Full Opinion

In The Court of Appeals Ninth District of Texas at Beaumont __________________ NO. 09-25-00348-CV __________________ IN THE INTEREST OF L.G.O.A. __________________________________________________________________ On Appeal from the 88th District Court Hardin County, Texas Trial Cause No. 61903 __________________________________________________________________ MEMORANDUM OPINION G.A. (“Appellant” or “Father”) appeals the trial court’s Nunc Pro Tunc Order in a Suit Affecting the Parent-Child Relationship (the “Nunc Pro Tunc Order”). The trial court granted the Motion for Judgment Nunc Pro Tunc filed by M.O. (“Appellee” or “Mother”) relating to their child, L.G.O.A. 1 Simultaneously, the trial court also denied Mother’s Petition for Bill of Review as “moot” in a separate proceeding in trial cause number 65604, which was filed December 19, 2024, and it 1 To protect the child, we use initials for the child and designations of Father or Mother for the parents. See Tex. R. App. P. 9.8(a), (b). 1 concerned the same issue. However, neither party filed a notice of appeal from the bill of review proceeding. Background 2 On December 28, 2020, the trial court signed an Order in Suit Affecting the Parent-Child Relationship (the “SAPCR Order”). The relevant part of the SAPCR Order states as follows: Child Support IT IS ORDERED that [Father] is obligated to pay and shall pay to [Mother] child support of one thousand eight hundred forty dollars ($1,840.00) per month, with the first payment being due and payable on _________ , 2020 and a like payment being due and payable on the 1st day of each month thereafter until the first month following the date of the earliest occurrence of one of the events specified below: 1. the child reaches the age of eighteen years or graduates from high school, whichever occurs later, subject to the provisions for support beyond the age of eighteen years set out below; 2. the child marries; 3. the child dies; 4. the child enlists in the armed forces of the United States and begins active service as defined by section 101 of title 10 of the United States Code; or 5. the child’s disabilities are otherwise removed for general purposes. If the child is eighteen years of age and has not graduated from high school and [Father]’s obligation to support the child has not already terminated, IT IS ORDERED that [Father]’s obligation to pay child support to [Mother] shall not terminate but shall continue for as long as the child is enrolled- 1. under chapter 25 of the Texas Education Code in an accredited secondary school in a program leading toward a high school diploma or under section 130.008 of the Education Code in courses for joint high 2 Because Father’s issue on appeal relates to child support, we limit our discussion of the background and our analysis to the facts relevant to that issue. 2 school and junior college credit and is complying with the minimum attendance requirements of subchapter C of chapter 25 of the Education Code or 2. on a full-time basis in a private secondary school in a program leading toward a high school diploma and is complying with the minimum attendance requirements imposed by that school. On October 29, 2024, Mother filed a Motion for Judgment Nunc Pro Tunc, alleging that the December 28, 2020, the SAPCR Order contained a clerical mistake, specifically she argued the start date of the monthly child support obligation was left blank and that the start date of the monthly child support obligation should have been January 1, 2021. In his response to the Motion, Father argued that the omission was not a clerical error but a judicial error, and that the trial court lacked plenary power to insert a date at this time. On August 20, 2025, the trial court held a hearing on Mother’s motion. Mother’s counsel explained that the underlying suit affecting the parent-child relationship was originally filed in October of 2020 by Mother and that a proposed agreed order bearing both parties’ signatures and prepared by Mother’s then legal counsel was submitted to the trial court, which was signed by the trial court on December 28, 2020. Mother’s attorney stated there was a “blank space for the inclusion of a start date for the child support obligation[]” that “was overlooked[]” but the trial court, while it still had plenary power, signed a withholding order on January 8, 2021, and it directed to Father’s then employer, an NFL team, to withhold from Father’s income for payment of the child support awarded in the agreed order. 