Full Opinion

Reverse and Dismiss and Opinion Filed November 20, 2026 S In The Court of Appeals Fifth District of Texas at Dallas No. 05-25-01520-CV DALLAS INDEPENDENT SCHOOL DISTRICT, Appellant V. SAMMY MCKEE, Appellee On Appeal from the 439th Judicial District Court Rockwall County, Texas Trial Court Cause No. 1-23-1062 MEMORANDUM OPINION Before Justices Breedlove, Lewis, and Jackson Opinion by Justice Breedlove Appellee Sammy McKee brought suit against appellant Dallas Independent School District, his former employer, under the Texas Whistleblower Act. TEX. GOV’T CODE ANN. §§ 554.001–554.010. The trial court denied DISD’s plea to the jurisdiction and its hybrid motion for summary judgment. DISD appeals, contending in four issues that it is immune from McKee’s claims because (1) McKee failed to initiate DISD’s grievance process, (2) McKee did not report a violation of law, (3) McKee did not report to an appropriate law enforcement authority, and (4) McKee did not experience any adverse personnel actions as a result of his alleged protected activity. Concluding that McKee failed to raise a fact issue that he reported a violation of law to an appropriate law enforcement authority, we reverse the trial court’s order and render judgment for DISD dismissing McKee’s claims. See id. § 554.002(a). BACKGROUND The facts relevant to our decision are taken from McKee’s brief. McKee, an experienced high school basketball coach, was hired by DISD in 2022 as the head basketball coach at Woodrow Wilson High School (Woodrow) in Dallas. McKee is not a lawyer, but in his ten years’ experience as a Texas public school educator, he became “generally familiar” with Texas school enrollment laws. It was his understanding that “generally,” Texas law required school-aged children under the age of 18 to attend school in the district where they resided, and if a student under the age of 18 lived apart from a parent or guardian, that student’s presence in the district must not be for the primary purpose of participating in extracurricular activities, including basketball. McKee was also familiar with the forms high school student athletes were required to complete when changing schools. Under regulations promulgated by the University Interscholastic League (UIL), a student’s parents were required to complete a “Previous Athletic Participation Form” (PAPF) when a student transferred to a new school. Both the previous school and the new school had the opportunity to review the PAPF and to provide additional information including responses to questions about the student’s participation in “non-school teams.” –2– When McKee arrived at Woodrow, he took action to address what he perceived to be past recruiting issues at the school and to ensure that Woodrow’s program was in compliance with his understanding of UIL regulations and Texas enrollment laws. These actions included McKee’s reports to the UIL by telephone and then by email that raised complaints about three schools. The record contains only McKee’s testimony in this lawsuit about the content of the telephone calls; there is no transcript or recording of what was said. Copies of McKee’s emails to the UIL, however, are included in the summary judgment record. McKee first reported to the UIL about a student’s transfer from Woodrow to Faith Family Academy.1 On the student’s PAPF, McKee indicated his understanding that the student’s transfer was primarily for athletic reasons. McKee later saw the student’s name on Faith Family’s published roster and images of the student on Faith Family’s basketball social media even though the student was still enrolled at Woodrow. McKee reported this information to the UIL, first by telephone and then by email. McKee also learned that the student’s mother had been employed at Faith Family to facilitate the student’s eligibility for varsity basketball, but this information is not included in the email McKee sent to the UIL. In his phone call to the UIL, McKee also mentioned witnessing “violations of Texas enrollment laws and UIL regulations” at two other DISD high schools, Justin 1 Faith Family Academy is not part of the Dallas Independent School District. In his brief, McKee concedes that “Faith Family is a charter school, and DISD engaged in no specific retaliation against McKee in response to this report relating to Faith Family’s violations of UIL regulations or Texas enrollment laws.” –3– F. Kimball High School and W.T. White High School. At the UIL official’s request, McKee emailed the UIL information he believed evidenced these violations. On October 31, 2022, McKee sent an email to the UIL about Kimball, and on November 10, 2022, McKee sent an email to the UIL about W.T. White. As to Kimball, McKee reported that the head boys’ basketball coach “used his connections with the