Full Opinion

TEXAS COURT OF APPEALS, THIRD DISTRICT, AT AUSTIN NO. 03-24-00635-CV Rain Levy Minns Udall, Appellant v. Michael Minns, Appellee FROM THE 53RD DISTRICT COURT OF TRAVIS COUNTY NO. D-1-FM-21-004054, THE HONORABLE AURORA MARTINEZ-JONES, JUDGE PRESIDING MEMORANDUM OPINION Appellant Rain Levy Minns Udall (Mother) challenges the trial court’s order granting the motion for enforcement of child support filed by appellee Michael Minns (Grandfather). Grandfather was awarded sole managing conservatorship of Mother’s children in a suit affecting the parent-child relationship (SAPCR), which he brought under Family Code Section 102.004(a)(1). Mother asserts three issues in this appeal: (1) the trial court lacked jurisdiction over Grandfather’s claims and the children; (2) the trial court abused its discretion by ordering Mother to pay Grandfather for unreimbursed medical costs of the children; and (3) the trial court abused its discretion by holding Mother in criminal contempt for failing to pay her support obligations. For the reasons explained below, we affirm the trial court’s order in part. Because we dismiss for want of jurisdiction Mother’s issue concerning the trial court’s contempt holding, we do not consider that portion of the enforcement order. BACKGROUND Mother has three children. Mother and the children’s father (Father) divorced in 2016. Mother and Father were appointed joint managing conservators of the children in the Agreed Final Decree of Divorce. Father was diagnosed with cancer not long after the divorce was finalized, and he died in November 2017. In 2021, Grandfather filed an Original Petition in Suit Affecting the Parent Child Relationship, initially seeking conservatorship only of Mother’s oldest child but later amending his petition to seek conservatorship of all three children. The events leading to the trial court’s award of sole managing conservatorship to Grandfather are described in detail in our opinion affirming the Final SAPCR Order, Udall v. Minns (Udall I), 730 S.W.3d 704 (Tex. App.— Austin 2026, pet. denied). While Mother’s appeal from the final SAPCR order was pending, Grandfather filed a Motion for Enforcement of Child Support, seeking to enforce the portions of the Final SAPCR Order requiring Mother to pay child support and medical support for the children. Grandfather sought to have the trial court confirm that Mother was in arrears for child support, cash medical support, and unreimbursed medical expenses and render judgment plus interest on the arrearages, attorneys’ fees, and costs. Grandfather requested that Mother be held in contempt for each violation alleged and jailed for up to 180 days in the aggregate, with each period of confinement to run concurrently. Mother filed a response to the enforcement motion, arguing that it was premature because the Final SAPCR Order was being appealed, that she was insolvent and unable to pay, and that Grandfather failed to meet the preconditions required to entitle him to medical reimbursements. After an evidentiary hearing, the trial court signed an Order on Motion for 2 Enforcement (Enforcement Order) on September 30, 2024, finding that Mother had committed the following enumerated violations of the Final SAPCR Order: failure to pay a prior judgment for child-support arrearage, seven new violations of the child-support portion, seven violations of the portion of the order requiring her to pay cash medical support, and 118 violations of the portion of the order requiring her to pay unreimbursed medical expenses. The Enforcement Order stated in a section titled “Relief Granted,” “IT IS ADJUDGED that [Mother] is in contempt for each violation enumerated above.” In the following section, titled “Criminal Contempt and Suspension of Commitment,” the trial court held Mother in contempt for her failure to pay the previously confirmed child-support arrearage, for the seven counts of failure to pay current monthly child support, and for her failure to pay cash medical support. The court ordered “that punishment for each separate violation is assessed at confinement in the county jail of Travis County, Texas, for a period of two (2) weeks to run concurrently,” but it suspended commitment until further order of the court and set a review hearing for one month later. The Enforcement Order confirmed Mother’s failure to pay a previously confirmed child-support arrearage of $14,192.71. The Enforcement Order also granted a new cumulative judgment to Grandfather of an additional $93,778.44. The cumulative judgment included the current child-support arrearages of $13,136.48; current cash-medical-support arrearage of $643.31; unreimbursed medical expenses of $65,532.40; and attorneys’ fees of $14,467.25 assessed against Mother. Mother filed her notice of appeal on October 2. She filed a supplemental response to Grandfather’s enforcement motion on October 28, in advance of the October 30 review hearing. After the review hearing, the trial court issued a November 20 