Full Opinion

NUMBER 13-26-00517-CV COURT OF APPEALS THIRTEENTH DISTRICT OF TEXAS CORPUS CHRISTI – EDINBURG IN RE LA JOYA INDEPENDENT SCHOOL DISTRICT ON PETITION FOR WRIT OF MANDAMUS MEMORANDUM OPINION Before Justices Peña, West, and Fonseca Memorandum Opinion by Justice Fonseca1 By petition for writ of mandamus, relator La Joya Independent School District (La Joya ISD) asserts that the trial court 2 abused its discretion by ordering the production of communications that are protected by the work-product doctrine and attorney-client privilege. We conditionally grant the petition for writ of mandamus. 1 See TEX. R. APP. P. 52.8(d) (“When denying relief, the court may hand down an opinion but is not required to do so. When granting relief, the court must hand down an opinion as in any other case.”); id. R. 47.4 (distinguishing opinions and memorandum opinions). 2 This original proceeding arises from trial court cause number C-4039-25-F in the 332nd District Court of Hidalgo County, Texas, and the respondent is the Honorable Juan R. Alvarez. See id. R. 52.2. I. BACKGROUND La Joya ISD employed real party in interest Cristina Flores as the Coordinator for Human Resources. La Joya ISD terminated her employment, and Flores filed an internal complaint of discrimination against La Joya ISD Superintendent Dr. Marcey Sorensen pursuant to La Joya ISD’s “DIA” policy. 3 La Joya ISD had previously retained the law firm of Trautmann & Garcia, Attorneys at Law, PLLC (Trautmann & Garcia) to assist in investigations undertaken in connection with its policies. Attorney Jaime Garcia investigated Flores’s claims, and after investigation concluded, he informed Flores that “the District did not find merit in the allegations raised.” Nevertheless, Flores filed suit against La Joya ISD for racial discrimination and retaliation. During the litigation, Flores propounded interrogatories, requests for production, and requests for admission to La Joya ISD. As relevant here, La Joya ISD objected to responding to certain discovery requests on grounds that the information and documents at issue were protected from disclosure by the attorney-client privilege and work-product doctrine. Flores filed a motion to compel La Joya ISD to respond to her discovery requests, and La Joya ISD filed a response thereto. In its response, La Joya ISD asserted that it engaged Garcia to investigate Flores’s internal employment complaint in “reasonable anticipation of litigation.” La Joya ISD argued that Garcia’s report and investigatory materials were not subject to disclosure based on attorney-client privilege and the work-product doctrine. La Joya ISD supported its response to the motion to compel with copies of: (1) Flores’s first set of interrogatories, 3 The parties do not define the acronym “DIA.” DIA is an alphabetic filing code used by the Texas Association of School Boards to refer to a policy regarding “Freedom from Discrimination, Harassment, and Retaliation.” See, e.g., TEX. SCH. FOR THE BLIND & HEARING IMPAIRED, D Policy Index: Personnel, https://www.tsbvi.edu/administration/policies/d-policy-index-personnel (last visited Aug. 17, 2026). 2 requests for production, and requests for admission; (2) La Joya’s second amended objections and answers to these requests; (3) La Joya ISD’s contract for legal services with Trautmann & Garcia, dated April 22, 2024, and signed on May 9, 2024; (4) Garcia’s letter to Flores informing her that the investigation was complete and La Joya ISD did not find her allegations meritorious; (5) a May 29, 2024 letter from Flores’s counsel to La Joya ISD notifying it of her claims and including a copy of her complaint; and (6) Garcia’s affidavit. After a hearing, the trial court granted Flores’s motion to compel. By order signed on June 30, 2026, the trial court ordered La Joya ISD to produce emails, texts, memoranda, and letters sent or received by Garcia to Sorensen or Jaime Miller 4 regarding Flores’s complaint under La Joya ISD’s DIA policy that Garcia investigated. The trial court’s order encompassed “any video or audio recordings made by [Garcia] in the scope of his investigation.” This original proceeding ensued. The Court sua sponte ordered the June 30, 2026 order to be stayed pending the resolution of this original proceeding. See TEX. R. APP. P. 52.10(b). The Court ordered Flores and any others whose interests might be affected by the relief sought to file a response to the petition for writ of mandamus. See id. R. 52.4, 52.8. Flores filed a response to the petition for writ of mandamus, and La Joya ISD filed a reply thereto. See id. R. 52.5. II. MANDAMUS Mandamus relief is an extraordinary remedy available only when (1) the trial court 4 The record reflects that Jaime Miller was La Joya ISD’s “Chief of Human Capital and Talent Development” and records custodian. 