Full Opinion

In The Court of Appeals Seventh District of Texas at Amarillo No. 07-26-00095-CV APPROXIMATELY $319,925.00 UNITED STATES CURRENCY, APPELLANT V. THE STATE OF TEXAS, APPELLEE On Appeal from the 100th District Court Carson County, Texas Trial Court No. 12929, Honorable Dale A. Rabe, Jr., Presiding August 27, 2026 MEMORANDUM OPINION Before DOSS and YARBROUGH and PRATT, JJ. This appeal arises from an asset forfeiture proceeding filed by the State of Texas under Chapter 59 of the Texas Code of Criminal Procedure. By his two issues, Oscar Menjivar, the real party in interest, appeals the trial court’s judgment granting the State’s civil forfeiture action. We reverse and render. BACKGROUND On November 3, 2022, at approximately 11:30 a.m., Texas Department of Public Safety Trooper Darrin Bridges was on routine patrol westbound on Interstate 40 in Carson County when he stopped a vehicle for traveling 78 miles per hour in a 75-mile-per-hour zone. The driver, Hector Menjivar, was the vehicle’s sole occupant. He produced a California driver’s license and a rental agreement showing the vehicle had been rented in Columbus, Ohio, on November 1, 2022, and was due to be returned in Los Angeles on November 3. Trooper Bridges observed that the vehicle had a “lived-in” appearance, with fast-food and convenience-store trash inside, and that Hector appeared more nervous than the average person during the stop. Hector told the officer that he had flown from Los Angeles to Columbus on October 31, rented the vehicle the following morning to drive back, and had been in Columbus for approximately sixteen hours before beginning the return trip. He explained that he had gone to visit friends and family and did not like flying. Trooper Bridges issued a warning for the speeding violation but inquired whether Hector had “guns, drugs, or large sums of U.S. currency” in the vehicle. Hector responded that he had $13 in cash and had used credit cards for his travel expenses. He did not consent to a search of the vehicle. Trooper Bridges then detained Hector and requested a canine unit. Investigator Danny Dawson responded with a narcotics-detection dog, which alerted during a free-air sniff of the exterior of the vehicle. Officers then searched the vehicle’s rear cargo area and found a duffel bag secured with a small lock and a sack containing a cardboard box. A locked safe was inside the cardboard box. Hector stated he did not have the combination or key to either the lock or the safe. Investigator Dawson cut open the duffel 2 bag and found four vacuum-sealed bundles of currency. No drugs or drug paraphernalia were found in the vehicle at any time. Hector was arrested for money laundering.1 Upon returning to their facility, officers arranged a luggage line of five boxes, and the narcotics dog alerted only to the box containing the seized currency. The officers were also able to open the safe, which contained fifteen additional vacuum-sealed bundles of money. The currency totaled approximately $319,925, with no accompanying bank slips. Trooper Bridges deposited the seized funds into an asset-forfeiture account. Hector was served notice of the forfeiture proceedings. He answered, but he did not receive notice of subsequent proceedings. The State then sought a default judgment, but this was set aside on Hector’s motion. Oscar Menjivar, Hector Menjivar’s brother and employer, and the claimant to the currency, joined in the proceedings. On December 9, 2025, the trial court conducted a bench trial on the forfeiture. Trooper Bridges testified at trial, and the State also admitted photographs of the vehicle and its contents as evidence at trial. According to Trooper Bridges, based on his experience in money laundering cases, he believed the currency was illegal proceeds from drug activities. This was largely based on Hector’s described travel pattern (a same- day round trip after only sixteen hours in Columbus), the vehicle’s observable condition, Hector’s nervous demeanor, and the canine alert. He also testified that Interstate 40 is a known corridor for transporting drugs and money. On cross-examination, he admitted that the various issues taken in isolation would not indicate someone was engaging in money laundering or drug trafficking. However, 1 TEX. PENAL CODE § 34.02. 