Full Opinion

Opinion filed October 29, 2026 In The Eleventh Court of Appeals __________ No. 11-26-00247-CV __________ IN RE JESSICA CORONADO Original Mandamus Proceeding MEMORANDUM OPINION This original proceeding arises from a divorce and suit affecting the parent- child relationship (SAPCR) between Relator, Jessica Coronado, and Real Party in Interest, Hiram Coronado. This is the second mandamus proceeding before us arising from temporary orders entered in this divorce proceeding. See In re Coronado, No. 11-26-00196-CV, 2026 WL 2117287 (Tex. App.—Eastland July 23, 2026, orig. proceeding) (mem op.) (Coronado I). In the first mandamus, we conditionally granted Jessica’s petition seeking to vacate the trial court’s temporary orders of May 29, 2026. Id. at *4. As set out below, the opinion in Coronado I has a bearing on this proceeding under the “law of the case” doctrine. Jessica has now filed a second petition for writ of mandamus in which she challenges the trial court’s second set of temporary conservatorship and visitation orders for their child, L.J.C, who is under the age of three. Specifically, Jessica contends that the Honorable Brent Morgan, presiding judge of the 318th District Court of Midland County, clearly abused his discretion by: (1) failing to appoint Jessica temporary sole managing conservator; (2) imposing a geographic restriction as to where Jessica can reside; and (3) granting Hiram unsupervised visitation. Hiram has filed a response. We conditionally grant the petition in part and deny it in part. Factual and Procedural Background Jessica and Hiram were married in May 2024, and L.J.C. was born in February 2025. Jessica had two children before the marriage, J.E.C. and J.I.C., who were eleven and thirteen at the time of the hearing on temporary orders in April 2026. On December 1, 2025, Jessica separated from Hiram and moved with the three children to her hometown in Hidalgo County. The April 2026 Hearing Jessica testified at the initial hearing on temporary orders that the day before she left, Hiram “spanked” and “slapped” J.E.C. so hard that it caused bruising to J.E.C. In February 2025, Hiram caused bruising to J.E.C. in the same area in a similar manner. He also spanked Jessica’s oldest son, J.I.C., and threatened to physically discipline and humiliate J.I.C. “like in county,” referring to his experience in county jail. Jessica reported the abuse and was granted an emergency protective order for the protection of her and her three children. J.E.C. and J.I.C. spoke to law enforcement and forensic interviewers, which led to Hiram’s arrest for the felony offense of injury to a child. See TEX. PENAL CODE ANN. 22.04(a)(3), (f) (West Supp. 2026). 2 Jessica offered photographs of J.E.C.’s injuries, and text messages between her and Hiram in which Hiram discussed physically disciplining his stepsons. Additionally, Jessica testified that there was one incident during which Hiram “push[ed]” and “shov[ed]” her, and that Hiram had been arrested in the past for fighting. In light of Hiram’s physical abuse of J.E.C. and J.I.C., Jessica sought to be appointed temporary sole managing conservator of L.J.C. See TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. § 153.004 (West Supp. 2026). Hiram testified, and “[p]lead[ed] the Fifth” seven times in response to questions about J.E.C.’s injuries. He agreed that he texted Jessica describing, in graphic detail, how he intended to discipline J.I.C. in the same manner in which corrections officers punished inmates. At the conclusion of the hearing, the trial court designated Jessica and Hiram temporary joint managing conservators of L.J.C. with Hiram’s periods of possession to be supervised. The trial court further ordered Jessica to transport L.J.C. from Hidalgo County to Hiram’s residence in Midland twice a month to exchange possession. The Initial Mandamus Proceeding On July 1, 2026, Jessica filed a petition for writ of mandamus challenging the trial court’s first set of temporary orders. We conditionally granted mandamus relief on July 23, 2026. Coronado I, 2026 WL 2117287. In Coronado I, we found that the trial court abused its discretion by (1) appointing the parties joint managing conservators when there was credible evidence that Hiram had physically abused Jessica’s older child and (2) ordering Jessica to provide all transportation for Hiram’s visitation. Id. at *3. The mandamus opinion directed the trial court to vacate the temporary orders. Id. at *4. 