Dallas Independent School District v. Sammy McKee
CourtTexas Court of Appeals, 5th District (Dallas)
Date FiledNovember 20, 2026
Docket05-25-01520-CV
JudgeBreedlove
StatusPublished
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Full Opinion
Reverse and Dismiss and Opinion Filed November 20, 2026
S In The
Court of Appeals
Fifth District of Texas at Dallas
No. 05-25-01520-CV
DALLAS INDEPENDENT SCHOOL DISTRICT, Appellant
V.
SAMMY MCKEE, Appellee
On Appeal from the 439th Judicial District Court
Rockwall County, Texas
Trial Court Cause No. 1-23-1062
MEMORANDUM OPINION
Before Justices Breedlove, Lewis, and Jackson
Opinion by Justice Breedlove
Appellee Sammy McKee brought suit against appellant Dallas Independent
School District, his former employer, under the Texas Whistleblower Act. TEX.
GOV’T CODE ANN. §§ 554.001–554.010. The trial court denied DISD’s plea to the
jurisdiction and its hybrid motion for summary judgment. DISD appeals, contending
in four issues that it is immune from McKee’s claims because (1) McKee failed to
initiate DISD’s grievance process, (2) McKee did not report a violation of law,
(3) McKee did not report to an appropriate law enforcement authority, and
(4) McKee did not experience any adverse personnel actions as a result of his alleged
protected activity. Concluding that McKee failed to raise a fact issue that he reported
a violation of law to an appropriate law enforcement authority, we reverse the trial
court’s order and render judgment for DISD dismissing McKee’s claims. See id.
§ 554.002(a).
BACKGROUND
The facts relevant to our decision are taken from McKee’s brief. McKee, an
experienced high school basketball coach, was hired by DISD in 2022 as the head
basketball coach at Woodrow Wilson High School (Woodrow) in Dallas. McKee is
not a lawyer, but in his ten years’ experience as a Texas public school educator, he
became “generally familiar” with Texas school enrollment laws. It was his
understanding that “generally,” Texas law required school-aged children under the
age of 18 to attend school in the district where they resided, and if a student under
the age of 18 lived apart from a parent or guardian, that student’s presence in the
district must not be for the primary purpose of participating in extracurricular
activities, including basketball.
McKee was also familiar with the forms high school student athletes were
required to complete when changing schools. Under regulations promulgated by the
University Interscholastic League (UIL), a student’s parents were required to
complete a “Previous Athletic Participation Form” (PAPF) when a student
transferred to a new school. Both the previous school and the new school had the
opportunity to review the PAPF and to provide additional information including
responses to questions about the student’s participation in “non-school teams.”
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When McKee arrived at Woodrow, he took action to address what he
perceived to be past recruiting issues at the school and to ensure that Woodrow’s
program was in compliance with his understanding of UIL regulations and Texas
enrollment laws. These actions included McKee’s reports to the UIL by telephone
and then by email that raised complaints about three schools. The record contains
only McKee’s testimony in this lawsuit about the content of the telephone calls; there
is no transcript or recording of what was said. Copies of McKee’s emails to the UIL,
however, are included in the summary judgment record.
McKee first reported to the UIL about a student’s transfer from Woodrow to
Faith Family Academy.1 On the student’s PAPF, McKee indicated his understanding
that the student’s transfer was primarily for athletic reasons. McKee later saw the
student’s name on Faith Family’s published roster and images of the student on Faith
Family’s basketball social media even though the student was still enrolled at
Woodrow. McKee reported this information to the UIL, first by telephone and then
by email. McKee also learned that the student’s mother had been employed at Faith
Family to facilitate the student’s eligibility for varsity basketball, but this
information is not included in the email McKee sent to the UIL.
In his phone call to the UIL, McKee also mentioned witnessing “violations of
Texas enrollment laws and UIL regulations” at two other DISD high schools, Justin
1
Faith Family Academy is not part of the Dallas Independent School District. In his brief, McKee
concedes that “Faith Family is a charter school, and DISD engaged in no specific retaliation against McKee
in response to this report relating to Faith Family’s violations of UIL regulations or Texas enrollment laws.”
