Full Opinion

TEXAS COURT OF APPEALS, THIRD DISTRICT, AT AUSTIN NO. 03-25-00363-CV Kael Ryan Denton, Appellant v. Monica Hagle, Appellee FROM THE 119TH DISTRICT COURT OF RUNNELS COUNTY NO. 16,383, THE HONORABLE BARBARA L. WALTHER, JUDGE PRESIDING MEMORAN D U M OPI N I ON Kael Ryan Denton, appearing pro se, appeals from the trial court’s final divorce decree ending his marriage to Monica Hagle and establishing provisions for the conservatorship, possession of, and access to the parties’ three minor children of the marriage. Denton raises several issues on appeal, challenging the decree’s property division and conservatorship provisions. For the following reasons, we affirm the decree. BACKGROUND Denton filed for divorce in September 2021. Hagle answered and counterpetitioned. Denton filed a motion for the appointment of an amicus attorney for the children, and the trial court appointed one. At Denton’s request, a jury trial was scheduled, and Denton filed a motion to bifurcate the issues in the matter, asking the court to hear and “settle all marital property dispute issues” and leave the custody determinations to the jury. On the eve of trial, the trial court signed an order dismissing the amicus attorney due to “the limited role an Amicus Attorney would play in a jury trial.” The order dismissing the amicus awarded him a judgment against both Denton and Hagle for the outstanding fees each owed him. The day trial began, Denton, who was represented by counsel at the trial court, filed a “Motion Requesting the Jury Decide the Characterization of the Property Located at 311 Hamilton Pursuant to 119 S.W.3D 435.” The record contains no ruling on this motion, although outside the jury’s presence and before evidence was heard, the court and the parties took up the issue. Hagle objected to Denton’s purported failure in his disclosures to identify the Hamilton property as separate property, and the court observed that whether he did disclose the claim “may be a fundamental question for the presentation of evidence” and that, “if the evidence supports a charge where separate property could be determined . . . then, yes, a jury can make a determination with regard to the character of the property.” The trial court finished the discussion by stating, “at a separate portion of this trial we can rediscuss” the issue. After that exchange, there was a break in the proceedings and Denton called his first witness. The presentation of evidence to the jury concluded without Denton again raising the issue of his motion for the jury to hear and decide the characterization of the Hamilton property, and no evidence was elicited on the issue. After closing arguments, the court delivered its charge to the jury and recessed for deliberation. The trial court then tried the issues of property division and child support. Denton elicited testimony from his witnesses about the Hamilton property being separate property. During Denton’s testimony, the court paused the proceedings and invited the parties’ attorneys “to go calmly talk about the resolution of the community estate.” Afterward, Hagle’s counsel read her “proposal” into the record, Denton consulted off the record with his counsel, and Denton’s counsel stated on the record that Denton accepted the proposal. The parties 2 and the court further clarified the terms of the parties’ agreement for property division and child support on the record. Thereafter, and on the record, the trial court rendered judgment on the parties’ agreement, stating that “the agreement of the parties is rendered as if the Court had rendered it herself.” The trial court signed its divorce decree on April 16, 2025. The first paragraph of the decree recites, “the Court presided over a jury trial regarding the children’s issues and . . . also considered the proposed agreement set forth in open Court on the record regarding the settlement of all other issues remaining on January 26, 2025.” The last paragraph of the decree reads, “Date of Judgment. This divorce judicially PRONOUNCED AND RENDERED in court on January 25, 2025 and further noted on the court’s docket sheet on the same date, but signed on [April 16], 2025.” Denton perfected this appeal from the final decree. DISCUSSION Denton raises eight issues on appeal, which we address out of order and group together for efficient analysis. Denton’s third and seventh issues relate to the trial court’s characterization and division of property. In his third issue, he contends that the trial court abused its discretion by failing to rule on his “Motion for Separate Trial Pursuant to TRCP 174 Regarding Marital Property, to Wit: The House,” in which he prayed that the court “set this matter for a bifurcated bench trial prior to the jury trial to settle all marital property dispute issues.” In his seventh issue, he contends that the trial court erred in rendering judgment on the parties’ agreement on property division and child support because “the record does not reflect . . . mutual assent and objective manifestations of agreement to be bound.” 