Full Opinion

NUMBER 13-26-00680-CV COURT OF APPEALS THIRTEENTH DISTRICT OF TEXAS CORPUS CHRISTI – EDINBURG IN RE DG & GG INVESTMENTS, LLC ON PETITION FOR WRIT OF MANDAMUS MEMORANDUM OPINION Before Justices Silva, Peña, and West Memorandum Opinion by Justice Peña1 By petition for writ of mandamus, relator DG & GG Investments, LLC asserts that the trial court 2 abused its discretion by denying relator’s Rule 91a motion to dismiss claims which are barred by the statute of limitations, and relator lacks an adequate remedy by 1 See TEX. R. APP. P. 52.8(d) (“When denying relief, the court may hand down an opinion but is not required to do so. When granting relief, the court must hand down an opinion as in any other case.”), id. R. 47.1 (“The court of appeals must hand down a written opinion that is as brief as practicable but that addresses every issue raised and necessary to final disposition of the appeal.”), id. R. 47.4 (explaining the differences between opinions and memorandum opinions). 2 This original proceeding arises from trial court cause number CL-24-2679-D in the County Court at Law No. 4 of Hidalgo County, Texas, and the respondent is the Honorable Federico Garza Jr. See id. R. 52.2. appeal to address this error. See TEX. R. CIV. P. 91a. We conditionally grant the petition for writ of mandamus. I. BACKGROUND On June 21, 2024, real party in interest Adrian Cantu De Leon (Cantu) filed an original petition against Marley Group Ventures LLC, Peacock Family Business Ltd., Peacock Family Business Management LLC, Peacock Family Management LLC and Peacock Family Limited Partnership (collectively referred to as the Peacock entities), for personal injuries that Cantu sustained on October 1, 2022, when he slipped and fell while he was a customer at a laundromat. Cantu’s original petition included a section entitled “Assumed Names” which stated that: Pursuant to Rule 28 of the Texas Rules of Civil Procedure, [Cantu] is suing any partnership, unincorporated association, a private corporation, or individual whose name contains the words or who does business under or as [the Peacock entities]. It is the intent of [Cantu] to file [his] lawsuit against the owners, occupiers, property managers[,] and/or controllers of the 24 HRS LAUNDROMAT located at 310 Tom Gill Rd, Mission, Texas 78576. On October 28, 2025, Cantu filed his first amended petition, now including relator as a named defendant in the case. Cantu’s first amended petition included a similar “Assumed Names” paragraph as that contained in his original petition. On February 10, 2026, relator filed special exceptions and its original answer. Its original answer included the affirmative defense that Cantu’s claims against it were barred by the statute of limitations. That same day, relator filed a Rule 91a motion to dismiss asserting that Cantu’s claims against it had no basis in law because they were barred by the two-year statute of limitations. See id.; TEX. CIV. PRAC. & REM. CODE § 16.003. Relator’s motion was set to be heard on March 26, 2026; however, that setting was passed by agreement, and the hearing was reset for June 15, 2026. On or about June 2 11, 2026, Cantu filed a response to the motion to dismiss and a motion for leave to file that response on grounds that it was untimely filed. Cantu’s response to the motion to dismiss included several exhibits: Cantu’s original petition; the answer filed by the Peacock entities; Cantu’s first amended petition; relator’s special exceptions and original answer; a printed email dated October 21, 2025, from Glenda Gaona, the registered agent for the Peacock entities and relator, to Cantu’s counsel advising that the “legal owner during the accident was [relator]”; and a property search for the Peacock entities, including a franchise tax account status for relator. On June 15, 2026, relator filed a reply in support of its Rule 91a motion to dismiss. In its reply, relator objected to several of Cantu’s exhibits, specifically, the answer filed by the Peacock entities, the email, and the property search. Relator argued that Cantu had not received leave of court to file its response late, and relator further attacked Cantu’s claims on the merits. Relator asserted, inter alia, that Cantu’s first amended petition did not contain a defense tolling the statute of limitations. On the same day, the trial court held a hearing on