Full Opinion

Opinion issued October 27, 2026 In The Court of Appeals For The First District of Texas ———————————— NO. 01-23-00419-CV ——————————— JACK MADISON MANISCALCO, JR., Appellant V. DARREN WOMACK AND RICHARD WOMACK, Appellees On Appeal from the Probate Court No. 3 Harris County, Texas Trial Court Case No. 484217 OPINION This appeal stems from a will contest involving a dispute over whether the decedent equitably adopted his former stepson. The putative heir, Appellant Jack Madison Maniscalco, Jr., argued he was adopted by estoppel by his former stepfather, and that he was therefore an heir to his estate. Following a four-day jury trial, the jury found that the decedent had not adopted Jack. The jury also found that Jack and Appellees Darren and Richard Womack had acted in good faith and with just cause in pursuing their claims, resulting in an award of attorneys’ fees. In four issues, Jack argues that (1) improper jury arguments “irreparably tainted” the jury’s perception of him, causing “undue prejudice”; (2) the trial court abused its discretion in admitting certain pleadings from other proceedings into evidence; (3) the trial court abused its discretion by refusing to grant a mistrial; and (4) the jury’s finding that he is not the decedent’s adopted son is against the “great weight and preponderance of the evidence.” In their cross-appeals, Darren and Richard Womack argue that Jack was not entitled to recover attorneys’ fees. Darren argues that (1) Jack lacked standing to obtain attorneys’ fees and that (2) even if he had standing, Jack did not act in good faith and with just cause in prosecuting his application to probate the decedent’s will. Richard argues that Jack (1) was not entitled to recover attorneys’ fees pursuant to the Estates Code; (2) the evidence is legally insufficient to support the jury’s finding that Jack acted in good faith in contesting the application for probate; (3) the evidence is factually insufficient to support the jury’s finding that Jack acted in good faith in contesting the application for probate; and (4) Jack is not entitled to reimbursement for “unnecessary items in the clerk’s record.” 2 We affirm the trial court’s judgment. We further order that Jack be required to pay for sixty percent of the clerk’s record when costs are assessed in connection with this appeal and that the costs for the remaining forty percent be apportioned jointly and severally among the three parties. Background Huland Eugene Womack (“Gene”) married Norma Womack in 1970. When they married, Norma had two minor children: Jack Madison Maniscalco, Jr. and Tommy Maniscalco, both from her previous marriage to Jack Maniscalco, Sr. When Gene and Norma married, Jack was almost nine years old.1 Gene executed a will in 1980 making Norma the executor of his estate. The will left Gene’s estate to Norma, but provided that if she predeceased him, the estate would go to my child, JACK MADISON MANISCALCO, JR. and any other child or children legally adopted by me, in equal shares in fee simple absolute. In the event that any or all of my children and/or legally adopted child or children should not survive me, then I direct that the living issue of any deceased child shall take, per stirpes, the share of said child. (Emphasis in original.) The addendum to the will provides in part: I require that my wife, NORMA D. WOMACK, takes full responsibility for providing for my son and any other child or children, in the same fashion that we are now being responsible for him, JACK MADISON MANISCALCO, JR. I also require that my wife keep flowers on the grave of my other son, TOMMY DEAN 1 Tommy died at age 16 while Gene and Norma were married. 3 MANISCALCO in the same fashion as I am now doing, i.e. flowers on the grave at all times, and changed periodically, and on holidays and his birthday, of March 25th. (Emphasis in original.) Gene and Norma divorced in 1992 after twenty-two years of marriage. Gene died in March 2020. At the time of his death, he had four surviving brothers: Donald, Charles, Richard, and James Womack.2 After Gene’s death, Donald filed an application to appoint an independent administrator of Gene’s estate. The application, filed in April 2020, stated that Gene died intestate. Donald also filed an application for determination and declaration of heirship. In June 2020, Jack filed an application to probate Gene’s will and for issuance of letters of administration. According to Jack’s application, Gene and Norma had an “informal marriage” beginning in approximately 2000 and lasting until Gene’s death in 2020.3 Jack’s application stated that he was “legally Decedent’s son, as clearly stated multiple times in Decedent’s Will.” In June 2020, the trial court signed a final judgment determining and declaring heirship and appointing Donald as independent administrator of Gene’s estate. In the final judgment, the trial court made several findings, including the following: 2 By the time of trial, Richard was the only living brother. 