Full Opinion

Affirmed and Opinion Filed November 18, 2026 S In The Court of Appeals Fifth District of Texas at Dallas No. 05-25-00814-CV RAGLE, INC. AND COLONIAL AMERICAN CASUALTY AND SURETY CO., Appellants V. THE LEVY COMPANY, INC., Appellee On Appeal from the 44th Judicial District Court Dallas County, Texas Trial Court Cause No. DC-23-16781 MEMORANDUM OPINION Before Justices Smith, Lewis, and Lee Opinion by Justice Lee Appellee The Levy Company, Inc. sued appellants Ragle, Inc. and Colonial American Casualty and Surety Co. for breach of contract. Following a non-jury trial, the trial court rendered judgment for Levy, awarding it $122,219.83 and attorney’s fees. In six issues, appellants contend that (1) Levy’s recovery was precluded because it failed to perform within the time period required by the contract’s “time is of the essence” clause; (2) the trial court erred in disregarding the contract’s “time- of-performance and delay provisions”; (3) the evidence is legally and factually insufficient to support the trial court’s findings that Levy performed its contractual obligations; (4) the trial court erred in invalidating the contract’s liquidated damages and delay provisions; (5) the evidence was legally insufficient to support the award of attorney’s fees; and (6) Levy failed to establish principal liability against Ragle under the subcontract and bond. For the reasons explained below, we affirm the trial court’s judgment. Background Levy sued Ragle and Colonial in Dallas County over unpaid electrical subcontract work on the Orange County Swing Bridge project. Levy alleged it completed its work and sought $122,219.83 under its final pay application, plus interest, fees, and costs. Levy’s amended petition also asserted quantum meruit and Texas Prompt Payment Act claims. Ragle and Colonial initially filed a general denial and later counterclaimed for breach, alleging Levy’s deficient and delayed performance caused approximately $446,066 in damages. Ragle alleged it withheld $80,805.83 and sought the remaining $365,259.77, fees, costs, and interest. Levy moved to strike the counterclaim as untimely, prejudicial, and asserted after discovery closed. Levy also answered the counterclaim with general and specific denials and asserted defenses including substantial performance, waiver, laches, acceptance, release, mitigation, and comparative responsibility. The case was tried to the court, and the court struck Ragle’s counterclaim during a pretrial hearing. There is no reporter’s record of the trial before us on appeal. –2– Following trial, the trial court found Levy completed its work and that Ragle refused payment of Levy’s final application without written explanation. The court found project delays resulted from factors unrelated to Levy, including vessel accidents, design issues, other subcontractors, fabrication problems, defective equipment, and a TxDOT time suspension. The court found TxDOT increased Ragle’s contract time from 300 to 667 working days and assessed Ragle no liquidated damages. The court found Ragle never formally assessed liquidated damages against Levy, paid no delay damages to TxDOT, and was fully paid by TxDOT. The court found that Ragle was not damaged by any delay attributed to Levy and that “Levy did not cause delays on the project during any period of time outside of the TxDOT contract suspension from July 1, 2019, through June 15, 2020.” The court concluded Ragle and Colonial materially breached the subcontract and were jointly and severally liable for Levy’s damages. The court further concluded, among other things, that “Levy’s failure to complete the project within 180 days is excused due to inability to perform” and “Levy’s failure to complete the project within 180 days did not cause any damage to Ragle.” Following trial, Levy filed an application for attorney’s fees and costs of court. Levy stated that the court’s findings determined Levy performed its subcontract obligations. Levy asserted that the findings determined Ragle and Colonial materially breached the subcontract by failing to pay Levy. Levy asserted that the findings entitled it to trial fees, court costs, and prejudgment interest. Levy asserted –3– that Ragle and Colonial were jointly and severally liable for its damages and attorney’s fees. Levy requested $60,222 in attorney’s fees through trial and $2,329 in court costs. Levy requested conditional appellate fees of $25,000 in the court of appeals, $10,000 for a supreme