Ragle, Inc. and Colonial American Casualty and Surety Co. v. the Levy Company, Inc.
CourtTexas Court of Appeals, 5th District (Dallas)
Date FiledNovember 18, 2026
Docket05-25-00814-CV
JudgeLee
StatusPublished
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Full Opinion
Affirmed and Opinion Filed November 18, 2026
S In The
Court of Appeals
Fifth District of Texas at Dallas
No. 05-25-00814-CV
RAGLE, INC. AND COLONIAL AMERICAN CASUALTY AND SURETY
CO., Appellants
V.
THE LEVY COMPANY, INC., Appellee
On Appeal from the 44th Judicial District Court
Dallas County, Texas
Trial Court Cause No. DC-23-16781
MEMORANDUM OPINION
Before Justices Smith, Lewis, and Lee
Opinion by Justice Lee
Appellee The Levy Company, Inc. sued appellants Ragle, Inc. and Colonial
American Casualty and Surety Co. for breach of contract. Following a non-jury trial,
the trial court rendered judgment for Levy, awarding it $122,219.83 and attorney’s
fees. In six issues, appellants contend that (1) Levy’s recovery was precluded
because it failed to perform within the time period required by the contract’s “time
is of the essence” clause; (2) the trial court erred in disregarding the contract’s “time-
of-performance and delay provisions”; (3) the evidence is legally and factually
insufficient to support the trial court’s findings that Levy performed its contractual
obligations; (4) the trial court erred in invalidating the contract’s liquidated damages
and delay provisions; (5) the evidence was legally insufficient to support the award
of attorney’s fees; and (6) Levy failed to establish principal liability against Ragle
under the subcontract and bond. For the reasons explained below, we affirm the trial
court’s judgment.
Background
Levy sued Ragle and Colonial in Dallas County over unpaid electrical
subcontract work on the Orange County Swing Bridge project. Levy alleged it
completed its work and sought $122,219.83 under its final pay application, plus
interest, fees, and costs. Levy’s amended petition also asserted quantum meruit and
Texas Prompt Payment Act claims.
Ragle and Colonial initially filed a general denial and later counterclaimed for
breach, alleging Levy’s deficient and delayed performance caused approximately
$446,066 in damages. Ragle alleged it withheld $80,805.83 and sought the
remaining $365,259.77, fees, costs, and interest.
Levy moved to strike the counterclaim as untimely, prejudicial, and asserted
after discovery closed. Levy also answered the counterclaim with general and
specific denials and asserted defenses including substantial performance, waiver,
laches, acceptance, release, mitigation, and comparative responsibility.
The case was tried to the court, and the court struck Ragle’s counterclaim
during a pretrial hearing. There is no reporter’s record of the trial before us on appeal.
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Following trial, the trial court found Levy completed its work and that Ragle refused
payment of Levy’s final application without written explanation. The court found
project delays resulted from factors unrelated to Levy, including vessel accidents,
design issues, other subcontractors, fabrication problems, defective equipment, and
a TxDOT time suspension. The court found TxDOT increased Ragle’s contract time
from 300 to 667 working days and assessed Ragle no liquidated damages. The court
found Ragle never formally assessed liquidated damages against Levy, paid no delay
damages to TxDOT, and was fully paid by TxDOT. The court found that Ragle was
not damaged by any delay attributed to Levy and that “Levy did not cause delays on
the project during any period of time outside of the TxDOT contract suspension from
July 1, 2019, through June 15, 2020.” The court concluded Ragle and Colonial
materially breached the subcontract and were jointly and severally liable for Levy’s
damages. The court further concluded, among other things, that “Levy’s failure to
complete the project within 180 days is excused due to inability to perform” and
“Levy’s failure to complete the project within 180 days did not cause any damage to
Ragle.”
Following trial, Levy filed an application for attorney’s fees and costs of court.
Levy stated that the court’s findings determined Levy performed its subcontract
obligations. Levy asserted that the findings determined Ragle and Colonial
materially breached the subcontract by failing to pay Levy. Levy asserted that the
findings entitled it to trial fees, court costs, and prejudgment interest. Levy asserted
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that Ragle and Colonial were jointly and severally liable for its damages and
attorney’s fees. Levy requested $60,222 in attorney’s fees through trial and $2,329
in court costs. Levy requested conditional appellate fees of $25,000 in the court of
appeals, $10,000 for a supreme court petition response, and $20,000 for merits
briefing and argument in the supreme court. The affidavit stated that Levy excluded
$4,695 in paralegal fees from its fee request.