3 According to Mother’s attorney, the child support payments began in August of 2021, “seven or so months” after the then employer received the order and since that time, “payments” have been made by Father whenever he has “actively” been employed by “various NFL teams[,]” but when Father has not been with any NFL team, payments were not received. According to Mother’s attorney, when Father transferred to another NFL team, the trial court issued a new withholding order that was submitted to each team. Mother’s attorney requested the trial court to “interline the date” or insert January 1, 2021, as the date the parties had anticipated as being the date that the child support obligation would start. Father’s attorney argued that the nunc pro tunc must be denied because both the SAPCR Order and the initial income withholding order also left out a date, there was no evidence in the record that the parties agreed to a start date for child support to begin, a prove up did not occur, and there was nothing put on the record regarding the start date. Upon questioning from the trial court, Father’s attorney acknowledged that child support payments had been made from August of 2021 until the day of the hearing. Rebecca Walton testified at the hearing. She is an attorney, and in 2020 she had been practicing family law in Hardin County for twenty-seven years. Walton explained that she had known both Mother and Father since they were born, and that as an attorney licensed to practice law in Texas, she represented Mother in 4 establishing paternity and child support for L.G.O.A., a child conceived between Mother and Father. Walton did not recall any contested issues between the parties. Walton recalled that there were several conversations with the parties. She specifically remembered a three-way phone call between herself and the parties around the end of October of 2020, to discuss what they wanted their agreement to reflect and what would be included in the proposed order. The parties agreed to the amount of child support, visitation, conservatorship, possession and access. As to the start date for child support, Walton testified that the submitted order did not include a month or day but did include “2020[]” as the year. Walton testified that there were some conversations around the middle of December where the parties and Walton were “working out all the details[]” including obtaining Father’s health insurance information and the proposed order was submitted shortly thereafter and the “intention would have been to start child support shortly after the order was entered.” According to Walton, “[w]e all thought there was a date in” the SAPCR Order. Walton further testified that Mother had notified her that Father requested that the child support start two weeks later, which would have started the child support in mid-January 2021. Walton agreed that a withholding order signed by the trial court on January 8, 2021, was prepared by a paralegal in her office, submitted to the trial court for signature, and sent to Father’s then employer, although she was not aware of how the withholding order was delivered to Father’s employer. Walton confirmed 5 that the withholding order “was complied with at some point in time[]” and that she did not know why it took so long for the payments to start. According to Walton, she was aware of the standard practices of the courts in Hardin County, including the trial court’s, which she learned during her twenty- seven years of practice. Based on her experience, Walton agreed that the trial court’s standard practice was for the start of a child support obligation to begin “the first day of the month following the entry of the order[.]” Walton explained that there was no hearing on the proposed order because it was also the trial court’s standard practice to forego a hearing on suits to establish parental rights that were submitted by agreement. On cross-examination, Walton testified that she never spoke to Father about a start date for child support and that she had provided Mother with a copy of the proposed order and that Mother had facilitated obtaining Father’s signature and had returned it to Walton with both signatures. On redirect, Walton testified that the SAPCR Order also included a provision that “[a]s additional child support, [Father] is ordered to maintain health insurance for the child as long as child support is available for the child[.]” Walton agreed that “it was clearly the intent of the parties that child support be ordered because, in addition to child support and in the present order, there is also a present order that [Father] maintain health insurance for the child as additional child support[.]” 