Full Opinion

Reversed and Remanded and Memorandum Opinion filed November 17, 2026. In The Fourteenth Court of Appeals NO. 14-25-00923-CV CHARLES HERD, BRANDON FRANCIS, AND HERD LAW FIRM, PLLC, Appellants V. LESLIE JONES, Appellee On Appeal from the 215th District Court Harris County, Texas Trial Court Cause No. 2025-33695 MEMORANDUM OPINION By a single issue in this accelerated appeal, appellants Charles Herd, Brandon Francis, and Herd Law Firm, PLLC (“Herd Law Firm”) argue the trial court erroneously denied their motion to compel arbitration. Because the venue provision and the arbitration clause are reconcilable, we reverse the trial court’s order denying the motion to compel arbitration. We remand to the trial court with instructions to issue an order compelling the parties to arbitrate under their March 30, 2022, engagement agreement (“Agreement”) and staying the trial court proceeding until arbitration has occurred in accordance with the Agreement. I. Factual and Procedural Background Leslie Jones engaged Herd Law Firm to represent her in a personal injury lawsuit against the owner of the Sleep Inn Shamrock Hotel. Jones and Herd Law Firm entered into an Agreement governing the representation. In the Agreement, Jones agreed to arbitrate claims against Herd Law Firm and its attorneys arising from the Agreement or from their representation of Jones: “Any and all disputes, controversies, claims or demands arising out of or relating to this Agreement or any provision hereof, the providing of services by Attorneys to Client, or in any way relating to the relationship between Attorneys and Client … shall be resolved by binding arbitration pursuant to the Federal Arbitration Act with the Commercial Arbitration Rules then in effect with the American Arbitration Association.” The Agreement also includes a venue provision specifying that, “Any suit … will be filed in a Court of competent jurisdiction in Harris County, Texas.” Jones sued Herd Law Firm and two of its attorneys, Charles Herd and Brandon Francis, for professional negligence. The defendants-appellants moved to compel arbitration and to stay proceedings pending completion of arbitration. Jones opposed the motion to compel arbitration. Jones argued that the venue language nullified the arbitration clause, and therefore there was not a meeting of the minds supporting the agreement to arbitrate. Jones also argued the clause should not be enforced because Herd Law Firm allegedly failed to provide “necessary disclosures” regarding arbitration and the arbitration agreement was therefore unconscionable.1 The trial court signed an order denying the motion to compel 1 Jones did not dispute that she entered into the engagement agreement. And Jones did not 2 arbitration on October 7, 2025. This appeal followed. II. Analysis Appellants argue the arbitration agreement is enforceable under Texas law, and that the venue provision does not negate the arbitration provision. Appellee Jones argues the venue and arbitration provisions are inconsistent, and this shows there was not a meeting of the minds between the parties to support an agreement to arbitrate. Jones also argues the arbitration provision is unconscionable and was not adequately negotiated and explained to her. Under settled law, Jones has not demonstrated unconscionability and the arbitration agreement is valid. A. Standard of Review We review a trial court’s decision to grant or deny a motion to compel arbitration for an abuse of discretion. See Jack B. Anglin Co., Inc. v. Tipps, 842 S.W.2d 266, 271 (Tex. 1992). Under an abuse-of-discretion standard, we defer to the trial court’s factual determinations if they are supported by evidence, but we review the trial court’s legal determinations de novo. In re Labatt Food Serv., L.P., 279 S.W.3d 640, 643 (Tex. 2009). Whether a valid arbitration agreement exists between specific parties is generally a gateway matter for the court to decide. In re Rubiola, 334 S.W.3d 220, 224 (Tex. 2011). We review de novo the trial court’s determinations as to whether a valid arbitration agreement exists. R & L Carriers Shared Servs., L.L.C. v. Gonzalez, No. 14-24-00992-CV, 2026 WL 1172841, at *3 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] April 30, 2026, no pet.) (mem. op.). The ultimate issue of whether an arbitration agreement is unconscionable is a question of law for the court. Royston, Rayzor, Vickery, & Williams, LLP v. Lopez, 467 S.W.3d 494, 499 (Tex. 2015) (citing In re Poly–Am., L.P., 262 S.W.3d 337, 349 (Tex. 2008); J.M. dispute that her claims fell within the scope of the arbitration clause. 3 Davidson, Inc. v. Webster, 128 S.W.3d 223, 229 (Tex. 2003)). When unconscionability is the basis for denying a motion to compel arbitration and there are no factual disputes, the standard of review on appeal is de novo. Id. B. The Arbitration Agreement if Enforceable The presence of a venue provision and an arbitration provision in a single contract does not invalidate the agreement to arbitrate when the venue provision can be harmonized with the arbitration provision. See Valerus Compression Servs., LP v. Austin, 417 S.W.3d 202, 210 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 2013, no pet.); New Concept Const. Co. v. Kirbyville Consol. Indep. Sch. Dist., 119 S.W.3d 468, 470 (Tex. App.