Full Opinion

NUMBER 13-26-00542-CV COURT OF APPEALS THIRTEENTH DISTRICT OF TEXAS CORPUS CHRISTI – EDINBURG IN RE FLOR DE JESUS ESQUIVEL ON PETITION FOR WRIT OF MANDAMUS MEMORANDUM OPINION Before Chief Justice Tijerina and Justices Silva and Cron Memorandum Opinion by Chief Justice Tijerina1 By petition for writ of mandamus, relator Flor De Jesus Esquivel asserts that the trial court 2 abused its discretion by granting a new trial in favor of real party in interest Paulo Pedraza Jr. in a personal injury lawsuit arising from a motor vehicle collision. In one 1 See TEX. R. APP. P. 52.8(d) (“When denying relief, the court may hand down an opinion but is not required to do so. When granting relief, the court must hand down an opinion as in any other case.”); id. R. 47.1 (“The court of appeals must hand down a written opinion that is as brief as practicable but that addresses every issue raised and necessary to final disposition of the appeal.”); id. R. 47.4 (explaining the differences between opinions and memorandum opinions). 2 This original proceeding arises from trial court cause number C-4455-24-M in the 476th District Court of Hidalgo County, Texas, and the respondent is the Honorable Nereida Lopez-Singleterry. See id. R. 52.2. issue, Esquivel contends that the trial court’s new trial order is facially invalid and there is not a valid, merits-based reason to grant a new trial. Because we conclude that the trial court’s new trial order is facially invalid, we conditionally grant the petition for writ of mandamus in part and deny it in part. I. BACKGROUND Pedraza filed suit against Esquivel on grounds that he sustained “property damage and serious personal injuries” when their vehicles collided on March 27, 2024, in McAllen, Texas. Pedraza alleged that he was traveling northbound on North Second Street when he was rear-ended by Esquivel. Pedraza asserted causes of action against Esquivel for negligence and negligence per se. The parties’ dispute was ultimately submitted to a jury, which heard testimony from five witnesses: Pedraza; Esquivel; two medical experts—Dr. Matthew Kaplan, an anesthesiologist and specialist in pain management, who testified regarding Pedraza’s treatment and medical bills, and Dr. Blaine Hendrick, a chiropractor and nurse practitioner, who testified regarding Pedraza’s chiropractic care, musculoskeletal injuries—and Adelino Young, a licensed biomechanical engineer who provided expert testimony regarding the accident. In response to the first question in the jury charge, the jury found that the negligence of neither Pedraza nor Esquivel “proximately cause[d] the occurrence in question.” In accordance with their instructions, the jury did not answer the second question regarding the percentage of negligence attributable to each party. The third question in the charge instructed the jury as follows: 2 Answer Question No. 3 if you answered “Yes” for one or more of the Defendants in Question No. 1 and if you found that [Pedraza] was not more than 50% responsible in Question No. 2. QUESTION NO. 3 What sum of money, if paid now in cash, would fairly and reasonably compensate [Pedraza] for his injuries, if any, that resulted from the occurrence in question? Even though the jury did not find that Esquivel, Pedraza, or both were negligent, and did not find that Pedraza was not more than fifty percent responsible, the jury answered this question and awarded Pedraza $16,500 for past medical care and $1,000 for past physical pain and mental anguish. Thereafter, Pedraza filed a motion for new trial asserting that the jury’s findings were irreconcilable and the verdict was “fatally inconsistent.” Pedraza argued that “[t]he verdict demonstrates that the jury believed [that he] suffered or was entitled to compensable harm but was confused or misapplied the liability question,” and that “[t]his is precisely the type of conflict that the remedy of a [n]ew [t]rial is reserved for and would be in the best interest of justice in this matter.” In contrast, Esquivel filed a motion for entry of judgment based on the jury’s verdict. Esquivel argued, in part, “that the damages finding was immaterial once no liability was found, so the answers were reconcilable.” Pedraza filed a reply to Esquivel’s response reasserting his request for a new trial. The trial court held a hearing on Pedraza’s motion for new trial and took the matter under consideration. On May 29, 2026, the trial court granted Pedraza’s motion for new trial. The trial court’s new trial order states in its entirety: On this day, the Court considered [Pedraza’s] Motion for New Trial and [Esquivel’s] response, if any, and the record of this cause. 