3 clearly abused its discretion, and (2) the party seeking relief lacks an adequate remedy on appeal. In re Ill. Nat’l Ins., 685 S.W.3d 826, 834 (Tex. 2024) (orig. proceeding); In re Liberty Cnty. Mut. Ins., 679 S.W.3d 170, 174 (Tex. 2023) (orig. proceeding) (per curiam). “A court abuses its discretion if no evidence supports the finding on which its ruling rests and if the court could reasonably have reached only a contrary conclusion.” In re AutoZoners, LLC, 694 S.W.3d 219, 223 (Tex. 2024) (orig. proceeding) (per curiam). We conduct a “benefits-and-detriments analysis” to determine if the relator possesses an adequate remedy at law. In re Auburn Creek Ltd. P’ship, 655 S.W.3d 837, 843 (Tex. 2022) (orig. proceeding) (per curiam); see In re Prudential Ins. Co. of Am., 148 S.W.3d 124, 136–37 (Tex. 2004) (orig. proceeding). III. DISCOVERY Under the Texas Rules of Civil Procedure, the scope of discovery extends to “any matter that is not privileged and is relevant to the subject matter of the pending action.” See In re National Lloyds Ins., 532 S.W.3d 794, 802–03 (Tex. 2017) (orig. proceeding) (quoting TEX. R. CIV. P. 192.3(a)). The scope of discovery is generally within the trial court’s discretion. In re UPS Ground Freight, Inc., 646 S.W.3d 828, 831 (Tex. 2022) (orig. proceeding) (per curiam); In re Cent. Or. Truck Co., 644 S.W.3d 668, 671 (Tex. 2022) (orig. proceeding) (per curiam). “Because the purpose of discovery is to enable courts to decide disputes based on what the facts reveal, not by what facts are concealed, the rules must be liberally construed to allow the litigants to obtain the fullest knowledge of the facts and issues prior to trial.” In re K & L Auto Crushers, LLC, 627 S.W.3d 239, 248 (Tex. 2021) (orig. proceeding) (citation modified). 4 Nevertheless, “[a] discovery order that compels production beyond the rules of procedure is an abuse of discretion for which mandamus is the proper remedy.” In re Kuraray Am., Inc., 656 S.W.3d 137, 142 (Tex. 2022) (orig. proceeding) (per curiam) (quoting In re Nat’l Lloyds Ins., 449 S.W.3d 486, 488 (Tex. 2014) (orig. proceeding) (per curiam)). As relevant here, when the trial court abuses its discretion by ordering the production of privileged information, the party claiming the privilege has no adequate appellate remedy and mandamus is appropriate. See, e.g., In re Silver, 540 S.W.3d 530, 538 (Tex. 2018) (orig. proceeding); In re Christus Santa Rosa Health Sys., 492 S.W.3d 276, 279 (Tex. 2016) (orig. proceeding). IV. ATTORNEY-CLIENT PRIVILEGE AND WORK-PRODUCT DOCTRINE “The attorney-client privilege . . . is ‘the oldest and most venerated of the common law privileges of confidential communications.’” Paxton v. City of Dallas, 509 S.W.3d 247, 259 (Tex. 2017) (quoting United States v. Edwards, 303 F.3d 606, 618 (5th Cir. 2002)). “The attorney-client privilege exists to facilitate free and open communication between attorneys and their clients.” Univ. of Tex. Sys. v. Franklin Ctr. for Gov’t & Pub. Integrity, 675 S.W.3d 273, 279 (Tex. 2023). The “privilege is intended to encourage clients to provide counsel with ‘full and frank’ disclosures so that the resulting legal advice is accurate and helpful, ‘thereby promot[ing] broader public interests in the observance of law and administration of justice.’” Id. at 280 (alteration in original) (quoting Upjohn Co. v. United States, 449 U.S. 383, 389 (1981)). “The privilege ‘applies with special force’ in the governmental context because ‘public officials are duty-bound to understand and respect constitutional, judicial and statutory limitations on their authority; thus, their access to 5 candid legal advice directly and significantly serves the public interest.’” Id. at 279 (quoting Paxton, 509 S.W.3d at 260). Texas Rule of Evidence 503 governs the attorney-client privilege and provides that: a “client has a privilege to refuse to disclose and to prevent any