Full Opinion

TEXAS COURT OF APPEALS, THIRD DISTRICT, AT AUSTIN NO. 03-24-00513-CV Alper Uzmezler, Appellant v. Ekim Stevens, Appellee FROM THE 126TH DISTRICT COURT OF TRAVIS COUNTY NO. D-1-FM-21-005611, THE HONORABLE JESSICA MANGRUM, JUDGE PRESIDING MEMORANDUM OPINION In this divorce case, appellant Alper Uzmezler challenges the trial court’s property division, asserting that the trial court erred in its valuation of a community-property business. For the reasons explained below, we affirm. BACKGROUND Appellee Ekim Stevens and Uzmezler were married on June 28, 2010. The parties had one child during the marriage. In September 2021, Stevens petitioned for divorce on the grounds of insupportability, cruelty, and adultery; in her live petition, she amended the grounds to be insupportability because of discord or conflict of personalities and adultery. Uzmezler counterpetitioned for divorce on the grounds of insupportability, cruelty, and discord or conflict of personalities. Stevens sought a disproportionate share of the parties’ community estate for the following reasons: (a) Uzmezler’s fault in the marriage’s breakup; (b) Stevens’s being “the spouse to whom conservatorship of the child is granted”; (c) needs and expenses of the child of the marriage; (d) community indebtedness and liabilities; (e) nature of the property involved in the division; (f) wasting of community assets; and (g) attorneys’ fees to be paid. They resolved all issues of conservatorship and possession and access in a partial mediated settlement agreement before the trial and reserved the issue of Uzmezler’s child-support obligation for trial. During the two-day bench trial, the parties submitted the issues of child support, characterization and valuation of property, and division of the community estate to the trial court. The court heard testimony from the parties, each of their business-valuation experts, and their companies’ CPA. The parties owned and operated two businesses during the marriage: BAS Services and Graphics, LLC (BASSG) and Anka Labs, Inc. Both businesses are in the smart-building industry. The parties and the experts testified that the two companies were treated as one company in the way that they were run. BASSG was formed in 2008 before the parties married. Uzmezler and Stevens were the only two members of the company when it was formed. Uzmezler has a 75% membership interest, and Stevens has a 25% membership interest. BASSG is a company that provides building-automation systems, services, energy-management products, hardware, and 3D animated graphics for the building industry. Both parties worked for BASSG. Uzmezler is a software developer, and he holds various certifications related to building-automation systems. Stevens did accounting, modeled 3D floor plans, managed customer communications, and performed project management, sales, and administrative work. 2 Anka Labs was formed in January 2017. Uzmezler is the only shareholder of that corporation. Anka Labs sells AnkaStack software to building managers who want to monitor and control equipment made by different manufacturers from a single dashboard. AnkaStack relies on Project Sandstar technology, an open-source software platform that was created by Uzmezler. The Project Sandstar technology can be housed in small, inexpensive, open-source hardware boxes attached to the different manufacturers’ physical building equipment. The Project Sandstar technology can effectively translate the proprietary machine languages of the different manufacturers into a universal language that the AnkaStack website understands. To protect Anka Labs’ proprietary technology from larger firms, Uzmezler applied for and obtained a patent for Edge Analytics Control Devices and Methods. The goal is for hardware manufacturers to change how they build their hardware and pre-install Sandstar on their equipment so that the equipment could be run on a single website dashboard without needing a separate hardware box attached. Anka Labs also has a library of 9,600 non-fungible tokens (NFTs) that were valued at .1 ETH (which was equivalent to $1,900 at the time of trial). 1 Uzmezler started the creation of the NFT library to crowdfund the company. He testified that he wanted to get some outside investment into Anka Labs so that he could pay BASSG for the investment it made in R&D for the Anka Labs products. 