In Re Cody Wommack v. the State of Texas
CourtTexas Court of Appeals, 6th District (Texarkana)
Date FiledNovember 18, 2026
Docket06-26-00144-CV
StatusPublished
📰 News Coverage: Read the LAWS.com news report on this case
Full Opinion
In the
Court of Appeals
Sixth Appellate District of Texas at Texarkana
No. 06-26-00144-CV
IN RE CODY WOMMACK
Original Mandamus Proceeding
Before Stevens, C.J., van Cleef and Rambin, JJ.
Memorandum Opinion by Justice van Cleef
MEMORANDUM OPINION
In this mandamus action, Relator, Cody Wommack, requests that this Court compel the
Honorable Fred Duncan Thomas, Jr., presiding judge of the Seventy-sixth Judicial District Court
of Titus County, Texas, to vacate his order transferring this case from Titus County to Morris
County. Because we find that the trial court abused its discretion in granting a change of venue
without allowing the forty-five days’ notice contemplated in Rule 87 of the Texas Rules of Civil
Procedure, we conditionally grant the writ. See TEX. R. CIV. P. 87.
I. Background
Relator filed an election contest in Titus County challenging a May 2026 Daingerfield-
Lone Star Independent School District (the District) bond election. On June 26, 2026, Real Party
in Interest, Neil Roney (RPI), in his official capacity as President of the Board of Trustees for the
District, responded by filing a motion to transfer venue to Morris County. The parties did not
contest that the District falls within both Titus County and Morris County. However, RPI argued
in his motion that the District only had a marginal connection to Titus County and the
“substantial majority of the District’s territory lies in Morris County.” On August 13, 2026,
Relator responded to the motion opposing the transfer.
On August 25, 2026, after e-mail communications between the parties and court
coordinator, the trial court set a hearing for the venue issue on September 24, 2026. RPI then
filed a response to Relator’s opposition to transfer on September 17, 2026. On September 24,
2026, at 6:17 a.m. on the day of the hearing, Relator filed a motion for continuance of the
hearing, arguing that the trial court was required to give each party forty-five days’ notice of a
2
hearing on a motion to transfer venue, pursuant to Rule 87. The hearing was held on September
24, and the trial court orally denied Relator’s motion for continuance. At the close of the
hearing, the trial court granted the change of venue request. Subsequently, on September 29, an
order was entered reflecting the trial court’s granting of the motion and transferring the matter
from Titus County to Morris County.
This original proceeding ensued. Among other issues, Relator asserts that the trial court
abused its discretion by granting a change of venue without allowing the forty-five days’ notice
contemplated in Rule 87. This Court requested and received a response to the petition for a writ
of mandamus from RPI and further received a reply from Relators to RPI’s response. See TEX.
R. APP. P. 52.2, 52.4, 52.8.
II. Mandamus Review
Mandamus is “an extraordinary remedy” that is “available only in limited
circumstances.” Walker v. Packer, 827 S.W.2d 833, 840 (Tex. 1992) (orig. proceeding). A writ
of mandamus will issue only if the trial court clearly abused its discretion, and the relator has no
adequate remedy on appeal. In re Prudential Ins. Co. of Am., 148 S.W.3d 124, 135–36 (Tex.
2004) (orig. proceeding). With respect to the first requirement, “[a] trial court abuses its
discretion if ‘“it reaches a decision so arbitrary and unreasonable as to amount to a clear and
prejudicial error of law.”’” In re Cerberus Cap. Mgmt., L.P., 164 S.W.3d 379, 382 (Tex. 2005)
(orig. proceeding) (per curiam) (quoting Walker, 827 S.W.2d at 839). However, because a trial
court has no discretion in determining what the law is or in applying it to the facts, a trial court
abuses its discretion if it fails to correctly analyze or apply the law. See Prudential, 148 S.W.3d
3
at 135; see also In re J.B. Hunt Transp., Inc., 492 S.W.3d 287, 294 (Tex. 2016) (orig.
proceeding).
