Full Opinion

Majority and Dissenting Opinions filed October 22, 2026. In The Fifteenth Court of Appeals NO. 15-25-00028-CV TEXAS STATE UNIVERSITY AND TEXAS STATE UNIVERSITY SYSTEM, Appellants V. STUART PATRICK WILKINSON, Appellee On Appeal from the 22nd District Court Hays County, Texas Trial Court Cause No. 24-1162 CONCURRING AND DISSENTING OPINION The majority is correct to reverse the trial court’s order. However, I would render judgment dismissing Wilkinson’s Whistleblower Act claim without prejudice. The Texas Supreme Court has held that when a plaintiff’s pleadings are insufficient to establish jurisdiction, “a plaintiff deserves ‘a reasonable opportunity to amend’ unless the pleadings affirmatively negate the existence of jurisdiction.” 1 Tex. A & M Univ. Sys. v. Koseoglu, 233 S.W.3d 835, 839 (Tex. 2007) (citing Harris County v. Sykes, 136 S.W.3d 635, 639 (Tex. 2004); Tex. Dep’t of Parks & Wildlife v. Miranda, 133 S.W.3d 217, 226–27 (Tex. 2004); and Cnty. of Cameron v. Brown, 80 S.W.3d 549, 555 (Tex. 2002)). Here, as the majority properly concludes, Wilkinson failed to plead facts that would show he met two of the Whistleblower Act’s preconditions: a timely filed internal grievance and a timely filed lawsuit. Wilkinson’s claim should thus be dismissed. But because Wilkinson’s pleadings do not affirmatively demonstrate incurable defects for his Whistleblower Act claim, “the issue is one of pleading sufficiency.” Miranda, 133 S.W.3d at 226. He therefore should be afforded the opportunity to amend. Id. at 227. Importantly, Wilkinson amended his pleadings before the trial court ruled on Defendants’ plea to the jurisdiction and the trial court later found that Wilkinson’s amended pleadings were sufficient. Because Wilkinson’s amended pleadings could not take into account a court’s ruling that his pleadings are insufficient, which we decide here for the first time, he deserves the opportunity to amend his pleadings if the defects can be cured. Koseoglu, 233 S.W.3d at 839–40. As the majority recognizes, ante at 9, Wilkinson’s pleading defects can be cured if he provides “dates showing when the alleged retaliation occurred, when he filed a grievance, and whether any grievance is still pending or when it was concluded”— assuming that those dates help him. Under the majority’s reasoning, Defendants’ mere filing of a plea to the jurisdiction should have put Wilkinson on notice that his pleading would need to be amended to include the dates mentioned above. I agree with the majority that such dates are either within Wilkinson’s personal knowledge or are matters of record he could have discovered with reasonable diligence. Although Wilkinson could have 2 provided those dates in the first instance, his adversary’s filing of a plea to the jurisdiction was not adequate to put him on notice of this defect as a matter of law. If we hold that a Defendants’ plea to the jurisdiction provides the required “reasonable opportunity to amend,” such a rule, “would essentially allow governmental entities the unjust advantage of being not only a litigant, but also the judge of the plaintiff’s pleadings.” Koseoglu, 233 S.W.3d at 839–40. The Texas Supreme Court has expressly rejected such a rule. Id. So have our sister courts that have followed Koseoglu. See Bell Cnty. v. Kozeny, 2014 WL 4792656, at *3 (Tex. App.—Waco Sept. 25, 2014, no pet.) (noting that the Koseoglu court “rejected the proposed rule that the plaintiff's opportunity to amend arises when the governmental entity files its plea”); Leonard v. City of Burkburnett, 2023 WL 8940816, at *17 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth Dec. 28, 2023, no pet.) (same). The majority cites Koseoglu to dismiss with prejudice, recognizing that the Texas Supreme Court dismissed the plaintiff’s claims with prejudice in that case. Koseoglu, 233 S.W.3d at 840. But the Koseoglu court did so because it found that the plaintiff’s pleading defects could not be cured. Remanding that case “would serve no legitimate purpose” because there were no additional facts the plaintiff could plead that would overcome the defendant’s immunity from suit. Id. Here, the same might be said of Wilkinson’s constitutional claims, but that is not the case for his Whistleblower Act claim. For the Whistleblower Act claim, Wilkinson could plead facts that would overcome the government’s immunity and give the trial court jurisdiction over the suit—namely, the dates mentioned above. Depending on what they are, those dates may ultimately fail to save Wilkinson’s pleadings. And the majority is correct to observe that “bouncing cases back and forth between courts for a plaintiff to try again and again wastes public money and judicial resources.” Ante at 10. But at the 3 end of the day, a justice must be concerned first and foremost with the administration of justice. That is why Koseoglu requires that a plaintiff be given a reasonable opportunity to amend—even when such amendment creates costs and inefficiencies—and forbids allowing a government entity to be both a litigant and judge of the plaintiff’s pleading adequacy. Applying that precedent here, Koseoglu requires that we dismiss his Whistleblower Act claim without prejudice. Accordingly, I respectfully dissent. /s/ April Farris April Farris Justice 4