3 Norma did not attempt to recover under Gene’s will. Norma was not asked at trial whether she and Gene were informally married when he died. 4 • Gene died without leaving a valid will; • Gene was not married when he died; • Gene had no children “born to or adopted by him”; and • Gene’s four surviving brothers were his heirs. The court signed an order granting a new trial in July 2020. In September 2020, Donald filed a contest to Jack’s application to probate will. He also filed an application for probate and issuance of letters of administration and petition for declaratory judgment. After Donald’s death, his son—Darren—pursued the contest as the independent executor of Donald’s estate. In June 2022, Jack filed a third amended application to probate will and for issuance of letters of administration. He also filed an amended answer and petition for declaratory judgment. Richard then filed his application to probate will and letters of administration in which he offered Gene’s will to probate. Jury Trial Fourteen witnesses testified during a four-day jury trial: Norma, Jack, Gene’s brothers and nephew, some of Gene’s friends, and a few other witnesses. Norma Womack Norma testified that she was married to Gene from 1970 through 1992. When she began to date Gene, Jack was eight and Tommy was six. According to Norma’s testimony, when she married Gene, he agreed to adopt Jack and Tommy. 5 Gene told her, “I love you and I love them, and I want to take care of you.” She said he made a binding agreement to adopt the boys because he “always took care of them. Did things with them, supported them, loved them.” Norma testified that Gene and Jack “went to games together, sporting games. They watched sports on TV. They went fishing and hunting, did gardening, did chores together.” Gene took part in Jack and Tommy’s scouting activities. In 1975, Gene created a resume that said he was married and had “two children.” Gene and Norma stopped living together in 1987, five years before they were officially divorced. She filed two petitions for divorce, each of which said there were “no children born to or adopted of this marriage.” Gene’s petition for divorce also said there was no child born of or adopted during the marriage. According to Norma, Gene had “informally adopted” her sons. She testified, “[Jack] was adopted by Gene. Gene was their father.” Norma acknowledged that she received child support from Jack’s biological father and pursued him in court to pay back child support more than once. At some point, Gene said, “This is B.S. We’ll raise these boys ourselves.” Norma said she and Gene discussed the agreement to adopt Jack and Tommy at that time. Gene never filed a petition for adoption of the boys. Norma testified that she never consulted a lawyer in connection with Gene’s adoption of her sons or entered into a written adoption agreement with Gene but that the alleged adoption 6 agreement was made in 1973 or 1974.4 The last judgment against the boys’ biological father in connection with child support was issued in 1977, several years after Gene allegedly agreed to adopt the boys. Jack Maniscalco, Jr. Jack testified that he was Gene’s son. When Jack was young, he called Gene “Dad,” and as a teenager he called him “Pops.” He described Gene as a “loving, caring guy, definitely a disciplinarian. You know, a great guy. I mean, I couldn’t ask for a better dad.” According to Jack, he and Gene “did things together. We did things that a father and son should do. We would go hunting, fishing. We would throw the ball around. We would attend ball games. We went to Oiler games, Astro games, played backyard ball, threw the football, shot hoops on the driveway.”5 Jack testified that he called Gene’s parents “Grandma and Grandpa,” that Gene’s brothers were Jack’s uncles and still are, and that he was on Gene’s health insurance when he was young. Jack acknowledged that Gene did not make a formal attempt in court to adopt him, and that his biological father’s parental rights were never terminated. According to Jack, the Womack brothers were “not really” close. 