Full Opinion

Opinion issued November 6, 2026 In The Court of Appeals For The First District of Texas ———————————— NO. 01-25-00270-CV ——————————— LAVENDER APARTMENTS LLC, Appellant V. KIMBERLY AGUILERA, Appellee On Appeal from the County Civil Court at Law No. 3 Harris County, Texas Trial Court Case No. 1217849 MEMORANDUM OPINION Appellant Lavender Apartments LLC brings this restricted appeal from a default judgment rendered against it and in favor of appellee Kimberly Aguilera. Lavender contends that error is apparent on the face of the record because service of process was defective and therefore the trial court erred in rendering the default judgment. We reverse and remand. I. Background Aguilera filed suit against Lavender seeking a money judgment for a variety of claims. The district clerk issued a citation directed to “LAVENDER APARTMENTS LLC C/O ITS REGISTERED AGENT, LEGALCORP SOLUTIONS, LLC, 3 GREENWAY PLAZA #1320.” A deputy constable filed a return of citation purportedly indicating service of the citation on June 7, 2024. Lavender did not file an answer or otherwise appear in the case, and Aguilera moved for a default judgment. The trial court granted a final default judgment in favor of Aguilera and against Lavender for $164,347.77 in economic damages, $81,516.38 in mental-anguish damages, and $4,135.85 in attorney’s fees. Lavender did not participate in the hearing that resulted in the judgment or file a timely post-judgment motion. Lavender filed a notice of restricted appeal within six months of the trial court’s judgment. II. Analysis Under a single issue, Lavender argues this court should reverse the default judgment because the record shows that the service and return of citation failed to strictly comply with the rules of civil procedure. Lavender asserts the return 2 reflects service on an individual not identified in the record as Lavender’s agent for service of process or as otherwise connected to Lavender. A. Standard of review To prevail in this restricted appeal, Lavender must establish that: (1) it filed its notice of restricted appeal within six months after the trial court signed the judgment; (2) Lavender was a party to the underlying lawsuit; (3) it did not participate in the hearing that resulted in the judgment and did not timely file a post-judgment motion or request for findings of fact and conclusions of law; and (4) error is apparent on the face of the record. Ins. Co. of State of Pa. v. Lejeune, 297 S.W.3d 254, 255 (Tex. 2009). The first three requirements are jurisdictional; the fourth requirement goes to the merits. See Ex parte E.H., 602 S.W.3d 486, 496 (Tex. 2020). Aguilera does not contest the three jurisdictional requirements, and the record shows that each of them is satisfied. Therefore, we address whether error is apparent on the face of the record. The face of the record consists of all the papers on file, including the clerk’s record and reporter’s record, at the time that the judgment was signed. Alexander v. Lynda’s Boutique, 134 S.W.3d 845, 848 (Tex. 2004). B. Analysis In a restricted appeal, a no-answer default judgment cannot stand if the defendant “was not served in strict compliance with applicable requirements.” 3 Spanton v. Bellah, 612 S.W.3d 314, 316 (Tex. 2020) (quoting Wilson v. Dunn, 800 S.W.2d 833, 836 (Tex. 1990)). “‘[N]o-answer default judgments are disfavored’ and cannot be sustained absent meticulous adherence to service requirements.” Shamrock Enters., LLC v. Top Notch Movers, LLC, 728 S.W.3d 693, 699 (Tex. 2026) (quoting Spanton, 612 S.W.3d at 316). “The strict-compliance requirements in the default judgment context preclude courts from making even the most obvious and rational inferences.” Am. Servs. U.S., LLC v. Identity Built, LLC, No. 01-23-00540-CV, 2025 WL 1256273, at *9 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] May 1, 2025, pet. denied) (mem. op.) (quoting Harvestons Sec., Inc. v. Narnia Invs., Ltd., 218 S.W.3d 126, 132–33 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 2007, pet. denied)) (internal quotations omitted). Notably, in restricted appeals, “[t]here are no presumptions in favor of valid issuance, service, and return of citation.” Fidelity & Guar. Ins. Co. v. Drewery Const. Co., 186 S.W.3d 571, 573–74 (Tex. 2006). This rule must be strictly observed