Full Opinion

Petition for Writ of Mandamus Conditionally Granted and Opinion filed November 19, 2026. In The Fourteenth Court of Appeals NO. 14-26-00906-CV IN RE EKATERINA MEDYANIK, Relator ORIGINAL PROCEEDING WRIT OF MANDAMUS 507th District Court Harris County, Texas Trial Court Cause No. 2023-09275 OPINION Relator Ekaterina Medyanik filed a petition for writ of mandamus asking this court to compel the trial court to vacate its August 19, 2026 oral order denying relator’s motion to transfer this case to Montgomery County, Texas under Family Code section 155.201(b). We conditionally grant the petition. Background The trial court signed a divorce decree on February 19, 2024, which declared relator/mother Ekaterina Medyanik and real party in interest/father MD Arshad Nasim divorced.1 The decree appoints them joint managing conservators of their two children. The Harris County District Court acquired continuing, exclusive jurisdiction when the decree was rendered. Tex. Fam. Code § 155.001(a). On April 24, 2026, Arshad filed a motion for enforcement of the decree. In the motion, he alleged among other things that Ekaterina had failed to comply with provisions requiring her to inform Arshad of their children’s permanent residence and where they were enrolled in school. On May 6, 2026, Ekaterina filed a motion to transfer the case from Harris County to Montgomery County. She alleged in the motion that she and the children have continuously resided in Mongomery County for more than six months. For that reason, she asserted that the court was required to transfer the case to Montgomery County under Family Code sections 155.201 and 155.204. On May 26, 2026, Arshad filed a response to the motion to transfer together with a document entitled, “Controverting Affidavit Sworn Declaration In Support Of Response To Respondent’s Motion To Transfer Venue.” In relevant part, the affidavit states: I reside in Harris County and have been since the Divorce. I do not know where the children live and this is not a modification case. This is an enforcement and I do not wish for it to be transferred to another county, which would be inconvenient to me. (Emphasis added). 1 The final decree of divorce was rendered in Cause No. 2023-09275, in the 507th Judicial District Court of Harris County, Texas. 2 The trial court held a hearing on the motion to transfer on August 19, 2026. Ekaterina was the only witness to testify. Attorneys for both sides asked her questions. At the end of the hearing, the court denied the motion to transfer without stating reasons. Ekaterina challenges this oral order. Standard of Review Mandamus is an extraordinary and discretionary remedy. See In re Allstate Indem. Co., 622 S.W.3d 870, 883 (Tex. 2021) (orig. proceeding); In re Prudential Ins. Co. of Am., 148 S.W.3d 124, 138 (Tex. 2004) (orig. proceeding). The relator must show that (1) the trial court abused its discretion and (2) the relator lacks an adequate remedy on appeal. In re USAA Gen. Indem. Co., 624 S.W.3d 782, 787 (Tex. 2021) (orig. proceeding); In re Prudential Ins. Co. of Am., 148 S.W.3d at 135-36. A trial court abuses its discretion when it disregards guiding rules or principles or when it acts in an arbitrary or unreasonable manner. In re Garza, 544 S.W.3d 836, 840 (Tex. 2018) (orig. proceeding) (per curiam). We determine the adequacy of an appellate remedy by balancing the benefits of mandamus review against the detriments. In re Acad., Ltd., 625 S.W.3d 19, 25 (Tex. 2021) (orig. proceeding); In re Prudential Ins. Co. of Am., 148 S.W.3d at 136. Mandamus relief is available to compel the mandatory transfer of venue in a suit affecting the parent-child relationship because a trial court that improperly refuses its ministerial duty to transfer has abused its discretion. Proffer v. Yates, 734 S.W.2d 671, 673 (Tex. 1987) (orig. proceeding) (per curiam); In re Venegas, 595 S.W.3d 341, 344 (Tex. App.—Eastland 2020, orig. proceeding); In re Yancey, 550 S.W.3d 671, 674 (Tex. App.—Tyler 2017, orig. proceeding); see Cassidy v. Fuller, 568 S.W.2d 845, 847 (Tex. 1978) (orig. proceeding). In such cases, remedy by direct appeal is inadequate because parents and children who have a 3 right to mandatory venue “should not be forced to go through a trial that is for naught” and because “[j]ustice demands a speedy resolution of child custody and child support issues.” Proffer, 734 S.W.2d at 673. Additionally, interlocutory appeal is unavailable from an order refusing a mandatory transfer under the Family Code. Tex. Fam. Code § 155.204(h). Applicable Legal Principles Ekaterina contends that the trial court abused its discretion for several reasons, but we address only one because we conclude it is dispositive. In her first issue, she argues that transfer to Montgomery County was automatic and mandatory because Arshad failed to controvert her venue allegations in his affidavit. For that reason, Ekaterina continues, the trial court was required to grant the motion regardless of what evidence was presented at the hearing and indeed without conducting a hearing.2 See Tex. Fam. Code §§ 155.201(b), 155.204(b), (c). Family Code section 155.201(b) provides that, if a suit to modify or a motion to enforce an order is filed in the court having continuing, exclusive jurisdiction of a suit and a party files a timely motion to transfer, the court “shall, within the time required by Section 155.204, transfer the proceeding to another county in this state if the child has resided in the other county for six months or longer.” Tex. Fam. Code § 155.201(b).3 This text demonstrates the Legislature’s desire that matters affecting the parent-child relationship be heard in the county of 2 Ekaterina asserted this objection to the trial judge with sufficient clarity at the beginning of the hearing. 