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F. Kimball High School and W.T. White High School. At the UIL official’s request,
McKee emailed the UIL information he believed evidenced these violations. On
October 31, 2022, McKee sent an email to the UIL about Kimball, and on November
10, 2022, McKee sent an email to the UIL about W.T. White.
As to Kimball, McKee reported that the head boys’ basketball coach “used his
connections with the AAU [Amateur Athletic Union] Club Team Dallas Showtyme2
to bring in four Seniors from different schools who all played for Dallas Showtyme
this summer.” In his affidavit supporting his response to DISD’s second plea to the
jurisdiction, McKee testified that he also verbally informed the UIL about Kimball’s
enrollment of two players who were using the physical address of one of Kimball’s
assistant basketball coaches for purposes of enrollment at the school. This
information, however, was not included in the copy of the October 31, 2022 email
in the appellate record. In his affidavit, McKee conceded, “although I did not
expressly repeat in the E-mail the residency allegations I had previously orally
reported, I understood that the relevance of the recruiting information I reported in
writing was based entirely on the residency issues I had previously reported orally.”
Similarly, McKee’s email to the UIL about W.T. White stated that
W.T. White’s coach “used his connections with the AAU Club Team the Dallas
Mustangs to bring in” three students from the Mustangs to play for W.T. White. As
2
McKee explains in his brief that Dallas Showtyme Club is a “private basketball program” affiliated
with the Amateur Athletic Union.
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in the Kimball email, McKee discussed only the players’ involvement in the AAU
program to support his contention that W.T. White’s coach was recruiting students
to play basketball. Again, McKee testified in his summary judgment affidavit that
“although I did not expressly repeat in the E-mail the residency allegations I had
previously orally reported, I understood that the relevance of the recruiting
information I reported in writing was based entirely on the residency issues I had
previously reported orally.”
The UIL forwarded McKee’s emails to DISD, and McKee alleges that “swift
retaliation by DISD” followed. Among other complaints, McKee specifically cites
three reprimands he received in November 2022, and a December 7, 2022 notice
placing him on administrative leave during the investigation relating to the
November reprimands. Although DISD informed McKee that all accusations had
been found to be “unsubstantiated,” McKee was not returned to work until March
30, 2023, and he was reassigned from Head Coach of Boys Basketball to Assistant
Golf Coach based on his “failure to comply with District policies.” His coaching
assignment was not renewed for the next school year.
In his summary judgment affidavit, McKee complained of six retaliatory
actions he alleged were in response to his reports to the UIL. He cited the three
November reprimands, his placement on administrative leave, his reassignment from
basketball coach to assistant golf coach, and his notification of non-renewal as a
coach at DISD schools for the following year.
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On February 7, 2023, McKee’s counsel sent a letter to DISD’s Athletic
Director Silvia Salinas identifying the November reprimands and December
administrative leave as “adverse employment actions.” He then “submitted a letter
grievance” to Salinas by email and regular mail on May 30, 2023, complaining of
his reassignment to golf and his non-renewal as a coach in DISD for the following
school year. On June 21, 2023, DISD informed McKee and his counsel that his
grievances were closed as untimely. McKee does not dispute that he did not follow
the DISD grievance procedure; however, he alleges he was unable to access DISD’s
employment handbook and grievance policies and forms while he was on
administrative leave. McKee filed suit less than thirty days later, on July 20, 2023.
DISD filed a plea to the jurisdiction and a general denial, arguing that because
McKee failed to plead that he reported a violation of law to an appropriate law
enforcement authority, DISD’s governmental immunity was not waived. DISD
contended that McKee did not “identify any law that prohibits the alleged recruiting
misconduct that McKee reported to the UIL to establish jurisdiction,” and therefore,
McKee’s claims should be dismissed.
McKee filed an amended petition, now alleging that he reported violations of
§ 25.001(d) of the Texas Education Code to the UIL. That section provides in part:
(d) For a person under the age of 18 years to establish a residence for
the purpose of attending the public schools separate and apart from the
person’s parent, guardian, or other person having lawful control of the
person under a court order, it must be established that the person’s
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presence in the school district is not for the primary purpose of
participation in extracurricular activities. . . .
