Full Opinion

Opinion filed September 17, 2026 In The Eleventh Court of Appeals __________ No. 11-26-00194-CV __________ IN RE WELLTOWER TCG RIDEA TENANT LLC D/B/A WATERVIEW-THE COVE; SAGORA SENIOR LIVING, INC.; TCG HOLDINGS, LP; TCG HOLDINGS GENPAR, LLC; AND COVENANT GROUP HOLDINGS, LP Original Mandamus Proceeding MEMORANDUM OPINION Relators, Welltower TCG RIDEA Tenant LLC d/b/a Waterview–The Cove; Sagora Senior Living, Inc.; TCG Holdings, LP; TCG Holdings GENPAR, LLC; and Covenant Group Holdings, LP, filed this original petition for writ of mandamus asserting that Respondent, the Honorable Shaun Carpenter, presiding judge of the 220th District Court of Comanche County, clearly abused his discretion by transferring the case below from Comanche County to Hood County. Relators request that we direct Judge Carpenter to transfer the case to Tarrant County, the county requested in Relators’ motion to transfer venue. Because we conclude that the trial court clearly abused its discretion by transferring the case to an improper venue and that Relators have no adequate remedy by appeal, we conditionally grant mandamus relief. I. Factual and Procedural Background Real party in Interest, the Estate of Donal R. Schmidt, Sr. (RPI), filed suit against Relators, alleging that Schmidt fell from a second story window at an assisted living facility in Hood County and died enroute to the hospital as a result of Relators’ negligence. RPI pleaded that venue was proper in Comanche County because it was the location of Schmidt’s residence and where RPI’s “contractual undertakings, representations, and decisions” took place. Each Relator answered suit and filed a motion to transfer venue. Relators argued that Comanche County was an improper venue because none of the alleged events or omissions giving rise to the lawsuit occurred there. Relators asserted that, because RPI filed its suit in a county of improper venue, venue should be transferred to Tarrant County, the principal place of business and headquarters of Relator Sagora Senior Living, Inc (SSL). RPI filed a response to the motions to transfer venue, arguing that Comanche County was the proper venue because Schmidt’s estate was being administered there and that it was the county where Schmidt “maintained a long-standing residence.” RPI asserted that Relators’ verified motions did not establish that the principal place of business for any Relator was in Tarrant County. RPI alternatively argued that Hood County was an appropriate venue because that was where the events leading to Schmidt’s death occurred. Relators filed a reply, again asserting that venue was appropriate in Tarrant County, and that no venue provision supported venue in Comanche County. Relators further maintained that other named parties were not proper parties and not 2 relevant for venue consideration and that, under the Texas venue statutes, RPI was bound by its initial venue choice and could not thereafter select a different venue in the alternative. Relators attached to their reply the affidavit of Sydney Allen, a compliance specialist for SSL, in which she testified that SSL’s principal place of business and headquarters were in Tarrant County. Ruling on the motions by submission, the trial court entered an order transferring the case to Hood County, finding that it was the location where “all or a substantial part of the events or omissions giving rise to the claim occurred.” Relators filed this petition for writ of mandamus challenging the trial court’s order. We ordered RPI to file a response, but it did not file one. II. Mandamus Mandamus is an “extraordinary remedy” that is “available only in limited circumstances.” Walker v. Packer, 827 S.W.2d 833, 840 (Tex. 1992) (orig. proceeding). A writ of mandamus will issue only if the trial court clearly abused its discretion, and the relator has no adequate remedy by appeal. In re Prudential Ins. Co. of Am., 148 S.W.3d 124, 135–36 (Tex. 2004) (orig. proceeding). With respect to the first requirement, “a trial court clearly abuses its discretion if ‘it reaches a decision so arbitrary and unreasonable as to amount to a clear and prejudicial error of law.’” Walker, 827 S.W.2d at 839 (quoting Johnson v. Fourth Court of Appeals, 700 S.W.2d 916, 917 (Tex. 1985)); In re Cerberus Cap. Mgmt., L.P., 164 S.W.3d 379, 382 (Tex. 2005) (orig. proceeding) (per curiam). In addition, because a trial court has no discretion in determining what the law is or in applying it to the facts, a trial court abuses its discretion if it fails to correctly analyze or apply the law. See Prudential, 148 S.W.3d at 135; Walker, 827 S.W.2d at 840; see also In re J.B. Hunt Transp., Inc., 492 S.W.3d 287, 294 (Tex. 2016) (orig. proceeding). 