4 Tommy died after the alleged adoption agreement was made. 5 Jack testified that his biological father did not routinely exercise his visitation rights when he was young. 7 Gene’s Brothers and Nephew James Womack, one of Gene’s brothers, testified by deposition.6 He testified that when Gene and Norma were married, and Jack was a minor, he believed Gene considered Jack to be his son. However, even though Jack called him “Uncle Jim” as a child, James did not believe Jack was Gene’s son. Donald Womack, another of Gene’s brothers, also testified by deposition. Donald testified that he was not aware of any relationship between Gene and Jack after Gene and Norma divorced. Further, even before the divorce but after Jack turned eighteen, Gene never talked to Donald about Jack at all. According to Donald, Gene never discussed with him any agreement he made with Norma to raise Jack and Tommy as his own children. Nor did Norma ever discuss such an agreement. Donald did not consider Jack and Tommy to be his children’s cousins and did not consider them to be Gene’s children, even when they called him “Uncle Donald.” He believed Jack was Gene’s stepson. Donald did not know Jack was claiming to be Gene’s son until Norma produced the will after Gene’s death. Charles, also Gene’s brother, testified by deposition that he was not aware that Gene had a will. He testified that he did not believe Jack was Gene’s son because Gene “never claimed him around me, never claimed he was a son or a 6 James, Donald, and Charles Womack died between the time of their depositions and trial. 8 sibling or—never, never that I can recall him saying that.” He was not witness to any agreement for Gene to raise Jack and Tommy as his own sons, and he never met Jack’s children. He acknowledged Jack and Tommy called him “Uncle” or “Hickey” when they were young. In 1977 or 1978, Charles saw the aftermath of a fight at Gene’s house. According to Charles, Jack had “a busted lip, a black eye, a bloody nose, marks on his body where punches had been thrown and hit.” Tommy’s mouth was bloody. Jack screamed at Charles; he screamed insults about Charles’ mother. Jack also said “insulting” words to Gene. Eventually, the sheriff’s department came and Jack and Tommy were handcuffed. Jack apparently had been fighting Gene. Darren is the executor of Donald’s estate. Darren testified that he, his son, and his niece are the last of the Womack lineage. He recalls having been around Jack as a child once, and Jack referred to Gene as “Gene” on that occasion. According to Darren, Gene was “embarrassed and ashamed” of Jack. He never heard Gene refer to Jack as his son. He called him “Jack” or “Jackie.” As an adult, Darren never heard his uncles refer to Jack as a nephew. He testified that he was shocked that Jack claimed to be Gene’s child. He never heard Jack call Gene “Dad,” and he never heard Gene say Jack was his son. 9 Darren testified that he was shocked when Jack testified that the uncles were not close, as they spoke “every other day” and “[t]hey always were in touch with each other. They met with each other constantly.” Richard, who was seventy years old at the time of trial, was Gene’s only surviving brother and lived on their deceased mother’s property. According to Richard, it was a “big shocker” during this trial to the Womack brothers that Jack claimed to be Gene’s son. Richard testified, “I was basically never told anything about an adoption to anybody. And it was just, you know, me and my brothers were close; and we talked all the time.” Richard testified that he saw or interacted with Gene almost every day. He said he probably spoke on the phone with him every other day, and he was equally as close with his other brothers. Richard saw Gene most often of the brothers, but they all saw him “[p]retty on a regular basis.” According to Richard, Gene never said anything to him about adopting Jack. In fact, he never heard anything about the purported adoption until after Gene’s death. Richard did not see Gene’s will until Jack presented it for probate. Richard testified that he treated Jack and Tommy when they were young as an uncle treats nephews. Jack and Tommy called him “Uncle Richard.” 