DISD responded with a plea to the jurisdiction and motion to dismiss the
amended petition. After a hearing, the trial court denied DISD’s plea. DISD then
filed a third plea to the jurisdiction and traditional and no-evidence motions for
summary judgment. McKee responded, DISD replied, and the trial court denied the
plea and the motions in orders dated October 27, 2025. This appeal followed.
DISCUSSION
1. Issues
In four issues, DISD contends the trial court erred by denying its plea to the
jurisdiction and its motions for summary judgment. DISD argues that governmental
immunity shields it from McKee’s claims because (1) McKee failed to initiate
DISD’s official employee grievance process as required by § 554.006 of the Texas
Whistleblower Act; (2) McKee did not report a violation of law; (3) McKee did not
make a report to an appropriate law enforcement authority; and (4) McKee “did not
experience any adverse personnel action because of his emails to UIL.”
2. Immunity from suit
“Immunity from suit may be asserted through a plea to the jurisdiction or other
procedural vehicle, such as a motion for summary judgment.” Alamo Heights Indep.
Sch. Dist. v. Clark, 544 S.W.3d 755, 770 (Tex. 2018). When a plea to the jurisdiction
challenges the pleadings, we determine if the plaintiff has alleged facts affirmatively
demonstrating subject-matter jurisdiction. Id. If the plea challenges the existence of
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jurisdictional facts, we look beyond the pleadings and consider evidence when
necessary to resolve the jurisdictional issues. Id. A plea to the jurisdiction may
mirror a no-evidence motion for summary judgment and assert that the plaintiff has
no evidence of an element required to invoke jurisdiction. City of Austin v. Powell,
704 S.W.3d 437, 447–48 (Tex. 2024). Resolution of the jurisdictional issue may
implicate both subject-matter jurisdiction and the merits of a claim. Alamo Heights,
544 S.W.3d at 770-71.
Whether the trial court has subject-matter jurisdiction is a question of law that
we review de novo. Tex. Dep’t of Parks & Wildlife v. Miranda, 133 S.W.3d 217,
226 (Tex. 2004). In conducting our review, we construe the pleadings liberally in
favor of the plaintiff and look to the plaintiff’s intent. Id. at 226. We consider the
pleadings and evidence pertinent to the jurisdictional inquiry. Id. at 226–27; Dallas
Area Rapid Transit v. Carr, 309 S.W.3d 174, 176 (Tex. App.—Dallas 2010, pet.
denied). The plaintiff has the burden to plead facts affirmatively showing the trial
court has subject-matter jurisdiction. Miranda, 133 S.W.3d at 226. If the evidence
creates a fact issue concerning jurisdiction, the plea to the jurisdiction must be
denied. Id. at 227–28.
3. Governmental immunity and the Texas Whistleblower Act
Governmental entities are typically immune from suit unless the state
consents through an express legislative enactment. City of Fort Worth v. Pridgen,
653 S.W.3d 176, 181 (Tex. 2022). The Texas Whistleblower Act, TEX. GOV’T CODE
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ANN. §§ 554.001–554.010 (TWA), provides a limited waiver of that immunity.
Pridgen, 653 S.W.3d at 182.
The TWA’s purposes are (1) to “enhance open government by protecting
public employees from retaliation by their employers when an employee reports a
violation of the law in good faith,” and (2) to “secure lawful conduct by those who
direct and conduct the affairs of government.” City of Fort Worth v. Burke, 700
S.W.3d 819, 824 (Tex. App.—Dallas 2023, pet. denied). The TWA “provides a
general remedy for retaliation based on the report of any violation of law” and “is a
broad remedial measure intended to encourage disclosure of governmental
malfeasance and corruption.” City of Waco v. Lopez, 259 S.W.3d 147, 154 (Tex.
2008).