3 After considering the motion, and the applicable law, the Court is of the opinion that the motion should be GRANTED. It is therefore ORDERED that: 1. [Pedraza’s] Motion for New Trial is GRANTED; 2. The Jury’s verdict for trial started on April 20, 2026 is VACATED; 3. This case is REINSTATED on the Court’s active docket with [a] new Docket Control Conference to be scheduled at a later date; [and] All relief not expressly granted herein is denied. This original proceeding ensued. In one issue, Esquivel asserts that the trial court clearly abused its discretion in granting Pedraza’s motion for new trial because: (1) the new trial order is facially invalid; and (2) there is no valid merits-based reason for granting the motion for new trial. Esquivel also filed a motion to stay the trial court proceedings pending the resolution of her petition for writ of mandamus. See TEX. R. APP. P. 52.10(a). We granted Esquivel’s motion to stay, see id. R. 52.10(b), and we requested and received a response to the petition for writ of mandamus from Pedraza. See id. R. 52.4, 52.8. 3 Esquivel filed a reply in support of her request for relief. See id. R. 52.5. Pedraza also filed a motion to abate this original proceeding and remand it to the trial court for clarification of the new trial order, and Esquivel filed a response in opposition. II. MANDAMUS Mandamus relief provides an “extraordinary remedy.” In re Rogers, 690 S.W.3d 296, 302 (Tex. 2024) (orig. proceeding) (per curiam) (quoting In re USAA Gen. Indem. 3 Pedraza filed a motion for extension of time to file his response to the petition for writ of mandamus and a motion for leave to file his response. We grant both motions, and we consider Pedraza’s response on the merits. 4 Co., 624 S.W.3d 782, 787 (Tex. 2021) (orig. proceeding)). Mandamus is discretionary in nature and it is governed by equitable principles. In re First Rsrv. Mgmt., L.P., 671 S.W.3d 653, 663 (Tex. 2023) (orig. proceeding); In re Garza, 544 S.W.3d 836, 840 (Tex. 2018) (orig. proceeding) (per curiam). To obtain mandamus relief, the relator must show that the trial court clearly abused its discretion and the relator lacks an adequate remedy by appeal. In re Dall. HERO, 698 S.W.3d 242, 247 (Tex. 2024) (orig. proceeding); In re AutoZoners, LLC, 694 S.W.3d 219, 223 (Tex. 2024) (orig. proceeding) (per curiam). In this regard, there is no adequate remedy by appeal when the trial court abuses its discretion by granting a new trial. In re Columbia Med. Ctr. of Las Colinas, Subsidiary, L.P., 290 S.W.3d 204, 209–10 (Tex. 2009) (orig. proceeding). III. NEW TRIALS Trial courts possess “considerable authority to grant new trials” and have the duty “to do so when they observe problems that threaten the integrity of the process and, therefore, the reliability of [a jury’s] verdict.” In re Rudolph Auto., LLC, 674 S.W.3d 289, 302 (Tex. 2023) (orig. proceeding). However, because “disregarding a jury’s verdict is an unusually serious act that imperils a constitutional value of immense importance—the authority of a jury”—the trial court may only do so “when clearly supported by sound reasons.” Id. Those reasons must be specifically set forth in the order. Id.; see In re Davenport, 522 S.W.3d 452, 456–56 (Tex. 2017) (orig. proceeding). In other words, trial courts are required to provide litigants with “an understandable, reasonably specific explanation” for setting aside a jury verdict and ordering a new trial. In re Bent, 487 S.W.3d 170, 173 (Tex. 5 2016) (orig. proceeding) (quoting In re Columbia Med. Ctr., 290 S.W.3d at 213). Trial courts must do so because: [A] vague explanation in setting aside a jury verdict