10 Gene’s Friends Scotty Free, a friend of Gene, testified that he met Gene in 2002. Gene purchased three properties through Scotty, who is a real estate broker. To his knowledge, Gene had no children. Gene told him that Jack would not inherit from him because Jack “had gotten everything he was ever going to get from Gene.” He did not know Jack personally. It was his impression that Gene was not enamored with Jack. Jerald Free, Scotty’s brother, also testified. Jerald is a general contractor. He became friends with Gene because Gene was a metal building salesman, and Jerald built a lot of metal buildings and bought some from Gene. As far as Jerald knew, Gene had no children and was divorced. Gene told Jerald that Jack would not inherit after Gene’s death: “Gene just told me that boy has got everything he’s ever going to get from him.” Jerald testified that he did not know that Gene, Jack, Norma, and Jack’s kids did things together or that Gene allegedly had “grandkids.” Other Witnesses • Aloysius Pye, a childhood friend of Jack, testified he saw Jack “on a regular basis” until their junior year in high school. He saw Gene and Norma at Jack’s sporting events and did not know that Gene was not Jack’s “real” dad. • Joseph Lamar Little met Jack in the fourth grade. He testified that he saw Gene and Norma in the stands at Jack’s sporting events and thought Gene was Jack’s biological father. 11 • Kay Womack Vavrina7 was Darren’s sister and Donald’s daughter. She testified she was not aware of any discussion or agreement regarding Gene’s adoption of Jack, and she never heard Gene refer to Jack as his son or Jack refer to Gene as his father. • Linda Cobb testified that she was a neighbor and lifelong friend of Gene. She said Gene referred to Jack as his stepson. She knew Gene was a stepfather to Jack and Tommy but “never did [she] hear that he adopted either one of them.” • Charles Valka, a school friend of Gene, testified that he knew Gene for seventy years. To his knowledge, Gene had no children. He testified he never met Jack but he had heard the name. He never saw Gene tell anyone that Jack was his son. Indeed, he testified, he asked Gene if he had kids and Gene said he did not. Verdict and Judgment The jury charge stated that adoption by estoppel required the adopted child to prove by a preponderance of the evidence (1) the existence of an oral or written agreement by the parent to adopt the child and (2) performance by the child, meaning that the child must show love and affection to the parent and render services such as a child would render to a parent. The charge continued: To establish that an agreement existed, the child must prove that the parent either (1) executed a statutory instrument of adoption in the office of the county clerk; (2) attempted to complete the statutory adoption but failed to do so because of some defect in the instrument of adoption, or in its execution or acknowledgment; or (3) agreed with the person to be adopted, 7 The reporter’s record referred to Kay’s last name as “Favrina,” but she spelled it out for the court reporter as “Vavrina.” 12 or with such other person acting on behalf of the child that he or she would adopt such person. The jury found that (1) Gene had not adopted Jack by estoppel prior to Jack’s eighteenth birthday; (2) Jack acted in good faith and just cause, whether or not successful, in prosecuting the suit “for the purpose of the Will dated January 23, 1980 to be admitted to probate”; (3) Darren acted in good faith8 and just cause,9 whether or not successful, in prosecuting the suit “for the purpose of the Will dated January 23, 1980 to be admitted to probate,” passing Gene’s assets to Richard, Donald, James, and Charles Womack, or their issue; and (4) Richard Womack acted in good faith and just cause, whether or not successful, in prosecuting the suit “for the purpose of the Will dated January 23, 1980 to be admitted to probate,” passing Gene’s assets to Richard, Donald, James, and Charles Womack, or their issue. The final judgment memorialized the jury’s findings and ordered that Jack recover his reasonable and necessary attorneys’ fees from Gene’s estate in the amount of $406,133.08; that Darren recover his reasonable and necessary attorneys’ fees from Gene’s estate in the amount of $299,965.38; and that Richard 8 “Good faith” was defined to mean that “the action is prompted by honesty of intention or a reasonable belief that the action was probably correct.” 9 “Just cause” was defined to mean that “the actions were based on reasonable grounds and there was a fair and honest cause or reason for the actions.” 