Full Opinion

Opinion issued October 9, 2026 In The Court of Appeals For The First District of Texas ———————————— NOS. 01-24-00806-CV 01-25-00823-CV ——————————— FITZ JACKSON, Appellant V. COURTNEY E. JAMES, Appellee On Appeal from Probate Court No. 2 Harris County, Texas Trial Court Case Nos. 486625 and 486625-401 MEMORANDUM OPINION Appellant Fitz Jackson, pro se, challenges three orders arising from probate proceedings concerning the Estate of Vera Mae James (Jackson’s longtime partner).1 1 Jackson represented himself in the probate court and continues to do so on appeal. Consistent with our Supreme Court’s precedent, we hold him to the same rules as First, Jackson challenges the probate court’s 2024 order that dismissed his motion for declaratory judgment with prejudice and awarded Appellee Courtney E. James (Vera’s daughter) $10,625.23 in attorney’s fees. Second, he challenges a 2025 order admitting a copy of Vera’s February 15, 2010 will to probate, denying admission of competing testamentary instruments, appointing Courtney Independent Executor, and authorizing the issuance of Letters Testamentary. Finally, he challenges a 2026 order that dismissed Jackson’s remaining claims, confirmed previous attorney’s-fee awards, rendered judgment on conditional appellate fees, and awarded Courtney an additional $10,000 in attorney’s fees. On appeal, Jackson raises numerous arguments. None supports reversal.2 all other litigants but construe his appellate briefing with liberality and patience. See Goldstein v. Sabatino, 690 S.W.3d 287, 295 (Tex. 2024). 2 We have jurisdiction over the challenged orders. See TEX. ESTATES CODE § 32.001(c); Estate of Wheatfall, 729 S.W.3d 788, 790–92 (Tex. 2026). The 2024 order disposed of the entire declaratory-judgment action by dismissing Jackson’s claims with prejudice. The 2025 order completed the will-admission phase by admitting the copy of the 2010 will, denying admission of the competing wills, appointing Courtney Independent Executor, and authorizing Letters Testamentary. See, e.g., In re Estate of Coleman, 360 S.W.3d 606, 610 (Tex. App.—El Paso 2011, no pet.); In re Hudson, 325 S.W.3d 811, 811 (Tex. App.—Dallas 2010, orig. proceeding). Finally, the 2026 order dismissed Jackson’s remaining motions and claims. 2 BACKGROUND A. Initial probate proceedings and temporary administration. Vera died in May 2020. The record reflects three purported wills from Vera, dated May 28, 1996, February 15, 2010, and October 18, 2017. In July 2020, Courtney filed an application to probate the 1996 will and opposing admission of the 2017 will. She asserted that Vera had suffered from Alzheimer’s disease and dementia beginning in approximately 2015 and lacked testamentary capacity to execute the 2017 instrument. Jackson answered and requested admission of the 2017 will and denial of the 1996 will. In October 2020, the probate court appointed Courtney temporary administratrix pending resolution of the will contest. Relevant to this appeal, the appointment order authorized Courtney to: • contact all heirs or beneficiaries of Decedent regarding this Temporary Administration; • request and receive all communications and records relevant to Decedent’s condition before her death from each physician, hospital, medical facility custodian of records or other person in possession of the communications or records, and • enter and take possession of the home of Decedent to have access to all of Decedent’s assets for the purpose of inventory. B. The 2020 mediated settlement agreement and 2022 judgment. Courtney and Jackson participated in mediation on December 28, 2020 and executed a settlement agreement. Under that agreement, the estate agreed to pay 3 Jackson $22,865.92. In exchange, Jackson agreed to: (1) release all claims against the estate, (2) nonsuit his action against the estate with prejudice, and (3) refrain from accessing accounts formerly owned by Vera and subject to the estate. The agreement contained a broad release of claims arising from or relating to the probate proceeding. Jackson later filed several motions seeking to set aside or invalidate the settlement. In August 2022, following a hearing concerning the settlement’s validity, the probate court signed a judgment enforcing the agreement and denying Jackson’s motions. The judgment awarded Courtney $27,697.77 in attorney’s fees, $625.23 in costs, and conditional attorney’s fees of $5,000 for each unsuccessful appeal. Jackson did not file a timely notice of appeal for a direct appeal of that decision. He instead attempted to appeal that August 2022 judgment through a restricted appeal. See TEX. R. APP. P. 26.1(c). But a prior panel of our Court dismissed Jackson’s attempted restricted appeal for lack of jurisdiction because he did not satisfy the requirements for a restricted appeal. Jackson v. James, No. 01-22- 00922-CV, 2023 WL 2977748 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] Apr. 18, 2023, pet. denied). Jackson petitioned for review in the Texas Supreme Court, but the Court denied Jackson’s petition. 