other person from disclosing confidential communications made for the purpose of facilitating the rendition of professional legal services to the client.” TEX. R. EVID. 503(b)(1). The privilege protects communication between the lawyer, the client, and their respective representatives. See id. “A communication is ‘confidential’ if not intended to be disclosed to third persons other than those: (A) to whom disclosure is made to further the rendition of professional legal services to the client; or (B) reasonably necessary to transmit the communication.” Id. R. 503(a)(5). “The primary purpose of the work[-]product rule is to shelter the mental processes, conclusions, and legal theories of the attorney, providing a privileged area within which the lawyer can analyze and prepare his or her case.” In re Nat’l Lloyds Ins., 532 S.W.3d at 803 (quoting Owens-Corning Fiberglas Corp. v. Caldwell, 818 S.W.2d 749, 750 (Tex. 1991) (orig. proceeding)). “The work[-]product privilege is broader than the attorney-client privilege because it includes all communications made in preparation for trial, including an attorney’s interviews with parties and non-party witnesses.” In re Bexar Cnty. Crim. Dist. Atty’s Off., 224 S.W.3d 182, 186 (Tex. 2007) (orig. proceeding) (footnote omitted). Texas Rule of Civil Procedure 192.5 governs the work-product doctrine. See TEX. R. CIV. P. 192.5. This rule explains that work product is defined as: (1) material prepared or mental impressions developed in anticipation of litigation or for trial by or for a party or a party’s representatives, including the party’s attorneys, consultants, sureties, indemnitors, insurers, employees, or agents; or 6 (2) a communication made in anticipation of litigation or for trial between a party and the party’s representatives or among a party’s representatives, including the party’s attorneys, consultants, sureties, indemnitors, insurers, employees, or agents. Id. at 192.5(a). Rule 192.5 provides that core work product, which is “the work[-]product of an attorney or an attorney’s representative that contains the attorney’s or the attorney’s representative’s mental impressions, opinions, conclusions, or legal theories,” is not subject to discovery. Id. R. 192.5(b)(1). In contrast, “other work[-]product is discoverable only upon a showing that the party seeking discovery has substantial need of the materials in the preparation of the party’s case and that the party is unable without undue hardship to obtain the substantial equivalent of the material by other means.” Id. R. 192.5(b)(2). Rule 192.5(c) explains that certain items, such as witness statements, do not constitute work-product that is protected from discovery. See id. R. 192.5(c)(1)–(5). “Pleading and producing evidence establishing the existence of a privilege is the burden of the party seeking to avoid discovery. The party asserting the privilege must establish by testimony or affidavit a prima facie case for the privilege.” In re Christus Santa Rosa Health Sys., 492 S.W.3d at 279 (quoting In re Mem’l Hermann Hosp. Sys., 464 S.W.3d 686, 698 (Tex. 2015) (orig. proceeding) (internal citations omitted)); see In re WHC, LLC, 570 S.W.3d 349, 353 (Tex. App.—El Paso 2018, orig. proceeding). Once the party claiming privilege presents a prima facie case that the documents are privileged, the burden shifts to the party seeking production to prove that an exception to the privilege applies. In re Christus Santa Rosa Health Sys., 492 S.W.3d at 279–80; In re Starr Indem. & Liab. Co., No. 12-24-00191-CV, 2024 WL 3858473, at *3 (Tex. App.—Tyler Aug. 15, 2024, orig. proceeding) (mem. op.); In re WHC, LLC, 570 S.W.3d at 353. 7 V. ANALYSIS La Joya ISD asserts that the trial court abused its discretion by compelling it to produce materials regarding the investigation of Flores’s complaint because those materials are protected by the attorney-client privilege and the work-product doctrine. Flores asserts that the trial court acted within its discretion because: (1) Garcia’s affidavit was conclusory; (2) Garcia was not acting as an attorney when he compiled the disputed materials; (3) Garcia failed to identify the parties he communicated with regarding the investigation; (4) the attorney-client privilege does not protect facts; there is no evidence that La Joya ISD anticipated litigation; and (5) Garcia did not compile the information in anticipation of litigation. A. Prima Facie Case Because La Joya ISD alleges that the documents at issue are privileged, we first consider whether La Joya ISD presented a prima facie case in support of this contention. See In re Christus Santa Rosa Health Sys., 492 S.W.3d at 279. To make a prima facie case, La Joya ISD was required to produce only the minimum quantum of evidence, in the form of testimony or affidavits, necessary to support a rational inference that the allegation of fact is true. See In re Nat’l Lloyds Ins., 532 S.W.3d at 804; In re Kona Coast Venture, Ltd., 730 S.W.3d 683, 699 (Tex. App.