relator’s motion to dismiss and other matters. At the hearing, the trial court verbally granted Cantu’s motion for leave to file his response. Cantu argued, among other things, that his first amended petition related back to his original petition. On June 25, 2026, the trial court denied relator’s Rule 91a motion. This original proceeding ensued. This Court ordered Cantu and any others whose interests might be affected by the relief sought to file a response to the petition for writ of mandamus. See TEX. R. APP. P. 52.4, 52.8. The Peacock entities filed a response advising the Court that they did not oppose relator’s requested relief. Cantu filed a response in 3 opposition. Relator filed a reply in support of its petition for writ of mandamus. See id. R. 52.5. II. MANDAMUS Mandamus relief is an extraordinary remedy available only when (1) the trial court clearly abused its discretion, and (2) the party seeking relief lacks an adequate remedy on appeal. In re Ill. Nat’l Ins., 685 S.W.3d 826, 834 (Tex. 2024) (orig. proceeding); In re Liberty Cnty. Mut. Ins., 679 S.W.3d 170, 174 (Tex. 2023) (orig. proceeding) (per curiam). “A court abuses its discretion if no evidence supports the finding on which its ruling rests and if the court could reasonably have reached only a contrary conclusion.” In re AutoZoners, LLC, 694 S.W.3d 219, 223 (Tex. 2024) (orig. proceeding) (per curiam). We conduct a “benefits-and-detriments analysis” to determine if the relator possesses an adequate remedy at law. In re Auburn Creek Ltd. P’ship, 655 S.W.3d 837, 843 (Tex. 2022) (orig. proceeding) (per curiam); see In re Prudential Ins. Co. of Am., 148 S.W.3d 124, 136–37 (Tex. 2004) (orig. proceeding). III. TEXAS RULE OF CIVIL PROCEDURE 91A With exceptions that are inapplicable to this case, a “party may move to dismiss a cause of action on the grounds that it has no basis in law or fact.” TEX. R. CIV. P. 91a.1; see In re First Reserve Mgmt., LP, 671 S.W.3d 653, 659 (Tex. 2023) (orig. proceeding). “A motion to dismiss must state that it is made pursuant to this rule, must identify each cause of action to which it is addressed, and must state specifically the reasons the cause of action has no basis in law, no basis in fact, or both.” TEX. R. CIV. P. 91a.2. Here, relator’s motion to dismiss is premised on the allegation that Cantu’s claims have no basis in law. 4 “A cause of action has no basis in law if the allegations, taken as true, together with inferences reasonably drawn from them, do not entitle the claimant to the relief sought.” Id. R. 91a.1; In re First Reserve Mgmt., 671 S.W.3d at 659. To establish that a cause of action has no basis in law, “the defendant must demonstrate that recovery by the plaintiff is foreclosed as a matter of law—i.e., that it is legally impossible for the plaintiff to recover on the claims in its petition—because either (1) the causes of action in the petition are not recognized by Texas law, or (2) the plaintiff has alleged facts that defeat those causes of action under settled law (i.e., the plaintiff has pleaded itself out of court).” In re Shire PLC, 633 S.W.3d 1, 19 (Tex. App.—Texarkana 2021, no pet.) (orig. proceeding) (internal citations omitted). “A plaintiff pleads himself out of court by alleging facts that render success on the merits impossible.” Id. at 25. “Dismissal is appropriate if the plaintiffs’ pleading of the cause of action fails to state a legally cognizable claim, conclusively establishes an affirmative defense, or otherwise shows the plaintiffs are not entitled to the relief sought. As to these matters, we are constrained to accept nonconclusory facts as pleaded but not the plaintiffs’ legal conclusions.” Carden v. Minton, Bassett, Flores & Carsey, P.C., 740 S.W.3d 487, 496 (Tex. 2026) (internal citations omitted). A Rule 91a motion must be based solely on the pleading of the cause of action, together with any pleading exhibits permitted by Texas Rule of Civil Procedure 59. TEX. R. CIV. P. 91a.6. The court may not consider evidence. See In re Farmers Tex. Cnty. Mut. Ins., 621 S.W.3d 261, 266 (Tex. 2021) (orig. proceeding). We construe the pleadings liberally in favor of the plaintiff, look to the pleader’s intent, accept the plaintiff’s factual allegations as true, and, if needed, draw reasonable inferences from the factual 5 allegations to determine if the pleadings state, as applicable here, a basis in law. Vasquez v. Legend Nat. Gas III, LP, 492 S.W.3d 448, 450 (Tex. App.