4 C. Jackson’s declaratory judgment action and probate court’s October 2024 Order. In early 2024, Jackson filed an original petition and motion for declaratory judgment, asserting that Courtney committed probate fraud, that the 2020 settlement agreement should be declared void, and that the 2022 judgment should be set aside.3 In May 2024, Courtney filed a motion for Jackson to provide security for costs under Texas Estates Code Section 53.052 before being allowed to participate further.4 On May 29, 2024, the probate court granted the motion and ordered Jackson to pay $50,000 security or post a surety bond. Shortly after, Jackson attempted to 3 Those pleadings were placed in ancillary cause number 486625-401, which the clerk’s record identifies as a declaratory-judgment proceeding ancillary to the original probate cause. 4 Texas Estates Code Section 53.052 provides as follows: (a) The clerk may require a person who files an application, complaint, or opposition relating to an estate, other than the personal representative of the estate, to provide security for the probable costs of the proceeding before filing the application, complaint, or opposition. (b) At any time before the trial of an application, complaint, or opposition described by Subsection (a), anyone interested in the estate or an officer of the court may, by written motion, obtain from the court an order requiring the person who filed the application, complaint, or opposition to provide security for the probable costs of the proceeding. The rules governing civil suits in the county court with respect to giving security for the probable costs of a proceeding control in cases described by Subsection (a) and this subsection. (c) An executor or administrator appointed by a court of this state may not be required to provide security for costs in an action brought by the executor or administrator in the executor's or administrator's fiduciary capacity. TEX. ESTATES CODE § 53.052. 5 file a bond for that amount, but the court did not approve the bond, and it was left unsigned.5 In July 2024, Courtney moved to dismiss on two bases: (1) for failure to give security, and (2) for lack of jurisdiction. She argued that Jackson’s claims presented no justiciable controversy and that his claims arose from matters already resolved by the 2022 judgment enforcing the settlement agreement and the unsuccessful appeals to this Court and the Texas Supreme Court. In September 2024, the probate court held a hearing on the motion, in which Jackson appeared remotely. On October 10, 2024, the probate court signed an order granting Courtney’s motion and dismissing Jackson’s claims with prejudice for failure to give security and for lack of jurisdiction (2024 Order). The court awarded Courtney $10,625.23 in attorney’s fees. Jackson filed a notice of appeal. D. The probate court’s September 2025 and January 2026 Orders. Litigation continued in the original probate cause. On August 14, 2025, Courtney filed a fourth amended application to probate a copy of Vera’s 2010 will. Courtney alleged that the 2010 will was self-proven, that its original could not be 5 Travelers Casualty and Surety Company of America issued a $50,000 bond for Jackson as “Principal,” which was “conditioned that the above bound Principal or Principals, appointed as Administrator of Vera Mae James, shall well and truly perform all duties required of the Principal or Principals by law under that appointment.” (Emphasis added.) Notably, Jackson was not appointed as administrator of the estate. 6 located despite reasonable diligence, and that she first learned of the instrument when Jackson filed it in December 2020. Jackson filed several objections to Courtney’s application and several motions requesting admission of the 2017 will. In September 2025, Courtney moved to dismiss Jackson’s remaining claims for failure to post security and to sanction Jackson as a vexatious litigant. September 2025 Order. On September 30, 2025, the probate court signed an Order Admitting Will Not Produced in Court to Probate and Authorizing Letters Testamentary (September 2025 Order). The Order expressly admitted a copy of the 2010 will, finding the original will could not be “located at this time, despite the exercise of reasonable diligence,” and that the will “was not revoked by Decedent.” The Order also