Stacie Shakir v. Amith Ellankiyil; Jannu Investments, LLC
CourtTexas Court of Appeals, 14th District (Houston)
Date FiledNovember 3, 2026
Docket14-25-00321-CV
JudgeWilson
StatusPublished
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Full Opinion
Affirmed in Part; Reversed and Remanded in Part; and Memorandum Opinion
filed November 3, 2026.
In The
Fourteenth Court of Appeals
NO. 14-25-00321-CV
STACIE SHAKIR, Appellant
V.
AMITH ELLANKIYIL; JANNU INVESTMENTS, LLC, Appellees
On Appeal from the 240th District Court
Fort Bend County, Texas
Trial Court Cause No. 24-DCV-315936
MEMORANDUM OPINION
Appellant Stacie Ann Shakir was evicted from a townhome leased by Jannu
Investments, LLC in 2015, and in 2024, she sued Jannu Investments and Amith
Ellankiyil, a director of Jannu Investments, alleging fraud and violations of the
Deceptive Trade Practices Act. Shakir’s claims were dismissed as baseless pursuant
to Rule of Civil Procedure 91a. On appeal Shakir asserts the trial court erred in
dismissing her claims because she was entitled to a jury trial. Shakir further asserts
that the trial court violated several state and federal criminal statutes.
We conclude Shakir has not challenged the grounds on which the trial court
could have relied when granting the motion to dismiss and motion for sanctions and
we affirm that portion of the judgment that dismissed claims against Ellankiyil.
Because Jannu Investments did not move for dismissal, the trial court could not have
granted relief on its behalf. We therefore reverse the portion of the judgment
dismissing Shakir’s claims against Jannu Investments and remand for proceedings
consistent with this opinion.
BACKGROUND
Jannu Investments rented a townhome to Shakir in 2014, and, after Shakir
failed to pay rent, successfully sued to evict her in 2015. In 2024, Shakir filed an
original petition in which she asserted claims against Ellankiyil and Jannu
Investments for fraud and violations of the Deceptive Trade Practices Act. The facts
underlying Shakir’s claims involved advertising of the townhome, and appellees’
lack of a real estate license. Ellankiyil answered, stating that Shakir was evicted in
2015, and no further action was taken after she vacated the property. Jannu
Investments, through counsel, filed an answer denying Shakir’s allegations and
asserting a limitations defense.
After Jannu Investments filed an answer, its attorney withdrew at the request
of Ellankiyil “on Behalf of Jannu Invesments [sic] LLC.” No other counsel appeared
for either Ellankiyil or Jannu Investments.
Ellankiyil, representing himself, filed a motion for sanctions pursuant to Rule
of Civil Procedure 13 and Civil Practice and Remedies Code section 10.001.
Ellankiyil also filed a motion to dismiss pursuant to Rule of Civil Procedure 91a. In
the motion to dismiss Ellankiyil alleged that Shakir failed to allege sufficient facts
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to support any claim for legal relief, and her allegations were not supported by a
legal or factual basis. Shakir did not respond to the rule 91a motion. The trial court
granted both motions finding that Shakir’s pleadings “have no basis in law or fact,”
dismissed “the entire case” with prejudice, and ordered Shakir to pay all costs of
court for “filing of this frivolous and groundless petition.” The trial court stated,
“This is the final judgment of this Court, it is appealable, and from which let
execution arise.” This appeal followed.
ISSUES PRESENTED
So far as we can determine, Shakir presents six issues for review. We group
those issues as follows.
In Shakir’s first three issues she asserts her right to a jury trial. We group
together as Shakir’s fourth issue all of her allegations that the trial court committed
criminal offenses. She contends that the trial court violated Chapter 38 and section
6.03 of the Penal Code, and that the trial court and opposing counsel conspired
against her federal rights in violation of 18 United States Code section 241. In what
we construe as Shakir’s fifth issue, she asserts Ellankiyil violated a court order in
contravention of Penal Code section 25.07. In Shakir’s sixth issue she alleges the
trial court violated Rule of Civil Procedure 166a, which applies to summary
judgments.
ANALYSIS
Although Shakir repeatedly refers to the trial court’s order as a summary
judgment, the record reflects that the trial court dismissed her claims pursuant to rule
91a. We therefore review the trial court’s judgment under the rule 91a standard.
