Full Opinion

Affirmed and Memorandum Opinion filed October 29, 2026 In The Fifteenth Court of Appeals NO. 15-26-00084-CV ANTHONY NORMAN, Appellant V. THE STATE OF TEXAS, GREG ABBOTT, DAVID SCHENCK, BOBBY LUMPKIN, AND SEAN TEARE, Appellees On Appeal from the 200th District Court Travis County, Texas Trial Court Cause No. D-1-GN-24-010216 MEMORANDUM OPINION In May of 2025, Anthony Norman sought mandamus in this Court to require the Executive Director of the Texas Department of Criminal Justice to change its records to state that his murder conviction was not final; we agreed with two federal courts and two other state courts that “his conviction is final” and accordingly denied relief.1 We also affirmed as frivolous (on both immunity and jurisdictional grounds) 1 See Norman v. Janak, 2025 WL 1271748, at *3 (Tex. App.—15th Dist. May 1, 2025, pet. his claims that TDCJ employees stole his mail, barred wearing jackets in hallways, and kept the facility too cold in cold weather, and for failing to adequately brief his response to those grounds.2 His interlocutory appeal here claims the Travis County district court erred by granting the plea to the jurisdiction of the Presiding Judge of the Court of Criminal Appeals and the Governor of the state. Although asserted as various violations of the Texas Bill of Rights, the suit against the former was for failing to issue written opinions regarding several of his post-conviction filings in that court attempting to set aside his conviction for murdering his wife, and against the latter for failing to appoint substitute judges since all the judges of the Court of Criminal Appeals were allegedly disqualified. For several reasons, these claims are not just invalid but frivolous. First, we take judicial notice that the CCA has already issued orders denying every filing Norman cites in his brief.3 As the alleged failure to do so is the basis for all his constitutional claims, none of them are valid. Second, an order to the Governor or the Presiding Judge of the CCA to compel denied) (citing Norman v. U.S. Att’y Gen., 2023 WL 9116687, at *4 (W.D. Tex. Mar. 13, 2023), aff’d, 2024 WL 64769 (5th Cir. Jan. 5, 2024) (“Despite his assertions to the contrary, Norman stands finally convicted of the murder of his wife.”); Norman v. State, 2012 WL 4163498, at *19 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] Sept. 20, 2012, pet. ref’d) (establishing finality of Norman's direct appeal); Norman v. Williamson, 2021 WL 500415, at *4 (Tex. App.—Austin Feb. 11, 2021, pet. denied) (affirming grant of plea to the jurisdiction where Norman did not allege failure to perform ministerial acts relating to his conviction)). 2 Norman v. Janak, 2025 WL 1271748, at *5. 3 See Williamson, 2021 WL 500415, at *4 (reflecting that petition for discretionary review was refused); Ex parte Norman, No. WR-76,389-08 (Tex. Crim. App. Aug. 19, 2015), https://www.txcourts.gov/cca/, (sent via postcard); Ex parte Norman, No. WR-76,389-12 (Tex. Crim. App. Jan. 31, 2018), https://www.txcourts.gov/cca/, (sent via postcard); Ex parte Norman, No. WR-76,389-10 (Tex. Crim. App. Nov. 16, 2016), https://www.txcourts.gov/cca/, (sent via postcard). 2 actions would require mandamus.4 Not even the Texas Supreme Court has mandamus jurisdiction of either official,5 much less an intermediate court of appeals like ours. Third, Norman attempts to avoid governmental immunity by pleading the denial of his rights as a takings claim.6 But failing to rule on a pending claim (even if there were one) is not a property claim cognizable as a taking; if it were, no courts of appeals would be necessary since every challenge to a court order could simply be filed in the trial court as a takings claim. Finally, for good measure Norman complains that the trial court erred by failing to issue findings and conclusions regarding the order granting the plea to the jurisdiction and finding his claims here to be frivolous. But the rules of civil procedure generally require findings and conclusions only after a “trial”: “In any case tried in the district or county court without a jury, any party may request the court to state in writing its findings of fact and conclusions of law.”7 That does not require findings and conclusions on summary judgments granted as a matter of law,8 much less a plea to the jurisdiction based solely on the pleadings. Norman has not requested an opportunity to amend. Even if he had, we would deny it because he has not suggested how these jurisdictional defects could be cured.9 4 See Campbell v. Wilder, 487 S.W.3d 146, 153–54 (Tex. 2016) (“When the purpose of the suit is to compel action, then mandamus is proper.”). 5 See TEX. CONST. art. V, § 3(a); TEX. GOV’T CODE § 22.002(a). 6 TEX. CONST. art. I, § 17 (“No person’s property shall be taken, damaged, or destroyed for or applied to public use without adequate compensation being made, unless by the consent of such person.”). 7 TEX. R. CIV. P. 296 (emphasis added). 8 See IKB Indus. (Nigeria) Ltd. v. Pro-Line Corp., 938 S.W.2d 440, 442 (Tex. 1997). 9 Tex. A&M Univ. Sys. v. Koseoglu, 233 S.W.3d 835, 840 (Tex. 2007) (noting plaintiff on appeal “has made no suggestion as to how to cure the jurisdictional defect”); see Matzen v. 3 We affirm the trial court’s dismissal with prejudice of Norman’s claims against appellees. /s/ Scott A. Brister Scott A. Brister Chief Justice Before Chief Justice Brister and Justices Field and Farris. McLane, 659 S.W.3d 381, 395–96 (Tex. 2021) (noting plaintiff on appeal has alleged “no viable theories of liability”). 4