13 recover his reasonable and necessary attorneys’ fees from Gene’s estate in the amount of $122,135.11. This appeal ensued. Jack’s Appellate Issues In four issues, Jack argues (1) improper jury arguments “irreparably tainted” the jury’s perception of him, causing “undue prejudice”; (2) the trial court abused its discretion in admitting certain pleadings from other proceedings into evidence; (3) the trial court abused its discretion by refusing to grant a mistrial; and (4) the jury’s finding that he is not Gene’s son is against the “great weight and preponderance of the evidence.” Jury Argument In his first issue, Jack argues that there was improper “jury argument” because Darren and Richard twice violated the trial court’s order in limine. In the court’s written order in limine, the trial court ordered that the parties, counsel, and witnesses “refrain from making any mention or interrogation, directly or indirectly, in any manner whatsoever, in the presence of the jury matters including: • Failure to call witnesses not within the subpoena range; • Any reference by parties or witnesses to oral statements made by deceased persons unless the reference to the statement is corroborated; and • Any reference to any inadmissible arrest or criminal conviction. 14 Jack points to two instances of what he identifies as improper jury argument. First, he complains of Darren’s and Richard’s “reference to inadmissible arrest or criminal convictions.” And second, he complains of an “attack” by Darren and Richard on the affidavit of Travis Tinsley “in front of the jury” by referring to Tinsley’s “failure to appear in court to testify.” We address each argument in turn. A. Jack’s Criminal History As a preliminary matter, it does not appear that Jack is actually referring to improper jury argument. He does not cite where in the record the improper argument occurred, and a review of Darren’s and Richard’s opening and closing arguments do not reflect the arguments about which he complains. For example, there is no reference in either closing argument to Jack’s criminal past. Presumably, Jack is complaining about the following exchange during his testimony while questioned by Darren’s counsel: Q (by Darren’s counsel): Why are you not applying to be administrator of Gene’s estate? A (by Jack): Why didn’t I? Q: Yeah. A: I didn’t want to have an argument with Uncle Donald. ... Q: Isn’t it because you are a felon? 15 A: I am not a felon. I don’t have no felony convictions. After this exchange, upon Jack’s request, the jury was instructed to disregard the question about Jack being a felon. Jack then moved for a mistrial “for violation of the motion in limine for something so prejudicial.” The trial court denied the motion for mistrial and instructed both parties to approach the bench before asking any questions about “criminal convictions.” The following day, before questioning resumed, the parties discussed whether they could ask Jack about his prior conviction. Jack argued the evidence should not come in because he was not seeking to be the administrator of Gene’s estate and this was just a ploy to get “inadmissible criminal complaints in violation of the limine into evidence.” The court ruled that he would allow only limited questioning on the matter.10, 11 The following exchange then occurred: 10 Appellees’ counsel argued Jack had opened the door to the line of questioning because in his deposition, Jack testified he had not applied to be administrator of Gene’s will because he “offered his daughter” to be the administrator instead, but at trial, he testified he had not applied “because of [Donald].” Appellees’ counsel argued that this “was not the first time” Jack’s “story [had] changed” and he was thus entitled to ask Jack about his prior felony conviction under Rule of Evidence 609 to “attack [his] character for truthfulness.” Appellees’ counsel argued that “[the conviction] should be admitted because [Jack] opened the door when he said he was qualified repeatedly and when he changed his story from the reason he wasn’t applying” from “I stepped aside for my daughter” to “now my client’s interference that never happened.” Jack argued he was not a “felon” because his conviction was downgraded to a misdemeanor, he was not seeking to be the administrator of Gene’s estate, and this was just a ploy to get “inadmissible criminal complaints in violation of the limine into evidence.” 