1 ETH is the native digital currency used to pay for transactions and services on Ethereum, which is a global, decentralized computer network based on blockchain technology. Instead of having a central bank, Ethereum uses a shared secure ledger to record transactions and run automated digital agreements called smart contracts. NFTs are unique digital assets created and traded on this network using these contracts. Thus, the value of Anka Labs’ NFT library is tied to the market price of Ethereum’s native cryptocurrency, ETH. 3 Both parties hired experts to value the businesses, and both experts testified at trial about the businesses’ value. In addition, the companies’ CPA, Richard Schwartz, testified at trial. Schwartz testified that he had been both companies’ CPA since their formation and that he submits their business taxes each year, as well as the parties’ personal taxes. He testified that he does not have expertise in valuing a business. He testified in general terms to the companies’ past profit and loss, and he stated that “for tax purposes, everything was paid out of one company.” He further explained that “it was BAS[SG] who basically incurred all the expenses for the software development. And if the software failed, did not work, it would be BAS[SG] that absorbed all the losses on it.” Michael Benaglio, Stevens’s valuation expert, explained that there are three approaches that may be used to evaluate a business: the asset approach, the market approach, and the income approach. Benaglio considered all three approaches but primarily used the asset and income approaches. He further explained that within each approach, there are multiple methodologies that may be used. Because the biggest asset of these companies is the intangible asset of intellectual property (IP), Benaglio focused on it in his analysis. In his report, Benaglio explains that “[i]ntellectual capital is recognized as the most important asset of many of the world’s largest and most powerful companies; it is the foundation for market dominance and continuing profitability of leading corporations”; “[i]t is often the key objective in mergers and acquisitions”; and “[o]ne of the key factors affecting a company’s success or failure is the degree to which it exploits intellectual capital and values risk.” Benaglio testified that Anka Labs was the software-developing part of the two businesses. BASSG brought in consulting income of a little over $1 million per year, and it would be the arm selling and receiving the funds for the 4 software being developed, even though Anka Labs owned the software. Benaglio valued BASSG at $1,050,000, and he valued Anka Labs at $1.5 million. Erin Buck, Uzmezler’s valuation expert, testified that she used the income approach, applying a discounted cash-flow method, and the market approach, applying a transaction method. She testified that she did not feel the asset approach “presented the highest and best value for the companies.” Under the income approach, her total valuation of the businesses as a whole was approximately $307,000. Under the market approach, her total valuation of the businesses as a whole was approximately $345,000. Her average of the two was $326,000. At the close of the trial in December 2023, the trial court granted the divorce and confirmed the final partial mediated settlement agreement on the record. On May 23, 2024, the trial court signed the final divorce decree. The terms of the mediated settlement agreement were included in the decree. 2 In the decree, the trial court awarded all cash accounts and debts associated with BASSG to Uzmezler. 3 Concerning Anka Labs, the trial court found “that this decree is a partition of the community property of the parties” and that “[b]ecause of the nature of the properties making up the estate, the property cannot be divided in a just and right manner 2 The parties agreed in the mediated settlement agreement that the divorce would be granted only on the grounds of insupportability, but Stevens’s counsel argued that her pleading and proof of infidelity supported her request for a disproportionate share of the community estate. 3 In its February 2024 letter ruling, the trial court stated that it confirmed the parties’ separate-property interest in BASSG of 25% to Stevens and 75% to Uzmezler. It further found that the BASSG debts and assets had been commingled to constitute community property and awarded to Uzmezler and made him responsible for all cash accounts and debts associated with the company. 5 without impairing the value of all portions.” The trial court found that Anka Labs had a community-property value of $1.5 million. The trial court awarded the parties’ interest in Anka Labs to Uzmezler and ordered that he pay $750,000 to Stevens to compensate her for her interest. To accomplish this payment, the trial court ordered a judgment in favor of Stevens against Uzmezler in the amount of $750,000, with 6% interest, to be paid on the following schedule: $150,000 to be paid on or before September 1, 2024, with the remaining balance of $600,000 to be paid over a period of 60 months. The court secured the judgment to equalize the community estate with an owelty lien on the home awarded to Uzmezler and ordered Uzmezler to sign a real-estate-lien note with the terms of the payout included. The trial court also divided the remainder of the community estate. Uzmezler did not request findings of fact and conclusions of law. This appeal followed. ANALYSIS Uzmezler contends that the trial court abused its discretion when it determined that the value of Anka Labs was $1.5 million based on Benaglio’s valuation. 