3 Trooper Bridges also indicated that while the totality of the circumstances led him to believe he had probable cause to search the car, he did not have any other evidence related to the fact that this was “drug currency.” He further acknowledged that his investigation did not identify a specific criminal offense to which the currency was connected. He was not aware of any other criminal investigation carried out by the State. Oscar Menjivar testified for the defense at trial. Oscar testified that he operated a trucking, warehousing, and real estate business in which it is common for him to carry substantial amounts of cash and maintain several bank accounts. According to Oscar, Hector was his employee and had been sent to look for used trucks and equipment for the company’s fleet, including in the Dallas area, and he had given Hector the $319,925 for that purpose. He further testified that the funds came from various sources within his business operations. While he did not further specify their origin or produce supporting records, Oscar specifically denied that his other sources were involved with drug trafficking. On cross-examination, he testified that there was no specific “target” for Hector to acquire with the currency while Hector was in Texas. He also indicated he was not sure how Hector flew with the safe or what route Hector took while driving back to Los Angeles, California. On redirect, he reiterated that the money was part of his legitimate business proceeds. After closing arguments, the trial court found that the seized currency was contraband subject to forfeiture under Chapter 59. The trial court entered an Amended Final Judgment on December 11, 2025. On January 12, 2026, Oscar filed a motion to vacate or alternatively to modify this judgment. In his motion, he raised the legal sufficiency argument related to the judgment. The trial court did not vacate the judgment 4 on Oscar’s no-evidence grounds, but on January 22, 2026, the trial court signed a Second Amended Final Judgment modifying the judgment. Oscar Menjivar, as claimant for the currency, timely filed a notice of appeal. ANALYSIS By his two issues, Appellant challenges the sufficiency of evidence to support the judgment. He claims the evidence is legally insufficient to support forfeiture because the State failed to present a specific offense and evidence connecting the property to criminal activity. He also claims the evidence is legally insufficient to support probable cause to seize the currency. Standard of Review A forfeiture proceeding under Chapter 59 of the Texas Code of Criminal Procedure is a matter of civil law. 2000 GMC Sierra Truck v. State, No. 07-16-00356-CV, 2018 Tex. App. LEXIS 5575, at *4 (Tex. App.—Amarillo July 23, 2018, no pet.) (mem. op.); TEX. CODE CRIM. PROC. art. 59.05(a), (b). The proceeding is an action in rem against contraband, which is subject to seizure and forfeiture. State v. Silver Chevrolet Pickup, 140 S.W.3d 691, 692 (Tex. 2004) (per curiam); see State v. Ten Thousand Two Hundred Fourteen Dollars ($10,214.00), No. 07-18-00306-CV, 2020 Tex. App. LEXIS 2742, at *6 (Tex. App.—Amarillo Apr. 1, 2020, no pet.) (mem. op). As applicable here, contraband means property of any nature that is used or intended to be used in the commission of any crime articulated in Article 59.01. See TEX. CODE CRIM. PROC. art. 59.01(2). In addition to all the other felony offenses related to controlled substances, any felony under Chapter 34 of the Penal Code (Money Laundering) falls within the definition of 5 contraband, making property used or intended to be used in money laundering subject to seizure and forfeiture. A person commits money laundering if he knowingly transports the proceeds (cash) of criminal activity. TEX. PENAL CODE § 34.02(a)(1). “Criminal activity” is defined as any offense that is “classified as a felony under the laws of this state.” Id. § 34.01(1)(A). “In an appeal from a bench trial, the trial court’s findings of fact and conclusions of law have the same weight as a jury verdict.” Stevens v. Avent, No. 07-20-00265-CV, 2022 Tex. App. LEXIS 961, at *8 (Tex. App.