In Re Rosa Nelia Ramos and Maria Luisa Martinez v. the State of Texas
CourtTexas Court of Appeals, 13th District
Date FiledNovember 16, 2026
Docket13-26-00620-CV
StatusPublished
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Full Opinion
NUMBER 13-26-00620-CV
COURT OF APPEALS
THIRTEENTH DISTRICT OF TEXAS
CORPUS CHRISTI – EDINBURG
IN RE ROSA NELIA RAMOS AND MARIA LUISA MARTINEZ
ON PETITION FOR WRIT OF MANDAMUS
MEMORANDUM OPINION
Before Chief Justice Tijerina and Justices Cron and Fonseca
Memorandum Opinion by Justice Cron1
By petition for writ of mandamus, relators Rosa Nelia Ramos and Maria Luisa
Martinez assert that the trial court 2 abused its discretion by disqualifying their counsel of
record, Jay Peña and the law firm of Pope & Peña, P.C. We agree, and we conditionally
1 See TEX. R. APP. P. 52.8(d) (“When denying relief, the court may hand down an opinion but is not
required to do so. When granting relief, the court must hand down an opinion as in any other case.”), id. R.
47.1 (“The court of appeals must hand down a written opinion that is as brief as practicable but that
addresses every issue raised and necessary to final disposition of the appeal.”), id. R. 47.4 (explaining the
differences between opinions and memorandum opinions).
2 This original proceeding arises from trial court cause number CL-24-0291-H in the County Court
at Law No. 8 of Hidalgo County, Texas, and the respondent is the Honorable Omar Maldonado. See id. R.
52.2.
grant the petition for writ of mandamus.
I. BACKGROUND
The underlying lawsuit arises from a 2022 transaction in which Jose Ernesto Lugo
Jr. sold stock in Edinburg Adult Day Care, Inc. (EADCI) to relators. After the transaction,
relators filed suit individually and derivatively against Lugo, Dana Lopez, and Jelugo
Properties LLC (Jelugo) for breach of contract, fraud, statutory fraud, breach of fiduciary
duty, conversion, tortious interference, and civil conspiracy. In relators’ Second Amended
Petition, filed on November 4, 2025, relators explained that:
5.1. In anticipation of acquiring [EADCI], [relators] retained legal
counsel to draft formal transactional documents. These were intended to
ensure a lawful, structured transfer of ownership and operational control, in
compliance with Texas licensing rules and Medicaid contracting regulations.
5.2. [Relators] entered into two sets of documents (collectively, the
“Stock Transfer Documents”) titled “Stock Transfer Purchase Agreement”
and “General Assignment and Bill of Sale.” The first set, dated September
30, 2022, transferred 49% of shares to [relators] for $60,000. The second
set, dated December 31, 2022, transferred the remaining 51% of shares for
an additional $60,000. The [relators] fulfilled all conditions precedent by
tending all monies due to Lugo.
5.3. The Stock Transfer Documents expressly required Lugo to “do
all such other and further acts and things, as may be necessary to more
fully and effectively grant, convey, and assign to the [relators] the agency
and its assets hereby intended to be so conveyed hereunder or pursuant to
the Stock Purchase Agreement signed concurrent to this document”.
5.4. Lopez drafted and notarized these transactional documents
despite not being an attorney licensed to practice law in Texas. Lopez acted
as Lugo’s agent and engaged in the unauthorized practice of law,
proximately causing harm to [relators] by preparing ambiguous and
noncompliant instruments affecting ownership and control of a licensed
healthcare corporation.
5.5. Lugo also concealed the fact that he had made no effort to tender
any of the notifications required of him to the Texas Health and Human
Services Commission (HHSC), the Texas Medicaid & Healthcare
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Partnership (TMHP), or the Managed Care Organizations (MCOs).
Although he knew these notifications were necessary to effectuate a lawful
transfer of ownership and contracting authority, Lugo failed and refused to
submit them, while representing to [relators] that such obligations had been
or would be fulfilled. He nonetheless accepted and retained all payments
made under the agreements, despite knowing that his omissions would
prevent [relators] from assuming lawful control and continuing [EADCI’s]
operations.
5.6. On or about October 1, 2022, while still the majority (51%)
shareholder and controlling officer of [EADCI], Lugo caused his wholly
owned company, [Jelugo], to enter into a Commercial Lease Agreement
with [EADCI] for the premises located at 1206 E. University Drive, Edinburg,
Texas. The Petition in Intervention filed by [Jelugo] and its attached lease
confirm that [Jelugo], through Lugo as its principal member, was the sole
owner and landlord of the property.
