Full Opinion

In the Court of Appeals Second Appellate District of Texas at Fort Worth ___________________________ No. 02-26-00109-CV ___________________________ RODOLFO G. ROSA, Appellant V. OFFICE OF THE ATTORNEY GENERAL (OAG) TITLE IV-D - DENTON COUNTY DIVISION; JUDGE BRUCE MCFARLING, IN HIS OFFICIAL CAPACITY; DAVID TRANTHAM, IN HIS OFFICIAL CAPACITY AS DISTRICT CLERK OF DENTON COUNTY; TRACY MURPHREE, IN HIS OFFICIAL CAPACITY AS SHERIFF OF DENTON COUNTY; THOMAS LITTLE, INDIVIDUALLY AND IN HIS OFFICIAL CAPACITY AS ATTORNEY FOR KARLIE N. SEATER; BRENT HILL, INDIVIDUALLY AND IN HIS FORMER CAPACITY AS COURT-APPOINTED COUNSEL, Appellees On Appeal from the 442nd District Court Denton County, Texas Trial Court No. 25-3585-442 Before Wallach, J.; Sudderth, C.J.; and Walker, J. Per Curiam Memorandum Opinion 2 MEMORANDUM OPINION Appellant Rodolfo G. Rosa appeals from the trial court’s February 16, 2026 “First Amended Order Granting [Appellee] Thomas Little’s Motion to Dismiss and Dismissing Plaintiff’s Claims for Want of Jurisdiction” (the February 16 Order), which dismissed Rosa’s claims against Little on multiple grounds. The trial court had previously signed an order dismissing the claims against the Office of the Attorney General (OAG), Judge Bruce McFarling, Denton County District Clerk David Trantham, and Denton County Sheriff Tracy Murphree.1 However, the trial court has not signed an order disposing of Rosa’s claims against Appellee Brent Hill, who has filed a motion to dismiss the appeal. The February 16 Order does not clearly and unequivocally express the trial court’s intent to render a final judgment, see Bella Palma, LLC v. Young, 601 S.W.3d 799, 801 (Tex. 2020), and the order does not actually dispose of all claims and parties. Thus, the order is not final. See Patel v. Nations Renovations, LLC, 661 S.W.3d 151, 154 (Tex. 2023) (“By definition, a final judgment must dispose of all parties and all claims in the underlying case.”). However, although the February 16 Order was not clearly and unequivocally final, it contained some language suggesting that the trial court may have intended it 1 In his trial court filings, Appellant spelled the Sheriff’s name as “Murphee,” and that spelling appears in the trial court’s order dismissing Murphree, Trantham, Judge McFarling, and the OAG. We use the correct spelling in this opinion. 3 to be final. Accordingly, on June 17, 2026, we abated the appeal to allow the trial court the opportunity to make it final. See Tex. R. App. P. 27.2 (stating that an appellate court “may allow an appealed order that is not final to be modified so as to be made final”). The trial court has taken no action in response to the abatement order. We interpret the trial court’s inaction to mean that it did not intend the February 16 Order to be a final judgment. Generally, appeals may be taken only from final judgments and certain interlocutory orders made appealable by statute. See Tex. Civ. Prac. & Rem. Code § 51.014; In re Guardianship of Jones, 629 S.W.3d 921, 924 (Tex. 2021); Lehmann v. Har-Con Corp., 39 S.W.3d 191, 195–96 (Tex. 2001). The February 16 Order is neither a final judgment nor an appealable interlocutory order. See Tex. Civ. Prac. & Rem. Code § 51.014(a). Accordingly, we do not have jurisdiction over this appeal. We grant Hill’s motion and dismiss the appeal for want of jurisdiction. We deny as moot Appellant’s pending “Motion to Reinstate Appeal and Request for Further Relief.” Per Curiam Delivered: October 8, 2026 4