Charles Kimathi Murungi v. Sarah Kawinzi
CourtTexas Court of Appeals, 14th District (Houston)
Date FiledNovember 17, 2026
Docket14-25-01011-CV
JudgeMcLaughlin
StatusPublished
📰 News Coverage: Read the LAWS.com news report on this case
Full Opinion
Affirmed as Modified and Memorandum Opinion filed November 17, 2026.
In The
Fourteenth Court of Appeals
NO. 14-25-01011-CV
CHARLES KIMATHI MURUNGI, Appellant
V.
SARAH KAWINZI, Appellee
On Appeal from the 308th District Court
Harris County, Texas
Trial Court Cause No. 2022-69290
MEMORANDUM OPINION
This is an appeal from a post-divorce enforcement and receivership
accounting order. In seven issues on appeal, appellant Charles Kimiathi Murungi
argues that the trial court erred by: (1) awarding a grossly disproportionate
property division between himself and appellee Sarah Kawinzi; (2) failing to
properly classify the proceeds of a second mortgage; (3) awarding Kawinzi
property that was not community; (4) allocating unproven business interests and
valuations; (5) imposing travel restrictions without the necessary findings;
(6) awarding monetary judgments at disbursement that were inconsistent,
miscalculated, and unsupported by the evidence; and (7) ordering child support to
begin retroactively while the parties were cohabiting. While we dismiss five of
Murungi’s claims for lack of subject-matter jurisdiction, we modify Kawinzi’s
monetary award and affirm the judgment of the trial court as modified.
I. BACKGROUND
In October 2022, Murungi filed for divorce. In 2023, Murungi obtained a
$150,000 second mortgage to fund the parties’ agreed-upon buyout of Kawinzi’s
home-equity interest. On May 31, 2024, a final divorce decree was signed. As
relevant to this appeal, the divorce decree: (1) required that their former marital
residence be sold through a receiver; (2) ordered the net proceeds from the sale of
the home be split exactly 50/50 between the parties; (3) provided that the $150,000
second mortgage (also referred to as the “Discover Loan”) was Murungi’s separate
liability that he had to satisfy personally; (4) set forth the property division and
value determinations; (5) imposed travel restrictions on Murungi; and
(6) mandated child support. In the event that Murungi did not fully repay the
second mortgage before the sale of the marital residence was closed, the divorce
decree gave the receiver authority to “reallocate the disbursement of net sales
proceeds between the parties to effectuate the intent that CHARLES KIMATHI
MURUNGI be solely responsible for repayment of 100% of the outstanding
balance of the Discover Loan.”
The record reflects that instead of using the funds from second mortgage to
buy out Kawinzi’s equity interest in the home as agreed upon, Murungi kept 100%
of the loan proceeds in his personal bank account and used the funds for his
personal benefit. In 2025, the receiver closed the sale of the former marital
residence. The net proceeds from the sale—defined by the divorce decree as “gross
2
sales price less cost of sale, payment of receiver fees and costs and full repayment
of [the first mortgage on the house]”—was $259,490.31. However, because
Murungi had not paid off the second mortgage as mandated by the divorce decree,
$148,114.40 was taken out of the funds to satisfy the second mortgage and clear
title to the residence, leaving the receiver’s trust account with only $111,375.91.
On November 7, 2025, the trial court signed its disbursement order,
awarding Kawinzi the full $111,375.91 remaining in the receiver’s account in
addition to a money judgment in the amount of $92,426.44. Murungi now appeals
the November 7, 2025 disbursement order.
II. SUBJECT-MATTER JURISDICTION
As noted above, this is an appeal of the November 7, 2025 disbursement
order. Murungi did not appeal the final divorce decree itself and the time to do so
has long passed. As such, Murungi cannot use the current appeal to challenge the
May 31, 2024 decree or any of the matters resolved therein. See Tex. Fam. Code
Ann. § 9.007(a) (stating that in an enforcement order, a trial court may not “amend,
modify, alter, or change the division of property” originally set out in the decree);
Hagen v. Hagen, 282 S.W.3d 899, 902 (Tex. 2009) (“Attempting to obtain an order
that alters or modifies a divorce decree’s property division is an impermissible
collateral attack.”).
Therefore, Murungi’s issues that challenge portions of the original divorce
decree, including the just and right division of property, the valuation of the
property, the travel restrictions, and the child support calculations—that is, issues
1, 3, 4, 5, and 7—are dismissed for lack of subject-matter jurisdiction.
III. MONETARY DISBURSEMENT
The only remaining issues left to address are issues 2 and 6, in which
3
Murungi challenges the trial court’s classification of the proceeds of the second
mortgage and the effect that classification had on the calculations involved in the
disbursement order, respectively.
A. Applicable law
A trial court is prohibited from modifying the substantive division of
property made in a final divorce decree. See Tex. Fam. Code Ann. § 9.007(a).
However, “[i]f a party fails to comply with a decree of divorce or annulment and
delivery of property awarded in the decree is no longer an adequate remedy, the
court may render a money judgment for the damages caused by that failure to
comply.” Id. § 9.010(a).
B. The trial court computed disbursement incorrectly
Because Murungi did not pay off the Discover Loan as ordered, the trial
court possessed the authority to render a money judgment to compensate Kawinzi
for that failure. See id. Murungi argues that the trial court miscalculated the money
judgment and disbursement to Kawinzi by inconsistently classifying the Discover
Loan and imposing “duplicative liability” on Murungi for the same “economic
event.” Kawinzi asserts that the trial court employed proper accounting principles
because “[w]hen a co-owner’s separate default is satisfied out of a shared asset
pool, the court must employ an ‘add-back’ ledger to determine what the true
community value would have been but for the breach.” Although we agree with
Kawinzi’s assertion generally, that is not what the trial court did.
As noted above, the divorce decree established that Murungi and Kawinzi
would evenly split the net proceeds from the sale of the marital residence. As
defined by the divorce decree itself, the net sales proceeds were $259,490.31,
meaning that had Murungi paid off the Discover Loan out of his separate money as
4
he was ordered to, Murungi and Kawinzi would have each been entitled to
$129,745.16. However, the trial court’s order awarded Kawinzi the entire amount
remaining in the receiver’s trust fund—$111,375.91—plus a money judgment from
Murungi in the amount of $92,426.44, granting Kawinzi a total monetary award of
$203,802.35. This is a windfall for Kawinzi and an improper deviation from the
divorce decree’s provision that the parties would share the proceeds 50/50. Instead,
the trial court should have awarded Kawinzi the $111,375.91 in the receiver’s trust
fund plus a monetary award in the amount of $18,369.25. This is the amount
necessary to get Kawinzi to a total award of $129,745.16, which is her half of the
net sales proceeds she would have been entitled to if not for Murungi’s failure to
satisfy the Discover Loan.
Accordingly, we sustain issues 2 and 6.
IV. CONCLUSION
We modify the judgment of the trial court to reduce Kawinzi’s additional
monetary award from $92,426.44 to $18,369.25. Thus, the modified judgment
awards Kawinzi the full $111,375.91 remaining in the receiver’s account in
addition to a monetary judgment against Murungi in the amount of $18,369.25. We
affirm the judgment of the trial court as modified.
/s/ Tonya McLaughlin
Justice
Panel consists of Hart, McLaughlin, and Antú.
5