3 To trigger the statutory right to a transfer, the motion to transfer must be timely. Tex. Fam. Code §§ 155.201(b), 155.204(b). There is no dispute that Ekaterina’s motion to transfer was timely. 4 the child’s residence. In re Avalos, No. 13-21-00350-CV, 2021 WL 5148011, at *3 (Tex. App.—Corpus Christi-Edinburg Nov. 5, 2021, orig. proceeding) (mem. op.); see Cassidy, 568 S.W.2d at 847 (explaining that it is easier to prove the current circumstances affecting children in their county of residence). A party who contests the transfer must file “a controverting affidavit denying that grounds for the transfer exist” on or before “the first Monday after the 20th day after the date of notice of a motion to transfer is served.” Tex. Fam. Code § 155.204(d). If a qualifying controverting affidavit is timely filed, each party is entitled to notice not less than ten days before the hearing date on the transfer motion. Id. § 155.204(e). If, on the other hand, no controverting affidavit is filed within the period allowed for its filing, “the proceeding shall, not later than the 21st day after the final date of the period allowed for the filing of a controverting affidavit, be transferred without a hearing to the proper court.” Id. § 155.204(c). This provision is mandatory. See Proffer, 734 S.W.2d at 673; In re Avalos, 2021 WL 5148011, at *3. Analysis Ekaterina asserts that the trial court abused its discretion by failing to transfer the case to Montgomery County because Arshad’s affidavit neither denied the asserted grounds for transfer nor presented controverting evidence of the children’s residence. See Tex. Fam. Code § 155.204(b). Arshad has not filed a response to the mandamus petition in this court. By its terms, section 155.201(b) requires that the child has resided in the other county for six months or longer before a mandatory duty to transfer is triggered. To meet this burden, the motion to transfer need not be sworn or verified; venue allegations are sufficient. In re Nabors, 276 S.W.3d 190, 194 (Tex. 5 App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 2009, orig. proceeding); In re Sanchez, 1 S.W.3d 912, 915 (Tex. App.—Waco 1999, orig. proceeding). Ekaterina’s motion to transfer was unverified but alleged that she had continuously resided in Montgomery County with the children for over six months. Thus, the burden to defeat the grounds for transfer shifted to Arshad. Under section 155.204, a party who wishes to contest a motion to transfer venue “must file a controverting affidavit denying that grounds for the transfer exist.” Tex. Fam. Code § 155.204(d). As many courts have held, an affidavit that fails to deny the allegations of the child’s residence or present controverting facts regarding the child’s residence is not sufficient to constitute a “controverting affidavit” under that section. In re Avalos, 2021 WL 5148011, at *4; Martinez v. Flores, 820 S.W.2d 937, 939-41 (Tex. App.—Corpus Christi-Edinburg 1991, orig. proceeding) (concluding that the movant’s allegations regarding venue were “effectively uncontroverted” by the controverting affidavit); In re T.H., 650 S.W.3d 224, 233 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth 2021, orig. proceeding); In re L.C.R., No. 01-19-00667-CV, 2020 WL 3456595, at *4 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] June 25, 2020, no pet.) (mem. op.) (“[A]n affidavit that fails to deny venue facts is not a controverting affidavit under [section] 155.204(d).”); In re Whitworth, No. 05-19-00677-CV, 2019 WL 2710747, at *1 (Tex. App.—Dallas June 28, 2019, orig. proceeding) (mem. op.) (“When a controverting affidavit is filed but the affidavit fails to deny that grounds for transfer exist, the allegations in the motion to transfer are effectively uncontroverted.”). In his affidavit, Arshad did not deny Ekaterina’s venue allegations, did not deny that grounds for transfer exist, and did not otherwise assert any facts about the children’s residence. Indeed, Arshad flatly denied personal knowledge of the 6 children’s residence. Accordingly, we conclude that Ekaterina’s venue allegations were “effectively uncontroverted” by Arshad’s affidavit. In re Avalos, 2021 WL 5148011, at *4; In re L.C.R., 2020 WL 3456595, at *4; In re T.H., 650 S.W.3d at 234; see Martinez, 820 S.W.2d at 939-41. In the absence of a controverting affidavit denying that grounds for the transfer exist, the trial court had a mandatory duty to transfer the case to Montgomery County without holding a hearing. Tex. Fam. Code § 155.204(c); In re Avalos, 2021 WL 5148011, at *5; In re Sanchez, 1 S.W.3d at 914; see In re Venegas, 595 S.W.3d at 346; In re Yancey, 550 S.W.3d at 675-76; In re Leyva, 333 S.W.3d 315, 318 (Tex. App.—San Antonio 2010, orig. proceeding); see also In re L.C.R., 2020 WL 3456595, at *4. We conclude the trial court abused its discretion in denying Ekaterina’s motion to transfer venue, and relator lacks an adequate remedy by appeal. See Proffer, 734 S.W.2d at 673; In re Avalos, 2021 WL 5148011, at *5; In re Venegas, 595 S.W.3d at 344; In re Yancey, 550 S.W.3d at 674. We sustain relator’s first issue. Conclusion We conditionally grant the petition for writ of mandamus and direct the trial court to vacate its August 19, 2026 oral order denying relator’s motion to transfer venue and to issue an appropriate written order transferring the case to Montgomery County, Texas. Our writ will issue only if the trial court fails to promptly comply. 7 /s/ Kevin Jewell Justice Panel consists of Justices Wise, Jewell, and Wilson. 8