5.7. Although Lugo did not sign the lease in the name of [EADCI], he
held exclusive control over the building, the keys, and [EADCI’s] regulatory
and operational lifelines—including access to HHSC licensing, Medicaid
provider credentials, and client records stored on the premises. As a result,
[EADCI] had no realistic choice but to accept and perform under the lease
that Lugo’s company dictated. Lugo’s dual control over both the landlord
[Jelugo] and the tenant [EADCI] rendered the lease a coercive, non-arm’s-
length transaction designed for his personal benefit and adverse to
[EADCI’s] interests.
5.8. Lugo later weaponized this arrangement. When disputes arose,
he invoked his position as landlord to evict [EADCI] and seize its operational
premises, while simultaneously obstructing [relators’] ability to comply with
regulatory requirements and maintain continuity of care for clients.
5.9. The schedules attached to the parties’ Stock Transfer
Documents identified several vehicles and operational assets used by
[EADCI] in providing Day Activity and Health Services (DAHS). Lugo
retained physical control over those vehicles and other assets, as they
remained on the leased premises at 1206 E. University Drive, a property
owned and controlled by his company, [Jelugo].
5.10. Lugo likewise maintained exclusive control of [EADCI’s]
electronically stored information (ESI), including email accounts, servers,
and cloud-based records associated with a domain name that he owned,
managed, or controlled. Essential communications with HHSC, TMHP,
MCOs, and other business partners were conducted through those
accounts. After evicting [relators] from the premises, Lugo refused to
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provide access credentials, passwords, or administrative control of
[EADCI’s] digital infrastructure, effectively depriving [relators] and [EADCI]
of their business records, regulatory correspondence, and operational data.
During the transaction and in the lawsuit, relators were represented by Peña of Pope &
Peña, P.C.
On April 14, 2026, less than a month before the trial date of May 11, 2026, Lugo
and Jelugo filed a motion to disqualify Peña and Pope & Peña, P.C. 3 as counsel for
relators based on Texas Disciplinary Rule of Professional Conduct 3.08. See TEX.
DISCIPLINARY RULES PROF’L CONDUCT R. 3.08, reprinted in TEX. GOV’T CODE, tit. 2, subtit.
G. app. A. (governing the lawyer as witness). Lugo and Jelugo asserted that Peña’s
testimony was necessary to determine whether relators were justified in relying on Lugo’s
alleged misrepresentations, and Peña’s potential dual role as advocate and witness
would cause them to suffer actual prejudice. They argued that the motion to disqualify
was “timely requested” because “the fact that [Peña] represented [relators] in the stock
transfer first came to light in [Ramos’s] deposition on March 30, 2026.”
Relators filed an “omnibus” response to the motion to disqualify, asserting in part
that, twenty-six days before trial, Lugo and Jelugo had “launched a coordinated campaign
of procedural filings designed not to obtain relief on the merits, but to consume [relators’]
final weeks of trial preparation and to inject unpled theories into the case.” Relators thus
addressed a quartet of recent filings by Lugo and Jelugo, including the motion to disqualify
as well as a motion for leave to designate Peña as a responsible third party, a motion for
an in camera inspection of records, and a motion for sanctions. Relators specifically
3 The motion to disqualify mistakenly names the law firm as “Poe & Peña, P.C.” as does the trial
court’s order granting that motion.
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argued that the motion to disqualify failed on the merits because Peña’s testimony was
not necessary to establish any essential fact and his role in the case would not cause any
prejudice to Lugo and Jelugo. On May 6, 2026, the trial court granted the motion to
disqualify and disqualified Pope & Peña, PC as counsel for relators. 4
This original proceeding ensued. By two issues, relators assert that: (1) the trial
court abused its discretion in disqualifying their counsel and (2) they lack an adequate
remedy by appeal. The Court ordered the real parties in interest to file a response to the
petition for writ of mandamus, and Lugo and Jelugo filed a response. See TEX. R. APP. P.
52.4, 52.8. Lopez has not made an appearance in this original proceeding.
II. MANDAMUS
Mandamus relief provides an “extraordinary remedy.” In re Rogers, 690 S.W.3d
296, 302 (Tex. 2024) (orig. proceeding) (per curiam) (quoting In re USAA Gen. Indem.