3 Subsequent Proceedings The trial court subsequently vacated the initial temporary orders and held a second temporary hearing on August 5, 2026. At the outset of the hearing, the trial court stated: “The Court of Appeals’ opinion was for this Court to vacate its order. Which it did. So we’re starting over from scratch.” At the time of the second temporary hearing, Jessica was still residing with her three children in Hidalgo County where she had obtained “better” employment, enrolled L.J.C. in daycare, and registered her two older children for school. Between the two temporary hearings, Hiram exercised supervised visitations with L.J.C. that went well. L.J.C. had problems traveling to visitations, which included needing frequent stops, having “blowout[]” diapers, and throwing up from motion sickness. Jessica requested that the trial court order Hiram exercise his supervised visitation in McAllen, which was closer to the child’s residence. At the conclusion of the second temporary hearing, the trial court again appointed the parties temporary joint managing conservators with Jessica having the right to designate the child’s residence in Midland County and granted Hiram unsupervised visitation under a standard possession order with exchanges occurring at the Child Safety Zone of the Midland Police Department. In making its ruling, the trial court found that there had been no family violence. The trial court also evaluated the factors in Section 153.254(a) of the Family Code in making its visitation order. See FAM. § 153.254(a). Jessica filed the instant petition for writ of mandamus challenging the trial court’s second set of temporary orders. Mandamus Standard of Review Mandamus is an “extraordinary” remedy that is “available only in limited circumstances.” Walker v. Packer, 827 S.W.2d 833, 840 (Tex. 1992) (orig. proceeding). A writ of mandamus will issue only if the trial court clearly abused its 4 discretion, and the relator has no adequate remedy by appeal. In re Prudential Ins. Co. of Am., 148 S.W.3d 124, 135–36 (Tex. 2004) (orig. proceeding). First, “[a]n appeal is not an adequate remedy when a party complains of temporary orders” entered while a SAPCR is pending. In re Walser, 648 S.W.3d 442, 445 (Tex. App.— San Antonio 2021, orig. proceeding) (citing Walker, 827 S.W.2d at 842). That is because such temporary orders “are interlocutory and there is no statutory provision for appeal of these orders.” Id. at 445. To the contrary, the Family Code declares that temporary orders rendered in a pending SAPCR “are not subject to interlocutory appeal.” FAM. § 105.001(e). Therefore, Jessica has no adequate remedy by direct appeal of the trial court’s temporary orders in this case. 1 Trial courts have broad authority to enter temporary orders in a SAPCR “for the safety and welfare of the child.” FAM. § 105.001(a); see Coronado I, 2026 WL 2117287, at *2. “A trial court abuses its discretion if ‘it reaches a decision so arbitrary and unreasonable as to amount to a clear and prejudicial error of law.’” In re Cerberus Cap. Mgmt., L.P., 164 S.W.3d 379, 382 (Tex. 2005) (orig. proceeding) (per curiam) (quoting Walker, 827 S.W.2d at 839); see In re A.L.M.-F., 593 S.W.3d 271, 282 (Tex. 2019). Because a trial court has no discretion in determining what the law is or in applying it to the facts, a trial court abuses its discretion if it fails to correctly analyze or apply the law. See Prudential, 148 S.W.3d at 135; see also In re J.B. Hunt Transp., Inc., 492 S.W.3d 287, 294 (Tex. 2016) (orig. proceeding). To demonstrate a clear abuse of discretion, a party seeking mandamus relief must show that the trial court “could have reached only one conclusion and that a contrary finding is thus arbitrary and unreasonable.” In re State Farm Lloyds, 520 S.W.3d 595, 604 (Tex. 2017) (orig. proceeding). An “appellate court may not substitute its judgment for the trial court’s determination of factual or other matters 1 We sustain Jessica’s first issue wherein she contends that she has no adequate remedy by appeal. 5 committed to the trial court’s discretion, even if the mandamus court would have decided the issue differently.” Id. Alternatively, the party may demonstrate that the trial court erred in “determining what the law is or applying the law to the facts, even when the law is unsettled.” Id. (internal quotation marks omitted). An oral order may be the subject of mandamus relief if the trial court’s ruling is a clear, specific, and enforceable order that is adequately shown by the record. In re State ex rel. Munk, 448 S.W.3d 687, 690 (Tex. App.