16 Q (by Darren’s counsel): Have you ever been convicted of a felony? A (by Jack): Yes. Q: Do you understand that a person is not qualified to act as executor administrator [sic] if they’re convicted of a felony? A: Yes, ma’am. Jack subsequently testified that his conviction was downgraded to a misdemeanor and he is able to vote. Neither of these exchanges constitutes jury argument.12 In his brief, Jack complains that Darren and Richard sought testimony regarding “a topic barred” by the trial court’s order in limine, which ordered the parties to refrain from making “[a]ny reference to any inadmissible arrest or criminal conviction.” He argues that “[t]hese improper arguments undoubtedly had a negative, material effect on the jury’s finding.” He argues that the bias caused by 11 After the judge’s ruling and before the questioning, Jack moved for a mistrial because “[opposing] counsel is allowed to ask about felony convictions that are no longer—is no longer a felony and that are irrelevant.” The trial court implicitly denied the motion for mistrial stating “that is the court’s ruling.” 12 Counsel for Darren states that Jack waived his objection to the testimony about his status as a felon because he did not object when the question was asked “on both occasions.” We disagree. Texas Rule of Evidence 103(b) provides that when the trial court “hears a party’s objection outside the presence of the jury and rules that evidence is admissible, a party need not renew an objection to preserve a claim of error for appeal.” TEX. R. EVID. 103(b). The trial court specifically identified the questions it would allow to be asked, and Jack moved for a mistrial at that time based on the ruling. We do not believe he needed to reurge his objections after those very questions were asked. 17 the statements “could not have been cured by any limiting instructions by this Court.” The jury was instructed to disregard the first question about Jack being a felon and we presume the jury did so. “When inadmissible evidence is introduced and the trial court sustains an objection and gives the jury an instruction to disregard, we presume the jury properly followed that instruction.” Collins v. Sunrise Senior Living Mgmt., Inc., No. 01-10-01000-CV, 2012 WL 1067953, at *23 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] Mar. 29, 2012, no pet.) (mem. op.) (citing Owens–Corning Fiberglas Corp. v. Malone, 916 S.W.2d 551, 563 (Tex. App.— Houston [1st Dist.] 1996), aff’d, 972 S.W.2d 35 (Tex. 1998)); see also Taylor v. Am. Fabritech, Inc., 132 S.W.3d 613, 625 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 2004, pet. denied) (“We presume, absent evidence to the contrary, that the jury followed such an instruction [to disregard].”). The following day, however, Jack testified that he had been convicted of a felony offense. Jack’s challenge on appeal to the question about his prior conviction appears to stem entirely from what he perceived to be a violation of the court’s order in limine. He does not complain on appeal that anything was improperly admitted under the Rules of Evidence. Instead, he argues that error “was properly preserved as [he] objected to the violation of Darren and Richard’s disregard of the Order [in Limine].” A motion in limine “does not preserve error on 18 evidentiary rulings because it does not seek a ruling on admissibility.’” In re Space Expl. Techs. Corp., 716 S.W.3d 576, 584 (Tex. 2025) (quoting Wackenhut Corp. v. Gutierrez, 453 S.W.3d 917, 920 n.3 (Tex. 2015)). In the absence of any appellate argument as to the admissibility of the testimony regarding Jack’s felony conviction, there is nothing for us to review. We overrule this part of Jack’s first issue. B. The Tinsley Affidavit During Jack’s testimony, counsel asked Jack about a sworn affidavit made by Travis Tinsley. Jack testified that Travis was married to Peggy Tinsley, a friend of Gene and Norma. According to Jack, when Peggy came to town to visit her grandchildren, she would stay with Norma. The court admitted an affidavit by ninety-year-old Travis, in which Travis said that Gene identified Jack as his son, Jack’s son as his grandson, and Jack’s daughter as his granddaughter. Jack argues that Darren and Richard made “improper and prejudicial jury arguments” by “improperly attack[ing] the affidavit of Travis Tinsley” and referencing his “failure to appear in court to testify.” Jack argues that by referencing Tinsley’s absence, Darren and Richard “confused and misled the jury into questioning the credibility of Tinsley’s testimony.”13 13 Tinsley lived in Louisiana. 