court petition response, and $20,000 for merits briefing and argument in the supreme court. The affidavit stated that Levy excluded $4,695 in paralegal fees from its fee request. The trial court rendered final judgment awarding Levy $122,219.83, $14,997.39 prejudgment interest, $60,222 attorney’s fees, and $2,329 court costs. The judgment awarded postjudgment interest and conditional appellate fees of $25,000 for an unsuccessful court-of-appeals appeal and $30,000 for unsuccessful supreme court review. The judgment ordered Ragle and Colonial to take nothing on their claims and disposed of all parties and claims. Ragle and Colonial moved for a new trial, challenging Levy’s performance, the time-is-of-the-essence provision, attorney’s fees, liquidated damages, and Colonial’s liability. The court denied the motion for new trial, and this appeal followed. Discussion Breach of contract Appellants’ first, second, third, fourth, and sixth issues all complain of the trial court’s findings and judgment on evidentiary grounds in various ways. In the first and third issues, they contend the trial court erred in finding Levy performed –4– the subcontract because it failed to complete work within the contractually mandated period, and that the “time is of the essence” provision precluded Levy’s recovery. In the second issue, they argue the trial court erred in failing to apply the subcontract’s “express time-of-performance requirements and delay-related contractual provisions.” In their fourth issue, appellants contend the trial court erred in finding the “liquidated damages clause was not in effect or constituted an unenforceable penalty.” And in their sixth issue, they argue that “the trial court erred in holding Colonial American Casualty & Surety Co. liable absent proof of a breach by its principal, Ragle.” As we stated above, there is no reporter’s record before us on appeal. Without a reporter’s record showing the evidence before the trial court, we presume the evidence supports the trial court’s findings. See Bennett v. Cochran, 96 S.W.3d 227, 230 (Tex. 2002) (“[C]ourt of appeals was correct in holding that, absent a complete record on appeal, it must presume the omitted items supported the trial court’s judgment.”); Vasquez v. Firebird SFE I, LLC, No. 05-19-00057-CV, 2020 WL 2059913, at *1 (Tex. App.—Dallas Apr. 29, 2020, no pet.) (mem. op.). Consequently, we presume the evidence supports the trial court’s findings that Levy completed its work and that Ragle refused payment; that project delays resulted from factors unrelated to Levy, including vessel accidents, design issues, other subcontractors, fabrication problems, defective equipment, and a TxDOT time suspension; that Levy did not cause delays on the project during any period of time –5– outside of the TxDOT contract suspension; that Ragle was not damaged by any delay attributed to Levy; that TxDOT increased Ragle’s contract time from 300 to 667 working days and assessed Ragle no liquidated damages; that Ragle never formally assessed liquidated damages against Levy, paid no delay damages to TxDOT, and was fully paid by TxDOT; and that Ragle and Colonial materially breached the subcontract and were jointly and severally liable for Levy’s damages. We presume the evidence supports the trial court’s findings and judgment, and we overrule appellants’ first through fourth and sixth issues. Attorney’s fees In their remaining issue, appellants complain that the evidence was legally insufficient to support the award of attorney’s fees. They contend Levy failed to meet its burden to prove fees were reasonable and necessary. When a party challenges the legal sufficiency of the evidence to support attorney’s fees, the challenge fails if there is more than a scintilla of evidence to support the award. Wal- Mart Stores, Inc. v. Canchola, 121 S.W.3d 735, 739 (Tex. 2003); Bearden v. PSN Services, LLC, No. 05-24-00815-CV, 2025 WL 3465452, at *7 (Tex. App.