4 Stevens responds 4 Although Uzmezler identifies six issues in the “Issues Presented” section of his brief, within the body of his brief he argues only that the trial court abused its discretion when it determined that the value of Anka Labs was $1.5 million, which is his sixth issue. In the other five issues presented, Uzmezler asserts that the trial court abused its discretion because it lacked sufficient evidence to support the following portions of the decree: (1) its characterization, value, and division of the marital property (including community and separate property); (2) its order that Uzmezler must buy out Stevens’s 50% community-property interest in Anka Labs based on Benaglio’s $1.5 million valuation of the company; (3) its order that Uzmezler must pay Stevens $750,000, in accordance with terms of closing documents provided for in the decree, with interest at 6% per year compounded annually from the date of judgment for which execution shall issue; (4) its order that Uzmezler sign a real-estate-lien note for $750,000 payable to Stevens under the terms specified in the decree, including a $150,000 payment due by September 1, 2024, and subsequent monthly installments of $11,598.88; and (5) its order that 6 that the trial court did not abuse the broad discretion it has to divide the community estate by assigning a value to Anka Labs that was within the range of the evidence presented by the competing experts. I. The Trial Court Has Broad Discretion Over Property Division In a divorce decree, the trial court “shall order a division of the estate of the parties in a manner that the court deems just and right, having due regard for the rights of each party and any children of the marriage.” Tex. Fam. Code § 7.001; see Bradshaw v. Bradshaw, 555 S.W.3d 539, 543 (Tex. 2018) (defining “just,” “right,” and “due regard” and describing abuse-of-discretion standard for reviewing trial court’s division of marital estate). The property division should be equitable, but “just and right” division does not require a trial court to divide the community estate into equal shares. See Murff v. Murff, 615 S.W.2d 696, 698-99 (Tex. 1981); Cyree v. Cyree, No. 03-21-00319-CV, 2022 WL 17835215, at *3 (Tex. App.—Austin Dec. 22, 2022, no pet.) (mem. op.). The trial court must have a reasonable basis for an unequal division. O’Carolan v. Hopper (O’Carolan I), 71 S.W.3d 529, 532 (Tex. App.—Austin 2002, no pet.). “To constitute an abuse of discretion, the property division must be manifestly unfair.” Id. (citing Mann v. Mann, 607 S.W.2d 243, 245 (Tex. 1980)). Uzmezler sign an owelty-lien deed of trust to secure the real-estate-lien note, sign a promissory note for the $600,00 remaining balance of the buy-out of Stevens’s interest in Anka Labs, and sign a security agreement with collateral pledge and appointment of escrow agent. Stevens responds that Uzmezler waived these issues concerning the specific terms of Uzmezler’s buy-out of Stevens’s community-property interest in Anka Labs because of his failure to provide legal or factual citations or argument on those issues. Because the first five issues Uzmezler identifies all depend upon a conclusion that the trial court abused its discretion by valuing Anka Labs at $1.5 million and because Uzmezler does not provide argument with appropriate citations to authorities and the record for each of those issues within the body of the brief, we address only the central issue of whether the trial court abused its discretion by valuing Anka Labs at $1.5 million. See Tex. R. App. P. 47.1. 7 A trial court may consider numerous factors when exercising its broad discretion to divide the marital property, including the parties’ relative earning capacity and business opportunities, relative financial condition and obligations, education, the nature of the property, the size of the separate estates, and the probable need for future support. Murff, 615 S.W.2d at 699. The trial court has the opportunity to observe the parties and other witnesses, determine credibility, and evaluate the parties’ needs and potentials. Id. at 700. “The court may also, in making a disproportionate division, consider the conduct of the errant spouse,” e.g., Chafino v. Chafino, 228 S.W.3d 467, 473 (Tex. App.—El Paso 2007, no pet.); Mohindra v. Mohindra, No. 14-06-00056-CV, 2007 WL 3072057, at *2 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] Oct. 23, 2007, no pet.) (mem. op.), and the wasting of community assets, see, e.g., Schlueter v. Schlueter, 975 S.W.2d 584, 589 (Tex. 1998) (explaining that court may consider wrongful depletion of community assets when dividing estate). “The circumstances of each marriage dictate what factors should be considered in division of the marital estate.” Cyree, 2022 WL 17835215, at *3 (quoting Roberts v. Roberts, 531 S.W.3d 224, 232 (Tex. App.