3 III. Venue Generally, all lawsuits must be brought in: (1) the county in which all or a substantial part of the events or omissions giving rise to the claim occurred; (2) the county of defendant’s residence at the time the cause of action accrued, if the defendant is a natural person; (3) the county of the defendant’s principal office in Texas, if the defendant is not a natural person; or (4) if none of the preceding three rules apply, the county in which the plaintiff resided at the time of the accrual of the cause of action. See TEX. CIV. PRAC. & REM. CODE ANN. § 15.002(a) (West 2017); In re Lowe’s Home Centers, L.L.C., 531 S.W.3d 861, 869–70 (Tex. App.—Corpus Christi–Edinburg 2017, orig. proceeding). The plaintiff makes the initial choice of venue by filing an original petition. Fortenberry v. Great Divide Ins. Co., 664 S.W.3d 807, 811 (Tex. 2023); In re Fox River Real Est. Holdings, Inc., 596 S.W.3d 759, 762 (Tex. 2020) (orig. proceeding). A defendant may challenge a plaintiff’s chosen venue by filing a motion to transfer. TEX. R. CIV. P. 86; see CIV. PRAC. & REM. § 15.063. If a defendant challenges the plaintiff’s venue choice, the plaintiff then bears the burden to present prima facie proof that venue is maintainable in the county of suit, while the defendant bears the burden to prove venue is maintainable in the county to which the transfer is sought. Fortenberry, 664 S.W.3d at 811; In re Sanofi-Aventis U.S. LLC, 711 S.W.3d 732, 738 (Tex. App.—15th Dist. 2025, orig. proceeding); In re Rino-K&K Compression, Inc., 656 S.W.3d 153, 158 (Tex. App.— Eastland 2022, orig. proceeding); see generally TEX. R. CIV. P. 87(2)(a), 87(3)(a). “The court shall determine the motion to transfer venue on the basis of the pleadings, any stipulations made by and between the parties and such affidavits and attachments as may be filed by the parties.” TEX. R. CIV. P. 87(3)(b); see also CIV. PRAC. & REM. § 15.064 (“The court shall determine venue questions from the pleadings and affidavits.”). Further, “[t]he determination of a motion to transfer venue shall be 4 made promptly by the court and such determination must be made in a reasonable time prior to commencement of the trial on the merits.” 1 TEX. R. CIV. P. 87(1). If proper venue is established as to one defendant, then venue is proper as to all defendants in all claims arising out of the same transaction or occurrence. CIV. PRAC. & REM. § 15.005. Generally, venue rulings may only be reviewed on appeal from the final judgment in the case. See id. § 15.064(a) (prohibiting interlocutory appeals of venue determinations); TEX. R. CIV. P. 87(6) (same); In re Masonite Corp., 997 S.W.2d 194, 197 (Tex. 1999) (orig. proceeding). However, mandamus relief is available to enforce mandatory venue provisions and, on rare occasions, to remedy erroneous venue determinations in cases that present “‘exceptional circumstances’ that make appeal an inadequate remedy.” Masonite Corp., 997 S.W.2d at 198; see CIV. PRAC. & REM. § 15.0642 (“A party may apply for a writ of mandamus with an appellate court to enforce the mandatory venue provisions of this chapter.”); Wagner v. Apache Corp., 627 S.W.3d 277, 288 (Tex. 2021) (stating that “interlocutory review of a trial court’s failure to enforce a mandatory venue provision is available only through a writ of mandamus”). IV. Discussion Relators argue that RPI’s failure to file suit in a county of proper venue “vested [them] with the option to transfer the case to a county of proper venue of their choosing.” Relators maintain that they moved to transfer the case to a proper venue, yet the trial court transferred the matter to RPI’s alternative choice of venue 1 There is no complaint by any party regarding the trial court’s decision to rule on the motions to transfer venue by submission rather than an oral hearing. “Nothing in Rule 87 indicates that an oral hearing is required on a motion to transfer venue.” Orion Enterprises, Inc. v. Pope, 927 S.W.2d 654, 657 (Tex. App.—San Antonio 1996, orig. proceeding); see Gulf Coast Inv. Corp. v. Nasa 1 Bus. Ctr., 754 S.W.2d 152, 153 (Tex. 1988) (“Unless required by the express language or the context of the particular rule, therefore, the term ‘hearing’ does not necessarily contemplate either a personal appearance before the court or an oral presentation to the court.”). 