—San Antonio 2016, pet. denied); HMT Tank Serv. v. Am. Tank & Vessel, Inc., 565 S.W.3d 799, 808 (Tex. App.— Houston [14th Dist.] 2018, no pet.). We apply the fair notice pleading standard to determine whether the allegations of the petition are sufficient. See Thomas v. 462 Thomas Family Props., LP, 559 S.W.3d 634, 639–40 (Tex. App.—Dallas 2018, pet. denied); Reaves v. City of Corpus Christi, 518 S.W.3d 594, 599 (Tex. App.—Corpus Christi–Edinburg 2017, no pet.). “A pleading must give fair notice not just of alleged facts, but of the claim and the relief sought such that the opposing party can prepare a defense, and ascertain from the pleading the nature and basic issues of the controversy and what testimony will be relevant.” Montelongo v. Abrea, 622 S.W.3d 290, 300 (Tex. 2021) (citation modified). Under this standard, courts assess whether an opposing party can ascertain from the pleading the nature of the controversy, its basic issues, and the type of evidence that might be relevant. Thomas, 559 S.W.3d at 640. We review the merits of a Rule 91a ruling de novo because whether a defendant is entitled to dismissal under the facts alleged is a legal question. In re Farmers Tex. Cnty. Mut. Ins., 621 S.W.3d at 266. Rule 91a provides a harsh remedy, and we strictly construe its requirements. Longhorn Creek Ltd. v. Gardens of Connemara Ltd., 686 S.W.3d 418, 425 (Tex. App.—Dallas 2024, pet denied); Davis v. Homeowners of Am. Ins., 700 S.W.3d 837, 842 (Tex. App.—Dallas 2023, no pet.). The rule is not a substitute for special exception or summary judgment practice, “both of which come with protective features against precipitate summary dispositions on the merits.” Davis, 700 S.W.3d at 842. 6 IV. ANALYSIS By one issue, relator asserts that the trial court abused its discretion by denying its motion to dismiss because Cantu’s claims were barred by the statute of limitations, he failed to plead any facts in avoidance of this affirmative defense, and relator lacks an adequate remedy by appeal. In response, Cantu contends that there was no abuse of discretion, and relator has not established that it lacks an adequate remedy by appeal. A. Statute of Limitations The primary issue in this case concerns the statute of limitations. The Supreme Court of Texas has explained the purpose of statutes of limitations as follows: Statutes of limitations have long been an important feature “in all systems of enlightened jurisprudence.” Wood v. Carpenter, 101 U.S. 135, 139, 25 L.Ed. 807 (1879). They “are vital to the welfare of society and are favored in the law” because they “promote repose by giving security and stability to human affairs.” Id.; see also Murray v. San Jacinto Agency, Inc., 800 S.W.2d 826, 828 (Tex. 1990) (recognizing that statutes of limitations reflect the Legislature’s determination of what is a reasonable time to present a claim). By terminating claims the Legislature has deemed stale, statutes of limitations “protect defendants and the courts from having to deal with cases in which the search for truth may be seriously impaired by the loss of evidence, whether by death or disappearance of witnesses, fading memories, disappearance of documents or otherwise.” Murray, 800 S.W.2d at 828. Statutes of limitations are themselves bright-line rules, requiring a person to bring suit within a specified time after the cause of action accrues. See, e.g., TEX. CIV. PRAC. & REM. CODE § 16.003(a) (identifying various claims that must be brought “not later than two years after the day the cause of action accrues”). Ferrer v. Almanza, 667 S.W.3d 735, 737–38 (Tex. 2023). Statutes of limitations establish a point of repose and terminate stale claims by compelling the assertion of claims “within a reasonable period.” Carden v. Minton, Bassett, Flores & Carsey, P.C., 740 S.W.3d 487, 505 (Tex. 2026) (quoting Computer Assocs. Int’l, Inc. v. Altai, Inc., 918 S.W.2d 453, 455 7 (Tex. 1996)). Thus, a statute of limitations bars a party from asserting a right after a specified period. LaTouche v. Perry Homes, LLC, 606 S.W.3d 878, 883 (Tex. App.