order extending the suspension of Mother’s jail sentence until the next review hearing on January 10, 2025. On 3 December 20, 2024, Grandfather filed a Motion to Revoke Suspension of Commitment because Mother had failed to pay any amount toward the arrearages and made only nominal payments toward the additional monthly child-support obligations that had subsequently accrued. On January 7, 2025, Mother filed a Motion to Void Due to Lack of Jurisdiction and a Plea to the Jurisdiction, asking the trial court to declare all orders in the case void. Mother argued for the first time that the trial court never had jurisdiction over the case because it had been randomly assigned to the 53rd District Court of Travis County when Grandfather filed, and instead it should have been filed in the 200th District Court of Travis County, the court that signed Mother’s Agreed Final Decree of Divorce from Father in 2017. The parties agreed to postpone the January 10 review hearing and instead scheduled a hearing on Mother’s new filings for February 19. After the February 19 hearing, the trial court denied Mother’s jurisdictional challenges. It set another review hearing to determine whether to continue suspending Mother’s jail sentence for March 5. On the morning of March 5, Mother filed a motion for emergency stay with this Court, asking that we stay enforcement of the Final SAPCR Order pending this appeal. We denied Mother’s emergency motion on March 6. After conducting its status and follow-up hearing on March 5, the trial court signed an order on Grandfather’s motion to revoke suspension of commitment. That order required Mother to provide, on or before 5:15 p.m. on March 6, 2025, to the trial court and Grandfather “documentation evidencing and verifying that [Mother] has initiated the withdrawal of $86,069.99 from her account with the Minns Law Firm 401(k) Profit Sharing Plan and Trust to be payable to and through the state disbursement unit.” The trial court ordered Mother to appear in person in the courtroom on March 11, 2025, at 11:00 a.m., to be committed to the 4 sheriff’s custody for a two-week period of confinement if she did not comply with the order to provide documentation. The record does not reflect further events in the trial court after March 6. In their briefing, the parties represent that Mother has not been subject to confinement. ANALYSIS On appeal, Mother challenges the trial court’s order in three issues. First, she contends that the trial court lacked jurisdiction to enter any orders in Grandfather’s SAPCR, including the order on appeal, asserting that under Texas Family Code Section 155.001, the 200th District Court of Travis County acquired continuing, exclusive jurisdiction over any SAPCR matters related to the children, and absent a valid transfer under Chapter 155, no other court may exercise jurisdiction over such matters. Second, Mother argues that the trial court abused its discretion by requiring Mother to pay medical-reimbursement arrearages that had accrued under the temporary orders without requiring Grandfather to prove that he had met the requirements imposed in the temporary orders for obtaining medical reimbursements. Third, Mother asserts that the trial court abused its discretion by holding Mother in criminal contempt for failure to pay the medical-reimbursement arrearages when Mother was not afforded due process. Because Mother’s first and third issues concern our jurisdiction over the issues raised in this appeal, we address them first. I. The trial court has jurisdiction over this case. In her first issue, Mother argues that this Court should declare void every order issued in Grandfather’s SAPCR because the case should have been filed as a modification proceeding in the divorce case in the 200th District Court of Travis County instead of as an 5 original suit in the 53rd District Court of Travis County. Mother argues that under Texas Family Code Section 155.001, the 200th District Court acquired continuing, exclusive jurisdiction over any SAPCR matters related to the children, and absent a valid transfer under Chapter 155, no other court may exercise jurisdiction over such matters. Thus, she contends, all orders issued after Grandfather’s SAPCR was filed in the 53rd District Court are void. As we explained in Udall I, we disagree. Udall I, 730 S.W.3d at 719-20 (holding that orders issued in Grandfather’s SAPCR are not void for lack of jurisdiction). The central- docket system adopted by Travis County District Courts, which allows for any available judge to hear a matter, is “consistent with the concept of judges exchanging benches,” and does not conflict with the requirements of Family Code Section 155.001. Id. at 720 (quoting In re Garza, 981 S.W.2d 438, 441 (Tex. App.