expressly denied probate of the 1996 and 2017 instruments. It appointed Courtney as the Independent Executor and issued her Letters Testamentary. January 2026 Order. After a hearing, the probate court also granted Countney’s 2025 motion to dismiss; it dismissed Jackson’s claims with prejudice. The probate court memorialized its dismissal in a signed order dated January 6, 2026 (January 2026 Order). The order additionally: • “confirmed” the $27,697.77 in attorney’s fees and $625.23 in costs awarded in the August 2022 judgment; • “confirmed” the $10,625.23 in attorney’s fees awarded in the 2024 Order; 7 • rendered “judgment of $15,000 for appellate attorney’s fees” based on three unsuccessful appeals; and • awarded Courtney an additional $10,000 in attorney’s fees incurred in connection with the 2025 dismissal motion. Jackson appeals those September 2025 and January 2026 Orders. DISCUSSION On appeal, Jackson raises arguments about the 2024 Order, as well as the September 2025 and January 2026 Orders. We address them in turn. A. Jackson’s arguments concerning the 2024 Order do not support reversal. Jackson raises three issues concerning the 2024 Order. He argues that the probate court: (1) improperly rejected his attempted security bond, (2) denied him due process by proceeding with the September 2024 hearing despite his medical condition, and (3) improperly awarded attorney’s fees in violation of the “American Rule.” None of these arguments supports reversal. 1. Jackson does not challenge each independent ground supporting the probate court’s 2024 Order. As explained, Courtney’s 2024 motion to dismiss asserted two grounds for dismissal. In addition to arguing that Jackson failed to provide the required security, Courtney argued that the probate court lacked jurisdiction over Jackson’s claims because they presented no justiciable controversy and arose from the same facts and issues resolved by the August 2022 judgment (enforcing the mediated settlement agreement) and subsequent unsuccessful appeals. 8 The 2024 Order granted dismissal on two stated grounds: (1) for failure to provide security for costs, and (2) for lack of jurisdiction. Under Texas law, when an appealed ruling rests on multiple independent grounds, “an appellant must attack all independent bases or grounds that fully support a complained-of ruling or judgment.” Britton v. Tex. Dep’t of Criminal Justice, 95 S.W.3d 676, 681 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 2002, no pet.); accord Wood v. Wiggins, 650 S.W.3d 533, 554 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 2021, pet. denied); City of Houston v. Henderson, 731 S.W.3d 667, 672 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 2026, no pet.). If an appellant fails to challenge each independent ground, “we must affirm the ruling or judgment.” Britton, 95 S.W.3d at 681. Here, even construing Jackson’s arguments liberally, Jackson challenges only the probate court’s determination that he failed to provide the required security for costs. Jackson does not challenge the court’s separate, stated ground that it lacked jurisdiction over his claims. He does not present any argument or authority explaining why that ground cannot support the probate court’s dismissal. Because Jackson has not challenged each independent ground that fully supports the 2024 Order, under Texas law, we affirm the ruling without addressing the merits of his challenge to the security-for-costs ground. See Britton, 95 S.W.3d at 681; Wood, 650 S.W.3d at 554; Henderson, 731 S.W.3d at 672. 9 2. Jackson did not preserve his complaint about the September 2024 hearing. Jackson next argues that the probate court violated his due process rights by proceeding with the September 2024 hearing after he disclosed during the hearing that he was experiencing pain and could not think clearly. “Due process at a minimum requires notice and an opportunity to be heard at a meaningful time and in a meaningful manner.” Univ. of Tex. Med. Sch. at Houston v. Than, 901 S.W.2d 926, 930 (Tex. 1995). Here, the record establishes that Jackson received notice of the hearing, requested and obtained permission to appear remotely, and appeared by videoconference. His complaint is not that he lacked notice or was excluded but that his physical condition prevented him from participating fully and that the probate court erred by failing to postpone the hearing because of his condition. But that sort of complaint must be preserved by a timely request to the trial court (for a continuance or other relief) and a ruling on that request. See In re H.D.D.B., No. 01-20-00723-CV, 2022 WL 2251655, at *10–12 (Tex. App.