because presumptions can neither be confirmed nor rebutted by evidence in an appellate court. Id. at 573. Thus, for example, if the citation says an amended petition was attached (which named the defaulted party) and the return says the document served was the original petition (which did not name the defaulted party), an appellate court cannot tell from the record which is true. Id. Similarly, if the petition says the registered agent for service is “Henry Bunting, 4 Jr.” but the citation and return reflect service on “Henry Bunting,” an appellate court cannot tell whether the two names mean the same or different persons. See Uvalde Country Club v. Martin Linen Supply Co., 690 S.W.2d 884, 885 (Tex. 1985). The return of citation is not a trivial or formalistic document. See Primate Const., Inc. v. Silver, 884 S.W.2d 151, 152 (Tex. 1994). The recitations in the return of citation are prima facie evidence of the facts recited in the return. Id. The recitations carry enough weight that they cannot be rebutted by the uncorroborated proof of the moving party. Id. Further, a return of citation does not cease to be prima facie evidence of the facts of service simply because the facts are recited in a form rather than filled in by the process server. Id. It is the responsibility of the party requesting service, not the process server, to see that service is properly accomplished. See id. This responsibility extends to seeing that the service is adequately reflected in the record. Id. If proper service is not affirmatively shown in the record, then error exists on the face of the record, and a default judgment cannot stand. Id. In Aguilera’s live pleading she alleged that Lavender is a Texas limited liability company that may be served through its registered agent, LegalCorp Solutions, LLC at 3 Greenway Plaza #1320, Houston, TX 77046. The return of citation recites that the citation was executed on June 7, 2024, at 2:07 p.m. “by 5 summoning LAVENDER APARTMENTS LLC C/O ITS REGISTERED AGENT, LEGALCORP SOLUTIONS, LLC a Corporation at 3 GREENWAY PLAZA DR #1320, HOUSTON, Texas 77046 By [sic] delivering to LEGALCORP SOLUTIONS, LLC. / CHARLES BREEDY in person the REGISTERED AGENT of said Corporation a true copy of this CITATION, together with the accompanying certified copy of [the live pleading].” Other than in this return, the record contains no mention of Charles Breedy. Lavender contends that the return’s use of a forward slash, also known as a virgule, creates an ambiguity as to whether the citation was delivered to LegalCorp Solutions, LLC or Charles Breedy. Lavender also asserts that there is nothing in the record that shows Charles Breedy is LegalCorp’s agent for service of process or that Breedy has any connection to LegalCorp. According to Aguilera, the face of the record shows that the citation was served in person on Charles Breedy as the registered agent for service of process of LegalCorp, which is Lavender’s registered agent for service of process. Aguilera argues that the return contains no ambiguity and that the return clearly defines the term “Corporation” to mean LegalCorp. The return refers to “LAVENDER APARTMENTS LLC C/O ITS REGISTERED AGENT, LEGALCORP SOLUTIONS, LLC a Corporation.” It is not clear whether the term “Corporation” refers to Lavender or LegalCorp. There 6 is no way to determine from the return whether “Corporation” refers to Lavender or LegalCorp. Whichever entity it refers to, this statement is incorrect. Lavender and LegalCorp are both limited liability companies. A limited liability company is not a corporation, and absent an express definition to the contrary, the term “corporation” does not encompass a limited liability company. See Alta Mesa Holdings, L.P. v. Ives, 488 S.W.3d 438, 453–54 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 2016, pet. denied). Even if “LEGALCORP SOLUTIONS, LLC. / CHARLES BREEDY” means that the citation was delivered to Charles Breedy of LegalCorp, it is not clear what “the REGISTERED AGENT of said Corporation” means. That phrase could mean that LegalCorp is Lavender’s registered agent for service of process, in which case nothing in the record shows what the connection, if any, is between Breedy and LegalCorp or Lavender. That phrase could also mean that Breedy is Lavender’s registered agent for service of process, which would conflict with the allegation in the live pleading that LegalCorp is Lavender’s registered agent for service of process. Aguilera argues this phrase means that Breedy is LegalCorp’s registered agent for service of process, but there is no way to determine if this is so from the face of the record. The record does not affirmatively show that the citation was delivered to Breedy and that Breedy was authorized to receive service of the citation on behalf of LegalCorp. See Uvalde Country Club, 690 S.W.2d at 7 885; Barker CATV Constr., Inc. v. Ampro, Inc., 989 S.W.2d 789, 793 (Tex. App.