—Beaumont 2003, pet. denied) (holding forum-selection provision that did not exclude arbitration was consistent with arbitration provision that contemplated trial-court involvement under certain circumstances surrounding arbitration or if arbitration were waived); cf. Transcor Astra Grp. S.A. v. Petrobras Am. Inc., 650 S.W.3d 462, 481 (Tex. 2022) (“While arbitration clauses can survive and be harmonized with forum-selection clauses . . . the forum-selection clause in the 2012 settlement agreement states that Harris County courts and the Southern District of Texas are ‘the exclusive forums for any dispute’ regarding the settlement agreement, indicating the parties’ intent to supersede the arbitration clause in the 2006 stock-purchase agreement.”). In this case, the venue provision does not render the arbitration agreement meaningless because the two clauses can be harmonized. The venue clause does not exclude arbitration, nor does it require that any suit be submitted to a court in Harris County for resolution. Read together, the venue clause governs only the court proceedings that remain available alongside arbitration such as a motion to compel arbitration, a proceeding to confirm or vacate an arbitration award, or litigation that occurs if arbitration is waived. Here, in relevant part to this appeal, the venue and arbitration provisions read 4 as follows: XI. TEXAS LAW TO APPLY 11.01 This agreement shall be construed under and in accordance with the laws of the State of Texas. Any suit between Client and Attorneys or either of them regarding Attorneys’ representation of Client or regarding anything covered by this Agreement will be filed in a Court of competent jurisdiction in Harris County, Texas. XII. ARBITRATION, MEDIATION 12.01 Any and all disputes, controversies, claims or demands arising out of or relating to this Agreement or any provision hereof, the providing of services by Attorney to Client, or in any way relating to the relationship between Attorneys and Client, whether in contract, tort or otherwise, at law or in equity, for damages or any other relief, shall be resolved by binding arbitration pursuant to the Federal Arbitration Act in accordance with the Commercial Arbitration Rules then in effect with the American Arbitration Association. Any such arbitration proceeding shall be conducted in Harris County, Texas. This arbitration provision shall be enforceable in either federal or state court in Harris County, Texas, pursuant to the substantive federal laws established by the Federal Arbitration Act. Any party to any award rendered in such arbitration proceeding may seek a judgment upon the award and that judgment may be entered by any federal or state court in Harris County, Texas having jurisdiction. (Emphasis in original). The venue and arbitration provisions are straightforward to reconcile because the arbitration clause itself expressly contemplates Harris County court involvement: it states the arbitration provision “shall be enforceable in either federal or state court in Harris County, Texas,” and that any judgment on an arbitration award “may be entered by any federal or state court in Harris County... having jurisdiction.” The venue clause—fixing Harris County as the forum for “any suit” regarding the 5 representation or the agreement—dovetails with, rather than contradicts, this language. On its face, the venue provision can be read as governing the ancillary court proceedings (compelling arbitration, confirming or vacating an award) that the arbitration clause anticipates will occur in Harris County courts, not as an independent grant of a right to litigate the underlying dispute on the merits. See Valerus, 417 S.W.3d at 210; New Concept Const. Co., 119 S.W.3d at 470. Finally, Jones’s unconscionability argument does not render the arbitration agreement unenforceable, and we note that Jones does not distinguish in her briefing between procedural and substantive unconscionability. 2 Once it is established that a valid arbitration agreement exists between an attorney and client, and that the claims in question are within the scope of the agreement, a presumption arises in favor of arbitrating those claims and the party opposing arbitration has the burden to prove a defense to arbitration. Lopez, 467 S.W.3d at 499–500 (citing In re Pham, 314 S.W.3d 520, 526–28 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 2010, orig. proceeding)). A defense that the arbitration clause is unconscionable requires evidence proving unconscionability. Id. at 500. In her appellate brief, Jones does not cite any evidence of unconscionability in the record, nor was any attached to her response to the motion to compel arbitration in the trial court. In her response to the motion to compel arbitration, Jones filed her own declaration stating that in connection with signing the engagement agreement with the Herd Law Firm, she was not provided legal counsel concerning the arbitration provision or advised to seek counsel of her own regarding the arbitration provision. CR 96. But as the Supreme Court of Texas has explained, there is no legal requirement that attorneys 2 Jones also argues the trial court correctly denied arbitration because mediation was a condition precedent to arbitration in the Agreement. This argument is moot and we do not reach its merits because this appeal was abated and the parties were ordered to mediation, but did not reach a settlement agreement at mediation. 6 explain to prospective clients, either orally or in writing, arbitration provisions in attorney-client employment agreements. Lopez, 467 S.W.3d at 504; see also Greenberg Traurig, LLP v. Nat’l Am. Ins. Co., 448 S.W.3d 115, 121 (Tex. App.— Houston [14th Dist.] 2014, no pet.) (“. . .we conclude that Greenberg did not have a fiduciary duty, in spite of its longstanding relationship with NAICO, to disclose the implications of an arbitration provision in a retainer agreement for a new representation”). We sustain appellants’ sole issue on appeal. III. Conclusion Having sustained appellants’ sole issue on appeal, we reverse the trial court’s order denying the motion to compel arbitration. We remand this case to the trial court with instructions to issue an order compelling the parties to arbitrate in accordance with their Agreement and staying the trial court proceeding until arbitration has occurred in accordance with the Agreement. /s/ Chad Bridges Justice Panel Consists of Justices Bridges, Boatman, and Antú. 7