. op.) (quoting James W. Paulsen, Acquiring Separate Property on Credit: A Review and Proposed Revision of Texas Marital Property Doctrine, 37 St. Mary’s L.J. 675, 676 (2006)). 10 part community property in proportion to the amount of separate and community property.” (citing Gleich v. Bongio, 99 S.W.2d 881, 883 (Tex. 1937)); Chacon v. Chacon, 222 S.W.3d 909, 914 n.5 (Tex. App.—El Paso, 2007, no pet.); Grogan v. Henderson, 313 S.W.2d 315, 321 (Tex. App.—Texarkana 1958, writ ref’d n.r.e.). Therefore, “[i]f a party shows that property was purchased in part with that party’s separate funds and in part with community funds, the property is held in a tenancy in common between the party and the community estate.” In re Marriage of Daugherty, 42 S.W.3d 331, 333 (Tex. App.—Texarkana 2001, no pet.) (citing Cockerham, 527 S.W.2d at 168–69); Stanton v. Stanton, No. 02-13-00097-CV, 2014 WL 5307194, at *3 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth Oct. 16, 2014, pet. denied) (mem. op.) (same). Because the trial court entered findings that the Scroggins Property was acquired partly by separate property, the Scroggins Property was part community property and part Myers’s separate property. “Certainly, a court cannot divest an owner of separate property.” In re Marriage of Moncey, 404 S.W.3d at 715 (quoting Pearson, 332 S.W.3d at 364 (citing Eggemeyer v. Eggemeyer, 554 S.W.2d at 137, 140–41 (Tex. 1977) (“concluding that taking separate property from one spouse and giving it to other violates Article I, Section 19 of Texas Constitution”6))). ‘“When a court mischaracterizes separate property as community property, the error requires reversal’ as a matter of law.” Id. (quoting In re Marriage of Morris, 12 S.W.3d 877, 880 (Tex. App.—Texarkana 2000, no pet.)). 6 See TEX. CONST. art. I, § 19. 11 We also note that Myers raises a complaint that the purported deed signed by Vorster in 2024 gave her separate estate all of the interest in the Scroggins Property. However, we overrule this complaint because, while “spouses may partition or exchange between themselves all or a part of their community property,” the purported deed was neither a partition nor an exchange. See TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. § 4.102; see also Mora v. Mora, No. 04-10-00832-CV, 2012 WL 1721540, at *1 (Tex. App.—San Antonio May 16, 2012, no pet.) (mem. op.) (“Because the agreement does not make a specific reference to partition or otherwise indicate a partition of community property was intended, the agreement is not enforceable under [S]ection 4.102.”); Byrnes v. Byrnes, 19 S.W.3d 556, 559 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth 2000, no pet.) (“Absent a specific reference to a partition or language indicating that such a division was intended, Texas courts have refused to uphold transactions between spouses as partitions.”). Further, the trial court’s finding that Vorster’s testimony regarding the execution of the deed was credible, and thus that the purported deed was coerced, was supported by Vorster’s testimony and Myers’s own testimony that she knew Vorster did not want to sign the document. Therefore, we reverse the trial court’s property division. We further note that the Scroggins Property appeared to be the most valuable asset acquired during the marriage. As a result, we remand the property division so that the trial court may evaluate the just and right division of community property after proper characterization of the Scroggins Property.7 7 Because our ruling that the Scroggins Property was part of Myers’s separate property under these circumstances, we remand for redetermination. See In re Matter of Steven O. Steele & Rachel L. Steele, No. 05-25-00133-CV, 2026 WL 2426064 (Tex. App.—Texarkana Aug. 19, 2026, no pet. h.) (mem. op.). As a result, we find our ruling dispositive of Myers’s remaining complaints associated with the Scroggins Property, including whether the trial court erred by “treating Myers’ . . . separate property ownership interest as a $17,000[.00] equitable claim to be 12 III. Myers Did Not Prove Her Entitlement to Reimbursement In her last point of error, Myers argues that the trial court erred by failing to reimburse her $225,000.00 expenditure for credit-card debt acquired during the marriage. “A claim for reimbursement exists when one or both spouses use property of one marital estate to confer on the property of another marital estate a benefit which, if not repaid, would result in unjust enrichment to the benefited estate.” TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. § 3.402(a) (Supp.). “The party claiming a right to reimbursement has the burden of pleading and proving that the expenditures . . . were made and that they are reimbursable.” Goyal, 2021 WL 2149628, at *18 (citing Vallone v. Vallone, 644 S.W.2d 455, 459 (Tex. 1982)). We review the trial court’s decision regarding reimbursement for an abuse of discretion. Wagner & Brown, Ltd. v. Sheppard, 282 S.W.3d 419, 429 n.54 (Tex. 2008) (citing Penick v. Penick, 783 S.W.2d 194, 198 (Tex. 1988)); see Graham v. Graham, 836 S.W.2d 308, 311 (Tex. App.—Texarkana 1992, no writ). Myers’s evidence at trial showed that she was seeking reimbursement for “satisf[action] [of] community debts and expenses incurred by the community during the marriage.” At trial, Myers testified that the credit-card debt was incurred because “we were using [them] to live off of, basically.” However, trial courts “may not recognize” a claim for reimbursement for “the living expenses of a spouse.” TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. § 3.409(2); Goyal, 2021 WL 2149628, at *18 (quoting TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. § 3.409(2) (citing Norris v. Vaughan, 260 S.W.2d 676, 683 considered in the division of the community estate” and whether Myers had to either sell the Scroggins Property and split the proceeds with Vorster or pay him $40,000.00 if she chose to keep the home. 13 (Tex. 1953))). As a result, Myers failed to meet her burden to show that the expenditure was reimbursable. Further, Myers first testified that the money to pay community bills came from her TSP retirement account but then admitted she paid the credit-card bills from a commingled bank account. Myers failed to introduce any bank statement or credit-card bill into evidence. For this reason, the trial court found that Myers’s “claim for $225,000.00 reimbursement is not supported by the evidence and any testimony from [Myers] regarding this claim was not credible.” After reviewing the record, we agree with the trial court’s finding that Myers failed to meet her burden to show entitlement to reimbursement. For the foregoing reasons, we conclude that the trial court did not abuse its discretion by declining Myers’s reimbursement claim. We overrule this last point of error. IV. Conclusion We affirm the portion of the trial court’s final decree granting the parties’ divorce. Even so, we reverse the portion of the trial court’s order setting forth its property division and remand the matter to the trial court for further proceedings consistent with this opinion. Scott E. Stevens Chief Justice Date Submitted: June 22, 2026 Date Decided: August 26, 2026 14