—Amarillo Feb. 9, 2022, no pet.) (mem. op.) (citing Catalina v. Blasdel, 881 S.W.2d 295, 297 (Tex. 1994)). A trial court’s finding cannot stand if it rests on no more than a scintilla of evidence or requires the factfinder to guess between competing inferences. City of Keller v. Wilson, 168 S.W.3d 802, 813–14 (Tex. 2005). Under a legal sufficiency standard, we consider all of the evidence in the light most favorable to the prevailing party, make every reasonable inference in that party’s favor, and disregard contrary evidence unless a reasonable factfinder could not disregard that evidence. Id. at 827. Issue 2–Probable Cause to Seize Appellant’s second issue is related to probable cause for seizing the property, but this probable cause analysis is intertwined with the overarching forfeiture analysis forming the basis of Appellant’s first issue. In the context of a civil forfeiture proceeding, the State must establish probable cause exists for seizing the property. $10,214.00, 2020 Tex. App. LEXIS 2742, at *6 (citations omitted). Probable cause in this context is a reasonable belief that a substantial connection exists between the property and the criminal activity defined by the statute. Id. This is accomplished when the State proves that it is more 6 reasonably probable than not that the seized currency was either intended for use in, or derived from, a violation of the offenses listed in the forfeiture statute. State v. $5,500 in U.S. Currency, 296 S.W.3d 696, 701 (Tex. App.—El Paso 2009, no pet.). As our written opinion must address every issue raised and necessary to the disposition of the appeal,2 we assume, arguendo, the officers had probable cause to seize the cash involved in this controversy. Issue 1–Intent to Use Currency in the Commission of a Statutorily Defined Offense Appellant challenges the legal sufficiency of the evidence to support forfeiture, arguing the State failed to present a specific offense and evidence connecting the property to criminal activity. We agree. In addition to complying with the procedural requirements of Article 59.04, the State’s only burden in a forfeiture case is proving by a preponderance of the evidence that the property in question is subject to forfeiture, which includes proving probable cause in the civil forfeiture context. State v. One (1) 2004 Lincoln Navigator, 494 S.W.3d 690, 701 (Tex. 2016); see TEX. CODE CRIM. PROC. art. 59.04 & 59.05(b); $10,214.00, 2020 Tex. App. LEXIS 2742, at *6. This analysis requires the State to prove a substantial nexus or connection between the property to be forfeited and a statutorily defined criminal activity, which may be shown by circumstantial evidence. Id. A final conviction for an underlying offense is not a requirement for forfeiture. See TEX. CODE CRIM. PROC. art. 59.05(d). But the State may not seize property based on mere suspicion, and it must prove that the money was used or intended to be used in the commission of a defined 2 See TEX. R. APP. P. 47.1. 7 criminal activity. One (1) 2004 Lincoln Navigator, 494 S.W.3d at 701; see TEX. CODE CRIM. PROC. art. 59.04 & 59.05(b); $10,214.00, 2020 Tex. App. LEXIS 2742, at *6. The narrow question before us is whether the trial court’s conclusion—that the $319,925 in Hector’s vehicle was the proceeds of an unnamed criminal activity—was warranted by the cumulative force of all the circumstantial evidence. Generally, the analysis in similar cases is fact specific. Both civil forfeiture and criminal money laundering cases are instructive as to what kind of evidence is relevant to show a nexus between money and drug dealing. Acosta v. State, 429 S.W.3d 621, 625 (Tex. Crim. App. 2014). Utilizing this framework, in support of a nexus between Appellant’s currency and criminal activity, the State points to evidence of the following: (1) the substantial amount of money; (2) the packaging of the currency; (3) a trained drug dog’s open-air alert; (4) the dog’s alert on the package in the luggage line; (5) suspicious activity consistent with drug trafficking; (6) testimony of an officer’s beliefs; (7) Appellant’s denial of knowledge of the currency; and (8) the inability to establish the specific origin of the currency. Civil forfeiture jurisprudence has produced clear standards for evaluating these evidentiary categories.3 However, here, while we can evaluate the State’s evidence and 3 See, e.g., $10,214.00, 2020 Tex. App. LEXIS 2742, at *7 (possession of large amounts of currency, standing alone, fails to show any nexus to a defined criminal activity) (citing Approximately $31,421.00 v. State, 485 S.W.3d 73, 82 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 2015, pet. denied)); $27,920.00 in United States Currency v. State, 37 S.W.3d 533, 535 (Tex. App.—Texarkana 2001, pet. denied) (“although drugs may be illicit, possessing large sums of cash alone is licit.”); see also Deschenes v. State, 253 S.W.3d 374, 383 (Tex. App.