— Houston [14th Dist.] 2020, pet. denied). A party must “bring suit” within the applicable limitations period to vest jurisdiction in the trial court. Tex. State Univ. v. Tanner, 689 S.W.3d 292, 300 (Tex. 2024); see City of Houston v. De La Cruz, No. 01-24-00797-CV, 2025 WL 3672311, at *4 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] Dec. 18, 2025, no pet.) (mem. op.). B. Limitations and Rule 91a “Dismissal under Rule 91a may be based on any affirmative defense that is conclusively established by the pleaded facts, including limitations.” Carden, 740 S.W.3d at 505 (internal citations omitted). “Rule 91a permits motions to dismiss based on affirmative defenses ‘if the allegations, taken as true, together with inferences reasonably drawn from them, do not entitle the claimant to the relief sought.’” Bethel v. Quilling, Selander, Lownds, Winslett & Moser, P.C., 595 S.W.3d 651, 656 (Tex. 2020) (quoting TEX. R. CIV. P. 91a.1). The “court may consider the defendant’s pleadings if doing so is necessary to make the legal determination of whether an affirmative defense is properly before the court.” Id. at 656; see Dean v. Jones, No. 05-25-00975-CV, 2026 WL 1481438, at *3 (Tex. App.—Dallas May 26, 2026, no pet.) (mem. op.). Limitations is an affirmative defense that must be specifically pleaded and proved. See TEX. R. CIV. P. 94; Woods v. William M. Mercer, Inc., 769 S.W.2d 515, 517 (Tex. 1988); Dean, 2026 WL 1481438, at *4. As stated previously, relator pleaded the affirmative defense of limitations in its original answer. 8 C. Application Cantu filed causes of action against relator for negligence and premises liability resulting in personal injury. The governing statute of limitations here is section 16.003 of the Texas Civil Practice and Remedies Code. See TEX. CIV. PRAC. & REM. CODE § 16.003; Benavidez v. Cascade-Nueces Health Servs., Ltd., No. 13-24-00481-CV, 2026 WL 1982847, at *3 (Tex. App.—Corpus Christi–Edinburg July 9, 2026, no pet.) (mem. op.); Pugh v. Rise Church Abilene, Inc., No. 11-25-00356-CV, 2026 WL 1752037, at *9 (Tex. App.—Eastland June 18, 2026, pet. denied) (mem. op.). Section 16.003(a) requires a person to “bring suit” for personal injury “not later than two years after the day the cause of action accrues.” TEX. CIV. PRAC. & REM. CODE § 16.003(a). “Under Texas law, a cause of action generally accrues when a wrongful act causes some legal injury.” Carden, 740 S.W.3d at 505; Regency Field Servs., LLC v. Swift Energy Operating, LLC, 622 S.W.3d 807, 814 (Tex. 2021) (“Generally, a claim accrues when the defendant’s wrongful conduct causes the claimant to suffer a legal injury, which gives the claimant the right to seek a judicial remedy.”). A plaintiff timely brings suit by filing an original petition and serving the defendant with process before the statute of limitations expires. Tex. State Univ., 689 S.W.3d at 296. Cantu does not dispute that he was aware of his injury on October 1, 2022, when he slipped and fell, nor does he dispute that he did not add relator to his lawsuit until October 28, 2025. Thus, unless a tolling principle applies, Cantu’s claims against relator are barred by the two-year statute of limitations applicable to personal injury claims. See TEX. CIV. PRAC. & REM. CODE § 16.003; In re Amazon.com Servs., LLC, No. 03-23-00634- CV, 2023 WL 8791266, at *4 (Tex. App.—Austin Dec. 20, 2023, orig. proceeding) (mem. 9 op.). Cantu did not plead the discovery rule or any other tolling doctrine in his amended petition where relator was first named as a party, nor does he contend that any tolling or equitable principles apply. Nevertheless, Cantu asserts that his amended petition, liberally construed, “does not conclusively establish that relator “was a wholly new and unrelated party first brought into the occurrence after limitations expired.” He explains that his first amended petition “identifies the same occurrence and premises, carries forward the stated intent to sue the premises’ owners and controllers, and names [relator] as the owner-directed defendant.” However, with limited exceptions, “an amended pleading adding a new party does not relate back to the original pleading.” Univ. of Tex. Health Sci. Ctr. at San Antonio v. Bailey, 332 S.W.3d 395, 400 (Tex. 2011) (noting that misnomer and misidentification are exceptions to this general rule) (quoting Alexander v. Turtur & Assocs., Inc., 146 S.W.3d 113, 121 (Tex. 2004)); see Patience v. Jackson, No. 09-24-00328-CV, 2025 WL 2490470, at *11 (Tex. App.—Beaumont Aug. 28, 2025, no pet.) (mem. op.); Nolan v. Hughes, 349 S.W.3d 209, 212 (Tex. App.