19 The only reference to Tinsley’s affidavit in jury argument was in Darren’s closing: And then we have this affidavit of this 90-year-old man, Travis Tinsley, who lives in Louisiana. Allegedly, he’s the only person that seems to have heard Gene say that Jack was his son, not during minority, but in 2014. But what’s odd about that is the only people who were involved in what Mr. Tinsley sent an affidavit in at 90 years old to say, were Jack and Norma. The statement does not refer to Tinsley’s failure to testify in person, and Jack also did not object to the statement about Tinsley’s affidavit. “[A] party waives an objection to improper jury argument if he does not object immediately after the contested statement is made or preserve the issue in a motion for new trial.” In re C.H., No. 02-13-00312-CV, 2014 WL 3891636, at *1 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth Aug. 7, 2014, no pet.) (mem. op.) (citing TEX. R. CIV. P. 324(b)(5)).14 Assuming without deciding that Jack refers to questions posed to him by Darren’s and Richard’s counsel, here again, Jack does not describe or explain how any statements constituted improper jury argument. Jack’s counsel asked him where Tinsley was during trial, and Jack responded, “He’s 94, 95 years old and he’s having some major health issues right now and is not doing too well.” During cross-examination, Jack testified he asked Tinsley to execute an affidavit “since he 14 Jack’s motion for new trial argues the same contention about the Tinsley affidavit as he argues on appeal, claiming that he objected to improper jury argument. Here again, it is unclear exactly where Jack made any such objection during trial or what the improper jury argument was. 20 couldn’t travel.” He testified he reached out to Tinsley in Louisiana to make the affidavit to support his claim of adoption by estoppel. Jack does not indicate where he objected to any “argument” regarding the Tinsley affidavit—or where the argument occurred.15 Given that we cannot ascertain specifically the argument about which Jack complains or identify any objections preserving the issue for our review, we overrule this part of Jack’s first issue. Judicial Notice In his second issue, Jack argues the trial court abused its discretion by taking improper judicial notice of certain pleadings and by admitting unauthenticated pleadings from other proceedings into evidence. Jack does not cite any evidentiary rule in his argument.16 Rather, he states, “[t]he applicable evidentiary rules and Texas case law prohibit the admission of 15 We have no duty to search the record “without guidance from appellant to determine whether an assertion of reversible error is valid.” Flume v. State Bar of Tex., 974 S.W.2d 55, 62 (Tex. App.—San Antonio 1998, no pet.) (noting appellant failed to direct court to references in evidence presented to jury to illustrate how counsel’s argument constituted error); G.R.A.V.I.T.Y. Enters., Inc. v. Reece Supply Co., 177 S.W.3d 537, 546 (Tex. App.—Dallas 2005, no pet.) (holding briefing on omission of good faith jury question was inadequate because “[Appellant] makes no citation to the record to where it demonstrated [Appellee’s] lack of good faith or any description of the evidence of [Appellee’s] lack of good faith. This Court has no duty to search through the record without guidance from [Appellant] to determine whether its assertion of reversible error is valid.”). 16 Jack relies entirely on a Fourteenth Court of Appeals case in which “the trial court’s ruling was based on its judicial notice of all documents and testimony ever admitted in this case on any subject.” Guyton v. Monteau, 332 S.W.3d 687, 692 21 these exhibits, and admission of the materials constitutes error.” Jack also fails to identify the “multiple unauthenticated exhibits and pleadings” of which he complains or cite to the appellate record in his argument. The closest he comes is when he states that the trial court “did not simply take judicial notice that a divorce had occurred or that a probate proceeding had commenced.” He continues, “The actual facts contained within the documents and pleadings (from other proceedings) were presented to the jury as true.” Without knowing specifically which pleadings Jack refers to or when during trial the purported error was made, we cannot review the record to determine whether error was preserved, or even whether the court took judicial notice of any documents.17 See TEX. R. CIV. P. 38.1(i) (“The brief must contain a clear and concise argument for the contentions made, with appropriate citations to authorities and to the record.”). Nor can we ascertain whether any facts in any such pleadings were improperly “presented to the jury as true,” given that Jack did not provide any examples of the trial court’s purported error in this regard. See Wade v. Comm’n for Lawyer Discipline, 961 S.W.2d 366, 373 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 2011, no pet.). As noted below, it is unclear whether the trial court took judicial notice of any pleadings or other documents, given that Jack does not point to any place in the record where it occurred. Nor does Jack make any admissibility argument in his brief based on the Rules of Evidence. 