does not enhance respect for the judiciary or the rule of law, detracts from transparency we strive to achieve in our legal system, and does not sufficiently respect the reasonable expectations of parties and the public when a lawsuit is tried to a jury. Parties and the public generally expect that a trial followed by a jury verdict will close the trial process. Those expectations may be overly optimistic, practically speaking, but the parties and public are entitled to an understandable, reasonably specific explanation why their expectations are frustrated by a jury verdict being disregarded or set aside, the trial process being nullified, and the case having to be retried. In re Columbia Med. Ctr., 290 S.W.3d at 213. Generally, this requirement is satisfied when a trial court’s stated reason is “a reason for which a new trial is legally appropriate” and “is specific enough to indicate that the trial court did not simply parrot a pro forma template, but rather derived the articulated reasons from the particular facts and circumstances of the case at hand.” In re Bent, 487 S.W.3d at 173 (quoting In re United Scaffolding, Inc., 377 S.W.3d 685, 688–89 (Tex. 2012) (orig. proceeding)). The new trial order must show that it was granted “only after careful thought and for valid reasons.” In re Davenport, 522 S.W.3d at 456 (quoting In re United Scaffolding, Inc., 377 S.W.3d at 688). Granting a new trial “in the interests of justice and fairness” is not a sufficiently specific reason to grant a new trial, and such a generic rationale renders the new trial order facially invalid. In re Columbia Med. Ctr., 290 S.W.3d at 206, 213; see In re United Scaffolding, Inc., 377 S.W.3d at 689–90. Similarly, “the mere recitation of a legal standard, such as a statement that a finding is against the great weight and preponderance of the evidence, will not suffice.” In re United Scaffolding, Inc., 377 S.W.3d at 689. 6 We may also look past the face of the new trial order to perform a merits-based review of the validity of the trial court’s reasons for granting a new trial. In re Rudolph Auto., LLC, 674 S.W.3d at 300; In re Bent, 487 S.W.3d at 173. We do so because “[t]ransparency without accountability is meaningless.” In re Toyota Motor Sales, U.S.A., Inc., 407 S.W.3d 746, 758 (Tex. 2013) (orig. proceeding). The Supreme Court of Texas has further explained that “[i]t is simply impermissible for the district court, no matter how strongly it disagrees, to substitute its own judgment for the jury’s as a basis for a new trial.” In re Rudolph Auto., LLC, 674 S.W.3d at 307. IV. ABATEMENT We first address Pedraza’s motion to abate and remand this original proceeding to the trial court to allow it to “enter a clarified new[ ]trial order that states specific reasons” for granting the new trial. Esquivel asserts that abating this original proceeding for such a purpose is not authorized by the applicable law. We previously addressed the propriety of abatement to clarify an order granting a new trial. See In re Space Expl. Techs. Corp., 718 S.W.3d 293, 298–99 (Tex. App.— Corpus Christi–Edinburg 2024, orig. proceeding), subsequent mand. proceeding, 716 S.W.3d 576 (Tex. 2025). There, we questioned whether Texas Rule of Appellate Procedure 44.4 applied to original proceedings, and we considered the nature of the trial court’s responsibility to provide a reasonably specific explanation for granting a new trial. See id. We concluded that Rule 44.4, by its terms, applies to appeals rather than original proceedings. See id. at 298 (“On its face, Rule 44.4 applies to appeals rather than original proceedings.”). We further concluded that abatement, which is generally reserved to 7 address ministerial or perfunctory actions, was inappropriate to address the trial court’s significant exercise of discretion in determining why it should set aside a jury verdict and grant a new trial. See id. (collecting cases regarding limitations on abatement). We reach the same conclusion here. See id. Accordingly, we deny Pedraza’s motion for abatement of this original proceeding and all relief sought therein. V. ANALYSIS In one issue, Esquivel asserts that the