—Dallas Dec. 2, 2025, no pet.) (mem. op.). A claimant seeking an award of attorney’s fees generally must prove the attorney’s reasonable hours worked and reasonable rate by presenting sufficient evidence to support the fee award sought. Rohrmoos Venture v. UTSW DVA Healthcare, LLP, 578 S.W.3d 469, 501–02 (Tex. 2019). General, conclusory –6– testimony devoid of any real substance will not support a fee award. Id. at 501. Sufficient evidence includes, at a minimum, evidence of (1) particular services performed, (2) who performed those services, (3) approximately when the services were performed, (4) the reasonable amount of time required to perform the services, and (5) the reasonable hourly rate for each person performing such services. Id. at 502. Contemporaneous billing records are not required to prove the requested fees are reasonable and necessary. Id. However, billing records are strongly encouraged to prove the reasonableness and necessity of requested fees when those elements are contested. Id. Regardless, the proof must be sufficient to permit a court “to perform a meaningful review of [the] fee application.” El Apple I, Ltd. v. Olivas, 370 S.W.3d 757, 764 (Tex. 2012). We note, however, that the evidentiary requirements to support an award of attorney’s fees under Chapter 38 are different when the issue is presented to the trial court for determination, as here, rather than to a jury. Rohrmoos Venture, 578 S.W.3d at 490 n.9; Logan v. Randall, No. 05-19-00043-CV, 2020 WL 948381, at *8 (Tex. App.—Dallas Feb. 27, 2020, pet. denied) (mem. op.). Where the attorney’s fee claim under Chapter 38 is made in a bench trial, the trial court may take judicial notice of the usual and customary fees and of the contents of the case file, presume the usual and customary charges for the work performed are reasonable, and set the fees based on such judicial notice without receiving further evidence. See Scott Pelley P.C. v. Wynne, 578 S.W.3d 694, 705 (Tex. App.—Dallas 2019, pet. denied); see also TEX. –7– CIV. PRAC. & REM. CODE § 38.004. The court may take judicial notice with or without the request of a party and such notice constitutes some evidence to support the award. Logan, 2020 WL 948381, at *8; Commerce St. Capital, LLC v. Durant Bancorp, Inc., No. 05-19-00343-CV, 2020 WL 7585837, at *8 (Tex. App.—Dallas Dec. 22, 2020, pet. denied) (mem. op.) (“the trial judge’s ability to take judicial notice of usual and customary fees under Chapter 38 and the presumption that such fees are reasonable extend to appellate fees”). In the absence of other evidence supporting the award, we will presume the trial court took such judicial notice in determining the amount of fees awarded. Logan, 2020 WL 948381, at *8. We will not overturn an award of attorney’s fees unless it constitutes a clear abuse of discretion. Id. Levy, which sought fees under Chapter 38, supported its fee application with the affidavit of its counsel, Sylvan Lang, Jr. Lang stated that his hourly fee at the outset of the representation was $400 per hour and $500 at the time of the application. He stated that the hourly rate of his associate attorney, Hailey Nikkels, was $200 per hour at the outset of the representation and $300 per hour at the time of the application. The application included the curricula vitae of the two lawyers and described their backgrounds and experience. The application further included invoices from the case, which detailed the various tasks performed by each attorney (or paralegal) and the time spent on such tasks. Altogether, taking into consideration the hours worked at the various rates, fees amounted to $60,221.99, which did not –8– include paralegal fees. Lang also described his appellate experience and explained the time generally spent on similar appeals. He anticipated spending 15 to 20 hours reviewing the record, and 15 to 20 hours reviewing appellant’s arguments, researching the law, and drafting a brief. Lang further discussed the tasks and time anticipated with oral argument and responding in the supreme court. Lang also discussed the possibility of responding, briefing, and arguing in the supreme court, and the likely number of hours he expected to spend on these tasks. Lang stated that the $400 to $500 rate he charged for trial work would also be reasonable for appellate work, and noted that in his experience appellate specialists charged from between $400 to over $1000 per hour. Given this, he stated that conditional appellate fees of $25,000 for representation in the court of appeals was reasonable, $10,000 was reasonable for responding to a petition for review in the supreme court, and $25,000 was reasonable for briefing and arguing in the supreme court. Given the foregoing, we conclude the trial court did not abuse its discretion in awarding attorney’s fees to Levy. See Logan, 2020 WL 948381, at *8. We overrule appellants’ fifth issue. Conclusion Having overruled appellants’ six issues, we affirm the trial court’s judgment. /Mike Lee/ MIKE LEE JUSTICE –9–