3 The record directly controverts this latter contention. The reporter’s record from trial reflects that the parties agreed to all provisions pertaining to property division and child support in open court and on the record. After Hagle’s counsel recited the terms of the parties’ agreement on the record, which recitation was interspersed with clarification statements followed by affirmative statements by both parties’ counsel, the court asked each Denton and Hagle whether Hagle’s counsel’s recitation was “your understanding of the agreement.” Each Denton and Hagle responded affirmatively, and then the trial court stated on the record that “the agreement of the parties is rendered as if the Court had rendered it herself.” Furthermore, the trial court’s findings of fact reiterate the on-the-record agreement and rendition of the agreed judgment on property and child-support issues, which Denton does not challenge on appeal. 1 See Mamoe v. Mamoe, No. 03-23-00258-CV, 2024 WL 4137329, at *2 (Tex. App.—Austin Sep. 11, 2024, no pet.) (mem. op.) (“[A] party cannot appeal from a judgment to which it has consented or agreed, absent an allegation and proof of fraud, collusion, or misrepresentation.”); Guzzetta v. Brimhall LQ, LLC, 678 S.W.3d 251, 258 (Tex. App.—San Antonio 2023, no pet.) (“A party’s consent to the trial court’s entry of judgment waives any error, except for fundamental error, contained in the judgment, and that party has nothing to properly present for appellate review.”); see also Tex. R. Civ. P. 11 (requiring agreement between parties in pending suit to be either in writing, signed, and filed with court or “made in open court and entered of record”). 1 The trial court’s finding of fact reads, “The parties after conferring announced that they had reached an agreement on all property issues and on child support. The parties’s [sic] agreement was announced on the record in open Court. Both parties announced that they agreed to the settlement. The Court approved and Ordered the division as the parties had agreed and the agreed child support.” 4 Nonetheless, Denton argues that a post-rendition motion he filed, in which he “expressly stat[ed] that he disagreed with the proposed judgment and intended to challenge it on appeal,” supports his argument that there was no “clear mutual assent” to the agreed judgment. He concedes, however, that “post-rendition disagreement does not, by itself, invalidate an otherwise valid settlement agreement,” arguing that “such objections are relevant where the record otherwise lacks an express manifestation of assent.” But as discussed, the record does evidence the on-the- record agreement, and therefore there is no merit to Denton’s seventh issue. Similarly, we overrule his related third issue because his consent to an agreed judgment on division of the property obviates any complaint about his prior request to bifurcate the trial of “property dispute issues,” as the agreed judgment expressly settled all property issues and he has not, therefore, demonstrated any error. See Tex. R. App. P. 44.1(a) (harmless-error rule). In his first issue, Denton argues that the trial court abused its discretion in denying his motion for new trial because his “post-judgment filings presented uncontradicted, newly discovered evidence of child health crises, harmful parental act & omissions, and an email providing a coordinated evasion of reporting duties under Tex. Fam. Code § 261.101.” He also argues that the trial court “failed to meaningfully address allegations affecting the integrity of the proceedings.” However, the only record citations he uses to show “newly discovered evidence” are his entire 41-page motion for new trial (including exhibits) and 115-page amended motion for new trial (including exhibits). It is not the task of the appellate court to scour these motions and exhibits to find evidence supporting Denton’s claims, and appellants waive error if they fail to support their contentions with appropriate citations to the record. See Valentini v. Cordier, No. 03-23-00421-CV, 2025 WL 409054, at *7 (Tex. App.