— Houston [1st Dist.] June 23, 2022, no pet.) (collecting cases). For instance, in H.D.D.B., an incarcerated father asserted on appeal that his COVID-19 infection prevented him from attending a parental-rights termination hearing by videoconference. Id. This Court held that he failed to preserve the complaint because the record did not show that he requested a continuance, orally or in writing, 10 informed the trial court that illness prevented his attendance, or obtained a ruling on a request to postpone the hearing. Id. at *11–12 (“These things were required to preserve error, if any, for appellate review.”). The Court further explained that a pro se litigant must comply with the same preservation requirements as a represented party. Id.; see also Wheeler v. Green, 157 S.W.3d 439, 444 (Tex. 2005) (“[P]ro se litigants are not exempt from the rules of procedure.”). Here, during the hearing, Jackson stated he was in pain, could not think clearly, and could not present a defense. The probate court acknowledged his condition. But Jackson did not ask the court to continue or recess the hearing. He did not ask the court to reschedule the hearing, permit him to file a later written response, or defer its ruling.6 Nor did he object when the court proceeded or obtain a ruling on a request for additional time. Jackson’s statements described his condition but did not identify any relief he wanted the court to grant. Because Jackson did not present a request for relief and obtain a ruling, he did not preserve a complaint that the probate court should have postponed the hearing. See TEX. R. APP. P. 33.1(a); H.D.D.B., 2022 WL 2251655, at *11–12. 6 In his appellate brief, Jackson states he had lumbar-fusion surgery performed in April 2025. But that was approximately six months after the September 2024 hearing at issue, and it was not before the probate court. 11 3. The probate court did not abuse its discretion in awarding attorney’s fees in the 2024 Order. Jackson next argues that the probate court’s award of attorney’s fees in its 2024 Order violated the American Rule, which says generally that each party bears their own attorney’s fees. Not so. Under the American Rule, a party may not recover attorney’s fees unless authorized by statute or contract. Tony Gullo Motors I, L.P. v. Chapa, 212 S.W.3d 299, 310–11 (Tex. 2006); see also Allstate Ins. Co. v. Irwin, 627 S.W.3d 263, 271 (Tex. 2021) (“Texas courts have long required parties to bear their own attorney’s fees under the American Rule by ‘prohibiting fee awards unless specifically provided by contract or statute.’” (quoting source omitted)). Here, Jackson initiated the relevant proceeding as a declaratory judgment action. The Uniform Declaratory Judgments Act authorizes a trial court to “award costs and reasonable and necessary attorney’s fees as are equitable and just.” TEX. CIV. PRAC. & REM. CODE § 37.009; see also Allstate, 627 S.W.3d at 271 (“attorney’s fees may be available” under the UDJA). An award under Section 37.009 is committed to the trial court’s discretion and is not limited to the party who filed the declaratory judgment action. See Allstate, 627 S.W.3d at 270–71; Chappell Hill Bank v. Smith, 257 S.W.3d 320, 331 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 2008, no pet.) (trial court did not abuse discretion in awarding attorney’s fees to defendant 12 and noting “[c]ontrary to the bank’s argument, [Section 37.009] supports an award to either side in a declaratory-judgment action”). Additionally, Courtney’s 2024 motion to dismiss (which the 2024 Order granted) invoked Texas Rule of Civil Procedure 91a, which permits the trial court to “award the prevailing party on the motion all costs and reasonable and necessary attorney fees incurred with respect to the challenged cause of action in the trial court.” TEX. R. CIV. P. 91a.7; see also Fiamma Statler, LP v. Challis, No. 02-18- 00374-CV, 2020 WL 6334470, at *14, *16–18 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth Oct. 29, 2020, pet. denied) (explaining that Rule 91a.7 authorizes reasonable and necessary attorney’s fees incurred with respect to the challenged causes of action and requires the trial court to base the award on evidence). Jackson does not argue on appeal that the fee award lacked evidentiary support, that the fees were not awarded consistently with Rule 91a or the Uniform Declaratory Judgments Act, or that the award was not equitable and just. He argues only that the American Rule prohibited an award of fees. Because Section 37.009 and Rule 91a.7 authorize an attorney’s fee award, Jackson has not demonstrated an abuse of discretion on the ground he presents. We affirm the 2024 Order. 