TWA § 554.0035 provides that “[a] public employee who alleges a violation
of [the TWA] may sue the employing state or local governmental entity,” and
“[s]overeign immunity is waived and abolished to the extent of liability for the relief
allowed under [the TWA] for a violation of [the TWA].” Pridgen, 653 S.W.3d at
182 (quoting TWA § 554.0035). “Accordingly, the elements of a whistleblower
claim are jurisdictional facts necessary for determining whether the plaintiff’s claim
falls within the jurisdictional confines of § 554.0035.” Id. (internal quotations
omitted).
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Specifically, the TWA provides:
(a) A state or local governmental entity may not suspend or terminate
the employment of, or take other adverse personnel action against, a
public employee who in good faith reports a violation of law by the
employing governmental entity or another public employee to an
appropriate law enforcement authority.
(b) In this section, a report is made to an appropriate law enforcement
authority if the authority is part of a state or local governmental entity
or of the federal government that the employee in good faith believes is
authorized to:
(1) regulate under or enforce the law alleged to be violated in
the report; or
(2) investigate or prosecute a violation of criminal law.
TWA § 554.002.
The elements of a TWA § 554.002 claim are (1) that the plaintiff was a public
employee, (2) that the defendant was a state agency or local government, (3) that the
plaintiff reported in good faith a violation of law (4) to an appropriate law
enforcement agency, and (5) that the plaintiff’s report was the but-for cause of the
defendant’s suspending, firing, or otherwise discriminating against the plaintiff at
the time the defendant took that action. Guillaume v. City of Greenville, 247 S.W.3d
457, 461–62 (Tex. App.—Dallas 2008, no pet.) (citing TWA § 554.001(1) and Tex.
Dep’t of Human Servs. v. Hinds, 904 S.W.2d 629, 636 (Tex.1995)). A “law” is a
state or federal statute, an ordinance of a local governmental entity, or a rule adopted
under a statute or ordinance. Id. at 461–62 (citing TWA § 554.001(1).
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4. Reporting a “violation of law” to “appropriate law enforcement
authority” under the TWA
“[T]he waiver of immunity for claims under the [TWA] applies only to
allegations by a public employee that adverse personnel action was taken against
him after he made a good faith report of a violation of law to an appropriate law
enforcement agency.” Mullins v. Dallas Indep. Sch. Dist., 357 S.W.3d 182, 188
(Tex. App.—Dallas 2012, pet. denied). “If either of these elements is lacking, there
is no waiver of immunity and the trial court does not have subject matter
jurisdiction.” Id. (emphasis added).
In its second and third issues, DISD contends that the trial court should have
granted its motion for summary judgment and dismissed McKee’s claims because
McKee did not report a violation of law to an appropriate law enforcement authority.
McKee responds that the summary judgment evidence raised a material fact issue
on whether his “oral and written reports—taken together—reported violations of
law” or, in the alternative, whether he held “an objectively reasonable, good-faith
belief that he was reporting violations of law” to “an appropriate law enforcement
authority.”
In his amended petition, McKee pleaded that he “reasonably believed” the
actions by the DISD coaches “constituted violations of both Texas state law
governing public school enrollment, as well as specific UIL regulations based on
and relating to Texas state law governing public school enrollment,” citing education
code § 25.001(d), quoted above. That section is a subpart of the education code
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section governing admission to public schools in Texas. TEX. EDUC. CODE ANN.
§ 25.001(a)–(j) (“Admission”). Subsection 25.001(b) is mandatory, providing that a
school district “shall admit into the public schools of the district free of tuition a
person who is over five and younger than 21 years of age on the first day of
September of the school year in which admission is sought” if the person resides in
the district with a parent or meets any of the circumstances listed in subparts (b)(1)
through (b)(10). Id. § 25.001(b).
Subsection 25.001(d) is an exception to this general rule, applicable to a
person under age 18 who seeks to “establish a residence for the purpose of attending
the public schools separate and apart from the person’s parent, guardian, or other
person having lawful control of the person under a court order.” Id. § 25.001(d)
(emphasis added). Under those circumstances, “it must be established that the
person’s presence in the school district is not for the primary purpose of participation
in extracurricular activities.” Id.
McKee also pleaded that he reported violations of UIL regulations to the UIL.