—Austin Feb. 26, 2025, no pet.) (mem. op.). Denton does not provide a cognizable argument or substantive guidance about the specific 5 contents of these filings that purportedly constitute “newly discovered evidence,” and he has therefore waived this alleged error. See id.; see also Tex. R. App. P. 38.1(i) (“The brief must contain a clear and concise argument for the contentions made, with appropriate citations to authorities and to the record.”). He has similarly waived his complaint about the “integrity” of the proceedings by failing to identify specific record citations and legal authority. We overrule Denton’s first issue. In his second issue, Denton argues that the trial court abused its discretion in failing to rule on his motion to compel discovery. Although he concedes that Hagle produced 818 pages of documents in response to his requests, he argued to the trial court at a hearing on the motion that Hagle’s production was incomplete and misleading. The parties and court discussed the issue, and the court orally ordered Hagle to produce certain items within ten days. The parties and court discussed other alleged unproduced items, but Denton asserts that at the end of the hearing the trial court “declined to rule on the Motion to Compel” and stated, “That motion is left hanging in the air.” The court also stated that it “really can’t make a ruling on evidence that [it has]n’t seen” and requested an affidavit from Denton specifically identifying which documents were still outstanding. Denton argues that he submitted the requested affidavit to the court and “continued to raise concerns regarding whether the disputed production satisfied the outstanding requests,” citing the following comments his counsel made to the court as a trial date was being discussed: “And this is all assuming that the 818 pages is not successfully answering our request for production? Like all these issues are going on simultaneously as we set a trial date?” The trial court did not directly respond to the question except to reiterate that it was attempting to set a trial date. Apart from this procedural history of the dispute, Denton does not identify anything in the 6 record by which he further sought a ruling, set the motion for another hearing, or objected to the court’s refusal to rule, as required to preserve error. See Tex. R. App. P. 33.1(a)(2). Accordingly, he failed to preserve the issue, and we do not address it. See Lopez v. City of Hous., No. 14-25- 00343-CV, 2026 WL 1876196, at *9 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] June 30, 2026, no pet.) (mem. op.) (holding that appellant failed to preserve error by not objecting to trial court’s refusal to rule on motion to compel). In his fourth issue, Denton complains about the trial court’s “inconsistent handling” of the amicus attorney that the court appointed, on Denton’s motion, to represent the best interest of the children. He argues that the trial court appointed the amicus attorney, granted the amicus attorney’s motion for past-due fees and anticipated fees related to a jury trial, but then in a later order dismissed the amicus attorney shortly before trial due to the “limited role an Amicus Attorney would play in a jury trial.” Denton contends that the trial court’s “inconsistent handling” and changing its stance on whether an amicus attorney would be needed at trial constituted an abuse of discretion because the trial court did not articulate any “legal principle reconciling the two [inconsistent] decisions.” He states that he was harmed by these decisions because they “affected both the financial obligations imposed upon the parties and the procedural framework through which the conservatorship dispute proceeded” and that “the inconsistency carried consequences beyond the amicus appointment itself and contributed to the broader pattern of procedural irregularities reflected throughout the record.” But these alleged harms are conclusory, general, and vague, and we cannot discern what specific harm Denton claims to have suffered, or how this purported inconsistent handling of the amicus attorney probably caused the rendition of an improper judgment. See Tex. R. App. P. 44.1(a) (harmless-error rule). We accordingly overrule Denton’s fourth issue. 