—San Antonio 2017, pet. denied)). “Mathematical precision in dividing property in a divorce is usually not possible. Wide latitude and discretion rests in these trial courts and that discretion should only be disturbed in the case of clear abuse.” Murff, 615 S.W.2d at 700. II. Abuse-of-Discretion Standard of Review The appellant bears the burden “to show from the record that the division was so disproportionate, and thus unfair, that it constitutes an abuse of discretion.” O’Carolan v. Hopper (O’Carolan II), 414 S.W.3d 288, 311 (Tex. App.—Austin 2013, no pet.). In this context, the abuse-of-discretion standard overlaps with traditional standards for reviewing the 8 sufficiency of the evidence. Zeifman v. Michels, 212 S.W.3d 582, 587 (Tex. App.—Austin 2006, pet. denied). In reviewing the trial court’s property division, we must consider (1) whether the trial court had sufficient information upon which to exercise its discretion and (2) whether the trial court abused its discretion by dividing the property in a manner that is manifestly unjust and unfair. Horgan v. Horgan, 727 S.W.3d 262, 271 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 2025, no pet.). The legal and factual sufficiency of the evidence are not independent grounds of error but are merely relevant factors in assessing whether the trial court had sufficient information upon which to exercise its discretion, which we answer using traditional sufficiency standards of review. Kazmi v. Kazmi, 693 S.W.3d 556, 566 (Tex. App.—Austin 2023, pet. denied).5 We are to resolve every reasonable presumption in favor of a proper exercise of discretion of the trial court in dividing the parties’ property. Willis v. Willis, 533 S.W.3d 547, 551 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 2017, no pet.). The trier of fact “is the sole judge of the 5 In reviewing the legal sufficiency of the evidence, the court must consider evidence in the light most favorable to the verdict; it must credit favorable evidence if reasonable factfinders could do so and disregard contrary evidence unless reasonable factfinders could not do so. City of Keller v. Wilson, 168 S.W.3d 802, 822 (Tex. 2005). “The final test for legal sufficiency must always be whether the evidence at trial would enable reasonable and fair-minded people to reach the verdict under review.” Id. at 827. A legal-sufficiency challenge will be sustained only if (1) there is a complete absence of evidence of a vital fact; (2) the court is barred by the rules of law or evidence from giving weight to the only evidence offered to prove a vital fact; (3) the evidence offered to prove a vital fact is no more than a scintilla; or (4) the evidence conclusively establishes the opposite of a vital fact. Marathon Corp. v. Pitzner, 106 S.W.3d 724, 727 (Tex. 2003). More than a scintilla of evidence exists when the evidence rises to a level that would enable reasonable and fair-minded people to differ in their conclusions. Ford Motor Co. v. Ridgway, 135 S.W.3d 598, 601 (Tex. 2004). Evidence does not exceed a scintilla if it is so weak as to do no more than to create a mere surmise or suspicion that the fact exists. Id. In reviewing a factual-sufficiency point, the court must weigh all of the evidence in the record; findings may be overturned only if they are so against the great weight and preponderance of the evidence as to be clearly wrong and unjust. Ortiz v. Jones, 917 S.W.2d 770, 772 (Tex. 1996) (per curiam). The court must clearly state why the finding is supported by factually insufficient evidence or is so against the great weight and preponderance as to be manifestly unjust. Id. 9 credibility of witnesses and the weight to be given to their testimony.” Golden Eagle Archery, Inc. v. Jackson, 116 S.W.3d 757, 761 (Tex. 2003). We therefore “may not pass upon the witnesses’ credibility or substitute our judgment for that of the fact finder, even if the evidence would also support a different result.” 4922 Holdings, LLC v. Rivera, 625 S.W.3d 316, 325 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 2021, pet. denied). No findings of fact or conclusions of law were requested or filed; therefore, it is implied that the trial court made all the findings necessary to support its judgment. Worford v. Stamper, 801 S.W.2d 108, 109 (Tex. 1990) (per curiam). III. The Trial Court Has Discretion to Assign Value Within the Range of Evidence Uzmezler contends that the trial court abused its discretion by valuing the community-property interest in Anka Labs at $1.5 million and in its overall division of the community estate, asserting that there was no evidence or insufficient evidence to support the valuation. Uzmezler argues, without reference to any legal authorities, that the trial court erred in its valuation of Anka Labs by citing to his own testimony and Buck’s testimony to support his contention that the trial court should not have relied on Benaglio’s valuation. When considering conflicting expert testimony, it is the sole prerogative of the factfinder to determine the weight and credibility of the witnesses, the obligation of the respective advocates to persuade the factfinder, and “our obligation to see that the process was fair and carried out according to the rules.” Welch v. McLean, 191 S.W.3d 147, 160 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth 2005, no pet.) (quoting Cruz ex rel. Cruz v. Paso Del Norte Health Found., 44 S.W.3d 622, 646 (Tex. App.