5 instead. Relators maintain that this action was a clear abuse of discretion for which there is no adequate appellate remedy. In their motions to transfer venue, Relators contended that RPI did not choose any of the available general permissive venue options. Relators proposed Tarrant County as a proper venue because it was the principal place of business and headquarters for SSL. Relators’ motions were verified, but when RPI challenged the basis for their stated venue facts, Relators provided affidavit testimony establishing proper venue in Tarrant County. RPI responded by arguing that Comanche County was the proper venue, and it alternatively contended that Hood County was an appropriate venue because that is where the events leading to Schmidt’s death occurred. We agree with Relators that RPI did not initially select a county of proper venue. Section 15.002(a) provides the counties of proper venue in this case, either: (1) the county in which all or a substantial part of the events giving rise to the claims occurred; or (2) the county of a Relator’s principal office in Texas. See CIV. PRAC. & REM. § 15.002(a)(1), (3). The residual clause in Section 15.002(a)(4), which establishes the plaintiff’s county of residence as a proper venue, applies only when subsections (a)(1), (2), and (3) cannot be satisfied.2 Id. § 15.002(a)(4). Thus, Relators properly contested RPIs choice of venue in Comanche County and provided the trial court with evidence supporting venue in Tarrant County. By ignoring Relators’ proposed venue and giving RPI essentially a renewed opportunity to select venue, the trial court clearly abused its discretion. See Masonite Corp., 997 S.W.2d at 197–98 (“Functionally, the nonresident plaintiffs asked the trial court to fix their mistake and transfer their claims to another county of their choice, not Masonite’s. Because this provision does not apply, we do not address whether the plaintiff’s residence in this 2 case would be that of the decedent or his estate. 6 The trial court had no discretion to, in effect, grant the plaintiffs a transfer of venue; the plaintiffs had the first choice, but not the second, of a proper venue.”). We must next assess whether Relators lack an adequate remedy by appeal. As stated above, the general rule in Texas is that permissive venue determinations are not subject to mandamus review because an adequate remedy by appeal exists following a final judgment. See CIV. PRAC. & REM. § 15.064(a); TEX. R. CIV. P. 87(6). But the Texas Supreme Court has recognized that mandamus review of a permissive venue determination is appropriate in exceptional, or “extraordinary circumstances.” In re Team Rocket, L.P., 256 S.W.3d 257, 262 (Tex. 2008); Rino-K&K Compression, 656 S.W.3d at 159. Texas courts have previously held that allowing a plaintiff a second choice of venue in contravention of the venue rules is an extraordinary circumstance. See Masonite Corp., 997 S.W.2d at 197; Lowe’s Home Centers, 531 S.W.3d at 875 (concluding mandamus relief was appropriate where the trial court “improperly applied the venue statute and issued a ruling that allows the plaintiffs the second choice of venue”). Further, when assessing the adequacy of an appellate remedy, we balance the benefits of mandamus review against the detriments. See Team Rocket, 256 S.W.3d at 262 (citing In re Prudential Ins. Co. of Am., 148 S.W.3d 124, 136 (Tex. 2004)). In doing so, we consider: (1) whether mandamus will preserve important substantive and procedural rights from impairment or loss; (2) whether it will allow the appellate courts to give needed and helpful direction to the law that might be elusive in a direct appeal; and (3) the time and money that will be wasted by continuing with a proceeding that is subject to inevitable reversal. Id. “Our venue statutes create a balance: a plaintiff has the first choice of venue when he files suit, and a defendant is restricted to one motion to transfer that venue.” Id. Here, by granting RPI a second opportunity to fix venue, the trial court upset 7 that balance set in place by the legislature and impaired Relators’ procedural right to choose an appropriate venue when the plaintiff initially selects an improper one. See id. (“By defying the . . . trial court’s venue ruling by nonsuiting and refiling elsewhere, [plaintiffs] disrupted that balance in their favor and thereby impaired [defendant’s] procedural rights.”). Further, in our opinion the mandamus petition presents a legal issue that is likely to recur—whether a trial court can select a proper venue other than the one identified in the motion to transfer venue. See Team Rocket, 256 S.W.3d at 262. We conclude that under the specific circumstances presented here, Relators lack an adequate remedy by appeal and thus mandamus relief is appropriate. See Masonite Corp., 997 S.W.2d at 197. V. This Court’s Ruling We conditionally grant Relators’ petition for writ of mandamus. We direct the trial court to vacate its May 12, 2026 order transferring the case to Hood County and render an order transferring the case to Tarrant County. A writ of mandamus will issue only if the trial court fails to comply by October 2, 2026. W. BRUCE WILLIAMS JUSTICE September 17, 2026 Panel consists of: Bailey, C.J., Trotter, J., and Williams, J. 8