Denis Ramirez-Barahona v. the State of Texas
CourtTexas Court of Appeals, 3rd District (Austin)
Date FiledAugust 7, 2026
Docket03-24-00500-CR
StatusPublished
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Full Opinion
TEXAS COURT OF APPEALS, THIRD DISTRICT, AT AUSTIN
NO. 03-24-00500-CR
Denis Ramirez-Barahona, Appellant
v.
The State of Texas, Appellee
FROM THE 331ST DISTRICT COURT OF TRAVIS COUNTY
NO. D-1-DC-23-203069, THE HONORABLE CHANTAL ELDRIDGE, JUDGE PRESIDING
OR D ER AN D MEMORAN D U M OPI N I ON
PER CURIAM
This Court remanded the cause to the trial court on June 10, 2026, for the oral
pronouncement of appellant Denis Ramirez-Barahona’s sentences. See Ramirez-Barahona
v. State, No. 03-24-00500-CR, 2026 WL 1674102, at *2 (Tex. App.—Austin June 10, 2026, order)
(per curiam) (mem. op., not designated for publication). A jury found appellant guilty of sexual
assault and prohibited sexual conduct and assessed his punishments at twenty years’ confinement
and ten years’ confinement, respectively. See Tex. Penal Code §§ 22.011, 25.02. Although the
trial court entered judgments reciting that appellant was sentenced in accordance with the jury’s
verdicts, the record showed that the court failed to orally pronounce the sentences in
appellant’s presence.
In our order, we expressly noted that “reading a punishment verdict is not the same
as pronouncing a sentence” and explained that the trial court’s act of reading the verdicts at the
original punishment hearing and then remanding appellant into custody “to carry out his sentence”
was insufficient to satisfy the pronouncement requirement. See Ramirez-Barahona,
2026 WL 1674102, at *1 & n.1. The trial court seemingly misunderstood the basis for our order,
as is evident from its actions at the sentencing hearing on remand. The court informed appellant,
“[A]pparently it was determined that I did not read verbatim from the verdicts that were given by
the jury, so I’m going to go ahead and review those verdicts,” and once more read the verdicts in
appellant’s presence before remanding him into custody.
We again stress that reading aloud the jury’s punishment verdicts and remanding
appellant into custody does not constitute a pronouncement of sentence. Compare Tex. Code Crim.
Proc. arts. 37.04, .06 (requiring that trial court read verdict aloud in defendant’s presence), with id.
art. 42.03 (requiring that “sentence shall be pronounced in the defendant’s presence”); see
Bradshaw v. State, Nos. 03-24-00091-CR–00093-CR, 2024 WL 3470638, at *1 n.1 (Tex. App.—
Austin Jan. 19, 2024, order) (per curiam) (mem. op., not designated for publication) (explaining
that trial court’s reading jury’s punishment verdicts in open court with defendant present and
stating that it would “‘accept the jury’s verdict[s]’ . . . does not qualify as a pronouncement of
sentence”); Edic v. State, No. 03-17-00788-CR, 2018 WL 2123465, at *1 n.1 (Tex. App.—Austin
May 8, 2018, order) (per curiam) (mem. op., not designated for publication) (declaring that trial
court did not orally pronounce sentences despite reading verdicts aloud, stating that they would be
“accepted and entered,” and remanding defendant “to the sheriff’s department for transfer to
complete his sentence[s]”); Frias v. State, No. 03-12-00463-CR, 2014 WL 1362639, at *1 n.1 (Tex.
App.—Austin Apr. 4, 2014, order) (mem. op., not designated for publication) (concluding that trial
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court did not orally pronounce sentence by reading verdict and having defendant remanded “to the
custody of the Travis County sheriff’s department for execution of sentence”); see also Ette
v. State, 559 S.W.3d 511, 515–16 (Tex. Crim. App. 2018) (noting that $10,000 fine was not orally
pronounced when trial court read jury’s punishment verdict, which included fine).
So that we may correct the trial court’s omission and thereby gain jurisdiction over
this appeal, see Tex. R. App. P. 44.4; Keys v. State, 340 S.W.3d 526, 529 (Tex. App.—Texarkana
2011, order), we once more abate the appeal and remand the cause to the trial court to orally
pronounce appellant’s sentences in his presence. See Tex. Code Crim. Proc. art. 42.02 (defining
“sentence” as “that part of the judgment . . . “that orders that the punishment be carried into
execution in the manner prescribed by law”); see also, e.g., Lemon v. State, --- S.W.3d ---, ---,
No. 14-24-00985-CR, 2026 WL 2023457, at *2 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] July 14, 2026,
no pet. h.) (giving as example of valid pronouncement language, “It is the order, judgment, and
decree of the court that you be taken by the Sheriff . . . [and] held, until transferred to . . . [TCDJ]
where you shall be confined for [incarceration period]. Your sentence shall commence today”);
Haynes v. State, No. 05-91-00302-CR, 1994 WL 384149, at *6 (Tex. App.—Dallas July 21, 1994,
pet. ref’d) (not designated for publication) (pronouncement was accomplished when “trial judge
stated that he was sentencing appellant to ten years’ confinement in the Institutional Division of
the Texas Department of Criminal Justice”). “Before pronouncing sentence, the defendant shall
be asked whether he has anything to say why the sentence should not be pronounced against him.”
Tex. Code Crim. Proc. art. 42.07.
The new sentencing hearing is to be held within thirty days of the date of this
memorandum opinion. A supplemental reporter’s record of the hearing shall be prepared and filed
along with a supplemental clerk’s record containing the trial court’s new judgments of conviction.
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These supplemental records are to be filed in this Court within forty-five days of the date of this
memorandum opinion. The appeal will be reinstated when the supplemental records are filed.
It is so ordered August 7, 2026.
Before Chief Justice Byrne, Justices Crump and Ellis
Abated and Remanded
Filed: August 7, 2026
Do Not Publish
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