Ken Gazian v. Worth Casualty Company, Worth Claims Services, and Redpoint Insurance Group
CourtTexas Court of Appeals, 7th District (Amarillo)
Date FiledAugust 27, 2026
Docket07-25-00325-CV
StatusPublished
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Full Opinion
In The
Court of Appeals
Seventh District of Texas at Amarillo
No. 07-25-00325-CV
KEN GAZIAN, APPELLANT
V.
WORTH CASUALTY COMPANY, WORTH CLAIMS SERVICES, AND
REDPOINT INSURANCE GROUP, APPELLEES
On Appeal from the 348th District Court
Tarrant County, Texas
Trial Court No. 348-361750-25, Honorable Megan Fahey, Presiding
August 27, 2026
ORDER OF ABATEMENT AND REMAND
Before DOSS and YARBROUGH and PRATT, JJ.
Appellant, Ken Gazian, appeals from the trial court’s Order Granting Defendants’
Rule 91a Motion to Dismiss.1 Because the order is not a final, appealable judgment, we
abate the appeal and remand this cause to the trial court for further proceedings.
1 This appeal was originally filed in the Second Court of Appeals and was transferred to this Court
by a docket-equalization order of the Supreme Court of Texas. See TEX. GOV’T CODE § 73.001.
Gazian, sued Appellees, Worth Casualty Company, Worth Claims Services, and
Redpoint Insurance Group, asserting claims for breach of contract, breach of good faith
and fair dealing, negligence, fraud, violations of Chapter 542 of the Texas Insurance
Code, and a request for declaratory relief. Subsequently, Appellees filed a motion to
dismiss Gazian’s “cause of action” under Rule 91a of the Rules of Civil Procedure. The
motion, however, did not specify which claim or claims Appellees sought to dismiss. By
order of June 12, 2025, the trial court granted the motion, stating “Plaintiff Ken Gazian’s
cause of action against Defendants is hereby DISMISSED WITH PREJUDICE pursuant
to Texas Rule of Civil Procedure Rule 91a.” The order likewise failed to specify which of
Gazian’s several causes of action were dismissed. Gazian appealed.
Generally, with few statutory exceptions, an appeal may be taken only from a final
judgment. Lehmann v. Har-Con Corp., 39 S.W.3d 191, 195 (Tex. 2001). When there has
been no conventional trial on the merits, an order or judgment is not final for purposes of
appeal unless it actually disposes of every pending claim and party or it clearly and
unequivocally states that it finally disposes of all claims and all parties. Id. at 205. If an
appellate court is uncertain about the intent of an order to finally dispose of all claims and
parties, it can abate the appeal to permit clarification by the trial court. Id. at 206.
The Order Granting Defendants’ Rule 91a Motion to Dismiss does not contain any
finality language as expressed in Lehmann nor does it expressly dispose of all parties
and claims. Without a final judgment for review, this appeal is premature and we are
without appellate jurisdiction. As an alternative to dismissal, however, we may abate a
premature appeal to allow the trial court to cure a jurisdictional defect, particularly when
only the ministerial act of making a judgment final remains. See TEX. R. APP. P. 27.2
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(“The appellate court may allow an appealed order that is not final to be modified so as
to be made final and may allow the modified order and all proceedings relating to it to be
included in a supplemental record.”); Palma v. Young, 601 S.W.3d 799, 801 (Tex. 2020)
(discussing clarifying order confirming final judgment).
Consequently, we abate this appeal and remand the cause to the trial court to
clarify whether the Order Granting Defendants’ Rule 91a Motion to Dismiss is a final
judgment and, if necessary, to permit the parties to obtain an order disposing of all claims
and parties. See TEX. R. APP. P. 27.2. A supplemental clerk’s record containing the trial
court’s clarifying order, and any other necessary orders, shall be filed with the Clerk of
this Court by September 28, 2026.
It is so ordered.
Per Curiam
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