13 B. Jackson’s arguments concerning the September 2025 and January 2026 Orders likewise do not support reversal. In his appeal of the September 2025 and January 2026 Orders, Jackson argues: (1) the probate court abused its discretion in confirming the December 2020 mediated settlement agreement; (2) the probate court erred in granting Courtney’s 2025 motion to dismiss because, as temporary administrator, litigation was outside the scope of her temporary appointment duties such that her motion to dismiss and the order granting the motion to dismiss were void; and (3) the probate court admitted a revoked will and failed to hear conflicting applications as required by statute. None of these arguments support reversal. 1. Jackson may not use this appeal to challenge the December 2020 settlement agreement and August 2022 judgment enforcing it. Jackson’s principal argument in challenging the 2025 and 2026 Orders is that the December 2020 mediated settlement agreement and the August 2022 judgment enforcing it are void. But this appeal is from orders signed in September 2025 and January 2026, not from the August 2022 judgment. The August 2022 judgment was a final, appealable order because it conclusively resolved a discrete phase of the probate proceeding. See TEX. ESTATES CODE § 32.001(c) (“A final order issued by a probate court is appealable to the court of appeals.”); Estate of Wheatfall, 729 S.W.3d 788, 790–92 (Tex. 2026) (explaining 14 that in probate proceedings, “multiple judgments final for purposes of appeal can be rendered on certain discrete issues” and that a probate order is final if it “actually disposes of every party and issue in a particular phase of the proceedings” or clearly and unequivocally states that it does so (quoting source omitted)). The 2020 settlement agreement required the estate to pay Jackson in exchange for his release and dismissal with prejudice of his claims against the estate. After signing the agreement, Jackson challenged the agreement’s validity, and the probate court was presented (at issue in the 2022 judgment) with the question of whether the settlement bound the parties and disposed of Jackson’s claims. After a hearing, the probate court issued its August 2022 judgment determining that the agreement was valid and enforceable. In so holding, the court denied Jackson’s motions to set it aside, disposed of his settlement-related claims, and awarded attorney’s fees and costs. The judgment was decisive on the issues concerning the validity and enforceability of the settlement agreement and Jackson’s claims against the estate. See, e.g., Metro. Cas. Ins. Co. v. Foster, 226 S.W.3d 597, 600–01 (Tex. App.— Houston [1st Dist.] 2007, no pet.) (explaining “the probate court’s April 11, 2005 order approving the settlement was final” because order “was decisive on the issues of whether [appellee] had relinquished all claims against [appellant] and how much [appellant] would pay in return”). Accordingly, the August 2022 judgment was final and separately appealable. 15 As such, Jackson had 30 days after the August 2022 judgment was signed to file a notice of appeal, or 90 days if he timely filed certain post-judgment motions. See TEX. R. APP. P. 26.1(a). Jackson did not file an ordinary appeal within the applicable deadline. Instead, he sought to file another form of appeal available only in limited circumstances,7 but this Court dismissed that appeal for lack of jurisdiction because he did not satisfy the requirements for that type of appeal. See Jackson, 2023 WL 2977748, at *1–2. Our Court’s dismissal of that appeal did not extend or revive the deadline for an ordinary appeal from the August 2022 judgment, which remained final and unreversed. Jackson now seeks to use this appeal of the September 2025 and January 2026 Orders to obtain review of the merits of the August 2022 judgment. That is an untimely direct attack. See PNS Stores, Inc. v. Rivera, 379 S.W.3d 267, 271 (Tex. 2012). A direct attack on a judgment, such as an appeal, must be brought within the prescribed period after the challenged judgment is signed, “even when [appellants] argue a judgment is void.” Cortez v. Pharia, L.L.C., No. 01-24-00047-CV, 2025 WL 3481003, at *3–5 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] Dec. 4, 2025, no pet.); see also Tex. Dep’t of Pub. Safety v. Tran, 672 S.W.3d 806, 813 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th 7 Jackson attempted a restricted appeal. See TEX. R. APP. P. 26.1(c). A restricted appeal must be filed within six months after the judgment is signed and is available only to a party who neither participated in the hearing resulting in the judgment nor timely filed a post-judgment motion or request for findings of fact and conclusions of law. See id.; Ex parte E.H., 602 S.W.3d 486, 495 (Tex. 2020). 