—San Antonio 1998, orig. proceeding)). “Once continuing exclusive jurisdiction has been established in a particular district court in Travis County, under the operation of the Travis County Local Rules, any district judge in the county acting in that case is doing so for the court with continuing exclusive jurisdiction.” Id. In addition, Grandfather was not required to file a modification proceeding in the divorce case; Family Code Section 102.004(a) allows Grandfather to file an original suit requesting managing conservatorship if he proves the order is necessary under subsection (1). We reiterate our holding from Udall I that the orders issued in this SAPCR are not void for lack of jurisdiction. We overrule Mother’s first issue. II. We dismiss Mother’s contempt issue for want of jurisdiction because that issue must be challenged in an original proceeding. In her third issue, Mother argues that the trial court abused its discretion by holding Mother in criminal contempt for nonpayment of the medical-reimbursement arrearages 6 because the court did not provide Mother with due process. At the outset of her brief, Mother acknowledges that a contempt order is not an appealable order but instead is reviewable only in an original proceeding. See In re Janson, 614 S.W.3d 724, 727 (Tex. 2020) (citing In re Long, 984 S.W.2d 623, 625 (Tex. 1999) (orig. proceeding)). “[C]ontempt orders are not appealable, even when appealed along with a judgment that is appealable.” Cadle Co. v. Lobingier, 50 S.W.3d 662, 671 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth 2001, pet. denied). An order holding a party in contempt is not a final, appealable judgment because it is an order that “protects the status of the court itself,” not a judgment disposing of all claims and parties then before the court. In re Office of Atty. Gen. of Tex., 215 S.W.3d 913, 915 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth 2007, orig. proceeding) (citing Ex parte Pryor, 800 S.W.2d 511, 512 (Tex. 1990) (orig. proceeding); Lehmann v. Har–Con Corp., 39 S.W.3d 191, 192 (Tex. 2001)). When the contemnor is not jailed, as here, “the proper vehicle to challenge a contempt order is a writ of mandamus.” In re Janson, 614 S.W.3d at 727; see also In re Long, 984 S.W.2d at 625 (explaining that contempt orders involving confinement may be reviewed only by petition for writ of habeas corpus and contempt orders not involving confinement may be reviewed only by petition for writ of mandamus). Mother requests that we treat her appeal as a mandamus if we decide the trial court’s rulings are not appealable, asserting that she could have sought mandamus relief on all three issues that she raises in her brief. See CMH Homes v. Perez, 340 S.W.3d 444, 453-54 (Tex. 2011) (determining that appellant’s appeal from unappealable interlocutory order should have been treated as petition for writ of mandamus by court of appeals because appellant specifically requested mandamus relief as alternative “in an uncertain legal environment” where it was not clear whether particular type of arbitration order was appealable and requiring 7 appellant to refile brief as petition for writ of mandamus would waste judicial resources in case where merits had been addressed in appellant’s brief). Unlike the issue before the Texas Supreme Court in CMH Homes, which involved the appealability of certain arbitration orders, an area of the law that was in flux at the time, the question of whether contempt orders are appealable is well settled. In addition, we disagree with Mother’s contention that her first issue challenging the trial court’s jurisdiction to enter any orders in Grandfather’s SAPCR, her second issue arguing that the trial court abused its discretion by ordering Mother to pay the medical-reimbursement arrearages, and this third issue challenging the contempt order are all reviewable by mandamus. Mandamus relief is proper only to correct a clear abuse of discretion when there is no adequate remedy by appeal. In re Prudential Ins. Co. of Am., 148 S.W.3d 124, 135-36 (Tex. 2004) (orig. proceeding); see also Walker v. Packer, 827 S.W.2d 833, 840 (Tex. 1992) (“Mandamus is intended to be an extraordinary remedy, available only in limited circumstances.”). The trial court’s enforcement order requiring Mother to pay medical-reimbursement arrearages is an appealable order because it disposed of all claims raised in Grandfather’s enforcement motion. See In re Z. W.-M., No. 03-24-00767-CV, 2025 WL 2470828, at *3 (Tex. App.—Austin Aug. 28, 2025, no pet.) (mem. op.) (concluding that trial court’s order on attorney general’s enforcement motion was final and appealable as to that motion because it disposed of all claims raised in that motion even though it referred other issues raised by appellant to referring district court). Because Mother has raised an issue that is not appropriate for mandamus relief, we conclude that it is not appropriate in this case to treat her direct appeal as a petition for writ of mandamus. See, e.g., Heads v. McDade, No. 03-18-00753- CV, 2019 WL 3680144, at *1 (Tex. App.—Austin Aug. 7, 2019, no pet.) (mem. op.) (declining 8 to review contempt order as part of direct appeal also involving challenge to award of attorneys’ fees). We dismiss for want of jurisdiction Mother’s third issue challenging the contempt order. 