—Amarillo 2008, pet. ref’d) (traveling a particular route amounts to “mere conjecture” of criminal activity); Id., 253 S.W.3d at 384 n.19 (a positive alert by a canine to the presence of drugs does not evidence that the currency was used in connection with a drug deal); Id. at 385 (the mere fact that a person’s actions match a drug courier profile and that person is carrying a large amount of money that might be involved in some illegal activity is insufficient to establish probable cause to justify forfeiture); Id. at 383, n.10 (a number of courts have observed that nervousness is of minimal probative value, given that many, if not most, individuals can become nervous or agitated when detained by police officers). 8 the totality of the circumstances utilizing the respective standards articulated in case law, we are still left with suspicions on what criminal activity occurred. Plaintiff’s Original Notice of Seizure and Intended Forfeiture does not articulate a specific criminal activity, but rather, the State’s pleading includes the entire laundry list of felonies and misdemeanors outlined in TEX. CODE CRIM. PROC. art. 59.01. However, in the Affidavit of the Seizing Officer attached to the original pleading, Trooper Bridges observed “many indicators of criminal activity,” and this affidavit also specifically mentions that Hector was arrested for money laundering. The record also indicates that based on his experience in money laundering cases, Trooper Bridges believed the currency was illegal proceeds from “drug activity” at the time of its seizure. However, the State does not articulate what drug activities were suspected, investigated, or observed. Notably absent from the State’s case is credible evidence involving any specific “drug activity.” The State failed to present evidence of a controlled substance transaction, sale, or delivery at or around the time Hector was arrested for money laundering. No drugs, drug residue, or drug paraphernalia were found in the vehicle or on Hector’s person. The State did not present evidence on which narcotics could have been identified by the dog alert or any lab results identifying a controlled substance on the currency. The State did not present any evidence regarding Hector’s involvement in drugs or drug- related activities. Without evidence of an underlying felony, the State also failed to present evidence of the crime of money laundering. Furthermore, Hector made no admissions related to the source of the money, other than it being from his brother. Furthermore, at trial, Oscar’s testimony specifically contradicted the State’s evidence and the officer’s suspicions of the source of the money and its nexus to drug activity. 9 The trial court as factfinder may draw any and all inferences from the totality of the circumstances shown by the evidence, but reaching the conclusion that the seized funds were contraband without proof of criminal activity, as articulated in Article 59.01, requires us to impermissibly stack inference upon inference. See Marathon Corp. v. Pitzner, 106 S.W.3d 724, 728 (Tex. 2003) (“[S]ome suspicion linked to other suspicion produces only more suspicion, which is not the same as some evidence.”). Evidence that a defendant had the means to commit an offense is not evidence that he committed that offense. See Deschenes, 253 S.W.3d at 385, n.23 (citing U.S. v. $30,060.00, 39 F.3d 1039, 1044 (9th Cir.1994)) (such evidence not credible, speculative). In sum, nothing more than surmise or suspicion supports the conclusion that the money was used in connection with criminal activity or that Hector intended to use it in that way. Accordingly, the State did not meet its burden, and the evidence is legally insufficient to support forfeiture. We sustain Appellant’s first issue. CONCLUSION Having sustained Appellant’s first issue, we reverse the judgment of the trial court and render judgment that the State take nothing and that the State return the proceeds to Oscar Menjivar, the real party in interest.4 Laura A. W. Pratt Justice 4 Appellant requests in its prayer, in the alternative, that we remand for a determination of “pre- and post-judgment interest.” Appellant does not, however, brief its entitlement to such interest or provide argument or authority supporting that request. See TEX. R. APP. P. 38.1(i). Nor does the record before us reflect that Appellant requested such interest from the trial court. Accordingly, we decline to address the unbriefed issue or remand for its determination and instead render judgment as set forth herein. 10