Full Opinion

Affirmed in Part; Reversed and Remanded in Part; and Memorandum Opinion filed November 3, 2026. In The Fourteenth Court of Appeals NO. 14-25-00321-CV STACIE SHAKIR, Appellant V. AMITH ELLANKIYIL; JANNU INVESTMENTS, LLC, Appellees On Appeal from the 240th District Court Fort Bend County, Texas Trial Court Cause No. 24-DCV-315936 MEMORANDUM OPINION Appellant Stacie Ann Shakir was evicted from a townhome leased by Jannu Investments, LLC in 2015, and in 2024, she sued Jannu Investments and Amith Ellankiyil, a director of Jannu Investments, alleging fraud and violations of the Deceptive Trade Practices Act. Shakir’s claims were dismissed as baseless pursuant to Rule of Civil Procedure 91a. On appeal Shakir asserts the trial court erred in dismissing her claims because she was entitled to a jury trial. Shakir further asserts that the trial court violated several state and federal criminal statutes. We conclude Shakir has not challenged the grounds on which the trial court could have relied when granting the motion to dismiss and motion for sanctions and we affirm that portion of the judgment that dismissed claims against Ellankiyil. Because Jannu Investments did not move for dismissal, the trial court could not have granted relief on its behalf. We therefore reverse the portion of the judgment dismissing Shakir’s claims against Jannu Investments and remand for proceedings consistent with this opinion. BACKGROUND Jannu Investments rented a townhome to Shakir in 2014, and, after Shakir failed to pay rent, successfully sued to evict her in 2015. In 2024, Shakir filed an original petition in which she asserted claims against Ellankiyil and Jannu Investments for fraud and violations of the Deceptive Trade Practices Act. The facts underlying Shakir’s claims involved advertising of the townhome, and appellees’ lack of a real estate license. Ellankiyil answered, stating that Shakir was evicted in 2015, and no further action was taken after she vacated the property. Jannu Investments, through counsel, filed an answer denying Shakir’s allegations and asserting a limitations defense. After Jannu Investments filed an answer, its attorney withdrew at the request of Ellankiyil “on Behalf of Jannu Invesments [sic] LLC.” No other counsel appeared for either Ellankiyil or Jannu Investments. Ellankiyil, representing himself, filed a motion for sanctions pursuant to Rule of Civil Procedure 13 and Civil Practice and Remedies Code section 10.001. Ellankiyil also filed a motion to dismiss pursuant to Rule of Civil Procedure 91a. In the motion to dismiss Ellankiyil alleged that Shakir failed to allege sufficient facts 2 to support any claim for legal relief, and her allegations were not supported by a legal or factual basis. Shakir did not respond to the rule 91a motion. The trial court granted both motions finding that Shakir’s pleadings “have no basis in law or fact,” dismissed “the entire case” with prejudice, and ordered Shakir to pay all costs of court for “filing of this frivolous and groundless petition.” The trial court stated, “This is the final judgment of this Court, it is appealable, and from which let execution arise.” This appeal followed. ISSUES PRESENTED So far as we can determine, Shakir presents six issues for review. We group those issues as follows. In Shakir’s first three issues she asserts her right to a jury trial. We group together as Shakir’s fourth issue all of her allegations that the trial court committed criminal offenses. She contends that the trial court violated Chapter 38 and section 6.03 of the Penal Code, and that the trial court and opposing counsel conspired against her federal rights in violation of 18 United States Code section 241. In what we construe as Shakir’s fifth issue, she asserts Ellankiyil violated a court order in contravention of Penal Code section 25.07. In Shakir’s sixth issue she alleges the trial court violated Rule of Civil Procedure 166a, which applies to summary judgments. ANALYSIS Although Shakir repeatedly refers to the trial court’s order as a summary judgment, the record reflects that the trial court dismissed her claims pursuant to rule 91a. We therefore review the trial court’s judgment under the rule 91a standard. I. Standard of Review Rule of Civil Procedure 91a provides that “a party may move to dismiss a 3 cause of action