1 III. The trial court did not abuse its discretion by requiring Mother to pay medical-reimbursement arrearages that had accrued under the temporary orders. Mother contends in her second issue that the trial court erred by granting Grandfather’s enforcement motion on unreimbursed medical expenses, arguing that Grandfather failed to provide sufficient evidence that he followed the applicable orders’ requirements for obtaining reimbursement from Mother and that he did not provide adequate supporting documentation for the expenses. A. We review the trial court’s decision for an abuse of discretion. We review a trial court’s confirmation of child-support arrearages, including medical support, for an abuse of discretion. In re C.F., 576 S.W.3d 761, 772 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth 2019, no pet.). The trial court abuses its discretion if it acts “without reference to any guiding rules or principles,” or in other words, if it acts in an arbitrary or unreasonable manner. In re J.J.R.S., 627 S.W.3d 211, 218 (Tex. 2021) (quoting Worford v. Stamper, 801 S.W.2d 108, 109 (Tex. 1990) (per curiam)). In family-law cases, the abuse-of-discretion standard overlaps with traditional standards for reviewing the sufficiency of the evidence. See Zeifman v. Michels, 212 S.W.3d 1 We note that while the trial court held Mother in contempt for all the enumerated violations in the enforcement order, it held her in criminal contempt only for the failure to pay the previously confirmed child-support judgment, the current monthly child support, and the current case medical support. 9 582, 587-88 (Tex. App.—Austin 2006, pet. denied). Consequently, legal and factual insufficiency are not independent grounds of error but are relevant factors in assessing whether the trial court abused its discretion. Id. at 587. To determine whether the trial court has abused its discretion, we engage in a two-pronged inquiry, analyzing whether (1) the trial court had sufficient evidence upon which to exercise its discretion and (2) the trial court erred in its application of that discretion. Id. at 588. We apply the traditional standards for legal- and factual-sufficiency review when considering the first question. Id. Under the legal-sufficiency standard, when the appellant attacks the legal sufficiency of an adverse finding on which she did not have the burden of proof, she must demonstrate on appeal that there is no evidence to support the adverse finding. Exxon Corp. v. Emerald Oil & Gas Co., 348 S.W.3d 194, 215 (Tex. 2011). We credit all evidence and inferences favorable to the trial court’s decision if a reasonable factfinder could, and we disregard all evidence to the contrary unless a reasonable factfinder could not. City of Keller, 168 S.W.3d at 827. Evidence is legally sufficient if it “would enable reasonable and fair-minded people to reach the verdict under review.” Id. Evidence is legally insufficient when (1) there is a complete absence of a vital fact; (2) rules of law or evidence preclude giving weight to the only evidence offered to prove a vital fact; (3) the evidence offered to prove a vital fact is no more than a scintilla; or (4) the evidence conclusively establishes the opposite of the vital fact. See id. at 810, 815-16. Under the factual-sufficiency standard, when the appellant attacks the factual sufficiency of an adverse finding on which she did not have the burden of proof, we consider and weigh all the evidence in the record pertinent to the finding to determine if the credible evidence supporting the finding is so weak, or so contrary to the overwhelming weight of all the evidence, 10 that the finding should be set aside. Crosstex N. Tex. Pipeline, L.P. v. Gardiner, 505 S.W.3d 580, 615 (Tex. 2016). Because the trial court acts as the factfinder in a bench trial, the trial court is the “sole judge of the credibility of the witnesses and the weight to be given their testimony.” McGalliard v. Kuhlmann, 722 S.W.2d 694, 696 (Tex. 1986). The trial court does not abuse its discretion if it bases its decision on conflicting evidence or when evidence of a probative or substantive character exists to support the decision. Zeifman, 212 S.W.3d at 587. B. Grandfather satisfied his burden to establish the amount of support owed. A movant who seeks to enforce an order to provide medical support has the burden of establishing the amount of support owed. In re C.F., 576 S.W.3d at 773; see also Tex. Fam. Code § 154.183(c)(1) (establishing that healthcare expenses not reimbursed by health or dental insurance constitute “additional child support”). To meet this burden, the movant must prove the difference between the payments made by the obligor and the payments required by the support order. Beck v. Walker, 154 S.W.3d 895, 903 (Tex. App.