—Dallas 2011, no pet.). Thus, “Texas courts consistently have held that a personal-injury suit is properly barred as a matter of law based on limitations under similar circumstances—where the [plaintiff] mistakenly identifies and names someone other than the intended defendant as the defendant in the original petition and the plaintiff does not amend the petition to name the proper defendant until after the expiration of limitations.” Chavez v. Andersen, 525 S.W.3d 382, 386 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 2017, no pet.) (collecting cases); see Hernandez v. Cudco Sols., LLC, No. 14- 21-00605-CV, 2023 WL 2659103, at *4 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] Mar. 28, 2023, no pet.) (mem. op.) (“While we recognize the difficulties litigants may encounter when 10 trying to unravel a confusing web of corporate structures shielding a defendant, we are unaware of any legal doctrine which tolls limitations while the search continues for the “true” defendant.”). Construing the pleadings liberally in favor of Cantu and accepting his factual allegations as true, Cantu’s causes of action against relator have no basis in law. See TEX. R. CIV. P. 91a.1; Vasquez, 492 S.W.3d at 450; HMT Tank Serv., 565 S.W.3d at 808. Cantu’s first amended petition does not show that his claims against relator are not time- barred even though the limitations period had run. Thus, relator conclusively established its affirmative defense of limitations based on Cantu’s pleadings. See TEX. R. CIV. P. 91a.1; In re Amazon.com Servs., LLC, 2023 WL 8791266, at *5 (conditionally granting mandamus relief for the denial of a Rule 91a motion to dismiss based on the expiration of limitations); In re Springs Condominiums, L.L.C., No. 03-21-00493-CV, 2021 WL 5814292, at *1 (Tex. App.—Austin Dec. 8, 2021, orig. proceeding) (mem. op.) (same). Thus, Cantu’s claims against relator have no legal basis. See TEX. R. CIV. P. 91a.1. D. Appellate Remedy Relator asserts it lacks an adequate remedy by appeal because “it would be forced to litigate and defend itself against claims that expired nearly thirteen months before [Cantu] filed suit.” Though Cantu concedes that mandamus may be available to review the erroneous denial of a Rule 91a motion, he further asserts that “availability is not entitlement.” Cantu contends that the specific circumstances of this case weigh decisively against mandamus relief because: (1) relator has already presented the identical defense through a motion for summary judgment, “and ordinary appellate review remains available after the pertinent facts are developed and adjudicated”; (2) mandamus does not lie to 11 resolve the question at hand on a pleading-only record; (3) relator would only suffer the “ordinary burden of litigation” if mandamus relief were not awarded; and (4) relator delayed in seeking relief, and while Cantu does not assert that delay bars relief, “it weighs heavily in the balance this Court must strike.” As stated previously, we balance the benefits and detriments of mandamus review to determine if the relator possesses an adequate remedy at law. In re Auburn Creek Ltd. P’ship, 655 S.W.3d at 843 In re Prudential Ins. Co. of Am., 148 S.W.3d at 136–37. We examine whether mandamus will preserve significant substantive and procedural rights from impairment or loss, allow courts to provide direction to the law that would otherwise prove difficult in appeals from final judgments, and spare the parties and the public “the time and money utterly wasted enduring eventual reversal of improperly conducted proceedings.” In re Acad., Ltd., 625 S.W.3d 19, 32 (Tex. 2021) (orig. proceeding) (quoting In re Prudential Ins. Co. of Am., 148 S.W.3d at 136). Because “this balance depends heavily on circumstances, it must be guided by analysis of principles rather than simple rules that treat cases as categories.” In re McAllen Med. Ctr., Inc., 275 S.W.3d 458, 464 (Tex. 2008) (orig. proceeding). We agree with Cantu insofar as we determine whether appeal offers an adequate remedy based on the specific facts and circumstances of each case rather than by applying categorical rules. See id. The Supreme Court has explained that the availability of mandamus relief is discretionary and is never available as a matter of right, depending at least in part on the court’s equitable judgment regarding whether mandamus offers an efficient