—Austin 2026, orig. proceeding [mand. denied]); In re Stoehr, No. 12-25-00197-CV, 2025 WL 2985035, at *2 (Tex. App.—Tyler Oct. 22, 2025, orig. proceeding) (mem. op.). Here, La Joya ISD provided Garcia’s affidavit in support of its claimed privilege. Garcia’s affidavit provides in relevant part: 8 2. I am an owner of the law firm of [Trautmann & Garcia] in Laredo, Texas. I have served as outside legal counsel for [La Joya ISD] on various legal matters. 3. On May 9, 2024, my firm entered into an agreement with La Joya ISD to provide legal services and representation with third-party investigations associated [with] Board Policy DIA complaints pursuant to District policies, procedures, and regulations for one year. The contract went into effect that day after the La Joya ISD Board of Managers voted to approve the agreement. The agreement specified that the State Bar of Texas investigates and prosecutes professional misconduct. Professional misconduct includes breaking of client confidentiality and inappropriate breaches of privilege. A true and correct copy of the engagement letter is attached. 4. On May 29, 2024, [Flores] filed a DIA complaint, in which she alleged claims of disparate impact discrimination and racial discrimination. The complaint was forwarded to my office so that I could investigate and provide legal services to La Joya ISD in response to the complaint. The complaint prompted the investigation that my firm was legally obligated to perform, in light of the contract and engagement letter that was approved by La Joya ISD and my firm on May 9, 2024. 5. Given the allegations of Flores’s complaint—and the fact that Flores’s complaint was filed on her behalf by her private attorney—I believed that there was a substantial chance that litigation would result from the complaint. In particular, based on my prior experience representing school districts, I believed it was likely that Flores would file a Charge against La Joya ISD with the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission, Texas Workforce Commission, or both. I also believed, after conclusion of that administrative matter, that Flores would file a lawsuit against La Joya ISD. I informed La Joya ISD of that belief. Through my investigation, La Joya ISD was operating under reasonable anticipation of litigation by Flores. 6. My investigation was subject to the work-product doctrine and to the attorney-client privilege, to ensure the opportunity for a robust and candid assessment of legal issues affecting La Joya ISD’s employment practices and Human Resources office. 7. On August 23, 2024, I submitted my investigation report to La Joya ISD Board of Managers President Julian Alvarez III. The report includes my findings of fact and legal analyses, which I created in my capacity as an attorney. The report is labeled as a confidential investigation report. 9 8. On August 26, 2024, I sent a letter to Flores and her attorney, stating that my investigation had concluded. I also stated that La Joya ISD did not find merit in Flores’s allegations raised. 9. My firm has treated the documents from this representation as privileged and confidential at all times. I am not aware of any public disclosures of my draft report, final investigation report, or of any materials related to my investigation to any person who is not a representative of La Joya ISD. I have discussed the investigation only with authorized La Joya ISD senior executives and trustees. Flores asserts that Garcia’s affidavit is conclusory and therefore fails to constitute evidence in support of La Joya’s claimed privilege. Flores’s assertion is based on the tenet that a party resisting discovery “must do more than ‘make conclusory allegations that the requested discovery is unduly burdensome.’” In re K & L Auto Crushers, 627 S.W.3d at 253 (quoting In re Alford Chevrolet-Geo, 997 S.W.2d 173, 181 (Tex. 1999) (orig. proceeding)). An affidavit is conclusory and constitutes no evidence of the assertions therein when it does not contain the underlying facts that support its conclusion and instead contains bare, baseless opinions. See Nw. Mut. Inv. Servs., LLC v. Fabik ex rel. Howley, No. 12-25-00136-CV, 2025 WL 3237398, at *3 (Tex. App.