He asserted that “the reported conduct did constitute a violation of Texas laws” and
that “the UIL was an appropriate law enforcement authority to investigate, regulate
under and enforce such laws.” In the alternative, he pleaded that “at all material
times, Plaintiff held a reasonable good faith belief that the reported conduct did
constitute a violation of Texas laws and that the UIL was an appropriate law
enforcement authority to investigate, regulate under and enforce such laws.”
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“[W]hether the reporting of a violation of UIL rules and regulations to the UIL
is a good-faith report of a violation of law to an appropriate law-enforcement
authority is a jurisdictional question.” Galveston Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Jaco, 303
S.W.3d 699, 700 (Tex. 2010) (per curiam) (Jaco I). In Jaco I, the plaintiff alleged
that he was demoted from his position as a high school athletics director because he
reported UIL eligibility-rule violations to UIL officials. Id. at 699. The trial court
denied the school district’s plea to the jurisdiction and the court of appeals affirmed,
holding that the elements of § 554.002(a) of the Whistleblower Act were not
jurisdictional. See id. The supreme court disagreed, citing its opinion in State v.
Lueck, 290 S.W.3d 876, 883 (Tex. 2009), for the proposition that “the elements of
§ 554.002(a) can be considered to determine both jurisdiction and liability.” Jaco I,
303 S.W.3d at 699–700. The court reversed and remanded the case to the court of
appeals “to determine whether, under the analysis set forth in Lueck, Jaco has alleged
a violation under the Whistleblower Act.” Id. at 700.
On remand in Jaco, the court of appeals concluded that a UIL residency rule
was not a “law” as defined in the TWA. Galveston Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Jaco, 331
S.W.3d 182, 185–86 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 2011, pet. denied) (Jaco II).
Therefore, an athletic director’s report of a high school football player’s violations
of the UIL’s rules and regulations was not “an allegation of a ‘violation of law’ for
the purposes of the Whistleblower Act.” Id. at 186; see also Harris Cty. v. Noriega,
No. 14-24-00359-CV, 2025 WL 3458627, at *3–6 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th
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Dist.] Dec. 2, 2025, no pet.) (mem. op.) (following Jaco II, concluding that Harris
County’s code of conduct and personnel policies regarding false complaints of
sexual harassment were not “laws” for the purposes of the Whistleblower Act).
At oral argument, McKee conceded that under the court’s reasoning in Jaco II,
his reports to the UIL were not allegations of violations of law for purposes of the
TWA. But he argued that Jaco II is distinguishable because here, he offered
evidence of his good faith, objectively reasonable belief, in light of his training and
experience, that he was reporting violations of law.
We disagree. As we have explained, the supreme court in Jaco I framed the
“jurisdictional question” as “[w]hether the reporting of a violation of UIL rules and
regulations to the UIL is a good faith report of a violation of law to an appropriate
law-enforcement authority.” Jaco I, 303 S.W.3d at 699–700 (emphasis added). The
court in Jaco II held it was not. Jaco II, 331 S.W.3d at 186.
The court in Jaco II considered “whether, under the analysis set forth in Lueck,
Jaco has alleged a violation under the [TWA].” Jaco II, 331 S.W.3d at 184. In Lueck,
the plaintiff “was fired from the Texas Department of Transportation (TxDOT) after
he sent an e-mail to the director of the Transportation Planning and Programming
Division, reporting what he believed to be violations of state and federal law.” Lueck,
290 S.W.3d at 878. Lueck then sued his former employer, alleging that he “was fired
because of his good faith reports of TxDOT’s violation of state and federal law.” Id.
The supreme court held, however, that because Lueck “did not report a violation of
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law, and his supervisor is not a ‘law enforcement authority’” as defined in the TWA,
“Lueck’s pleadings affirmatively negate the trial court’s subject-matter jurisdiction.”
Id. at 880.