on the grounds that it has no basis in law or fact.” Tex. R. Civ. P. 91a.1. A cause of action has no basis in law if the allegations, taken as true, together with inferences reasonably drawn from them, do not entitle the claimant to the relief sought. Id. A cause of action has no basis in fact if “no reasonable person could believe the facts pleaded.” Id. We review the merits of a rule 91a motion de novo. San Jacinto River Auth. v. Medina, 627 S.W.3d 618, 628 (Tex. 2021). To survive a Rule 91a motion, a plaintiff’s pleadings must include the essential factual allegations supporting the claims, and those allegations must be sufficient to support a judgment if ultimately proven. In re Oncor Elec. Delivery Co., 716 S.W.3d 525, 532 (Tex. 2025) (orig. proceeding). In conducting our review, we must construe the pleadings liberally in favor of the plaintiff, look to the pleader’s intent, and accept as true the factual allegations in the pleadings to determine if the cause of action has a basis in law or fact. Wooley v. Schaffer, 447 S.W.3d 71, 76 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 2014, pet. denied). The decision to impose a sanction is left to the discretion of the trial court and will be set aside only upon a showing of abuse of discretion. Citibank, N.A. v. Estes, 385 S.W.3d 671, 674 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 2012, no pet.). The test for abuse of discretion is whether the trial court acted without reference to any guiding rules or principles or whether, under the circumstances of the case, the trial court’s action was arbitrary or unreasonable. Low v. Henry, 221 S.W.3d 609, 614 (Tex. 2007). II. The trial court lacked jurisdiction to grant relief in favor of Jannu Investments. We begin by addressing an assertion in Shakir’s brief that Ellankiyil could not represent Jannu Investments in the trial court. Because this assertion potentially affects this court’s jurisdiction, we construe Shakir’s brief liberally to reach this 4 assertion on the merits. See Perry v. Cohen, 272 S.W.3d 585, 587 (Tex. 2008). Legal entities, such as corporations or limited liability companies, generally may appear in a district or county court only through a licensed attorney. See Kunstoplast of Am., Inc. v. Formosa Plastics Corp., USA, 937 S.W.2d 455, 456 (Tex. 1996); Sherman v. Boston, 486 S.W.3d 88, 95 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 2016, pet. denied). A non-attorney’s attempt to appear for a corporation or present a case on its behalf has no legal effect. Sherman, 486 S.W.3d at 95–96. In the trial court only Ellankiyil filed a rule 91a motion to dismiss and motion for sanctions; Jannu Investments filed no motions. Ellankiyil could not legally file motions on behalf of the entity because he is not an attorney. Because Jannu Investments did not file a motion to dismiss or motion for sanctions, the trial court could not have granted relief in its favor. See Alam v. Reimer, No. 14-25-00400-CV, 2026 WL 1876181, at *5 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] June 30, 2026, no pet.) (mem. op.) (trial court could not have granted relief in favor of party who did not file a motion). Therefore, the trial court’s judgment was a partial dismissal, but purported to be a final judgment. Courts will deem a judgment issued without a conventional trial, such as the judgment here, to be final when (1) it actually disposes of all claims and parties then before the court, regardless of its language, or (2) it states with unmistakable clarity that it is a final judgment as to all claims and all parties, even if it does not actually dispose of all claims and parties. See In re C.K.M., 709 S.W.3d 613, 616 (Tex. 2025). The judgment in this case satisfies the second avenue of finality as it “clearly and unequivocally” expressed the trial court’s intent to dismiss all pending claims and parties and enter a final judgment. The order specifically provided, “[t]his is the final judgment of this Court, it is appealable.” The trial court, however, granted more relief than was requested. When a trial court grants more relief than requested, and 5 makes an otherwise partial judgment final, that judgment, although erroneous, is final and appealable. G & H Towing Co. v. Magee, 347 S.W.3d 293, 298 (Tex. 2011). When a judgment is final but erroneously