Full Opinion

Affirmed and Memorandum Opinion filed November 17, 2026. In The Fourteenth Court of Appeals NO. 14-26-00045-CV DONNA LYNN HOLLAND, Appellant V. LARRY DARNELL HOLLAND, Appellee On Appeal from the 245th District Court Harris County, Texas Trial Court Cause No. 2024-74580 MEMORANDUM OPINION Donna Lynn Holland appeals the divorce decree dissolving her marriage to Larry Darnell Holland. In three issues in her pro se brief, Donna contends that the trial court (1) failed to include necessary language in the decree that would allow her to access the federal employee retirement benefits that she was awarded, (2) abused its discretion in finding a postnuptial agreement was unconscionable or otherwise invalid, and (3) aggressively questioned her during her testimony regarding the postnuptial agreement. We affirm. Background Donna and Larry were married on December 22, 2017, and evidence indicated that they became separated in December 2019. They both had children from prior relationships, but they did not have any children together. During the marriage, on May 11, 2018, the parties entered a postnuptial agreement that reads in full as follows: In the event of divorce between Larry Holland and Donna Holland, Larry Holland will pay Donna Holland 50% of his income until death of either party and Donna Holland maintains 100% of any businesses she has. Larry Holland and heirs will not make any claims. The reason is because I, Larry Holland have not provided my wife, Donna Holland with safety, coverage or protection. I have been fantasying about other women, not respecting her as my wife, being disconnected and excluding her from social gatherings. The agreement was signed by both parties and notarized. Neither party was apparently represented by counsel at the time the agreement was signed. In a bench trial, Donna was represented by counsel and Larry represented himself. Donna urged the court to enforce the postnuptial agreement, but Larry asserted that at the time it was signed he “was not in the right mental state to agree to anything” because he was suffering from depression and post-traumatic stress disorder and was afraid that he “would lose everything.” During the trial, the court asked Donna a few questions, including regarding whether she told Larry that if he did not sign the agreement, she would not stay with him. After a little back and forth between Donna and the judge, Donna’s counsel requested to be able to ask a question to clarify the matter, and the court allowed counsel to continue his examination. Later, the judge also asked some clarification questions regarding Donna’s work history and whether she considered the couple separated in 2019. Among other things in the decree, the trial court denied enforcement of the 2 postnuptial agreement on the grounds that it was invalid and unconscionable. The court awarded Donna a portion of Larry’s 401k as well as a portion of his United States Postal Service retirement benefits. After entry of the decree, Donna requested a judgment nunc pro tunc because she contended that the decree failed to include language and information necessary for her to be able to access the USPS retirement benefits that she was awarded. The trial court granted the request and entered a nunc pro tunc judgment. Federal Retirement Benefits In her first issue, Donna contends that even in the nunc pro tunc judgment, the trial court failed to include necessary language and information that would allow her to access the USPS retirement benefits that she was awarded. 1 She asserts that the trial court abused its discretion in failing to enter a decree that can be implemented as written. As for what language and information is missing, Donna cites globally to Title 5, part 838 of the Code of Federal Regulations. 5 C.F.R. § 838.101–.1121. This part contains voluminous, detailed sections pertaining to court orders affecting federal retirement accounts. Donna, however, neither cites any specific section nor explains either how the trial court’s nunc pro tunc judgment still failed to provide an implementable decree or what language would be required to make the judgment implementable. An appellant’s brief “must contain a clear and concise argument for the contentions made, with appropriate citations to authorities and to the record.” Tex. R. App. P. 38.1(i). We decline to search the many sections of part 838 and 1 As with all litigants, we liberally construe briefs and other filings that are submitted by pro se parties, and we hold pro se litigants to the same standards as licensed attorneys and require them to comply with all applicable laws and rules of procedure. See Mansfield State Bank v. Cohn, 573 S.W.2d 181, 184–85 (Tex. 1978); Rogers v. City of Hous., 627 S.W.3d 777, 786 n.1 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 2021, no pet.). 3 compare them to the language in the decree in order to determine what may be missing without guidance from Donna. See CenterPoint Energy Hous. Elec., LLC v. Coleman, 672 S.W.3d 745, 773 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 2023, no pet.) (declining to make a party’s argument for them). Accordingly, we overrule Donna’s first issue. Postnuptial Agreement In her second issue, Donna contends that the trial court abused its discretion in determining that the postnuptial agreement was invalid and unconscionable and thus refusing to enforce the portion of the agreement requiring Larry to pay her half of his post-marriage income until the death of either party. More specifically, Donna asserts that the validity and enforceability of the agreement was governed by Family Code sections 4.102, 4.104, and 4.105, which pertain to marital property agreements. We conclude, however, that none of these provisions apply to the agreement at issue in this case. The statutory provisions in question read as follows: § 4.102. Partition or Exchange of Community Property At any time, the spouses may partition or exchange between themselves all or part of their community property, then existing or to be