I. Standard of Review
Rule of Civil Procedure 91a provides that “a party may move to dismiss a
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cause of action on the grounds that it has no basis in law or fact.” Tex. R. Civ. P.
91a.1. A cause of action has no basis in law if the allegations, taken as true, together
with inferences reasonably drawn from them, do not entitle the claimant to the relief
sought. Id. A cause of action has no basis in fact if “no reasonable person could
believe the facts pleaded.” Id. We review the merits of a rule 91a motion de novo.
San Jacinto River Auth. v. Medina, 627 S.W.3d 618, 628 (Tex. 2021).
To survive a Rule 91a motion, a plaintiff’s pleadings must include the
essential factual allegations supporting the claims, and those allegations must be
sufficient to support a judgment if ultimately proven. In re Oncor Elec. Delivery Co.,
716 S.W.3d 525, 532 (Tex. 2025) (orig. proceeding). In conducting our review, we
must construe the pleadings liberally in favor of the plaintiff, look to the pleader’s
intent, and accept as true the factual allegations in the pleadings to determine if the
cause of action has a basis in law or fact. Wooley v. Schaffer, 447 S.W.3d 71, 76
(Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 2014, pet. denied).
The decision to impose a sanction is left to the discretion of the trial court and
will be set aside only upon a showing of abuse of discretion. Citibank, N.A. v. Estes,
385 S.W.3d 671, 674 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 2012, no pet.). The test for
abuse of discretion is whether the trial court acted without reference to any guiding
rules or principles or whether, under the circumstances of the case, the trial court’s
action was arbitrary or unreasonable. Low v. Henry, 221 S.W.3d 609, 614 (Tex.
2007).
II. The trial court lacked jurisdiction to grant relief in favor of Jannu
Investments.
We begin by addressing an assertion in Shakir’s brief that Ellankiyil could not
represent Jannu Investments in the trial court. Because this assertion potentially
affects this court’s jurisdiction, we construe Shakir’s brief liberally to reach this
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assertion on the merits. See Perry v. Cohen, 272 S.W.3d 585, 587 (Tex. 2008).
Legal entities, such as corporations or limited liability companies, generally
may appear in a district or county court only through a licensed attorney. See
Kunstoplast of Am., Inc. v. Formosa Plastics Corp., USA, 937 S.W.2d 455, 456 (Tex.
1996); Sherman v. Boston, 486 S.W.3d 88, 95 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.]
2016, pet. denied). A non-attorney’s attempt to appear for a corporation or present a
case on its behalf has no legal effect. Sherman, 486 S.W.3d at 95–96.
In the trial court only Ellankiyil filed a rule 91a motion to dismiss and motion
for sanctions; Jannu Investments filed no motions. Ellankiyil could not legally file
motions on behalf of the entity because he is not an attorney. Because Jannu
Investments did not file a motion to dismiss or motion for sanctions, the trial court
could not have granted relief in its favor. See Alam v. Reimer, No. 14-25-00400-CV,
2026 WL 1876181, at *5 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] June 30, 2026, no pet.)
(mem. op.) (trial court could not have granted relief in favor of party who did not
file a motion). Therefore, the trial court’s judgment was a partial dismissal, but
purported to be a final judgment.
Courts will deem a judgment issued without a conventional trial, such as the
judgment here, to be final when (1) it actually disposes of all claims and parties then
before the court, regardless of its language, or (2) it states with unmistakable clarity
that it is a final judgment as to all claims and all parties, even if it does not actually
dispose of all claims and parties. See In re C.K.M., 709 S.W.3d 613, 616 (Tex. 2025).
The judgment in this case satisfies the second avenue of finality as it “clearly and
unequivocally” expressed the trial court’s intent to dismiss all pending claims and
parties and enter a final judgment. The order specifically provided, “[t]his is the final
judgment of this Court, it is appealable.” The trial court, however, granted more
relief than was requested. When a trial court grants more relief than requested, and
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makes an otherwise partial judgment final, that judgment, although erroneous, is
final and appealable. G & H Towing Co. v. Magee, 347 S.W.3d 293, 298 (Tex. 2011).