—Eastland 2014); see TEX. R. APP. P. 52.3(l)(1)(B); In re Bledsoe, 41 S.W.3d 807, 811 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth 2001, orig. proceeding)). Although the temporary orders were not reduced to a written order at the time Jessica filed her petition, the trial court’s oral findings and rulings are adequately shown in the transcript from the second temporary hearing. Temporary Sole Managing Conservatorship In Jessica’s second issue, she contends that the trial court clearly abused its discretion by failing to appoint her temporary sole managing conservator. “[B]ecause the trial court’s temporary orders are not appealable, mandamus is an appropriate means to challenge them.” In re Levay, 179 S.W.3d 93, 95 (Tex. App.—San Antonio 2005) (orig. proceeding). Conservatorship determinations are subject to review for abuse of discretion and may be reversed only if the decision is arbitrary and unreasonable. In re J.A.J., 243 S.W.3d 611, 616 (Tex. 2007) (citing Gillespie v. Gillespie, 644 S.W.2d 449, 451(Tex.1982)). It is ordinarily presumed that “the appointment of the parents of a child as joint managing conservators is in the best interest of the child.” FAM. § 153.131(b) (West 2014); see In re C.J.C., 603 S.W.3d 804, 818–19 (Tex. 2020). The fit parent presumption, however, is “[s]ubject to the prohibition in Section 153.004.” Id. § 153.131(a). Section 153.004 provides, in relevant part, that: 6 The [trial] court may not appoint [the parents] joint managing conservators [of a child] if credible evidence is presented of a history or pattern of past or present child neglect, or physical or sexual abuse by one parent directed against the other parent, a spouse, or a child. FAM. § 153.004(b) (emphasis added). Texas courts have held that “a single act of violence or abuse suffices to show a history of physical abuse.” In re J.M., No. 02- 16-00428-CV, 2017 WL 3821863, at *4 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth Aug. 31, 2017, no pet.) (mem. op.) (collecting cases). In Coronado I, we held that there was credible evidence developed at the initial hearing that Hiram physically abused J.E.C. Coronado I, 2026 WL 2117287, at *3. Because of that evidence, we concluded that the trial court’s appointment of Hiram as a joint managing conservator of L.J.C. was prohibited by statute and a clear abuse of discretion. Id.; see FAM. § 153.004(b); In re J.J.G., 540 S.W.3d 44, 60 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 2017, pet. denied). The transcript from the first temporary hearing was not offered into evidence at the second temporary hearing. As previously noted, when the hearing began, the trial court indicated that the parties were beginning from “scratch.” At the second hearing, Hiram was asked he if recalled the pictures from the prior temporary hearing regarding the abuse on his stepson and testifying that he was going to teach his stepson “how it’s done in the county” when he “severely spanked and bruised” his stepson’s body. Hiram recalled both the pictures and his prior testimony. Hiram was then asked, and agreed, that notwithstanding “that act of violence,” he should be appointed the “primary” conservator. Hiram also testified that the charge for injury to a child was still pending, but he had not been indicted and he was represented by a criminal defense attorney. At the conclusion of the second hearing, Jessica’s counsel argued that the evidence from the first hearing could be considered by the trial court. Conversely, 7 Hiram’s counsel argued that the evidence from the prior hearing was not properly before the trial court to be considered in the second temporary hearing. In the process of announcing its rulings at the end of the second hearing, the trial court noted that no one had asked it to take judicial notice of the prior hearing. However, the trial court recited facts from that first temporary hearing as the basis for some of the findings in the second temporary hearing. For example, the trial court considered the prior testimony that both parents were involved with the child when evaluating the factors required by Section 153.254. See FAM. § 153.254(a) (possession orders for a child less than three years of age). Additionally, the trial court made conflicting statements about which evidence it relied upon in its prior ruling, and it made findings that seemingly contradicted its previous rulings. As relevant to the issue of conservatorship, the trial court stated: At the hearing that we had back in April, the Court rendered an order that was just trying to give each person something of what it wanted. I would admit I probably acted