Similarly here, McKee did not report a violation of law and the UIL is not a
law enforcement authority. See id.; see also Jaco II, 331 S.W.3d at 186. Instead,
McKee reported to the UIL his concern that recruiting was occurring at two DISD
high schools in violation of UIL rules. Although McKee has testified that he also
raised concerns about residency requirements in his oral reports to the UIL, these
verbal concerns were not reflected in the reports the UIL made to DISD when
forwarding McKee’s emails. Nor did McKee reference the residency statute until his
amended petition in this lawsuit in response to DISD’s plea to the jurisdiction. There
is no evidence that DISD knew of McKee’s allegations about violations of the
Education Code, or more generally, about residency requirements, at the time of the
adverse employment actions that are the basis of McKee’s suit.
“[E]mployees can be protected by the [TWA] for reporting only perceived—
rather than actual—violations of the law . . . when their report is consistent with the
subjective and objective prongs of the good faith standard.” Tex. Health & Human
Servs. Comm’n v. Pope, 674 S.W.3d 273, 283 (Tex. 2023). However, “for an
employee to report a violation of law, there must be a statute, rule, or ordinance that
prohibits the action taken or requires action to be taken.” Id. at 288. “Put another
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way, the employee must have a good-faith belief that a law, which in fact exists, was
violated.” Id. (internal quotation omitted).
As a sister court explained,
Under the Act, a “law” means (a) “a state or federal statute;” (b) “an
ordinance of a local governmental entity;” or (c) “a rule adopted under
a statute or ordinance.” TEX. GOV’T CODE ANN. § 554.001(1) (Vernon
2004). An employee need not prove an actual violation of the law.
Llanes v. Corpus Christi Indep. Sch. Dist., 64 S.W.3d 638, 642 (Tex.
App.—Corpus Christi 2001, pet. denied) (citing City of Brenham v.
Honerkamp, 950 S.W.2d 760, 763 (Tex. App.—Austin 1997, writ
denied)). However, for an employee to sustain a claim under the Act,
there must be some law prohibiting the conduct of which the employee
complains. Id. In other words, “to recover under the Act, an employee
must have a good-faith belief that a law, which in fact exists, was
violated.” Id. at 643.
City of Houston v. Cotton, 171 S.W.3d 541, 547 n. 10 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th
Dist.] 2005, pet. denied). Further, “the [TWA’s] structure relies on the report being
made to an ‘appropriate law enforcement authority’ with the power to enforce the
law alleged to be violated or to investigate or prosecute criminal violations.” Pope,
674 S.W.3d at 283 (citing TWA § 554.002(b)).
McKee’s reports to the UIL complained of two DISD schools whose coaches
were allegedly recruiting players from private, non-school teams. On this record, we
conclude that McKee failed to raise a fact issue on whether he made a good faith
report of a “violation of law” to an “appropriate law enforcement authority.” See
Mullins, 357 S.W.3d at 188; Pope, 674 S.W.3d at 283. Because these elements are
lacking, DISD’s immunity was not waived and the trial court lacked subject matter
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jurisdiction. See Mullins, 357 S.W.3d at 188. We sustain DISD’s second and third
issues. See TWA § 554.002.
5. Disposition
“[I]f a plaintiff fails to allege or show facts demonstrating a waiver of
immunity after having a reasonable opportunity to conduct discovery directed to the
issue and to amend the pleadings, then the case should be dismissed.” In re Tex. Bd.
of Pardons & Paroles, No. 05-24-01213-CV, 2024 WL 4891065, at *2 (Tex. App.—
Dallas Nov. 26, 2024, no pet.) (mem. op.) (citing City of Austin v. Quinlan, 669
S.W.3d 813, 823 (Tex. 2023)). Because McKee had the opportunity to conduct
discovery and to amend his petition in response to DISD’s original plea to the
jurisdiction but the amended pleading did not allege facts that would constitute a
waiver of DISD’s immunity, the trial court should have dismissed McKee’s suit. See
id.3
CONCLUSION
We reverse the trial court’s October 27, 2025 Order denying DISD’s plea to
the jurisdiction and render judgment dismissing McKee’s action for lack of
jurisdiction.
/Maricela Breedlove/
MARICELA BREEDLOVE
JUSTICE
3
Given our disposition of McKee’s second and third issues, we need not address his first and fourth
issues. See TEX. R. APP. P. 47.4.
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