method to resolve the dispute. In re Bell Helicopter Servs. Inc., 741 S.W.3d 97, 107 (Tex. 2026) (orig. proceeding). Thus, “even in two cases involving the same clear 12 abuse of discretion . . . a decision granting mandamus relief in one case does not mean mandamus will automatically issue whenever a similar right or statute is at stake.” Id. That said, “any exercise of judicial discretion should be informed by the experience of the past, even when not controlled by it.” Id. The Supreme Court of Texas has repeatedly determined that the movant lacks an adequate remedy by appeal and mandamus review is appropriate when the trial court abuses its discretion by denying a Rule 91a motion to dismiss. See In re Oncor Elec. Delivery Co., 716 S.W.3d 525, 530 (Tex. 2025) (orig. proceeding) (stating that a party lacks an adequate remedy by appeal to cure an abuse of discretion in denying a Rule 91a motion to dismiss “particularly where, as here, mandamus relief would determine the fate of hundreds of suits by thousands of plaintiffs”); In re Farmers Tex. Cnty. Mut. Ins., 621 S.W.3d 261, 266 (Tex. 2021) (orig. proceeding) (“Mandamus relief is appropriate when the trial court abuses its discretion in denying a Rule 91a motion to dismiss.”); In re Essex Ins., 450 S.W.3d 524, 528 (Tex. 2014) (orig. proceeding) (per curiam) (“In light of the conflict of interest and prejudice that we have noted above, we conclude that mandamus relief is appropriate to spare the parties and the public the time and money spent on fatally flawed proceedings.”). And, as we have previously stated, “[i]n laying the groundwork for a rule mandating the early dismissal of baseless causes of action, the Legislature has effectively already balanced most of the relevant costs and benefits of an appellate remedy.” In re Butt, 495 S.W.3d 455, 460 (Tex. App.—Corpus Christi–Edinburg 2016, orig. proceeding). “Stated otherwise, mandamus review of orders denying Rule 91a motions comports with the Legislature’s requirement for an early and speedy resolution of baseless claims.” Id. 13 In this case, we further consider the purpose behind the application of the statute of limitations: Limitations statutes afford plaintiffs what the legislature deems a reasonable time to present their claims and protect defendants and the courts from having to deal with cases in which the search for truth may be seriously impaired by the loss of evidence, whether by death or disappearance of witnesses, fading memories, disappearance of documents or otherwise. The purpose of a statute of limitations is to establish a point of repose and to terminate stale claims. Murray v. San Jacinto Agency, Inc., 800 S.W.2d 826, 828 (Tex. 1990). Thus, in examining the adequacy of a remedy by appeal in this case, we consider not only the accelerated scheme for Rule 91a dismissals but also the fact that the statute of limitations is intended to bar stale claims. “While we are ever mindful that mandamus review must not be overused,” we conclude that the benefits of mandamus review outweigh the detriments in this case. In re State Farm Mut. Auto., 712 S.W.3d 53, 66 (Tex. 2025) (orig. proceeding). E. Summary We determine that the trial court abused its discretion by denying relator’s Rule 91a motion to dismiss, and that relator lacks an adequate remedy by appeal to address this issue. Accordingly, we sustain relator’s sole issue. 3 V. CONCLUSION The Court, having examined and fully considered the petition for writ of mandamus, Cantu’s response, relator’s reply, the record, and the applicable law, is of the opinion that relator has met its burden to obtain relief. Accordingly, we conditionally grant the petition 3 We note that relator also asserted that the trial court abused its discretion by improperly accepting Cantu’s evidence in ruling on the Rule 91a motion to dismiss; however, the record does not clearly indicate that the trial court did so. In any event, further addressing this matter is not necessary for the resolution of this original proceeding. See id. R. 47.1, 47.4. 14 for writ of mandamus, and we direct the trial court to vacate its June 25, 2026 order denying relator’s Rule 91a motion and to proceed in accordance with this memorandum opinion. Our writ will be issued only if the trial court fails to promptly comply. L. ARON PEÑA JR. Justice Delivered and filed on the 29th day of October, 2026. 15