—Tyler Nov. 19, 2025, no pet.) (mem. op.); Mogged v. Lindamood, No. 02-18-00126-CV, 2020 WL 7074390, at *15 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth Dec. 3, 2020, pet. denied) (mem. op.). “An objection that an affidavit is conclusory is a defect of substance that may be raised for the first time in an original proceeding.” In re Regency IHS of Longview, LLC, No. 12-25- 00082-CV, 2025 WL 2180535, at *7 (Tex. App.—Tyler July 31, 2025, orig. proceeding) (mem. op.). Garcia’s affidavit, however, is based on his personal knowledge of the work that he performed in this case. The affidavit includes specific facts supporting his opinions and 10 provides a reasoned basis for those opinions. See Nw. Mut. Inv. Servs., LLC, 2025 WL 3237398, at *3; Mogged, 2020 WL 7074390, at *15. We conclude that Garcia’s affidavit is not conclusory, and we reject Flores’s contentions otherwise. Accordingly, we determine that, through Garcia’s affidavit, La Joya ISD has established a prima facie claim of privilege. See In re Nat’l Lloyds Ins., 532 S.W.3d at 804; In re Kona Coast Venture, Ltd., 730 S.W.3d at 699; In re Stoehr, 2025 WL 2985035, at *2. Therefore, we turn our attention to whether Flores has met her burden to prove that any exception to the claimed privileges applies in this case. See In re Christus Santa Rosa Health Sys., 492 S.W.3d at 280. B. Garcia’s Investigation Flores asserts that the discovery at issue is not protected by the attorney-client privilege or work-product doctrine because it was compiled by Garcia in his capacity as an investigator. “[T]he privilege does not apply if the attorney is acting in a capacity other than that of an attorney.” In re Tex. Farmers Ins. Exch., 990 S.W.2d 337, 340 (Tex. App.— Texarkana 1999, orig. proceeding [mand. denied]); see Harlandale Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Cornyn, 25 S.W.3d 328, 332 (Tex. App.—Austin 2000, pet. denied). In determining whether this exception applies, we examine whether the attorney’s investigation was related to the rendition of legal services and was performed for the purpose of providing legal advice. See Harlandale, 25 S.W.3d at 334–35. In doing so, we review the terms of the engagement agreement and the surrounding circumstances. See Univ. of Tex. Sys., 675 S.W.3d at 283–84 (determining whether an investigator acted as a lawyer’s representative for purposes of applying the attorney-client privilege). 11 We review the terms of the contract between La Joya ISD and Garcia’s law firm. The contract specifies that it “is a CONTRACT FOR LEGAL SERVICES.” The contract states that La Joya ISD “retains Law Firm to provide legal services and representation to District in connection with third-party investigations undertaken by Law Firm pursuant to District policies, procedures, and/or regulations.” Further, Garcia’s affidavit provided that he “investigate[d] and provide[d] legal services” to La Joya ISD in response to Flores’s complaint. Based on these facts and circumstances, we determine that Garcia’s investigation was related to the rendition of his legal services and was performed for the purpose of providing legal advice to La Joya. See Univ. of Tex. Sys., 675 S.W.3d at 283– 84; Harlandale, 25 S.W.3d at 334–35. We disagree with Flores’s assertions otherwise. C. Scope of Communication Flores asserts that La Joya ISD cannot claim that the disputed materials are protected by attorney-client privilege or the work-product doctrine because Garcia failed to identify the individuals that he communicated with, along with their authority within La Joya ISD. Flores speculates that “if information was disclosed to [Flores], any privilege would be lost.” However, Garcia provided testimony that his “firm has treated the documents from this representation as privileged and confidential at all times,” and he has “discussed the investigation only with authorized La Joya ISD senior executives and trustees.” “Rule 503(b) protects not only confidential communications between the lawyer and client, but also the discourse among their representatives.” In re XL Specialty Ins., 373 S.W.3d 46, 49-50 (Tex. 2012) (orig. proceeding); see In re Textron, Inc., No. 09-25- 00240-CV, 2025 WL 3293884, at *7 (Tex. App.