a little bit more like a mediator and not like a judge. But as the Court of Appeals essentially pointed out, my job is to determine the facts first, apply the law to the facts. And so -- like, first I need to determine the facts and explain my findings since I didn’t really do that that well at the last hearing. I didn’t believe at the April 1st hearing and don’t believe now that there was sufficient evidence to show that [Hiram] abused any child or that he had committed any act of family violence. Court finds that the credible evidence showed any bruising on the child was not caused by an act of [Hiram] that was committed intentionally, knowingly, recklessly or with criminal negligence. As I recall from that testimony, the credible evidence was that there was a plan by [Jessica] to flee the jurisdiction of the Court and establish residence in Hidalgo County. If I recall correctly, she attempted to have the charges dismissed after leaving to Hidalgo County. She admitted herself that she had spanked -- I think her words were “spanked the s--t out of the child” via text message. I remember her testifying that she was trying to flee Midland 8 County because she was scared of [Hiram] and she wanted to hide from him. And I pointed out back at that time, if you really wanted to hide from someone, you wouldn’t pick the one county out of the over 200 counties in Texas where you would happen to be found, which is at your family’s house, which is why I didn’t find [Jessica] to be credible. Although there has been no testimony today as far as any family violence, but -- and no one has asked me to take judicial notice of the prior proceedings, even if someone had, the Court would not have found there to have been family violence. Coronado I and the “Law of the Case” Doctrine The Texas Supreme Court defines the “law of the case” doctrine as: [The] principle under which questions of law decided on appeal to a court of last resort will govern the case throughout its subsequent stages. By narrowing the issues in successive stages of the litigation, the law of the case doctrine is intended to achieve uniformity of decision as well as judicial economy and efficiency. The doctrine is based on public policy and is aimed at putting an end to litigation. Briscoe v. Goodmark Corp., 102 S.W.3d 714, 716 (Tex. 2003) (quoting Hudson v. Wakefield, 711 S.W.2d 628, 630 (Tex. 1986)). The law of the case doctrine is applicable to mandamus proceedings when an issue has been resolved on the merits in a prior mandamus proceeding. In re B.G.D., 351 S.W.3d 131, 141–42 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth 2011, no pet.); see In re Guardianship of Cantu de Villarreal, 330 S.W.3d 11, 20–21 (Tex. App.—Corpus Christi–Edinburg 2010, no pet.) (holding that the law of the case doctrine prevented reconsideration of an issue decided in earlier mandamus petition). In this regard, “[r]eview of a trial court’s action under the abuse of discretion standard is a question of law.” Landerman v. State Bar of Tex., 247 S.W.3d 426, 433 (Tex. App.—Dallas 2008, pet. denied); see In re A.T.M., No. 12-07-00243-CV, 2009 WL 1492832, at *3 (Tex. App.—Tyler May 29, 2009, pet. denied) (mem. op.) (stating that its prior holding as to whether abuse of discretion occurred was question of law, noting facts previously presented 9 were “substantially the same,” and holding that its prior mandamus ruling was law of the case). The doctrine “does not necessarily apply when either the issues or the facts presented at successive appeals are not substantially the same as those involved on the first trial.” Hudson, 711 S.W.2d at 630. We held in Cornado I that, because credible evidence of family violence was offered at the first temporary hearing, the trial court clearly abused its discretion by appointing joint managing conservators. Coronado I, 2026 WL 2117287, at *3. We noted in this regard that Hiram was statutorily prohibited from being appointed as a joint managing conservator because of the credible evidence of family violence. Id.; see FAM. § 153.004(b). The evidence at the second temporary hearing presented no additional facts that would alter that holding. Rather, the second temporary hearing reaffirmed the credible evidence supporting the finding of family violence and established that the charge for injury to a child against Hiram was still pending.2 The trial court’s attempt to reweigh the evidence from the first hearing after this court ruled as a matter of law that there was credible evidence of family violence violated the law of the case doctrine. See B.G.D., 351 S.W.3d at 141–42. Further, in reweighing the evidence, the trial court only commented on Jessica’s statements and disregarded the other credible evidence of family violence. See Coronado I, 2026 WL 2117287, at *3. 