16 Dist.] 2023, no pet.) (“Texas courts have held that an appellate court in an untimely direct appeal may not adjudicate a party’s arguments as to why a judgment or order is void.” (collecting cases)). An appeal from a later order does not restart the appellate timetable or permit review of an earlier final judgment after the deadline to appeal that judgment has expired. See, e.g., In re B.K.M. & J.J.M.S., No. 08-25- 00133-CV, 2026 WL 2359368, at *8 (Tex. App.—El Paso Aug. 13, 2026, no pet. h.) (“Daniel’s timely appeal of the final modification judgment does not revive his deadline to appeal earlier final orders.”). Nor may Jackson avoid the appellate deadline by recasting his challenge as a collateral attack. A collateral attack ordinarily must be brought in a separate proceeding; a challenge pursued in the same case in which the judgment was rendered remains a direct attack. See Cortez, 2025 WL 3481003, at *5; In re Thompson, 569 S.W.3d 169, 172, 175 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 2018, orig. proceeding); see also Royal Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Ragsdale, 273 S.W.3d 759, 766 n.7 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 2008, no pet.) (“An appellant cannot collaterally attack, in the same proceeding, an order that it failed to timely appeal.”). Thus, Jackson cannot use this appeal in the same probate proceeding to challenge the August 2022 judgment, whether he labels his challenge as direct or collateral. Jackson may not use this appeal from the September 2025 and January 2026 Orders to obtain review of the August 2022 judgment. 17 2. Jackson offers no basis to reverse as to his contention that Courtney lacked authority to file her 2025 motion to dismiss. Jackson next argues that Courtney lacked authority under Texas Estates Code Section 452.101 to file and prosecute her 2025 motion to dismiss (that the probate court granted in the January 2026 Order) because the original order appointing her temporary administrator did not expressly authorize litigation. He therefore contends that the January 2026 Order is void. We disagree. Section 452.101 provides that “[a] temporary administrator may exercise only the rights and powers: (1) specifically expressed in the court’s order appointing the temporary administrator; or (2) expressed in the court’s subsequent orders.” TEX. ESTATES CODE § 452.101(a). “An act performed by a temporary administrator is void unless expressly authorized by the court’s orders.” Id. § 452.101(b). Jackson’s argument treats Courtney’s appointment as temporary administrator as her only basis for participating in the proceeding. It was not. Courtney was also an heir, devisee, probate applicant, and party opposing Jackson’s competing application and claims for affirmative relief. As such, Courtney was an “interested person” under the Estates Code. See id. § 22.018(1) (defining “interested person,” in part, as “an heir, devisee, spouse, creditor, or any other having a property right in or claim against an estate being administered”). And an interested person may participate in a probate proceeding in an individual capacity even when that person lacks the same authority in a representative capacity. See Ferreira v. Butler, 18 575 S.W.3d 331, 334–35, 338 (Tex. 2019) (first wife, in her individual capacity as testator’s devisee, was interested party with capacity to seek probate of second wife’s will even though she lacked such authority in her representative capacity). Courtney filed the 2025 motion to dismiss for failure to provide security for costs pursuant to Texas Estates Code Section 53.052 and Texas Rule of Civil Procedure 143. Section 53.052 expressly permits “anyone interested in the estate” to “obtain from the court an order requiring the person who filed the application, complaint, or opposition to provide security for the probable costs of the proceeding.” TEX. ESTATES CODE § 53.052(b). Rule 143 similarly permits the court to require security “upon motion of any party” and provides that, if the party seeking affirmative relief fails to comply within twenty days after notice, the affirmative claim “shall be dismissed.” TEX. R. CIV. P. 143. Courtney qualified as an interested person and a party. She therefore did not need authority as temporary administrator to invoke the security-for-costs procedure or to request the dismissal required by Rule 143 after Jackson failed to comply. See Ferreira, 575 S.W.3d at 334–35, 338; Estate of Daniels, 575 S.W.3d 841, 843, 848 (Tex. App.