6 Mother also testified at the hearing. Mother explained that L.G.O.A. was almost four years old when the suit was filed. Mother acknowledged she was not “originally aware” that there was a blank in the SAPCR Order that had not been filled in. Mother also agreed that the reason the suit was filed was to “confirm parentage[]” of L.G.O.A. She testified that in December of 2020, she took the proposed order to Father and he did not object to any terms in the paperwork. She did not watch Father read the proposed order. Mother recalled that she did not have a discussion with Father about when the child support would begin when she brought him the proposed order. As for the starting date, Mother stated, “We didn’t sit down and say this is going to be the start date. We didn’t have a conversation[.]” Mother testified that she assumed child support would begin the “next following month when [Father] started with his next paycheck.” Mother did not have any concerns after receiving a copy of the SAPCR Order that had been signed by the trial court judge and had been in contact with Walton’s office regarding withholding orders and getting a copy of the SAPCR Order to Father’s then employer. Mother testified that about eight months after the SAPCR Order was signed, she began collecting child support and that she was under the impression that child support had been ordered but Father was not paying before that, and she had conversations with Father about the payments and he understood that he owed money for child support. Mother testified that Father told her, “I will have to get with my HR department and see 7 what’s going on[.]” Mother’s impression was that Father understood that he should have been paying child support but he did not understand why his employer, an NFL team, was not sending funds to her. Mother recalled Father requesting that the child support start date be “pushed back a couple of weeks[]” and that Mother reached out to Walton to inquire if that could be done. Mother was under the impression that when Father requested that the start date be pushed back that Father understood that he had an obligation to pay the child support. Mother confirmed that when Father was with an NFL team, she received payments for a little while and then the payments stopped when he left that team. Mother then “had to go and figure out” how to obtain another withholding order to send to the next NFL team that employed Father. Mother stated that Father did not complain when she was sending withholding orders or complain that she was trying to get money from him, and she agreed that Father never told her “that he thought that he didn’t have a responsibility to pay[]” her. Mother testified that Father has “[p]artially, somewhat” and “not consistent[ly]” continued to pay his child support obligation. Mother agreed that when the child support payments were being withheld, there was no issue in receiving a check. According to Mother, when Father was traded to the Pittsburgh Steelers and was injured, Mother did not receive any payments. Mother confirmed that within a month before the hearing on the Nunc Pro Tunc, she had received a child support payment. On cross-examination, Mother stated that she did not see a 8 blank on the proposed order when she took it to Father and that she did not know there was supposed to be a date provided. Mother also agreed that she and Father “never had a conversation about what date child support would actually start[.]” The attorneys made closing arguments to the trial court regarding the issue before the trial court. Mother’s attorney argued that the blank for the start date in the SAPCR Order was “clearly a clerical issue[]” and that the trial court “intended” a start date of January 1, 2021. Mother’s attorney noted that the SAPCR Order was an agreed order, that Father had paid support “regularly” in the past, and while the trial court still had plenary power, a withholding order was signed on January 7, 2021, and subsequent withholding orders had been signed as well with payments being made by the NFL teams who employed Father. Mother’s attorney also stated that the trial court’s standard practice, the trial court judge’s personal recollection of the judgment, as well as the additional language in the SAPCR Order requiring Father to maintain health insurance as additional child support, could all be considered by the trial court in determining the child support start date. Father’s attorney argued that Mother had not shown by clear and convincing evidence that the blank in the SAPCR Order was a clerical error. He argued that the SAPCR Order contained a judicial error and there was no oral testimony, written documents, or anything from the trial court that would support inserting a date of January 1, 2021, into the SAPCR Order. 