Co., 624 S.W.3d 782, 787 (Tex. 2021) (orig. proceeding)). Mandamus is discretionary in
nature and it is governed by equitable principles. In re First Reserve Mgmt., L.P., 671
S.W.3d 653, 663 (Tex. 2023) (orig. proceeding); In re Garza, 544 S.W.3d 836, 840 (Tex.
2018) (orig. proceeding) (per curiam). To obtain mandamus relief, the relator must show
that the trial court clearly abused its discretion and the relator lacks an adequate remedy
by appeal. In re Dall. HERO, 698 S.W.3d 242, 247 (Tex. 2024) (orig. proceeding); In re
AutoZoners, LLC, 694 S.W.3d 219, 223 (Tex. 2024) (orig. proceeding) (per curiam). If the
trial court abuses its discretion by disqualifying counsel, mandamus may issue because
there is not an adequate remedy by appeal to address the error. In re Zaidi, 732 S.W.3d
4 The order mistakenly recites that it was signed on April 6, 2026, rather than May 6, 2026. The
record indicates that the order was signed on May 6, 2026, and the parties do not argue otherwise. This
discrepancy does not affect our analysis in this original proceeding.
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525, 531 (Tex. 2026) (orig. proceeding); In re RSR Corp., 475 S.W.3d 775, 778 (Tex.
2015) (orig. proceeding); In re Sanders, 153 S.W.3d 54, 56 (Tex. 2004) (orig. proceeding)
(per curiam); In re Bradley, No. 13-26-00396-CV, 2026 WL 2096921, at *1 (Tex. App.—
Corpus Christi–Edinburg July 20, 2026, orig. proceeding) (mem. op.).
III. DISQUALIFICATION
“Disqualification of counsel is a severe remedy that can result in significant
expense to clients, disrupt the orderly progress of litigation, and deprive a party of the
counsel of its choice.” In re Murrin Bros. 1885, Ltd., 603 S.W.3d 53, 57 (Tex. 2019) (orig.
proceeding); see In re Cerberus Cap. Mgmt., L.P., 164 S.W.3d 379, 383 (Tex. 2005) (orig.
proceeding) (per curiam); In re Nitla S.A. de C.V., 92 S.W.3d at 419, 422 (Tex. 2002)
(orig. proceeding) (per curiam); In re Palomo, 721 S.W.3d 737, 743 (Tex. App.—Corpus
Christi–Edinburg 2025, orig. proceeding [mand. denied]); In re Heiser, 711 S.W.3d 775,
781 (Tex. App.—Austin 2025, orig. proceeding); In re Tex. Windstorm Ins. Ass’n, 417
S.W.3d 119, 129 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 2013, orig. proceeding). Courts must
apply “an exacting standard” in ruling on disqualification motions “to discourage their use
as a dilatory trial tactic.” In re Murrin Bros. 1885, Ltd., 603 S.W.3d at 57 (quoting In re
RSR Corp., 568 S.W.3d at 666); see NCNB Tex. Nat. Bank v. Coker, 765 S.W.2d 398,
399 (Tex. 1989) (orig. proceeding); Spears v. Fourth Ct. of Apps., 797 S.W.2d 654, 656
(Tex. 1990) (orig. proceeding); In re Heiser, 711 S.W.3d at 781. The Texas Disciplinary
Rules of Professional Conduct (Rules) do not set a dispositive standard for
disqualification; however, they “provide helpful guidance” and “suggest the relevant
considerations.” In re Murrin Bros. 1885, Ltd., 603 S.W.3d at 57 (quoting Nat’l Med.
Enters., Inc. v. Godbey, 924 S.W.2d 123, 132 (Tex. 1996) (orig. proceeding)); see In re
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Cerberus Cap. Mgmt., L.P., 164 S.W.3d at 382; In re Palomo, 721 S.W.3d at 744; In re
Heiser, 711 S.W.3d at 781–82 In re Tex. Windstorm Ins. Ass’n, 417 S.W.3d at 129.
The movant bears the burden of proof to establish its right to disqualification. In re
Sanders, 153 S.W.3d at 57; Spears, 797 S.W.2d at 656; In re Jim S. Adler & Assocs., No.