—El Paso 2001, pet. denied)), overruled on other grounds by Phillips v. Bramlett, 288 S.W.3d 876 (Tex. 2009). 10 Uzmezler raises four challenges to Benaglio’s valuation. First, he argues that Buck’s income approach was more appropriate to use for valuing Anka Labs than Benaglio’s asset approach. Second, he complains that Benaglio’s projected income for Anka Labs is unsupported by sufficient evidence. Third, he asserts that the $900,000 in IP value for BASSG that Benaglio added to its value, which was based on the value of the R&D costs it expended for Anka Labs, should be counted against Anka Labs’ value; Uzmezler also argues that the R&D costs were $237,000, not $900,000. Fourth, he argues that the NFT library should not be valued at its retail price because so few NFTs had been sold at the time of the valuation. A. Benaglio’s Use of the Asset Approach Uzmezler primarily complains that the asset approach used by Benaglio was not appropriate to use in this case. Instead, Uzmezler contends that Buck’s income approach was more appropriate to use. Uzmezler is not complaining that Benaglio failed to express a basis for his opinion or that the basis for his asset-approach valuation was contradicted by the facts. Instead, he relies on Buck’s testimony to assert that Benaglio should have used different or additional data. We conclude that Uzmezler’s complaint is about Benaglio’s underlying methodology, technique, or foundational data—i.e., the reliability of his testimony—and absent an objection at trial, Benaglio’s opinion may be considered probative evidence unless he provides no basis for his opinion or the basis offered for his opinion does not support it. See, e.g., Moore v. Moore, 383 S.W.3d 190, 198-99 (Tex. App.—Dallas 2012, pet. denied) (explaining that generally, to preserve complaint that expert’s testimony is unreliable, and specifically, to preserve a complaint “that the expert’s underlying methodology, technique, or 11 foundational data is not reliable,” party must object to expert’s testimony before trial or when it is offered). Here, Benaglio provided a factual basis for his opinion. He testified that his analysis was based on the data he received, which included financial information, such as tax returns, profit-and-loss statements, and asset lists. Because the biggest asset of these businesses is the intangible asset of IP, he analyzed the R&D costs and opportunity for royalties. He interviewed both parties (he was originally jointly hired by them) and reviewed their corporate documents. After he completed his initial report valuing the companies as of August 31, 2022, he prepared an updated report that included the Anka Labs’ NFT library and valued Anka Labs as of November 3, 2023. We discuss Benaglio’s valuation of the NFT library in more detail below. Buck’s analysis does not establish that the basis for Benaglio’s asset-approach valuation was contradicted by the facts. Buck did not consider the asset approach at all in her analysis. Instead, Uzmezler relies on her testimony to assert that Benaglio should have used different or additional data. Buck testified that Uzmezler provided her projections that she based her report on but did not provide her with exact projection numbers, and neither party stated to her what Anka Labs’ potential earnings are. In her report, she did not value the IP, the commercial goodwill, or the personal goodwill of either party in connection with either of the companies. Buck also did not review or value the NFT library created by Anka Labs. Buck testified that it was outside the scope of her engagement to evaluate that asset, and when asked whether the NFTs have value in addition to the IP that is not included, she responded, “I would have to look at the NFT library in detail. I have not done that.” She was not aware that Anka Labs was advertising crowdfunding through its website. She also testified that she did not 12 attribute any value to the patent owned and held by Anka Labs because she used the income approach. Uzmezler’s reliance on Buck’s completely different approach to valuation does not demonstrate that Benaglio did not express a basis for his opinion or that the basis he offered was contradicted by the facts. Thus, we conclude that Uzmezler was required to object at trial to Benaglio’s methodology to challenge his use of the asset approach. See id. at 200; see also Graves v. Tomlinson, 329 S.W.3d 128, 146 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 2010, pet. denied) (concluding that because party did not object to expert’s “valuation methodology before or during trial, she cannot attack his methodology on appeal by way of a legal sufficiency challenge predicated on asserted flaws in his methodology”). We next turn to Uzmezler’s sufficiency