2 In his response to Jessica’s mandamus petition, Hiram has submitted a “notice of rejection” from the Midland County District Attorney’s Office dated August 21, 2026, with respect to the criminal charge. However, this document was not presented to the trial court at the second hearing that occurred on August 5, 2026. In an original proceeding on petition for writ of mandamus, we must focus on the record that was before the trial court. In re Bristol–Myers Squibb Co., 975 S.W.2d 601, 605 (Tex. 1998) (orig. proceeding). We may not consider exhibits that were not part of the trial court record at the time of the hearing that is the subject of this original proceeding. In re Bahn, 13 S.W.3d 865, 870 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth 2000, orig. proceeding). Accordingly, we may not consider the post-hearing document submitted by Hiram. See In re Taylor, 113 S.W.3d 385, 392 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 2003, orig. proceeding). 10 Given the lack of new evidence at the second temporary hearing, the law of the case doctrine precluded the trial court from reconsidering the holding in Coronado I. There remains credible evidence of family violence that prevents the appointment of the parents as temporary joint managing conservators under Section 153.004(b). See id. Thus, the trial court was prohibited from appointing Hiram temporary joint managing conservator of L.J.C. at the second temporary hearing. See FAM. § 153.004(b). We conclude that the trial court clearly abused its discretion by incorrectly applying the law to the facts when it failed to appoint Jessica as temporary sole managing conservator. Accordingly, we sustain Jessica’s second issue. Geographic Restriction & Unsupervised Visitation In her third issue, Jessica asserts that the trial court clearly abused its discretion by ordering a geographic restriction on where she may reside and granting Hiram unsupervised visitation. In reviewing orders on geographic restrictions and possession, the best interest of the child is the primary consideration of the court in determining conservatorship and possession issues. FAM. § 153.002(a); Lenz v. Lenz, 79 S.W.3d 10, 14 (Tex. 2002). In determining the child’s best interest, no unique set of factors need to be proved by a party or considered by the trial court. In re B.G.J., 702 S.W.3d 886, 905–06 (Tex. App.—Eastland 2024, no pet.). The trial court may consider a variety of factors, including those set forth in Holley v. Adams.3 B.G.J., 702 S.W.3d at 905–06. These factors include (1) the desires of the child; (2) the emotional and physical needs of the child now and in the future; (3) the emotional and physical danger to the child now and in the future; (4) the parental abilities of the individuals seeking custody; (5) the programs available to assist these individuals to promote 3 544 S.W.2d 367, 371–72 (Tex. 1976). 11 the best interest of the child; (6) the plans for the child by these individuals; (7) the stability of the home; (8) the acts or omissions of the parent that may indicate that the existing parent-child relationship is not a proper one; and (9) any excuse for the acts or omissions of the parent. Holley, 544 S.W.2d at 371–72. The trial court is vested with broad discretion in making decisions regarding custody, possession, and visitation. In re B.G.J., 702 S.W.3d at 897 (citing Gillespie v. Gillespie, 644 S.W.2d 449, 451 (Tex. 1982); In re A.J.E., 372 S.W.3d 696, 698 (Tex. App.—Eastland 2012, no pet.)); see also In re J.A.J., 243 S.W.3d 611, 616 (Tex. 2007). “It is well established Texas law that an appellate court may not deal with disputed areas of fact in an original mandamus proceeding.” In re Walton, No. 11-16-00230-CV, 2017 WL 922418, at *1 (Tex. App.—Eastland Feb. 28, 2017, orig. proceeding) (mem. op.) (quoting In re Angelini, 186 S.W.3d 558, 560 (Tex. 2006) (orig. proceeding)). In other words, in a mandamus proceeding we “may not legitimately reconcile disputed factual matters.” Id. (citing Hooks v. Fourth Court of Appeals, 808 S.W.2d 56, 60 (Tex. 1991) (orig. proceeding)); see also Walker, 827 S.W.2d at 839 (“With respect to resolution of factual issues . . . the reviewing court may not substitute its judgment for that of the trial court.”). Because weighing evidence is a trial court function, mandamus will not lie if the record contains legally sufficient evidence both against and in support of the trial court’s decision. In re Walton, 2017 WL 922418, at *1; see also In re Odo, No. 11-21-00227-CV, 2021 WL 4782976, at *1 (Tex. App.