14-26-00041-CV, 2026 WL 1338227, at *3 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] May 14,
2026, orig. proceeding); In re Palomo, 721 S.W.3d at 744; In re TMD Def. & Space, LLC,
649 S.W.3d 764, 769–70 (Tex. App.—El Paso 2022, orig. proceeding); In re Tex.
Windstorm Ins. Ass’n, 417 S.W.3d at 129. The movant must also show that it will suffer
actual prejudice if counsel is not disqualified. In re Zaidi, 732 S.W.3d at 532; In re Murrin
Bros. 1885, Ltd., 603 S.W.3d at 57; In re Nitla S.A. de C.V., 92 S.W.3d at 422. In our
review, we also consider the extent to which the nonmovant will suffer prejudice if counsel
is disqualified. See In re Murrin Bros. 1885, Ltd., 603 S.W.3d at 57. We consider all the
facts and circumstances of the case in determining whether disqualification is warranted.
Id.
IV. RULE 3.08
As stated previously, the motion to disqualify is premised on Rule 3.08. See TEX.
DISCIPLINARY RULES PROF’L CONDUCT R. 3.08. Subject to certain exceptions that are not
applicable here, Rule 3.08 provides that “[a] lawyer shall not accept or continue
employment as an advocate before a tribunal in a contemplated or pending adjudicatory
proceeding if the lawyer knows or believes that the lawyer is or may be a witness
necessary to establish an essential fact on behalf of the lawyer’s client[.]” TEX.
DISCIPLINARY RULES PROF’L CONDUCT R. 3.08(a); see In re Sanders, 153 S.W.3d at 57;
Anderson Producing, Inc. v. Koch Oil Co., 929 S.W.2d 416, 418 (Tex. 1996). Further, “[a]
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lawyer shall not continue as an advocate in a pending adjudicatory proceeding if the
lawyer believes that the lawyer will be compelled to furnish testimony that will be
substantially adverse to the lawyer’s client, unless the client consents after full
disclosure.” TEX. DISCIPLINARY RULES PROF’L CONDUCT R. 3.08(b).
Rule 3.08 “is grounded in the concern that an attorney performing dual roles as
witness and advocate can unfairly prejudice the opposing party, because it may not be
clear whether a statement by an advocate-witness should be taken as proof or as
commentary on the proof.” In re Wheatley, No. 08-26-00001-CV, 2026 WL 1096281, at
*3 (Tex. App.—El Paso Apr. 22, 2026, orig. proceeding) (mem. op.). “Among the concerns
of this dual role are that ‘the attorney may be more impeachable for interest and,
therefore, a less effective witness,’ the dual role may place the attorney ‘in the unseemly
and ineffective position of arguing his own credibility,’ and ‘the roles of advocate and
witness are inconsistent, because the function of an advocate is to advance his client’s
cause and that of a witness is to state facts objectively.’” In re Keenan, 501 S.W.3d 74,
77 (Tex. 2016) (orig. proceeding) (per curiam) (quoting Warrilow v. Norrell, 791 S.W.2d
515, 521 n.6 (Tex. App.—Corpus Christi–Edinburg 1989, writ denied)). That said, “[t]he
fact that a lawyer serves as both an advocate and a witness does not, standing alone,
compel disqualification.” In re Tempus Holdings, Inc., No. 04-26-00224-CV, 2026 WL
1685915, at *3 (Tex. App.—San Antonio June 10, 2026, orig. proceeding) (mem. op.)
(quoting In re Garza, 373 S.W.3d 115, 117–18 (Tex. App.—San Antonio 2012, orig.
proceeding)); see Ayres v. Canales, 790 S.W.2d 554, 558 (Tex. 1990) (orig. proceeding).
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V. ANALYSIS
Lugo and Jelugo’s motion to disqualify was premised on relators’ Second Amended
Petition, in which relators alleged that Lugo made fraudulent representations inducing
them to purchase EADCI, and they accordingly alleged claims for fraud and statutory
fraud. See TEX. BUS. & COM. CODE § 27.01 (governing fraud in real estate and stock
transactions). Lugo and Jelugo asserted that Peña’s testimony was necessary to
determine whether relators “were justified in relying on Lugo’s alleged misrepresentation,”
which “is an essential fact and element of [relators’] affirmative claims.” They asserted
that parties represented by legal counsel in an arms-length transaction are not justified in
relying on the other party’s representations, and they further alleged:
In the present case, [relators] each testified that [Peña] was entrenched in
the negotiating, drafting, and consummating of the [EADCI] stock transfers.