—Texarkana 2019, pet. denied) (heirs were “interested persons” with standing to pursue their applications, objections, and other motions, even after accepting estate property); see also Clanton v. Clark, 639 S.W.2d 929, 929–30 (Tex. 19 1982) (affirming dismissal of will contest for failure to timely post security for costs under Rule 143 in favor of temporary administrator of estate). Accordingly, Jackson has not shown that Section 452.101 deprived Courtney of authority to file the 2025 motion to dismiss or rendered the January 2026 Order void. 3. Jackson has not demonstrated error in the probate court’s disposition of the competing wills. Finally, Jackson contends that the probate court erred by admitting a copy of the 2010 will and failing to consider his competing application to probate the 2017 instrument. The record does not support his contentions. When competing applications seek probate of different wills, the probate court must hear the applications together and determine which instrument, if either, should be admitted to probate. See TEX. ESTATES CODE § 256.101. Here, the probate court disposed of the competing applications on the same date: it admitted the copy of the 2010 will and denied admission of the competing instruments, including the 2017 will. Thus, the record does not support Jackson’s assertion that the court failed to consider his application for the 2017 will. Jackson also argues that the 2017 instrument necessarily revoked the 2010 will because it bears a later date and contains a clause revoking prior wills. But the later date and revocation clause alone do not establish revocation. A written will may be revoked by a later will, codicil, or written declaration only if the later instrument 20 was “executed with like formalities.” Id. § 253.002. The party relying on the later instrument to establish revocation must prove that it was validly executed and that the testator possessed testamentary capacity at the time of execution. See Estate of Wlecyk, No. 01-19-00299-CV, 2021 WL 1537489, at *5 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] Apr. 20, 2021, no pet.); Harkins v. Crews, 907 S.W.2d 51, 58 (Tex. App.— San Antonio 1995, writ denied). A later instrument determined to be invalid cannot revoke an earlier will merely because it contains an express revocation clause. See Estate of Corbett, No. 14-24-00922-CV, 2025 WL 3522942, at *3 (Tex. App.— Houston [14th Dist.] Dec. 9, 2025, no pet.) (“An invalid will cannot serve to revoke a former will.”). Because Jackson sought probate of the 2017 will, he bore the burden to establish that instrument’s entitlement to probate. See Wlecyk, 2021 WL 1537489, at *5; In re Kam, 484 S.W.3d 642, 650 (Tex. App.—El Paso 2016, pet. denied). He could not satisfy that burden merely by pointing to the instrument’s later date and revocation clause. See Harkins, 907 S.W.2d at 58 (a party seeking revocation by a subsequent will must prove “that the subsequent instrument was executed at a time when the [maker] was of sound mind and disposing memory”); see also In re Estate of Plohberger, 761 S.W.2d 448, 450 (Tex. App.—Corpus Christi–Edinburg 1988, writ denied) (later will determined to be void for undue influence could not serve to 21 revoke the earlier will, even though the later will contained an express revocation clause). Jackson offered no evidence to support the validity of the 2017 will. Lastly, Texas law permits probate of a will that cannot be produced in court. TEX. ESTATES CODE §§ 256.054, 256.156. The proponent must prove the cause of nonproduction, reasonable diligence in searching for the original, the will’s contents, and the remaining statutory requirements for probate. See id. §§ 256.152(a)(1), 256.156(b)(1); Estate of Brown, 704 S.W.3d 428, 434 (Tex. 2024). Courtney established that the 2010 will was self-proved, that its original could not be located despite reasonable diligence, and that she unsuccessfully searched the places where the original likely would have been found. Jackson did not challenge this basis. The probate court admitted the copy of the 2010 will and denied admission of the 2017 instrument. Accordingly, Jackson has not demonstrated that the probate court failed to consider the 2017 instrument or erred by admitting the copy of the 2010 will. We overrule this issue.8 8 After the above orders issued—resolving all issues at stake in them—Jackson filed a motion to release funds that, according to Jackson, belonged to him. The record does not show that the probate court has yet addressed this motion. The issue is not before us, and we express no opinion on the merits of his claimed entitlement. 22 CONCLUSION We affirm the probate court’s October 2024, September 2025, and January 2026 Orders. Jennifer Caughey Justice Panel consists of Justices Caughey, Morgan, and Dokupil. 23