9 The trial court granted the Nunc Pro Tunc, and stated orally on the record the following: Just for clarification, we do have two docket sheets in Cause No. 65604. That was a bill of review that was filed 12-19-24 and reflects the current events and in fact is the docket sheet I used to make docket entries. Case 65604 was heard simultaneously with 61903, which was the parent-child relationship case filed 11-19-2020. In that case, December the 28th, 2020, the Court signed an agreed order in the suit affecting parent-child relationship. Thereafter, on January the 7th of 2021, an income withholding order was signed. Thereafter, on November the 23rd, 2021, a withholding order was signed. Thereafter, on November the 3rd, 2024, a third withholding order was signed. And then we began making docket entries in that case on November the 20th, 2024, when the issue involving this litigation was brought to the Court’s attention and our first issues conference was heard. The Court at this time is going to grant the request for a nunc pro tunc order in the suit affecting parent-child relationship. I am noting that on December the 28th of 2020, the Court originally heard the parent-child case, and then on August the 20th of 2025, the Court heard the request for the nunc pro tunc order. Referring to page 18, the Court will approve the date of January 1 of 2021 as the start date for the payment of child support. I will sign that order today. Regarding the bill of review, the Court believes that is now moot because of the granting of the nunc pro tunc order; therefore, I will deny it as being moot. Father timely appealed the trial court’s Judgment Nunc Pro Tunc. None of the parties filed a notice of appeal pertaining to the denial of the bill of review, nor do they discuss the bill of review in their briefing on this appeal. 10 Issue on Appeal On appeal, Father argues in one issue that the trial court erred in granting Mother’s Motion for Judgment Nunc Pro Tunc in the absence of supporting evidence to establish that the Nunc Pro Tunc Order corrected a clerical error. Father argues that inserting a start date for child support in the absence of an agreement on the child support start date or an oral rendition inserting a start date constitutes a substantive change and is a judicial error which cannot be corrected by a nunc pro tunc after the trial court lost its plenary power. Analysis A judgment nunc pro tunc is reviewed de novo. Escobar v. Escobar, 711 S.W.2d 230, 231-32 (Tex. 1986); In re J.J., No. 09-22-00327-CV, 2023 Tex. App. LEXIS 7800, at *14 (Tex. App.—Beaumont Oct. 12, 2023, no pet.) (mem. op.). A trial court should only issue a judgment nunc pro tunc if the record establishes by clear and convincing evidence that a clerical error was made. In re Cherry, 258 S.W.3d 328, 334 (Tex. App.—Austin 2008, orig. proceeding). A trial court in the same case can sign an order rendering a judgment nunc pro tunc to correct a clerical error in the record of the original judgment. See Tex. R. Civ. P. 329b(f). A judgment nunc pro tunc can only be used to correct clerical errors and not judicial errors after a trial court’s plenary power has expired. In re J.J., 2023 Tex. App. LEXIS 7800, at *14 (citing Escobar, 711 S.W.2d at 231; In re A.M.R., 528 S.W.3d 119, 122 (Tex. 11 App.—El Paso 2017, no pet.); Seago v. Bell, 764 S.W.2d 362, 363-64 (Tex. App.— Beaumont 1989, no writ)). “An attempted nunc pro tunc judgment entered after the trial court loses plenary jurisdiction is void if it corrects judicial rather than clerical errors.” Tex. Dep’t of Transp. v. A.P.I. Pipe & Supply, LLC, 397 S.W.3d 162, 167 (Tex. 2013). Generally, a trial court has plenary power for thirty days after a judgment is signed to grant a new trial, vacate, modify, correct, or reform the judgment. See Tex. R. Civ. P. 329b(d). “‘A clerical error is a mistake occurring in the reduction of the judgment to writing, the correction of which does not result from ‘judicial reasoning or determination,’ but rather an examination of whether the writing properly reflects the judgment as actually rendered.’” In re Lowman, No. 09-25-00153-CV, 2025 Tex. App. LEXIS 7364, at *5 (Tex. App.—Beaumont Sept. 18, 2025, orig. proceeding) (mem. op.) (per curiam) (quoting Burgess v. Burgess, 834 S.W.2d 538, 540 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 1992, no writ) (quoting Andrews v. Koch, 702 S.W.2d 584, 585 (Tex. 1986)). “A judicial error is one made by the court in rendering judgment, as opposed to a failure to accurately recite the judgment rendered.” In re J.J., 2023 Tex. App. LEXIS 7800, at *15 (quoting Seago, 764 S.W.2d at 363-64). When determining whether there is a clerical or judicial error, the actual judgment rendered must be reviewed and not the judgment that should or might have been rendered. Id. (citing Escobar, 711 S.W.2d at 231; Gedney v. Gedney, No. 09-10- 12 00521-CV, 2012 Tex. App. LEXIS 3252, at **6-7 (Tex. App.