When a judgment is final but erroneously grants more relief than the movant
requested, we do not automatically reverse the judgment in its entirety. See
Wasserberg v. RES-TX One, LLC, No. 14-13-00674-CV, 2014 WL 6922545, at *3
(Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] Dec. 9, 2014, pet. denied) (mem. op.). Rather, in
the interest of judicial economy, we consider whether the trial court properly granted
the relief that was requested. Magee, 347 S.W.3d at 298. If so, the remedy is to affirm
the judgment in part, reverse it in part given that only a partial judgment should have
been granted, and remand the case to the trial court for further proceedings. Bandera
Elec. Coop., Inc. v. Gilchrist, 946 S.W.2d 336 (Tex. 1997); U.S. Bank Nat’l Ass’n
as Legal Title Tr. for Truman 2016 SC6 Title Tr. v. Silvers, No. 14-22-00910-CV,
2024 WL 2820883, at *6 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] June 4, 2024, pet.
denied) (mem. op.). We conclude the judgment is final, but erroneous, and consider
whether the trial court properly granted rule 91a relief to Ellankiyil.
III. Shakir has not challenged the grounds on which the trial court could have
relied when granting the motion to dismiss and motion for sanctions.
Interpreting Shakir’s petition liberally, as we must, she alleged that at the time
she leased the townhome neither Ellankiyil, nor Jannu Investments, had a real estate
license. Shakir also alleged that the townhome she rented was falsely advertised.
In granting the motions, the trial court stated:
The Court finds that Plaintiff’s original and amended petitions have no
basis in law or fact. They are frivolous, groundless and vexatious, and
filed for the purpose of harrassment [sic] and intimidation of
Defendants. The Court finds that Plaintiff was a former tenant of
Defendants who was evicted from Defendants’ rental property in 2014.
Since then Defendants have not had any factual dealings with Plaintiff
prior to the initiation of this lawsuit by Plaintiff. No allegations made
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by Plaintiff in her original or amended petition is based on any dealings
with Defendants.
Based on TRCP13 and CPRC section 10.001, the Court’s inherent
powers, and TRCP 91a, the Court orders that the entire case be
DISMISSED with prejudice and that Plaintiff pay all costs of court for
the filing of this frivolous and groundless petition against Defendants.
In Shakir’s brief she does not challenge the trial court’s findings. She makes
no mention of the rule 91a standard, whether her claims have any basis in law or
fact, or the sanctions assessed. Shakir also does not address the trial court’s sanctions
order. Instead, Shakir asserts a right to a jury trial, accuses the trial court and
Ellankiyil of violating certain criminal statutes, and asserts the trial court misapplied
a rule of civil procedure that does not apply to rule 91a actions. Because Shakir has
not challenged any ground on which the trial court could have relied when granting
the motion to dismiss and motion for sanctions, we must affirm the trial court’s
order. See Clarke, 717 S.W.3d at 928 (affirming rule 91a dismissal when appellant
failed to challenge all grounds on which the judgment could be based). We overrule
Shakir’s issues on appeal.
CONCLUSION
We affirm the portion of the trial court’s judgment that dismissed Ellankiyil’s
claims and ordered sanctions. We reverse the trial court’s judgment in part to the
extent the judgment dismisses Shakir’s claims against Jannu Investments. We
remand the case to the trial court for further proceedings limited to Shakir’s claims
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against Jannu Investments.1
/s/ Randy Wilson
Justice
Panel consists of Justices Jewell, Wilson, and Boatman.
1
After filing her opening brief, Shakir filed a “motion to accept brief” and a “motion for
summary judgment” in this court. We grant Shakir’s motion to accept her brief. In the “motion for
summary judgment” Shakir contends the trial court violated Rule of Civil Procedure 166a by
allowing Ellankiyil to testify during the hearing. As stated earlier, rule 166a does not apply to the
trial court’s order dismissing pursuant to rule 91a. Moreover, the record reflects that the trial court
heard testimony on the motion for sanctions, which was permissible. See generally Unifund CCR
Partners v. Villa, 299 S.W.3d 92, 98 (Tex. 2009). We therefore deny Shakir’s “motion for
summary judgment.”
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