The trial court rendered final judgment awarding Levy $122,219.83,
$14,997.39 prejudgment interest, $60,222 attorney’s fees, and $2,329 court costs.
The judgment awarded postjudgment interest and conditional appellate fees of
$25,000 for an unsuccessful court-of-appeals appeal and $30,000 for unsuccessful
supreme court review. The judgment ordered Ragle and Colonial to take nothing on
their claims and disposed of all parties and claims.
Ragle and Colonial moved for a new trial, challenging Levy’s performance,
the time-is-of-the-essence provision, attorney’s fees, liquidated damages, and
Colonial’s liability. The court denied the motion for new trial, and this appeal
followed.
Discussion
Breach of contract
Appellants’ first, second, third, fourth, and sixth issues all complain of the
trial court’s findings and judgment on evidentiary grounds in various ways. In the
first and third issues, they contend the trial court erred in finding Levy performed
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the subcontract because it failed to complete work within the contractually mandated
period, and that the “time is of the essence” provision precluded Levy’s recovery. In
the second issue, they argue the trial court erred in failing to apply the subcontract’s
“express time-of-performance requirements and delay-related contractual
provisions.” In their fourth issue, appellants contend the trial court erred in finding
the “liquidated damages clause was not in effect or constituted an unenforceable
penalty.” And in their sixth issue, they argue that “the trial court erred in holding
Colonial American Casualty & Surety Co. liable absent proof of a breach by its
principal, Ragle.”
As we stated above, there is no reporter’s record before us on appeal. Without
a reporter’s record showing the evidence before the trial court, we presume the
evidence supports the trial court’s findings. See Bennett v. Cochran, 96 S.W.3d 227,
230 (Tex. 2002) (“[C]ourt of appeals was correct in holding that, absent a complete
record on appeal, it must presume the omitted items supported the trial court’s
judgment.”); Vasquez v. Firebird SFE I, LLC, No. 05-19-00057-CV, 2020 WL
2059913, at *1 (Tex. App.—Dallas Apr. 29, 2020, no pet.) (mem. op.).
Consequently, we presume the evidence supports the trial court’s findings that
Levy completed its work and that Ragle refused payment; that project delays resulted
from factors unrelated to Levy, including vessel accidents, design issues, other
subcontractors, fabrication problems, defective equipment, and a TxDOT time
suspension; that Levy did not cause delays on the project during any period of time
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outside of the TxDOT contract suspension; that Ragle was not damaged by any delay
attributed to Levy; that TxDOT increased Ragle’s contract time from 300 to 667
working days and assessed Ragle no liquidated damages; that Ragle never formally
assessed liquidated damages against Levy, paid no delay damages to TxDOT, and
was fully paid by TxDOT; and that Ragle and Colonial materially breached the
subcontract and were jointly and severally liable for Levy’s damages.
We presume the evidence supports the trial court’s findings and judgment,
and we overrule appellants’ first through fourth and sixth issues.
Attorney’s fees
In their remaining issue, appellants complain that the evidence was legally
insufficient to support the award of attorney’s fees. They contend Levy failed to
meet its burden to prove fees were reasonable and necessary. When a party
challenges the legal sufficiency of the evidence to support attorney’s fees, the
challenge fails if there is more than a scintilla of evidence to support the award. Wal-
Mart Stores, Inc. v. Canchola, 121 S.W.3d 735, 739 (Tex. 2003); Bearden v. PSN
Services, LLC, No. 05-24-00815-CV, 2025 WL 3465452, at *7 (Tex. App.—Dallas
Dec. 2, 2025, no pet.) (mem. op.).
A claimant seeking an award of attorney’s fees generally must prove the
attorney’s reasonable hours worked and reasonable rate by presenting sufficient
evidence to support the fee award sought. Rohrmoos Venture v. UTSW DVA
Healthcare, LLP, 578 S.W.3d 469, 501–02 (Tex. 2019). General, conclusory
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testimony devoid of any real substance will not support a fee award. Id. at 501.