—Eastland Oct. 14, 2021) (orig. proceeding) (mem. op). Geographic Restriction We have determined with respect to Jessica’s second issue that the trial court should have appointed her as sole managing conservator of the child. Section 153.132 provides that a parent appointed as sole managing conservator of 12 a child has the exclusive right to designate the primary residence of the child “unless limited by court order.” FAM. § 153.132. “[R]esidency restrictions may be imposed upon a sole managing conservator if warranted by the child’s best interests.” In re A.S., 298 S.W.3d 834, 836 (Tex. App.—Amarillo 2009, no pet.). In this regard, it is the public policy of this state to “assure that children will have frequent and continuing contact with parents who have shown the ability to act in the best interest of the child” and to “encourage parents to share in the rights and duties of raising their child after the parents have separated or dissolved their marriage.” Id. (quoting FAM. § 153.001(a). The Texas Supreme Court in Lenz considered the following factors when addressing the best interest of the child in the context of a residency restriction: (1) the relationship with and presence of extended family; (2) the presence of friends; (3) the presence of a stable and supportive environment; (4) the custodial parent’s improved financial situation and ability to provide a better standard of living for the children; (5) positive impact on the custodial parent’s emotional and mental state, with beneficial results to the children; (6) the noncustodial parent’s right to have regular and meaningful contact; (7) the ability of the noncustodial parent to relocate; and (8) the ability of the noncustodial parent to adapt his work schedule to his children. 79 S.W.3d at 15–19; see also In re Z.N.H., 280 S.W.3d 481, 486–87 (Tex. App.—Eastland 2009, no pet.). Here, an evaluation of the Lenz factors reveals that there was conflicting evidence that required the trial court to make credibility determinations before weighing the evidence. The evidence indicated that both parents had positive relationships with their respective extended families given that Jessica chose to move back to Hidalgo County where all her relatives lived and that Hiram’s sister testified positively about Hiram’s relationship with his son. As to the status of the 13 parties’ employment, Jessica testified that her employment improved in Hidalgo County since the previous hearing, and she had been promoted to director of nursing at her place of employment. Hiram testified that he had “free reign” to work as many hours as he wanted but that it would be “a strain” for him to drive eighteen hours every other weekend from Midland County to see his child in Hidalgo County. Hiram further stated that Jessica had been a nurse in the Midland area before, and he believed she could acquire another nursing job in the area. Certainly, Jessica disagreed that a geographic restriction to Midland County was in the child’s best interest, but the trial court in its discretion could disagree with that statement. Because the child’s best interest is always the primary consideration, the trial court was free to consider the uncontroverted evidence that visitation after the first hearing between Hiram and the child had gone well. See FAM. § 153.002. Further, the trial court could consider Jessica’s testimony that traveling that length of time for visitation negatively impacted the child, was “not good,” and would be better if the distance was shorter. Parents residing several hours apart is not conducive to promoting frequent and continuing contact with parents or encouraging parents to share in the rights and duties of raising their child. See FAM. § 153.001(a). In the second hearing, the trial court placed a great deal of significance on evidence developed in the first hearing that Jessica had mentioned a “plan” to move to Hidalgo County a few days prior to the spanking incident that she testified led to her decision to move to Hidalgo County. Further, Jessica testified that she had discussed with Hiram that she wanted both of them to move to Hidalgo County. This evidence undermined Jessica’s testimony that she was motivated to move to Hidalgo County in order to protect her children. 