17 Richard and Darren argue that the trial court did not take judicial notice of any divorce and probate pleadings that were not admitted during the trial. 22 1997, no writ) (holding “[a]n appellate court is under no duty to make an independent search of the record for evidence supporting an appellant’s position”); Keene Corp. v. Gardner, 837 S.W.2d 224, 229 (Tex. App.—Dallas 1992, writ denied) (“We require an appellant to identify the places in the record that support its complaint.”) (citing Barham v. Turner Constr. Co., 803 S.W.2d 731, 740 (Tex. App.—Dallas 1990, writ denied)); CBS Outdoor, Inc. v. Potter, No. 01-11-00650- CV, 2013 WL 269091, at *17 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] Jan. 24, 2013, pet. denied) (mem. op.) (“An appellate court has no duty to search through the record without guidance from the appellant ‘to determine whether its assertion of reversible error is valid.’”) (citing G.R.A.V.I.T.Y. Enters., Inc. v. Reece Supply Co., 177 S.W.3d 537, 546 (Tex. App.—Dallas 2005, no pet.)).18 We thus overrule Jack’s second issue. See TEX. R. CIV. P. 38.1(i). Motion for Mistrial In Jack’s third issue, he argues that because “multiple motions in limine were violated, defeating the very reason they exhibit,” the “burden shifts to the trial court to grant a mistrial or risk an inevitable appeal.” 18 Richard argues that Jack premises this argument “on the false claim that [certain] documents were not authenticated.” Richard and Darren argue that the documents of which Jack complains—which were not identified in Jack’s brief—were certified copies of public documents, admissible under Texas Rule of Evidence 902. 23 Here again, Jack does not cite to the record where he moved for a mistrial, the proceedings that led up to his motion, or any curative orders issued by the trial court.19 Even if he had adequately briefed the issue, we disagree that any such burden somehow shifted to the trial court forcing it to grant a mistrial because an order in limine was violated. Jack has not cited any authority that describes such a burden on the trial court, and we are not aware of any. As noted above, an order in limine is not a ruling on admissibility. In re Space Expl. Techs. Corp., 716 S.W.3d at 584. Rather, it is an order requiring the parties to approach before the subject matter of the order is addressed in front of the jury. In re Smith, No. 01-19-00014-CV, 2020 WL 5269417, at *7 (Tex. App.— Houston [1st Dist.] Sept. 3, 2020, no pet.) (mem. op.) (“A ruling on a motion in limine does not exclude evidence, but merely requires counsel to approach the bench before any matters within the scope of the order are mentioned in front of the jury.”) (citing Gutierrez v. Gutierrez, 86 S.W.3d 729, 733 n. 8 (Tex. App.—El 19 In one of the two cases Jack relies on, In re Hightower, 580 S.W.3d 248, 254 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 2019, no pet.) (orig. proceeding), a post-trial mistrial was granted after the plaintiffs learned the defendants had violated a pre-trial exclusionary order, not an order in limine. The appellate court noted that “[t]he trial court’s reason for ordering a mistrial was both sufficiently specific and legally appropriate. In addition, the trial court’s reason for granting a mistrial is supported by the record.” In re Hightower is thus inapposite. The other case upon which Jack relies is not about a mistrial. See Smerke v. Office Equip. Co., 138 Tex. 236, 242, 158 S.W.2d 302, 305 (Comm’n App. 1941) (affirming reversal of jury verdict for plaintiff because of plaintiff’s counsel’s improper jury argument during closing argument). 24 Paso 2002, no pet.)). Indeed, even an agreed limine order is not an agreement to exclude evidence. Id. The trial court has discretion with respect to crafting a remedy for violation of its order in limine. “The violation of a motion in limine may entitle a party to relief, bu