— Houston [1st Dist.] 1999, no pet.); Master Cap. Solutions Corp. v. Araujo, 456 S.W.3d 636, 640 (Tex. App.—El Paso 2015, no pet.). Thus, the record in this case does not reflect strict compliance with the rules relating to the issuance, service, and return of citation. See Uvalde Country Club, 690 S.W.2d at 885; Barker, 989 S.W.2d at 793; Master Cap. Solutions Corp., 456 S.W.3d at 640. Aguilera argues that strict compliance does not require “obeisance to the minutest detail” and cites Herbert v. Greater Gulf Coast Enters., Inc. See 915 S.W.2d 866, 871 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 1995, no writ). In Herbert, this court concluded that the return of citation showed strict compliance with the rules regarding the issuance, service, and return of citation, even though the return referred to the “Original Petition” as the “Complaint.” See id. The Herbert court concluded that “complaint” is a term clearly synonymous with “petition” and that it was clear that appellant was served with the appropriate documents. See id. The court stated that “[e]ven strict compliance does not require such absolute obeisance to the minutest detail.” Id. Several other courts of appeals have made similar statements. The Supreme Court of Texas addressed this line of cases in Spanton v. Bellah. See 612 S.W.3d 314, 316–18 (Tex. 2020). In that case, the trial court’s order authorized substitute service at a house number on “Heathers Hill Drive” in 8 Dripping Springs, and the return stated that service was executed at the same house number but on “Heather Hills Drive” in Dripping Springs. See id. at 315. The court of appeals held that this discrepancy did not necessitate reversal. See id. at 316. Although the court of appeals agreed that the record must show strict compliance with the rules of service of citation for a default judgment to be affirmed on a restricted appeal, it concluded that “strict compliance does not require obeisance to the minutest detail.” Id. (internal quotations omitted). The Supreme Court stated that discrepancies in addresses may be mere details when the order authorizes substitute service wherever the defendant may be found or when the defendant is indisputably personally served, but that otherwise, discrepancies in the defendant’s name or address prevent any implication or presumption of proper substitute service. See id. at 317. The Supreme Court noted that such deviances are certainly not trivial when the trial court has authorized substitute service, and the court held that the substitute service did not strictly comply with the order permitting such service. See id. at 317–18. The Supreme Court has also recently emphasized that “‘no-answer default judgments are disfavored’ and cannot be sustained absent meticulous adherence to service requirements.” Shamrock Enters., LLC, 728 S.W.3d at 699 (quoting Spanton, 612 S.W.3d at 316). 9 Based on this binding precedent, we conclude that the category of items as to which a mistake does not violate the requirement of strict compliance with service requirements under the “minutest detail” line of cases is narrow and that today’s case does not fall within that doctrine. See Shamrock Enters., LLC, 728 S.W.3d at 699; Spanton, 612 S.W.3d at 316–18. Lavender has established error apparent on the face of the record. Service of process was defective, and the trial court erred in granting a default judgment against Lavender. We sustain Lavender’s sole issue. III. Conclusion We reverse the trial court’s judgment and remand this case for further proceedings consistent with this opinion. Andrew Johnson Justice Panel consists of Chief Justice Adams and Justices Guerra and Johnson. 10