grants more relief than the movant requested, we do not automatically reverse the judgment in its entirety. See Wasserberg v. RES-TX One, LLC, No. 14-13-00674-CV, 2014 WL 6922545, at *3 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] Dec. 9, 2014, pet. denied) (mem. op.). Rather, in the interest of judicial economy, we consider whether the trial court properly granted the relief that was requested. Magee, 347 S.W.3d at 298. If so, the remedy is to affirm the judgment in part, reverse it in part given that only a partial judgment should have been granted, and remand the case to the trial court for further proceedings. Bandera Elec. Coop., Inc. v. Gilchrist, 946 S.W.2d 336 (Tex. 1997); U.S. Bank Nat’l Ass’n as Legal Title Tr. for Truman 2016 SC6 Title Tr. v. Silvers, No. 14-22-00910-CV, 2024 WL 2820883, at *6 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] June 4, 2024, pet. denied) (mem. op.). We conclude the judgment is final, but erroneous, and consider whether the trial court properly granted rule 91a relief to Ellankiyil. III. Shakir has not challenged the grounds on which the trial court could have relied when granting the motion to dismiss and motion for sanctions. Interpreting Shakir’s petition liberally, as we must, she alleged that at the time she leased the townhome neither Ellankiyil, nor Jannu Investments, had a real estate license. Shakir also alleged that the townhome she rented was falsely advertised. In granting the motions, the trial court stated: The Court finds that Plaintiff’s original and amended petitions have no basis in law or fact. They are frivolous, groundless and vexatious, and filed for the purpose of harrassment [sic] and intimidation of Defendants. The Court finds that Plaintiff was a former tenant of Defendants who was evicted from Defendants’ rental property in 2014. Since then Defendants have not had any factual dealings with Plaintiff prior to the initiation of this lawsuit by Plaintiff. No allegations made 6 by Plaintiff in her original or amended petition is based on any dealings with Defendants. Based on TRCP13 and CPRC section 10.001, the Court’s inherent powers, and TRCP 91a, the Court orders that the entire case be DISMISSED with prejudice and that Plaintiff pay all costs of court for the filing of this frivolous and groundless petition against Defendants. In Shakir’s brief she does not challenge the trial court’s findings. She makes no mention of the rule 91a standard, whether her claims have any basis in law or fact, or the sanctions assessed. Shakir also does not address the trial court’s sanctions order. Instead, Shakir asserts a right to a jury trial, accuses the trial court and Ellankiyil of violating certain criminal statutes, and asserts the trial court misapplied a rule of civil procedure that does not apply to rule 91a actions. Because Shakir has not challenged any ground on which the trial court could have relied when granting the motion to dismiss and motion for sanctions, we must affirm the trial court’s order. See Clarke, 717 S.W.3d at 928 (affirming rule 91a dismissal when appellant failed to challenge all grounds on which the judgment could be based). We overrule Shakir’s issues on appeal. CONCLUSION We affirm the portion of the trial court’s judgment that dismissed Ellankiyil’s claims and ordered sanctions. We reverse the trial court’s judgment in part to the extent the judgment dismisses Shakir’s claims against Jannu Investments. We remand the case to the trial court for further proceedings limited to Shakir’s claims 7 against Jannu Investments.1 /s/ Randy Wilson Justice Panel consists of Justices Jewell, Wilson, and Boatman. 1 After filing her opening brief, Shakir filed a “motion to accept brief” and a “motion for summary judgment” in this court. We grant Shakir’s motion to accept her brief. In the “motion for summary judgment” Shakir contends the trial court violated Rule of Civil Procedure 166a by allowing Ellankiyil to testify during the hearing. As stated earlier, rule 166a does not apply to the trial court’s order dismissing pursuant to rule 91a. Moreover, the record reflects that the trial court heard testimony on the motion for sanctions, which was permissible. See generally Unifund CCR Partners v. Villa, 299 S.W.3d 92, 98 (Tex. 2009). We therefore deny Shakir’s “motion for summary judgment.” 8