acquired, as the spouses may desire. Property or a property interest transferred to a spouse by a partition or exchange agreement becomes that spouse’s separate property. The partition or exchange of property may also provide that future earnings and income arising from the transferred property shall be the separate property of the owning spouse. .... § 4.104. Formalities A partition or exchange agreement under Section 4.102 or an agreement under Section 4.103 must be in writing and signed by both 4 parties. Either agreement is enforceable without consideration. § 4.105. Enforcement (a) A partition or exchange agreement is not enforceable if the party against whom enforcement is requested proves that: (1) the party did not sign the agreement voluntarily; or (2) the agreement was unconscionable when it was signed and, before execution of the agreement, that party: (A) was not provided a fair and reasonable disclosure of the property or financial obligations of the other party; (B) did not voluntarily and expressly waive, in writing, any right to disclosure of the property or financial obligations of the other party beyond the disclosure provided; and (C) did not have, or reasonably could not have had, adequate knowledge of the property or financial obligations of the other party. (b) An issue of unconscionability of a partition or exchange agreement shall be decided by the court as a matter of law. (c) The remedies and defenses in this section are the exclusive remedies or defenses, including common law remedies or defenses. Tex. Fam. Code §§ 4.102, 4.104, 4.105. As can readily be seen from the statutory language, these provisions concern agreements between married parties to partition or exchange community property. See generally ExxonMobil Pipeline Co. v. Coleman, 512 S.W.3d 895, 899 (Tex. 2017) (explaining that issues of statutory construction are reviewed de novo, our objective in construing a statute being to give effect to the Legislature’s intent, which requires us to first look to the statute’s plain language, and if the language is unambiguous, we interpret the statute according to its plain meaning). The portion of the postnuptial agreement that Donna argues should have been enforced in this 5 case involved only Larry’s post-marriage income. By definition, Larry’s post- marriage income is not community property; thus, none of the code sections Donna relies on would apply. See Tex. Family Code § 3.002 (“Community property consists of the property, other than separate property, acquired by either spouse during marriage.”). Cf. McCartney v. McCartney, 720 S.W.3d 789, 804–05 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 2025, no pet.) (holding parties’ agreement husband would pay wife spousal maintenance was governed by general contract law and not the Family Code); McCollough v. McCollough, 212 S.W.3d 638, 645–48 (Tex. App.—Austin 2006, no pet.) (holding parties’ agreement husband would pay wife alimony was governed by general contract law and not the Family Code). Donna does not make any arguments based on any other law. Donna’s arguments are without merit, and we overrule her second issue. Judge’s Questioning In her third issue, Donna contends that the trial judge erred in questioning her regarding the postnuptial agreement. As discussed above, during her testimony, the trial judge asked Donna a few questions, including regarding whether she told Larry that if he did not sign the agreement, she would not stay with him. After a little back and forth between Donna and the judge, Donna’s counsel requested to be able to ask a question to clarify the matter, and the court allowed counsel to continue the examination. Although a trial judge should not act as an advocate, a judge may ask questions for the purpose of eliciting evidence that has not otherwise been brought out. E.g., Sklar v. Sklar, 598 S.W.3d 810, 825 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 2020, no pet.). For example, in a bench trial such as this, the judge may question a witness to clarify facts on an issue that the judge must decide as the factfinder. Id. We review a trial court’s questioning of a witness for an abuse of discretion. Id. 6 As Donna acknowledges in her briefing, she did not preserve her complaint regarding the trial judge’s questioning by making a timely objection. See Tex. R. App. P. 33.1; see also Sklar, 598 S.W.3d at 825 (“[C]ounsel failed to preserve the complaint that the judge was improperly questioning witnesses or acting as an advocate.”); Bhamani v. Citizens Enters., No. 11-13-00041-CV, 2015 WL 1779055, at *8 (Tex. App.—Eastland Apr. 16, 2015, no pet.) (mem. op.) (holding party failed to preserve any error in trial judge’s questioning of witnesses in an allegedly “‘frequent, aggressive, and inappropriate’ manner”). However, there is a limited, narrow, and rare exception to the preservation rule in the context of judicial conduct during a trial. If a judge’s conduct demonstrates incurable bias, courts will excuse a party’s failure to object. See, e.g., Jacquot v. Coker, No. 14-20-00123-CV, 2022 WL 1180138, at *11 (Tex. App.— Houston [14th Dist.] Apr. 21, 2022, pet. denied) (mem. op.). Such bias “is shown if the judge’s conduct showed ‘a deep-seated favoritism or antagonism that would make fair judgment impossible.’” Id. (quoting Dow Chem. Co. v. Francis, 46 S.W.3d 237, 240 (Tex. 2001)). In the present case, however, the judge’s questioning of Donna was rather brief, focused specifically on matters essential to the court’s factfinding, and did not reveal any “deep-seated favoritism or antagonism.” We particularly note that when Donna’s counsel offered to ask her questions to address the trial court’s concerns, the judge allowed counsel to proceed. The judge’s conduct here was nowhere near the level required for reversal, particularly given Donna’s failure to object. Finding no merit in Donna’s argument, we overrule the third issue. 7 We affirm the trial court’s decree. /s/ Maritza M. Antú Justice Panel consists of Justices Wilson, Boatman, and Antú. 8