—Dallas 2005, no pet.). In his enforcement motion, Grandfather sought confirmation of Mother’s arrearages for unreimbursed medical expenses that the children had incurred between July 2021 and March 2024. From July 2021 until the Final SAPCR Order was signed in October 2023, temporary orders were in place that governed the allocation of unreimbursed expenses between Mother and Grandfather. The temporary orders established that Mother was responsible for 100% of the healthcare expenses if Mother was not providing the children’s health insurance. 2 2 By the time of the Final SAPCR Order, Grandfather was providing the children with health insurance that Mother was ordered to pay for as additional child support. 11 The Final SAPCR Order also allocated 100% of the unreimbursed healthcare expenses to Mother “unless and until the Probate Court confirms the obligations of the Estate of [Father], as set forth in the Final Decree of Divorce.” Despite this allocation, Grandfather sought only to have Mother held responsible for payment of 50% of the unreimbursed healthcare expenses. 3 Mother contends that Grandfather failed to meet his burden to establish the amounts she owed because he did not prove he satisfied the prerequisites for receiving payment from Mother that were established in the temporary orders rendered by the associate judge on October 6, 2021 (but signed on December 1, 2021). The temporary-order provisions relied on by Mother are the following: If [Grandfather] incurs a health-care expense, including therapy expense, on behalf of a child, he is ORDERED to furnish to [Mother] and the Estate of [Father] all forms, receipts, bills, and statements, reflecting the unreimbursed portion of the health-care expenses within thirty days after he receives them. For expenses incurred prior to this hearing on September 3, 2021, [Grandfather] shall re-submit those forms, receipts, bills and statements to the other conservator within 30 days from September 3, 2021. IT IS ORDERED that [Grandfather] is not required to submit to [Mother] any explanations of benefits because he does not have access to them from the insurance company. IT IS ORDERED that [Mother] shall submit to [Grandfather] within 3 business day[s] of receipt all explanations of benefits received by her related to the children. If [Grandfather] furnishes to [Mother] and the Estate of [Father] the forms, receipts, bills and statements, reflecting the unreimbursed portion of the health- care expenses within thirty days after the incurring conservator receives them, [Mother] is ORDERED to pay her percentage of the unreimbursed portion of the health-care expenses either by paying the health-care provider directly or by reimbursing [Grandfather] for any advance payment of the unreimbursed portion of the health-care expenses within thirty (30) days after [Mother] receives the forms, receipts, bills and/or statements. If [Grandfather] fails to furnish to [Mother] and the Estate of [Father] the forms, receipts, bills and statements reflecting the unreimbursed portion of the 3 It is unclear from the record whether the Probate Court has confirmed the obligations of Father’s estate to pay child support. 12 health-care expenses within thirty days after [Grandfather] receives them, [Mother] is ORDERED to pay her percentage of the unreimbursed portion of the health-care expenses either by paying the health-care provider directly or by reimbursing [Grandfather] for any advance payment of the unreimbursed portion of the health-care expenses within 120 days after [Mother] receives the forms, receipts, bills and/or statements. (Italics and second bold emphasis added.) The Final SAPCR Order similarly provided as follows: If [Grandfather] incurs a health-care expense, including therapy expense, on behalf of a child, he is ORDERED to furnish to [Mother] and the Estate of [Father] all forms, receipts, bills, and statements, reflecting the unreimbursed portion of the health-care expenses within thirty days after he receives them. If [Grandfather] furnishes to [Mother] and the Estate of [Father] the forms, receipts, bills and statements, reflecting the unreimbursed portion of the health-care expenses within thirty days after the incurring conservator receives them, [Mother] is ORDERED to pay 100% of the unreimbursed portion of the health-care expense(s) either by paying the health-care provider directly or by reimbursing [Grandfather] for any advance payment of the unreimbursed portion of the health-care expenses within thirty (30) days after [Mother] receives the forms, receipts, bills and/or statements. If [Grandfather] fails to furnish to [Mother] and the Estate of [Father] the forms, receipts, bills and statements reflecting the unreimbursed portion of the health-care expenses within thirty days after [Grandfather] receives them, [Mother] is ORDERED to pay 100% of the unreimbursed portion of the health- care expense(s) either by paying the health-care provider directly or by reimbursing [Grandfather] for any advance payment of the unreimbursed portion of the health-care expenses within 60 days after [Mother] receives the forms, receipts, bills and/or statements. For the Court to hold the non-incurring conservator in civil or criminal contempt for failing to pay the non-incurring conservator’s percentage of the unreimbursed portion of a health-care expense, the incurring conservator must prove beyond a reasonable doubt that the non-incurring conservator personally received receipts, bills, statements, or explanations of benefits reflecting the unreimbursed portion of the health-care expense no later than thirty days after the incurring conservator received them. Even if the incurring conservator fails to meet that burden of proof, the Court may award the incurring conservator a judgment in the nature of child support against the non-incurring conservator in the amount of the 13 unreimbursed portion of the heath-care expense the non-incurring conservator was ordered but failed to pay. (Emphasis added.) Mother complains that Grandfather did not comply with these alleged “prerequisites” for reimbursement: (1) consultation with her before making healthcare decisions for the children and (2) timely provision of sufficient forms, receipts, bills, and statements reflecting the unreimbursed portion of the healthcare expenses. 4 Mother does not provide the Court with record references to the consultation provisions upon which she relies. Our review of the temporary orders and Final SAPCR Order does not indicate that Grandfather is required to comply with a consultation requirement to be entitled to reimbursement from Mother for unreimbursed medical expenses. 5 As for Mother’s complaint about Grandfather’s alleged failure to timely provide her with required documentation of unreimbursed medical expenses, she fails to point out any specific expenses for which she received inadequate or untimely documentation. At the hearing, 4 Mother also complains that Grandfather insisted on being allowed to insure the children under his own policy but did not give her a copy of the policy and that he chose costly providers, who often were not preferred providers, leading to excessive and unnecessary medical costs. She does not provide us with citations to evidence in the record supporting these complaints or point us to any provisions in the relevant orders establishing that these alleged actions excuse her from her obligation to pay unreimbursed medical expenses. 5 We note that Mother did not testify to any specific instances when Grandfather failed to confer with her before the children’s medical treatment or to inform her in a timely manner of significant information related to the children’s health. The August 12, 2021 temporary orders provide a “right to confer with the other conservator before making a decision concerning the health, education and welfare of the children,” but there is no provision specifying the details of how that right is to be exercised and no provision conditioning Grandfather’s entitlement to reimbursement on prior consultation. The Final SAPCR Order established that Mother has the right to confer with Grandfather via email at least three business days before Grandfather consents to invasive procedures or psychiatric and psychological treatment for the children. 14 Grandfather introduced into evidence spreadsheets documenting the service provider, the child who was served, the date of service, the amount paid, the date the document had been sent or provided to Mother, the amount due from Mother, and the date payment was due from Mother. Mother did not dispute at the hearing and does not dispute on appeal that these medical expenses for the children were actually incurred or that she had not reimbursed Grandfather for them. Grandfather initially attached these spreadsheets to his enforcement motion, and he submitted updated versions of them into evidence at the hearing removing some duplicate violations and a few violations for which the expense documentation had not yet been submitted to Mother when the enforcement motion was filed. Although Mother complains that “in many cases documents were not given to [Mother] until months after the services were performed,” she provides no specific examples and the spreadsheets show that the expense documentation typically was sent to Mother almost immediately, or at most within three to four months. Mother also complains that a significant number of documents were provided to her “in discovery without proper explanation” and that “[t]hese documents were not timely, nor were they complete.” However, she does not specify which services were allegedly lacking complete expense documentation, how the documentation was lacking, or why it was improper for some of the expense documentation to be provided to her as part of the ongoing discovery process in the case. Most importantly, Mother does not point to any provision in the orders requiring that the expense documentation be sent to her within a certain time period after the expense was incurred to be payable to Grandfather. Instead, the 