14 Giving deference to the trial court’s credibility determinations on the conflicting evidence and the public policy of promoting frequent, continuing and shared contact with parents, we conclude that there is sufficient credible evidence to support the imposition of a geographic restriction of Midland County and the trial court did not abuse its discretion when it imposed the geographic restriction. Unsupervised Visitation It is the state’s policy “to encourage frequent contact between a child and each parent for periods of possession that optimize the development of a close and continuing relationship between each parent and child.” FAM. § 153.251(b) (West 2014). There is a rebuttable presumption that unsupervised contact is not in the best interest of a child when there is a history of family violence during the two years preceding the date of the suit or during the suit. Id. §153.004(d)(1). However, unsupervised possession may still be awarded if the trial court finds that the access will not endanger the child’s physical health or emotional welfare and will be in the child’s best interest. Id. § 153.004(d)(1), (d-1)(1). Additionally, in rendering an appropriate possession order for a child under the age of three, a court shall consider evidence of all relevant factors, including: (1) the caregiving provided to the child before and during the current suit; (2) the effect on the child that may result from separation from either party; (3) the availability of the parties as caregivers and the willingness of the parties to personally care for the child; (4) the physical, medical, behavioral, and developmental needs of the child; (5) the physical, medical, emotional, economic, and social conditions of the parties; 15 (6) the impact and influence of individuals, other than the parties, who will be present during periods of possession; (7) the presence of siblings during periods of possession; (8) the child’s need to develop healthy attachments to both parents; (9) the child’s need for continuity of routine; (10) the location and proximity of the residences of the parties; (11) the need for a temporary possession schedule that incrementally shifts to the schedule provided in the prospective order under Subsection (d) based on: (A) the age of the child; or (B) minimal or inconsistent contact with the child by a party; (12) the ability of the parties to share in the responsibilities, rights, and duties of parenting; and (13) any other evidence of the best interest of the child. FAM. § 153.254(a). As we held above and in Coronado I, there was credible evidence of family violence. As such, the trial court was required to conduct the balancing test under Section 153.004 before ordering unsupervised periods of possession for Hiram. See id. §153.004. At the second temporary hearing, the trial court found that there was no evidence of any physical, medical, behavioral, or developmental concerns for the child resulting from visitation with Hiram, other than those related to travel. Our review of the record likewise finds no evidence demonstrating any of the concerns for the child resulting from visitation with Hiram other than those related to travel. The trial court also found that Hiram having access would have the “best effect” on the child. This finding is supported by Hiram’s testimony at the second temporary hearing that he is bonded to his son, his son is happy to see him, and his son enjoys 16 the time they are together. Additionally, Kayla Garcia, Hiram’s sister and the supervisor of Hiram’s visitation with L.J.C., testified that the interactions between Hiram and his child were “really good.” She further observed that Hiram takes good care of his child, including performing normal caretaking duties such as feedings and changing diapers. Garcia described the child as appearing happy when he was with Hiram. Even though the trial court erred as to the determination of family violence, the trial court’s other findings properly considered the requisite balancing test under Section 153.004. See id. As such, the trial court did not clearly abuse its discretion in ordering unsupervised visitation for Hiram. We overrule Jessica’s third issue. This Court’s Ruling Accordingly, we conditionally grant Jessica’s petition for writ of mandamus in part and direct Judge Morgan to vacate that portion of the temporary orders appointing the parties temporary joint managing conservators. A writ of mandamus will issue only if he fails to act by November 12, 2026. All other relief requested is denied. JOHN M. BAILEY CHIEF JUSTICE October 29, 2026 Panel consists of: Bailey, C.J., Trotter, J., and Williams, J. 17