In Re Ekaterina Medyanik v. the State of Texas
CourtTexas Court of Appeals, 14th District (Houston)
Date FiledNovember 19, 2026
Docket14-26-00906-CV
JudgeJewell
StatusPublished
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Full Opinion
Petition for Writ of Mandamus Conditionally Granted and Opinion filed
November 19, 2026.
In The
Fourteenth Court of Appeals
NO. 14-26-00906-CV
IN RE EKATERINA MEDYANIK, Relator
ORIGINAL PROCEEDING
WRIT OF MANDAMUS
507th District Court
Harris County, Texas
Trial Court Cause No. 2023-09275
OPINION
Relator Ekaterina Medyanik filed a petition for writ of mandamus asking
this court to compel the trial court to vacate its August 19, 2026 oral order denying
relator’s motion to transfer this case to Montgomery County, Texas under Family
Code section 155.201(b). We conditionally grant the petition.
Background
The trial court signed a divorce decree on February 19, 2024, which declared
relator/mother Ekaterina Medyanik and real party in interest/father MD Arshad
Nasim divorced.1 The decree appoints them joint managing conservators of their
two children. The Harris County District Court acquired continuing, exclusive
jurisdiction when the decree was rendered. Tex. Fam. Code § 155.001(a).
On April 24, 2026, Arshad filed a motion for enforcement of the decree. In
the motion, he alleged among other things that Ekaterina had failed to comply with
provisions requiring her to inform Arshad of their children’s permanent residence
and where they were enrolled in school.
On May 6, 2026, Ekaterina filed a motion to transfer the case from Harris
County to Montgomery County. She alleged in the motion that she and the
children have continuously resided in Mongomery County for more than six
months. For that reason, she asserted that the court was required to transfer the
case to Montgomery County under Family Code sections 155.201 and 155.204.
On May 26, 2026, Arshad filed a response to the motion to transfer together
with a document entitled, “Controverting Affidavit Sworn Declaration In Support
Of Response To Respondent’s Motion To Transfer Venue.” In relevant part, the
affidavit states:
I reside in Harris County and have been since the Divorce. I do not
know where the children live and this is not a modification case.
This is an enforcement and I do not wish for it to be transferred to
another county, which would be inconvenient to me. (Emphasis
added).
1
The final decree of divorce was rendered in Cause No. 2023-09275, in the 507th
Judicial District Court of Harris County, Texas.
2
The trial court held a hearing on the motion to transfer on August 19, 2026.
Ekaterina was the only witness to testify. Attorneys for both sides asked her
questions. At the end of the hearing, the court denied the motion to transfer
without stating reasons. Ekaterina challenges this oral order.
Standard of Review
Mandamus is an extraordinary and discretionary remedy. See In re Allstate
Indem. Co., 622 S.W.3d 870, 883 (Tex. 2021) (orig. proceeding); In re Prudential
Ins. Co. of Am., 148 S.W.3d 124, 138 (Tex. 2004) (orig. proceeding). The relator
must show that (1) the trial court abused its discretion and (2) the relator lacks an
adequate remedy on appeal. In re USAA Gen. Indem. Co., 624 S.W.3d 782, 787
(Tex. 2021) (orig. proceeding); In re Prudential Ins. Co. of Am., 148 S.W.3d at
135-36. A trial court abuses its discretion when it disregards guiding rules or
principles or when it acts in an arbitrary or unreasonable manner. In re Garza, 544
S.W.3d 836, 840 (Tex. 2018) (orig. proceeding) (per curiam). We determine the
adequacy of an appellate remedy by balancing the benefits of mandamus review
against the detriments. In re Acad., Ltd., 625 S.W.3d 19, 25 (Tex. 2021) (orig.
proceeding); In re Prudential Ins. Co. of Am., 148 S.W.3d at 136.
Mandamus relief is available to compel the mandatory transfer of venue in a
suit affecting the parent-child relationship because a trial court that improperly
refuses its ministerial duty to transfer has abused its discretion. Proffer v. Yates,
734 S.W.2d 671, 673 (Tex. 1987) (orig. proceeding) (per curiam); In re Venegas,
595 S.W.3d 341, 344 (Tex. App.—Eastland 2020, orig. proceeding); In re Yancey,
550 S.W.3d 671, 674 (Tex. App.—Tyler 2017, orig. proceeding); see Cassidy v.
Fuller, 568 S.W.2d 845, 847 (Tex. 1978) (orig. proceeding). In such cases,
remedy by direct appeal is inadequate because parents and children who have a
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right to mandatory venue “should not be forced to go through a trial that is for
naught” and because “[j]ustice demands a speedy resolution of child custody and
child support issues.” Proffer, 734 S.W.2d at 673. Additionally, interlocutory
appeal is unavailable from an order refusing a mandatory transfer under the Family
Code. Tex. Fam. Code § 155.204(h).
Applicable Legal Principles
Ekaterina contends that the trial court abused its discretion for several
reasons, but we address only one because we conclude it is dispositive. In her first
issue, she argues that transfer to Montgomery County was automatic and
mandatory because Arshad failed to controvert her venue allegations in his
affidavit. For that reason, Ekaterina continues, the trial court was required to grant
the motion regardless of what evidence was presented at the hearing and indeed
without conducting a hearing.2 See Tex. Fam. Code §§ 155.201(b), 155.204(b),
(c).
Family Code section 155.201(b) provides that, if a suit to modify or a
motion to enforce an order is filed in the court having continuing, exclusive
jurisdiction of a suit and a party files a timely motion to transfer, the court “shall,
within the time required by Section 155.204, transfer the proceeding to another
county in this state if the child has resided in the other county for six months or
longer.” Tex. Fam. Code § 155.201(b).3 This text demonstrates the Legislature’s
desire that matters affecting the parent-child relationship be heard in the county of
2
Ekaterina asserted this objection to the trial judge with sufficient clarity at the beginning
of the hearing.