challenges to specific items in Benaglio’s valuation. B. Benaglio’s Projected Income for Anka Labs Uzmezler contends that insufficient evidence supports Benaglio’s projected income for Anka Labs of $173,000 because Benaglio admitted in the past few years Anka Labs has had negative income with very little revenue. Benaglio testified that he based the projected income on information related to projected royalties that he received from Stevens, who handled the companies’ bookkeeping, which we conclude is some evidence supporting his projection. Moreover, Benaglio acknowledged that there is very little revenue now but explained that “the anticipation [of future revenue] is what projections are all about during startups.” He further noted that because Anka Labs is a startup, he used the IP value and the asset value and not an income approach. He “did income on BASSG, but Anka is — right now, in my opinion, the value is in the NFTs.” Thus, his valuation was based not on the projected income, but on the 13 NFT library, which was valued based on its then-current pricing at $1,673,133.12, and after applying a lack-of-marketability discount of 10%, was given a total rounded value of $1.5 million. C. Benaglio’s Attribution of $900,000 of IP Value to BASSG Uzmezler also contends that Benaglio’s $900,000 of IP value, funded by BASSG and added to its value, “should be reflected as a negative” against Anka Labs’ value. Even though he testified that BASSG funded the R&D costs for Anka Labs, he argues that the $900,000 in value should not be counted as an account receivable for BASSG because there is no documentation showing that BASSG will be paid for it. However, as Benaglio testified, “[i]f BASSG is not using Anka Labs’ technology that they developed and paid for, then the IP value would go to Anka Labs, just like [the] NFTs, as an asset . . . .” Benaglio used the R&D cost to value the IP. We conclude that some evidence supports Benaglio’s attribution of the IP value funded by BASSG to BASSG. In addition, Uzmezler contends that the correct amount of R&D costs was $383,000, which was reduced by several projects and jobs to reduce those costs to $227,000, and he submitted an exhibit showing a breakdown of payments to various people that he attested were R&D expenses. Benaglio, on the other hand, submitted a schedule with his report listing the various assets, including the NFT library; their cost (totaling $900,500); and their market value (totaling $4,460,633.12). Stevens testified that the asset sheet she provided to Benaglio as support for the R&D costs in his report was an asset sheet she and Uzmezler had prepared together for a presentation to a venture-capital firm, and emails between her and Uzmezler about 14 the assets were admitted into evidence as support for her testimony. We hold that the trial court had sufficient evidence before it to conclude that Benaglio’s valuation of R&D costs was correct. D. Benaglio’s Valuation of the NFT Library Uzmezler asserts that the NFT library should not be valued at its retail price because so few NFTs had been sold at the time of the valuation. When Uzmezler testified about his creation of the NFT library, he stated that in part his purpose was to obtain outside investment to repay BASSG for the investment it made in R&D. He attested that the R&D amount was around $227,000. However, he also acknowledged that he was offering those NFT images in exchange for 10% of the company, and he agreed that by his own designation of the prices on the NFT library, about $1.5 million was 10% of the company. Uzmezler’s complaint about Benaglio’s valuation is not a sufficiency complaint— it is another methodology complaint. Uzmezler himself set the value for the NFTs. His argument is that they should be valued using the income approach, not the asset approach. We hold that the trial court had sufficient evidence before it to conclude that some evidence supports Benaglio’s valuation of the NFT library. “[W]hen conflicting evidence of value exists, a trial court is permitted to assign a value within the range of evidence.” Moore, 383 S.W.3d at 200 (citing McIntyre v. McIntyre, 722 S.W.2d 533, 536 (Tex. App.—San Antonio 1986, no writ)). The trial court’s valuation of Anka Labs at $1.5 million fell within the range of numbers provided by the expert testimony. Even if the trial court concluded that there were flaws in both experts’ valuations and assumptions, it was permitted to blend the evidence to arrive at its valuation. Id. Viewing all the evidence in the record and implying all fact findings in favor of the verdict, we hold that the trial 15 court had legally and factually sufficient evidence before it that supported its ultimate valuation of Anka Labs at $1.5 million. CONCLUSION Having held that the trial court did not abuse its discretion by valuing Anka Labs at $1.5 million, we affirm. __________________________________________ Gisela D. Triana, Justice Before Justices Triana, Theofanis, and Crump Affirmed Filed: August 28, 2026 16