—Beaumont Nov. 26, 2025, orig. proceeding) (per curiam) (mem. op.). We conclude that the record does not indicate any 12 waiver of the attorney-client privilege or work-product doctrine by virtue of disclosure to unauthorized persons. Accordingly, we reject Flores’s speculative argument otherwise. Flores also asserts that the attorney-client privilege “does not protect facts, and facts cannot be protected by reporting them to an attorney.” This is incorrect. “Rule 503 does not exempt privileged communications that contain ‘factual statements’ about the underlying case from the category of privileged attorney-client communications.” In re Kona Coast Venture, Ltd., 730 S.W.3d at 703 (discussing TEX. R. EVID. 503); see Huie v. DeShazo, 922 S.W.2d 920, 923 (Tex. 1996) (orig. proceeding) (stating that “the privilege extends to the entire communication, including facts contained therein,” however, “a person cannot cloak a material fact with the privilege merely by communicating it to an attorney”). This is so because “[i]t is inconceivable that an attorney could give sound legal advice on a client’s case if he or she did not include an application of the law or opinion to the specific facts of that case.” In re ExxonMobil Corp., 97 S.W.3d 353, 357 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 2003, orig. proceeding) (quoting Pittsburgh Corning Corp. v. Caldwell, 861 S.W.2d 423, 425 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 1993, orig. proceeding)). Thus, while “the relevant facts of a case may not be hidden under the guise of privilege,” “those facts are discoverable through other proper means of discovery, without forcing the production of a privileged document which may also contain that factual information.” Pittsburgh Corning Corp., 861 S.W.2d at 425. We conclude that Flores’s argument here is misplaced. D. Anticipation of Litigation Flores asserts that Garcia did not compile the information in anticipation of litigation but rather prepared the materials “for a DIA investigation, which occurred in the ordinary 13 course of business and pursuant to public requirements.” Citing Enron Corp. Savings Plan v. Hewitt Associates, L.L.C., 258 F.R.D. 149, 162 (S.D. Tex. 2009), Flores asserts that the work-product doctrine does not protect materials created in the ordinary course of business or pursuant to public requirements that are not related to litigation. The Supreme Court of Texas has explained that an investigation is conducted in anticipation of litigation if it meets a two-pronged test. Nat’l Tank Co. v. Brotherton, 851 S.W.2d 193, 203 (Tex. 1993) (orig. proceeding) (modifying the test as articulated in Flores v. Fourth Ct. of Apps., 777 S.W.2d 38, 40–41 (Tex.1989) (orig. proceeding)). Specifically, an investigation is conducted in anticipation of litigation if (1) “a reasonable person would have concluded from the totality of the circumstances surrounding the investigation that there was a substantial chance that litigation would ensue” (the objective prong); and (2) “the party resisting discovery believed in good faith that there was a substantial chance that litigation would ensue and conducted the investigation for the purpose of preparing for such litigation” (the subjective prong). Id. at 207. A “substantial chance of litigation” does not “refer to any particular statistical probability that litigation will occur” but “simply means that litigation is ‘more than merely an abstract possibility or unwarranted fear.’” Id. at 204. “Although the subjective prong requires the investigation to be conducted for the purpose of preparing for litigation, Rule 192.5 does not require that the sole or primary purpose of the material or communication be for preparing for litigation.” In re Triple C Project Servs., LLC, No. 01-26-00594-CV, 2026 WL 2339560, at *3 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] Aug. 13, 2026, orig. proceeding) (mem. op.) (discussing TEX. R. CIV. P. 192.5); see In re Mid-Century Ins., 549 S.W.3d 730, 734 (Tex. App.