2021 temporary orders establish that if Grandfather did not send Mother the expense documentation within 30 days of receiving it from the provider, Mother’s deadline to reimburse Grandfather was extended from 30 days after her 15 receipt of it to 120 days after her receipt. The Final SAPCR Order similarly establishes that if Grandfather does not send her the expense documentation within 30 days of receiving it, Mother’s deadline to reimburse Grandfather was extended from 30 days after her receipt of it to 60 days after her receipt of it. In addition, the Final SAPCR Order provides that to hold Mother in civil or criminal contempt for nonpayment, Grandfather must prove beyond a reasonable doubt that he sent Mother the expense documentation within 30 days. If he cannot meet that burden of proof, the trial court nevertheless may award him “a judgment in the nature of child support” in the amount of the unreimbursed portion of the healthcare expense. At the hearing, Grandfather testified that the corrected spreadsheets accurately reflected the expenses he had incurred on behalf of the children and submitted to Mother for reimbursement and the sole payment that Mother had made toward those expenses. He testified that Mother had not made any other payments and that he was requesting that the Court confirm that Mother was in arrears for 50% of the children’s unreimbursed medical expenses, totaling $65,532.40. 6 Grandfather testified that Mother had never asked for any clarification or additional documentation of the expenses for which he sought reimbursement. Mother’s counsel did not object to the admission of the spreadsheets, stating, “if that’s what they say, then -- obviously they wouldn’t lie to us.” Mother’s counsel did not cross examine Grandfather about the spreadsheets, the documentation supporting it, or any of the underlying expenses. 7 When Mother testified, she did 6 As explained in Udall I, all three children had significant mental-healthcare needs, as well as physical-healthcare expenses. 7 Instead, Mother’s counsel attempted to elicit testimony from Grandfather about whether he had received payment for the unreimbursed medical expenses from some other source, such as Father’s estate, which the trial court precluded on relevance grounds, stating 16 not explain why the documentation she had been provided was not sufficient or provide any examples of expenses that she believed were not supported by sufficient documentation. She did not challenge any of the individual expenses listed on the spreadsheets. In addition, we note that Grandfather’s spreadsheets complied with Texas Rule of Evidence Rule 1006. Rule 1006 provides as follows: The proponent may use a summary, chart, or calculation to prove the content of voluminous writings, recordings, or photographs that cannot be conveniently examined in court. The proponent must make the originals or duplicates available for examination or copying, or both, by other parties at a reasonable time and place. And the court may order the proponent to produce them in court. The trial court had before it both the spreadsheets and Grandfather’s unchallenged testimony that the spreadsheets accurately summarized the unreimbursed medical expenses that Mother owed him under the terms of the temporary orders and Final SAPCR Order. We hold that the spreadsheets and Grandfather’s testimony constituted sufficient evidence upon which the trial court could exercise its discretion and that the trial court did not err in its application of that discretion. We overrule Mother’s second issue. “your client has an obligation under the order. . . . [T]he heart of what I want to understand, is whether your client has met her obligation, and if she has not, whether she should be held in contempt with any remedy that may be available to the Court.” On appeal, Mother argues that because Grandfather may receive some funds from Father’s estate to help with the children’s support—a fact she did not establish at this hearing—the trial court’s award of these expenses somehow constitutes a double recovery for Grandfather. It is unclear from the record before us what obligations Father’s estate has to support the children, but whatever those obligations are, Mother does not cite any legal authority to support the proposition that if Father’s estate has made some support payments, she is somehow discharged from her own court-ordered obligations to support her children. 17 CONCLUSION Because we conclude that we lack jurisdiction over Mother’s challenge to the trial court’s contempt ruling, we dismiss Mother’s third issue for want of jurisdiction, and we do not consider that portion of the enforcement order. Having overruled Mother’s first and second issues, we affirm the remainder of the trial court’s enforcement order. __________________________________________ Gisela D. Triana, Justice Before Justices Triana, Theofanis, and Crump Affirmed in part; Dismissed for Want of Jurisdiction in part Filed: October 23, 2026 18