3
To trigger the statutory right to a transfer, the motion to transfer must be timely. Tex.
Fam. Code §§ 155.201(b), 155.204(b). There is no dispute that Ekaterina’s motion to transfer
was timely.
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the child’s residence. In re Avalos, No. 13-21-00350-CV, 2021 WL 5148011, at
*3 (Tex. App.—Corpus Christi-Edinburg Nov. 5, 2021, orig. proceeding) (mem.
op.); see Cassidy, 568 S.W.2d at 847 (explaining that it is easier to prove the
current circumstances affecting children in their county of residence).
A party who contests the transfer must file “a controverting affidavit
denying that grounds for the transfer exist” on or before “the first Monday after the
20th day after the date of notice of a motion to transfer is served.” Tex. Fam. Code
§ 155.204(d). If a qualifying controverting affidavit is timely filed, each party is
entitled to notice not less than ten days before the hearing date on the transfer
motion. Id. § 155.204(e). If, on the other hand, no controverting affidavit is filed
within the period allowed for its filing, “the proceeding shall, not later than the
21st day after the final date of the period allowed for the filing of a controverting
affidavit, be transferred without a hearing to the proper court.” Id. § 155.204(c).
This provision is mandatory. See Proffer, 734 S.W.2d at 673; In re Avalos, 2021
WL 5148011, at *3.
Analysis
Ekaterina asserts that the trial court abused its discretion by failing to
transfer the case to Montgomery County because Arshad’s affidavit neither denied
the asserted grounds for transfer nor presented controverting evidence of the
children’s residence. See Tex. Fam. Code § 155.204(b). Arshad has not filed a
response to the mandamus petition in this court.
By its terms, section 155.201(b) requires that the child has resided in the
other county for six months or longer before a mandatory duty to transfer is
triggered. To meet this burden, the motion to transfer need not be sworn or
verified; venue allegations are sufficient. In re Nabors, 276 S.W.3d 190, 194 (Tex.
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App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 2009, orig. proceeding); In re Sanchez, 1 S.W.3d 912,
915 (Tex. App.—Waco 1999, orig. proceeding). Ekaterina’s motion to transfer
was unverified but alleged that she had continuously resided in Montgomery
County with the children for over six months. Thus, the burden to defeat the
grounds for transfer shifted to Arshad.
Under section 155.204, a party who wishes to contest a motion to transfer
venue “must file a controverting affidavit denying that grounds for the transfer
exist.” Tex. Fam. Code § 155.204(d). As many courts have held, an affidavit that
fails to deny the allegations of the child’s residence or present controverting facts
regarding the child’s residence is not sufficient to constitute a “controverting
affidavit” under that section. In re Avalos, 2021 WL 5148011, at *4; Martinez v.
Flores, 820 S.W.2d 937, 939-41 (Tex. App.—Corpus Christi-Edinburg 1991, orig.
proceeding) (concluding that the movant’s allegations regarding venue were
“effectively uncontroverted” by the controverting affidavit); In re T.H., 650
S.W.3d 224, 233 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth 2021, orig. proceeding); In re L.C.R.,
No. 01-19-00667-CV, 2020 WL 3456595, at *4 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.]
June 25, 2020, no pet.) (mem. op.) (“[A]n affidavit that fails to deny venue facts is
not a controverting affidavit under [section] 155.204(d).”); In re Whitworth, No.
05-19-00677-CV, 2019 WL 2710747, at *1 (Tex. App.—Dallas June 28, 2019,
orig. proceeding) (mem. op.) (“When a controverting affidavit is filed but the
affidavit fails to deny that grounds for transfer exist, the allegations in the motion
to transfer are effectively uncontroverted.”).
In his affidavit, Arshad did not deny Ekaterina’s venue allegations, did not
deny that grounds for transfer exist, and did not otherwise assert any facts about
the children’s residence. Indeed, Arshad flatly denied personal knowledge of the
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children’s residence. Accordingly, we conclude that Ekaterina’s venue allegations
were “effectively uncontroverted” by Arshad’s affidavit. In re Avalos, 2021 WL
5148011, at *4; In re L.C.R., 2020 WL 3456595, at *4; In re T.H., 650 S.W.3d at
234; see Martinez, 820 S.W.2d at 939-41.
In the absence of a controverting affidavit denying that grounds for the
transfer exist, the trial court had a mandatory duty to transfer the case to
Montgomery County without holding a hearing. Tex. Fam. Code § 155.204(c); In
re Avalos, 2021 WL 5148011, at *5; In re Sanchez, 1 S.W.3d at 914; see In re
Venegas, 595 S.W.3d at 346; In re Yancey, 550 S.W.3d at 675-76; In re Leyva, 333
S.W.3d 315, 318 (Tex. App.—San Antonio 2010, orig. proceeding); see also In re
L.C.R., 2020 WL 3456595, at *4.
We conclude the trial court abused its discretion in denying Ekaterina’s
motion to transfer venue, and relator lacks an adequate remedy by appeal. See
Proffer, 734 S.W.2d at 673; In re Avalos, 2021 WL 5148011, at *5; In re Venegas,
595 S.W.3d at 344; In re Yancey, 550 S.W.3d at 674. We sustain relator’s first
issue.
Conclusion
We conditionally grant the petition for writ of mandamus and direct the trial
court to vacate its August 19, 2026 oral order denying relator’s motion to transfer
venue and to issue an appropriate written order transferring the case to
Montgomery County, Texas. Our writ will issue only if the trial court fails to
promptly comply.
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/s/ Kevin Jewell
Justice
Panel consists of Justices Wise, Jewell, and Wilson.
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