—Beaumont Apr. 26, 2012, no pet.) (mem. op.)). An appellate court is not bound by a trial court’s finding that an error is clerical because whether an error is judicial or clerical is a question of law. Id. (citing Seago, 764 S.W.2d at 363-64). In determining whether there is sufficient evidence to support a trial court’s decision to grant a nunc pro tunc, a trial court’s docket entries may be considered as well as evidence from the hearing on the judgment nunc pro tunc in addition to any pertinent judgments. See Escobar, 711 S.W.2d at 232. A review of the trial court’s docket sheet reflects that the trial court judge signed an “Agreed Order in Suit Affecting [the] P[arent]-C[hild Relationship]” on December 28, 2020, and an “Income Withholding Order” on January 7, 2021. The trial court’s docket sheet entries do not reflect any additional information pertaining to the contents of the SAPCR Order; specifically, the docket sheet does not include the start date for child support, nor is there any oral pronouncement of the judgment that was rendered by the trial court. At the hearing on the nunc pro tunc, Mother testified that she and Father did not have an agreement as to the starting date for the child support. Further, a review of the initial “Income Withholding Order” reveals that it does not provide a “start date” for the child support to begin. Instead, when the Withholding Order was filled out, it is only partially filled out as “Dated January ______, 2021[,]” with 13 the withholding paragraph stating, “you must begin withholding no later than the first pay period that occurs 10 days after the date of / /2021 of the order/notice.” At the hearing, Walton, the attorney that represented Mother in the original SAPCR, testified that she prepared and submitted the proposed SAPCR Order for the trial court’s review and entry in 2020, as per the agreement of the parties. Walton testified that since the proposed order was submitted as an agreed order, no subsequent hearing or “prove up” was conducted and there is no recorded oral rendition of the SAPCR Order. Our court in In re J.J., stated: Where a judgment is prepared by an attorney for the successful party, then signed by the court, it becomes the judgment of the court. [Seago, 764 S.W.2d at 364]. “Recitations or provisions alleged to have been included or omitted by a mistake of the attorney are part of the court’s judgment and, therefore, are judicial errors.” Id. (citing Dikeman v. Snell, 490 S.W.2d 183, 185-86 (Tex. 1973)); see also In re Daredia, 317 S.W.3d 247, 249 (Tex. 2010) (‘“[P]rovisions alleged to have been inserted by mistake of the attorney nevertheless become a part of the court’s judgment and therefore are judicial errors when thus rendered in writing by the court.’”) (quoting Dikeman, 490 S.W.2d at 185-86). 2023 Tex. App. LEXIS 7800, at *15. We conclude that the omission of the child support start date constituted a judicial error and required judicial reasoning and determination to correct. See In re Lowman, 2025 Tex. App. LEXIS 7364, at *5; Tex. Dep’t of Transp., 397 S.W.3d at 167; In re J.J., 2023 Tex. App. LEXIS 7800, at *15. The Nunc Pro Tunc Order signed by the trial court on August 20, 2025, constituted a substantive change from the written judgment as rendered on December 28, 2020, in that the Nunc Pro Tunc 14 provided that the start date for the child support would be January 1, 2021, but there is no evidence to establish that January 1, 2021, was originally part of the judgment rendered by the trial court on December 28, 2020. See Escobar, 711 S.W.3d at 231- 32; Seago, 764 S.W.2d at 363-64; In re J.J., 2023 Tex. App. LEXIS 7800, at *19. Here, there was no oral pronouncement rendering the judgment, and nothing is noted on the docket sheet about the “start date,” nor is there a “start date” within the first withholding order issued by the trial court on January 7, 2021. Proof of a clerical error must be clear and convincing. Roan v. Roan, No. 03-09-00155-CV, 2010 Tex. App. LEXIS 8699, at *13 (Tex. App.—Austin Oct. 28, 2010, no pet.) (mem. op.) (citing Dickens v. Willis, 957 S.W.2d 657, 659 (Tex. App.—Austin 1997, no pet.)); In re Cherry, 258 S.W.3d at 334. We conclude that the change did not correct a clerical error in the Order in Suit Affecting the Parent-Child Relationship and therefore the Nunc Pro Tunc Order is void. We sustain Father’s issue on appeal. We vacate the trial court’s August 20, 2025 Nunc Pro Tunc Order in Suit Affecting the Parent-Child Relationship and reinstate the trial court’s December 28, 2020 Order in Suit Affecting the Parent- Child Relationship. 15 REVERSED AND RENDERED. LEANNE JOHNSON Justice Submitted on July 9, 2026 Opinion Delivered August 27, 2026 Before Johnson, Wright and Chambers, JJ. 16