Sufficient evidence includes, at a minimum, evidence of (1) particular services
performed, (2) who performed those services, (3) approximately when the services
were performed, (4) the reasonable amount of time required to perform the services,
and (5) the reasonable hourly rate for each person performing such services. Id. at
502. Contemporaneous billing records are not required to prove the requested fees
are reasonable and necessary. Id. However, billing records are strongly encouraged
to prove the reasonableness and necessity of requested fees when those elements are
contested. Id. Regardless, the proof must be sufficient to permit a court “to perform
a meaningful review of [the] fee application.” El Apple I, Ltd. v. Olivas, 370 S.W.3d
757, 764 (Tex. 2012).
We note, however, that the evidentiary requirements to support an award of
attorney’s fees under Chapter 38 are different when the issue is presented to the trial
court for determination, as here, rather than to a jury. Rohrmoos Venture, 578 S.W.3d
at 490 n.9; Logan v. Randall, No. 05-19-00043-CV, 2020 WL 948381, at *8 (Tex.
App.—Dallas Feb. 27, 2020, pet. denied) (mem. op.). Where the attorney’s fee claim
under Chapter 38 is made in a bench trial, the trial court may take judicial notice of
the usual and customary fees and of the contents of the case file, presume the usual
and customary charges for the work performed are reasonable, and set the fees based
on such judicial notice without receiving further evidence. See Scott Pelley P.C. v.
Wynne, 578 S.W.3d 694, 705 (Tex. App.—Dallas 2019, pet. denied); see also TEX.
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CIV. PRAC. & REM. CODE § 38.004. The court may take judicial notice with or
without the request of a party and such notice constitutes some evidence to support
the award. Logan, 2020 WL 948381, at *8; Commerce St. Capital, LLC v. Durant
Bancorp, Inc., No. 05-19-00343-CV, 2020 WL 7585837, at *8 (Tex. App.—Dallas
Dec. 22, 2020, pet. denied) (mem. op.) (“the trial judge’s ability to take judicial
notice of usual and customary fees under Chapter 38 and the presumption that such
fees are reasonable extend to appellate fees”). In the absence of other evidence
supporting the award, we will presume the trial court took such judicial notice in
determining the amount of fees awarded. Logan, 2020 WL 948381, at *8. We will
not overturn an award of attorney’s fees unless it constitutes a clear abuse of
discretion. Id.
Levy, which sought fees under Chapter 38, supported its fee application with
the affidavit of its counsel, Sylvan Lang, Jr. Lang stated that his hourly fee at the
outset of the representation was $400 per hour and $500 at the time of the
application. He stated that the hourly rate of his associate attorney, Hailey Nikkels,
was $200 per hour at the outset of the representation and $300 per hour at the time
of the application. The application included the curricula vitae of the two lawyers
and described their backgrounds and experience. The application further included
invoices from the case, which detailed the various tasks performed by each attorney
(or paralegal) and the time spent on such tasks. Altogether, taking into consideration
the hours worked at the various rates, fees amounted to $60,221.99, which did not
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include paralegal fees. Lang also described his appellate experience and explained
the time generally spent on similar appeals. He anticipated spending 15 to 20 hours
reviewing the record, and 15 to 20 hours reviewing appellant’s arguments,
researching the law, and drafting a brief. Lang further discussed the tasks and time
anticipated with oral argument and responding in the supreme court. Lang also
discussed the possibility of responding, briefing, and arguing in the supreme court,
and the likely number of hours he expected to spend on these tasks. Lang stated that
the $400 to $500 rate he charged for trial work would also be reasonable for appellate
work, and noted that in his experience appellate specialists charged from between
$400 to over $1000 per hour. Given this, he stated that conditional appellate fees of
$25,000 for representation in the court of appeals was reasonable, $10,000 was
reasonable for responding to a petition for review in the supreme court, and $25,000
was reasonable for briefing and arguing in the supreme court.
Given the foregoing, we conclude the trial court did not abuse its discretion in
awarding attorney’s fees to Levy. See Logan, 2020 WL 948381, at *8. We overrule
appellants’ fifth issue.
Conclusion
Having overruled appellants’ six issues, we affirm the trial court’s judgment.
/Mike Lee/
MIKE LEE
JUSTICE
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