trial court abused its discretion by granting a new trial because the new trial order is facially invalid and there is no valid merits-based reason supporting the trial court’s reasoning. We begin our analysis with the facial validity of the order. The Supreme Court of Texas has repeatedly instructed us that a trial court acts arbitrarily and abuses its discretion if it disregards a jury verdict and grants a new trial but does not specifically set out its reasons for doing so. See In re Rudolph Auto., LLC, 674 S.W.3d at 302; In re Davenport, 522 S.W.3d at 456–56; In re Bent, 487 S.W.3d at 173; In re Columbia Med. Ctr., 290 S.W.3d at 212–13. Here, the trial court’s order does not provide a rationale for granting a new trial. Further, the order’s reference to Pedraza’s motion for new trial and the applicable law does not supply the required rationale. See In re Lemus, No. 13-25-00120-CV, 2025 WL 1722401, at *5 (Tex. App.—Corpus Christi– Edinburg June 20, 2025, orig. proceeding) (mem. op.). Accordingly, the trial court abused its discretion by granting a new trial because its order doing so is facially invalid. See In re Rudolph Auto., LLC, 674 S.W.3d at 302; In re Davenport, 522 S.W.3d at 456–56; In re Bent, 487 S.W.3d at 173; In re Columbia Med. Ctr., 290 S.W.3d at 212–13. Esquivel has 8 established that she is entitled to mandamus relief directing the trial court to vacate its order. Esquivel also seeks a writ of mandamus directing the trial court to sign a judgment in accordance with the jury’s verdict. She asserts that the only ground Pedraza asserted in his motion for new trial was that the jury’s answers were irreconcilable, and she contends that merits-based reason is invalid. Esquivel thus contends that we should order the trial court to enter judgment in her favor based on the jury’s no-negligence finding. We disagree. See In Columbia Med. Ctr., 290 S.W.3d at 215 (directing the trial court to specify its reasons for granting a new trial but denying “without prejudice” relator’s request to instruct the trial court to vacate the new trial order and enter judgment on the verdict); In re Lemus, 2025 WL 1722401, at *6 (“In general, when appellate courts conclude that a new trial order is facially invalid, they do not proceed to address the merits of the order before allowing the trial court an opportunity to provide a sufficient explanation for its ruling.”); In re Foerster, No. 04-23-00920-CV, 2024 WL 1293964, at *2 (Tex. App.—San Antonio Mar. 27, 2024, orig. proceeding) (mem. op.) (rejecting the relator’s contention that judgment should be entered on the verdict because the relator “is not entitled to such relief”); In re Tex. Farm Bureau Mut. Ins., No 01-19-00742-CV, 2020 WL 573249, at *4 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] Feb. 6, 2020, orig. proceeding) (mem. op.) (“The remedy for a facially invalid order is a remand to the trial court, which then has the option to deny the motion for new trial or to sign an order that comports with Texas law.”). Under the circumstances presented here, where the new trial order fails to include any explanation for setting aside the jury’s verdict, we conclude that a review of the merits would be 9 premature. See In re Lemus, 2025 WL 1722401, at *6. Accordingly, to the extent that Esquivel requests merits review and seeks the rendition of judgment in her favor, we deny her petition for writ of mandamus without prejudice. VI. CONCLUSION The Court, having examined and fully considered the petition for writ of mandamus and the applicable law, is of the opinion that Esquivel has met her burden to obtain mandamus relief as stated herein. Accordingly, we lift the stay previously imposed in this case. See TEX. R. APP. P. 52.10(b). We conditionally grant the petition for writ of mandamus, in part, and we direct the trial court to vacate its order of May 29, 2026, and to proceed in accordance with this memorandum opinion. Our writ will issue only if the trial court fails to promptly comply. We deny the petition for writ of mandamus, in part, as to all other relief sought. JAIME TIJERINA Chief Justice Delivered and filed on the 18th day of August, 2026. 10