—Waco 2017, orig. proceeding). 14 Here, Garcia testified by affidavit that: Flores filed a DIA complaint on May 29, 2024, alleging claims of disparate impact discrimination and racial discrimination; Garcia was provided with Flores’s complaint so that he “could investigate and provide legal services to La Joya ISD in response to the complaint”; and Garcia believed that there was a substantial chance that litigation would result from the complaint “[g]iven the allegations of Flores’s complaint—and the fact that Flores’s complaint was filed on her behalf by her private attorney.” Garcia specifically stated that “[i]n particular, based on [his] prior experience representing school districts, [he] believed it was likely that Flores would file a [c]harge against La Joya ISD with the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission, Texas Workforce Commission, or both,” and that he “also believed, after conclusion of that administrative matter, that Flores would file a lawsuit against La Joya ISD.” While the record indicates that the materials at issue were generated “pursuant to District policies, procedures, and regulations,” the record also reflects that the investigation was performed “to provide legal services and representation” to La Joya ISD. See In re Triple C Project Servs., LLC, 2026 WL 2339560, at *3; In re Mid-Century Ins., 549 S.W.3d at 734. We determine that a reasonable person would have concluded from the totality of the circumstances surrounding the investigation that there was a substantial chance that litigation would ensue. See Nat’l Tank Co., 851 S.W.2d at 207. We further conclude that the record shows that La Joya ISD believed in good faith that there was a substantial chance that litigation would ensue and conducted the investigation for the purpose of preparing for such litigation. See id. Finally, Flores asserts that the applicable law requires the party itself to anticipate litigation, as opposed to its counsel, and here there is no evidence that La Joya ISD 15 anticipated litigation. In determining whether communications were made in anticipation of litigation for purposes of applying the work-product privilege, “the inquiry is not whether counsel possessed a good faith belief that litigation would ensue but rather whether the party invoking the privilege possessed a good faith belief.” In re Bonding, 522 S.W.3d 75, 87 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 2017, orig. proceeding). In this case, the record lacks testimony from a representative of La Joya ISD regarding the anticipation of litigation. However, Garcia’s affidavit stated that he informed La Joya ISD of his belief that litigation was forthcoming, and that “[t]hrough [his] investigation, La Joya ISD was operating under reasonable anticipation of litigation by Flores.” The record fails to indicate that Flores objected to this statement. Accordingly, while the record is not as robust as it could be regarding La Joya ISD’s anticipation of litigation, we conclude that the record nevertheless supports the application of the work-product doctrine. E. Summary La Joya ISD presented unrebutted prima facie evidence supporting its claim of privilege, and Flores failed to meet her burden to show that any exception applied. See In re Christus Santa Rosa Health Sys., 492 S.W.3d at 279. Thus, the trial court abused its discretion by ordering the production of the materials at issue. See id. Further, La Joya ISD lacks an adequate remedy by appeal to address this error. See In re Silver, 540 S.W.3d at 538; In re Christus Santa Rosa Health Sys., 492 S.W.3d 2at 279. Accordingly, we sustain the sole issue that La Joya ISD presented in this original proceeding. VI. CONCLUSION The Court, having examined and fully considered the petition for writ of mandamus, the response filed by Flores, La Joya ISD’s reply, and the applicable law, is of the opinion 16 that La Joya ISD has met its burden to obtain relief. Accordingly, we lift the stay previously imposed in this case. See TEX. R. APP. P. 52.10(b). We conditionally grant the petition for writ of mandamus, and we direct the trial court to vacate its June 30, 2026 order and to proceed in accordance with this memorandum opinion. Our writ will issue only if the trial court fails to promptly comply. YSMAEL D. FONSECA Justice Delivered and filed on the 20th day of August, 2026. 17