III. Venue
Generally, venue rulings may only be reviewed on appeal from the final judgment in the
case. See TEX. CIV. PRAC. & REM. CODE ANN. § 15.064(a) (prohibiting interlocutory appeals of
venue determinations); TEX. R. CIV. P. 87(6) (same); In re Masonite Corp., 997 S.W.2d 194, 197
(Tex. 1999) (orig. proceeding). However, mandamus relief is available to enforce mandatory
venue provisions and, on rare occasions, to remedy erroneous venue determinations in cases that
present “‘exceptional circumstances’ that make appeal an inadequate remedy.” In re Masonite
Corp., 997 S.W.2d at 198; see TEX. CIV. PRAC. & REM. CODE ANN. § 15.0642 (“A party may
apply for a writ of mandamus with an appellate court to enforce the mandatory venue provisions
of this chapter.”); Wagner v. Apache Corp., 627 S.W.3d 277, 288 (Tex. 2021) (stating that
“interlocutory review of a trial court’s failure to enforce a mandatory venue provision is
available only through a writ of mandamus” (citing TEX. CIV. PRAC. & REM. CODE ANN.
§ 15.0642)).
“Where the trial court denies a continuance and grants an early venue transfer, despite a
showing of the need for the full forty-five day notice, mandamus is the appropriate remedy to
[e]nsure compliance with Rule 87.” Beard v. Gonzalez, 924 S.W.2d 763, 765 (Tex. App.—
El Paso 1996, no writ) (citing Henderson v. O’Neill, 797 S.W.2d 905 (Tex. 1990) (per curiam)
(orig. proceeding)). Additionally, to preserve error on Rule 87 grounds that he did not receive
the full forty-five days’ notice of the hearing on the motion to transfer venue or reasonable time
4
to prepare, Relator must have moved for a continuance of the hearing. See TEX. R. APP. P. 33.1;
Bench Co. v. Nations Rent of Tex., L.P., 133 S.W.3d 907, 908 (Tex. App.—Dallas 2004, no pet.)
(“To preserve its right to have its venue motion determined before the summary judgment
hearing, it was incumbent upon Bench to either request a continuance of the summary judgment
hearing or seek leave of court to have the venue motion heard earlier by requesting the
[forty-five] day notice period be shortened.”); Beard, 924 S.W.2d at 765 (“To preserve error on
the grounds that he was not given adequate time to conduct discovery or prepare for a hearing on
venue, relator Beard was required to move for continuance.”); Gonzalez v. Nielson, 770 S.W.2d
99, 101 (Tex. App.—Corpus Christi–Edinburg 1989, writ denied) (“We hold that appellant was
required to move for a continuance to preserve error on his Rule 87 grounds that he was not
given either sufficient notice of the hearing or reasonable time to prepare for trial after the
hearing.”); In re Wildcat Midstream Holdings II, LLC, No. 13-17-00522-CV, 2017 WL 5486056,
at *3 (Tex. App.—Corpus Christi–Edinburg Nov. 15, 2017, orig. proceeding) (mem. op.).
Relator did so here, filing a motion for continuance, which was heard the morning of the hearing,
raising the issue in his pleadings, and also raising it in e-mail communications prior to the setting
of the hearing.
Rule 87 is the rule for determining a motion to challenge venue, which states, in relevant
part:
1. Consideration of Motion. The determination of a motion to transfer
venue shall be made promptly by the court and such determination must be made
in a reasonable time prior to commencement of the trial on the merits. The
movant has the duty to request a setting on the motion to transfer. Except on
leave of court each party is entitled to at least [forty-five] days notice of a hearing
on the motion to transfer.
5
TEX. R. CIV. P. 87(1). Here, the record reflects there was no leave of court to shorten the notice
requirement to less than forty-five days. Relator requested the full forty-five days’ notice to
present his argument at the hearing on the motion to transfer venue but was denied a
continuance.
Nothing before us reflects a viable reason for the court’s failure to provide the
parties with the forty-five day notice contemplated by the rule, and we therefore
conclude that the trial court abused its discretion in shortening the time to which
each party was entitled in order to prepare for the venue hearing.
Beard, 924 S.W.2d at 765 (citing Henderson, 797 S.W.2d at 905).
IV. Conclusion
Because the trial court’s order conflicts with Rule 87, we hold that Relator is entitled to a
writ of mandamus directing the trial court to vacate its transfer order and directing the trial court
to order the district clerk to return the complete file to Titus County. The writ shall issue only if
the trial court fails to act in accordance with this opinion.
Charles van Cleef
Justice
Date Submitted: November 17, 2026
Date Decided: November 18, 2026
6