According to [relators], [Peña] reviewed and revised the draft stock transfer
documents prepared by Lopez. Moreover, as noted above, [Peña] was
engaged by [relators] to prepare additional legal binding agreements for the
parties to sign in advance of the initial stock transfer. Also, [Peña’s] law firm
was also designated with the power of attorney to submit filings with the
Texas Secretary of the State. Therefore, [Peña’s] testimony is critical in
determining to what extent, if any, [relators] relied on Lugo’s purported
misrepresentations and inducement. [Relators’] testimony was deliberately
vague in exactly what [Peña’s] representation entails. Without [Peña’s]
testimony, [Lugo and Jelugo] would have no tangible way to challenge
[relators’] self-serving claim of justifiable reliance.
(Internal citations omitted).
Lugo and Jelugo further argued that communications between relators and Peña
were “presumably protected by attorney-client privilege,” yet this privilege could not be
used as both “a shield and a sword,” and Peña “may be required to produce evidence
substantially adverse to [relators’] interests.” Finally, Lugo and Jelugo asserted that
Peña’s dual role as advocate and witness would cause them actual prejudice. They
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supported their motion to disqualify with: (1) excerpts from Martinez’s November 12, 2025
deposition; (2) excerpts from Ramos’s March 30, 2026 deposition; (3) the Shareholders’
Agreement, effective on September 30, 2022; (4) the Share Purchase Option, effective
on September 30, 2022, and (5) relators’ Second Amended Petition.
Lugo and Jelugo assert that Peña’s testimony is required to rebut relators’ claims
that they justifiably relied on Lugo’s representations. In this regard, for relators to prevail
on their claims for fraud and statutory fraud, they must show, in part, that they justifiably
relied on a material, false representation. Pesca Holding LLC v. Skoldeberg, No. 04-24-
00642-CV, 2026 WL 3011758, at *3 (Tex. App.—San Antonio Oct. 7, 2026, no pet. h.).
“Justifiable reliance usually presents a question of fact,” however, it “can be negated as
a matter of law when circumstances exist under which reliance cannot be justified.”
JPMorgan Chase Bank, N.A. v. Orca Assets G.P., 546 S.W.3d 648, 654 (Tex. 2018).
“Generally, reliance on representations made in a business or commercial transaction is
not justified when the representation takes place in an adversarial context.” Mikob Props.,
Inc. v. Joachim, 468 S.W.3d 587, 598 (Tex. App.—Dallas 2015, pet. denied) (quoting AKB
Hendrick, LP v. Musgrave Enters., Inc., 380 S.W.3d 221, 232 (Tex.App.—Dallas 2012, no
pet.)). However, in determining whether justifiable reliance is negated as a matter of law,
we consider the circumstances in their entirety, including the parties’ relationship and the
contract at issue, while accounting for the parties’ relative levels of sophistication.
JPMorgan Chase Bank, N.A., 546 S.W.3d at 598. Here, relators have pleaded that Lugo,
as president, director, and controlling shareholder of EADCI, possessed fiduciary duties
of loyalty, good faith, and due care to EADCI and its shareholders and breached those
duties through, in relevant part, fraudulent misrepresentations.
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As movants for disqualification, Lugo and Jelugo had the burden to show that
Peña’s testimony is necessary. See In re Sanders, 153 S.W.3d at 57; Spears, 797 S.W.2d
at 656. However, Lugo and Jelugo provide no authority to support the proposition that
Peña’s testimony is required to counter relators’ claims of justifiable reliance, and we have
found none. Leaving aside the fact that representation by counsel is only one aspect of
the analysis regarding justifiable reliance, the fact that relators were represented by
counsel during the stock transaction is available through documentary and testimonial
evidence that is already contained in the record. Thus, Lugo and Jelugo have not shown
that evidence on this issue is unavailable from any other source. See In re Sanders, 153
S.W.3d at 57; see, e.g., In re Judwin Props., Inc., No. 14-24-00820-CV, 2025 WL 996440,
at *3 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] Apr. 3, 2025, orig. proceeding) (per curiam) (mem.
op.) (conditionally granting mandamus relief for an order disqualifying counsel because
the “record reflects there was no evidence Kelly is the only person in possession of facts
regarding the alleged misrepresentations that serve as the basis for relator’s claims”); In
re Monroe, No. 04-24-00488-CV, 2024 WL 4965678, at *3 (Tex. App.—San Antonio Dec.