7 In his fifth issue, Denton contends that he sought to present evidence at trial to rebut and impeach testimony against his interest that the trial court purportedly excluded. He claims that “the proposed testimony was offered for the purpose of permitting adversarial testing of allegations that bore directly on the children’s best interests and the conservatorship decision.” He concedes that the court “did not issue any on-the-record ruling admitting or excluding the evidence,” but he argues that the “absence of an on-the-record ruling is particularly significant because it prevents meaningful appellate review.” Denton cites the following portions of the reporter’s record of trial to support his argument: (1) a range of seventy-one pages of Casey Castro’s testimony and a twelve-page range of Hagle’s testimony, during which Denton contends that his direct examination of the witnesses was “restricted”; and (2) a bench discussion during Hagle’s testimony concerning the admission of an exhibit (a laptop screenshot) Denton was seeking to admit and to which Hagle’s counsel objected. The bench discussion concerned whether Denton had timely disclosed the subject screenshot during discovery. The bench discussion was cut short without a ruling on the issue due to the arrival of another of Denton’s witnesses, Seth Stout, and the parties’ agreement to pause Hagle’s testimony and take Stout’s. However, before Stout was sworn in, the court observed that Stout looked “extremely pale” due to illness and sent him home. Then the court raised the topic of the “possible exhibit,” there was an off-the-record discussion at counsel table, and Denton’s direct examination of Hagle resumed. Denton concedes in his brief that at this point in trial, “the testimony was not further developed about the subject [relating to the exhibit].” Denton has failed to preserve error as to this purported improper exclusion of the exhibit because he did not take up the issue again in his direct examination of Hagle or obtain an adverse ruling from the trial court refusing to admit the evidence when he offered it. See id. R. 8 33.1(a)(2)(A); B.O. v. Texas Dep’t of Fam. & Protective Servs., No 03–12–00676–CV, 2013 WL 1567452, at *3 (Tex. App.—Austin Apr. 12, 2013, no pet.) (mem. op.) (noting that to preserve complaint about erroneous exclusion of evidence, party must have offered evidence during trial and obtained adverse ruling). We accordingly do not address his unpreserved fifth issue. In his sixth issue, Denton contends that the trial court erred in “omitting a neglect theory” in the jury charge, citing Texas Family Code § 261.001(4). See Tex. Fam. Code § 261.004(4) (defining “neglect”). He argues that “the record contains evidence raising a neglect theory,” that he objected to the omission of neglect in the charge, and that he requested inclusion of neglect in the charge. The trial court noted his objection to a charge being submitted that did not include his requested “neglect theory” and stated that it would “not amend the charge.” Denton does not identify specific evidence in the record that he contends supported the inclusion of a neglect theory in the charge. See Columbia Rio Grande Healthcare, L.P. v. Hawley, 284 S.W.3d 851, 855 (Tex. 2009) (noting that requested jury instruction is proper if it “(1) assists the jury, (2) accurately states the law, and (3) finds support in the pleadings and evidence”). Rather, he cites two ranges of pages consisting of 145 pages and 170 pages, respectively, of two volumes of exhibits from trial. As already discussed, this Court will not comb the record to find specific support for an appellant’s issue. See Valentini, 2025 WL 409054, at *7. Denton also cites ranges of pages of pleadings from the clerk’s record, but pleadings do not constitute evidence, see Janish v. Janish, No. 03-23-00275-CV, 2025 WL 492505, at *3 (Tex. App.—Austin Feb. 14, 2025, no pet.) (mem. op.), and—in any event—he does identify with any particularity which of those pages support his argument, see Tex. R. App. P. 38.1(i) (brief must contain appropriate citations to record). And finally, Denton cites a range of pages from the 9 reporter’s record of a temporary-orders hearing, but such evidence was not heard by the jury and is irrelevant to his argument. We accordingly overrule Denton’s sixth issue. In his eighth issue, Denton argues that, under the cumulative-error doctrine, the “combined effect of the trial court’s errors rendered the proceeding fundamentally unfair.” See Owens-Corning Fiberglass Corp. v. Malone, 916 S.W.2d 551, 570 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 1996) (“Multiple errors, even if considered harmless taken separately, may result in reversal and remand for a new trial if the cumulative effect of such errors is harmful.”), aff’d, 972 S.W.2d 35 (Tex. 1998). However, we have determined that the trial court did not make the errors asserted and preserved by Denton and, therefore, there are no errors to cumulate. We overrule Denton’s eighth issue. CONCLUSION Having overruled Denton’s preserved issues, we affirm the trial court’s final divorce decree. __________________________________________ Karin Crump, Justice Before Justices Triana, Crump, and Ellis Affirmed Filed: September 30, 2026 10