4, 2024, orig. proceeding) (per curiam) (mem. op.) (“Alford fails to show how such
testimony is necessary to establish an essential element of his enforcement allegations.
Nor does he show that evidence on this element is unavailable from any other source
such that Leibowitz’s testimony would be required.”). Further, Lugo and Jelugo never
identified the “essential facts” regarding justifiable reliance that they allegedly needed to
prove through Peña’s testimony. See In re Tex. Tech. Servs., Inc., 476 S.W.3d 747, 751
(Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 2015, orig. proceeding) (“Simply stating that Lambright’s
attorneys’ testimony is necessary to establish one of the elements of its interference
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claim, without further explanation, is insufficient to meet PGS’s significant burden to show
that the testimony is necessary to establish an essential fact.”); In re VSDH Vaquero
Venture, Ltd., No. 05-14-00958–CV, 2014 WL 4262167, at *2–3 (Tex. App.—Dallas Aug.
28, 2014, orig. proceeding) (mem. op.) (holding that the disqualification movant must
identify the essential facts that the attorney’s testimony would establish).
Because we consider all the facts and circumstances of the case to determine
whether the interests of justice require disqualification, see In re Murrin Bros. 1885, Ltd.,
603 S.W.3d at 57, we review any evidence indicating the motion to disqualify was filed as
a dilatory trial tactic. In re Garza, No. 04-24-00568-CV, 2025 WL 1572792, at *2 (Tex.
App.—San Antonio June 4, 2025, orig. proceeding) (mem. op.). While relators do not
argue that Lugo and Jelugo waived their motion for disqualification through delay, they do
assert that the “eve of trial” timing of the motion represents the “tactical posture” for
disqualification motions that is forbidden by the relevant law. We agree.
Lugo and Jelugo alleged that Peña’s representation of relators in the stock
transaction only came to light during Ramos’s deposition on March 30, 2026. However,
Lugo executed the transactional documents on September 30, 2022. Based on the record
before us, Lugo was aware at that time that Peña was reviewing the transaction at
Ramos’s behest. The Shareholders’ Agreement and the Bill of Sale both include the name
of Peña’s law firm. These documents were first produced to Lugo’s counsel in this lawsuit
on May 7, 2024, in relators’ initial disclosures, and were again produced on August 15,
2025, in relators’ responses to Lugo’s first and second set of requests for production.
Further, Peña conducted Lugo’s deposition on November 18, 2025, and when he
questioned Lugo regarding who drafted some of the transaction documents, Lugo
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responded that “it might have been [Lopez] or your law firm,” because “both of you guys
were helping [relators] out with this.” Lugo further stated that Peña was “assisting with the
whole process.” Nevertheless, Lugo and Jelugo did not file the motion to disqualify until
April 14, 2026, less than one month before trial. Rule 3.08 should not be used as a tactical
“eve of trial” motion to deprive relators of the right to be represented by the lawyer of their
choice. See In re Sanders, 153 S.W.3d at 57–58; Ayres, 790 S.W.2d at 557; NCNB Tex.
Nat. Bank, 765 S.W.2d at 399; Spears, 797 S.W.2d at 656.
Based on the foregoing, we determine that Lugo and Jelugo failed to meet their
burden to show that relators’ counsel should be disqualified. See In re Sanders, 153
S.W.3d at 57; Spears, 797 S.W.2d at 656; In re TMD Def. & Space, LLC, 649 S.W.3d at
769–70; In re Tex. Windstorm Ins. Ass’n, 417 S.W.3d at 129. Thus, the trial court abused
its discretion by disqualifying relators’ counsel. See In re Murrin Bros. 1885, Ltd., 603
S.W.3d at 57. We sustain relators’ first issue. Further, relators lack an adequate remedy
by appeal after a final judgment to address this error. See In re Zaidi, 732 S.W.3d at 531;
In re RSR Corp., 475 S.W.3d at 778. Therefore, we sustain relators’ second issue.
VI. CONCLUSION
The Court, having examined and fully considered the petition for writ of mandamus,
Lugo and Jelugo’s response, the record, and the applicable law, is of the opinion that
relators have met their burden to obtain mandamus relief. Accordingly, we conditionally
grant the petition for writ of mandamus, and we direct the trial court to vacate its order of
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April 6, 2026, and to enter an order denying disqualification. Our writ will issue only if the
trial court fails to act in accordance with this memorandum opinion.
JENNY CRON
Justice
Delivered and filed on the
16th day of November, 2026.
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