AAU [Amateur Athletic Union] Club Team Dallas Showtyme2 to bring in four Seniors from different schools who all played for Dallas Showtyme this summer.” In his affidavit supporting his response to DISD’s second plea to the jurisdiction, McKee testified that he also verbally informed the UIL about Kimball’s enrollment of two players who were using the physical address of one of Kimball’s assistant basketball coaches for purposes of enrollment at the school. This information, however, was not included in the copy of the October 31, 2022 email in the appellate record. In his affidavit, McKee conceded, “although I did not expressly repeat in the E-mail the residency allegations I had previously orally reported, I understood that the relevance of the recruiting information I reported in writing was based entirely on the residency issues I had previously reported orally.” Similarly, McKee’s email to the UIL about W.T. White stated that W.T. White’s coach “used his connections with the AAU Club Team the Dallas Mustangs to bring in” three students from the Mustangs to play for W.T. White. As 2 McKee explains in his brief that Dallas Showtyme Club is a “private basketball program” affiliated with the Amateur Athletic Union. –4– in the Kimball email, McKee discussed only the players’ involvement in the AAU program to support his contention that W.T. White’s coach was recruiting students to play basketball. Again, McKee testified in his summary judgment affidavit that “although I did not expressly repeat in the E-mail the residency allegations I had previously orally reported, I understood that the relevance of the recruiting information I reported in writing was based entirely on the residency issues I had previously reported orally.” The UIL forwarded McKee’s emails to DISD, and McKee alleges that “swift retaliation by DISD” followed. Among other complaints, McKee specifically cites three reprimands he received in November 2022, and a December 7, 2022 notice placing him on administrative leave during the investigation relating to the November reprimands. Although DISD informed McKee that all accusations had been found to be “unsubstantiated,” McKee was not returned to work until March 30, 2023, and he was reassigned from Head Coach of Boys Basketball to Assistant Golf Coach based on his “failure to comply with District policies.” His coaching assignment was not renewed for the next school year. In his summary judgment affidavit, McKee complained of six retaliatory actions he alleged were in response to his reports to the UIL. He cited the three November reprimands, his placement on administrative leave, his reassignment from basketball coach to assistant golf coach, and his notification of non-renewal as a coach at DISD schools for the following year. –5– On February 7, 2023, McKee’s counsel sent a letter to DISD’s Athletic Director Silvia Salinas identifying the November reprimands and December administrative leave as “adverse employment actions.” He then “submitted a letter grievance” to Salinas by email and regular mail on May 30, 2023, complaining of his reassignment to golf and his non-renewal as a coach in DISD for the following school year. On June 21, 2023, DISD informed McKee and his counsel that his grievances were closed as untimely. McKee does not dispute that he did not follow the DISD grievance procedure; however, he alleges he was unable to access DISD’s employment handbook and grievance policies and forms while he was on administrative leave. McKee filed suit less than thirty days later, on July 20, 2023. DISD filed a plea to the jurisdiction and a general denial, arguing that because McKee failed to plead that he reported a violation of law to an appropriate law enforcement authority, DISD’s governmental immunity was not waived. DISD contended that McKee did not “identify any law that prohibits the alleged recruiting misconduct that McKee reported to the UIL to establish jurisdiction,” and therefore, McKee’s claims should be dismissed. McKee filed an amended petition, now alleging that he reported violations of § 25.001(d) of the Texas Education Code to the UIL. That section provides in part: (d) For a person under the age of 18 years to establish a residence for the purpose of attending the public schools separate and apart from the person’s parent, guardian, or other person having lawful control of the person under a court order, it must be established that the person’s –6– presence in the school district is not for the primary purpose of participation in extracurricular activities. . . . DISD responded with a plea to the jurisdiction and motion to dismiss the amended petition. After a hearing, the trial court denied DISD’s plea. DISD then filed a third plea to the jurisdiction and traditional and no-evidence motions for summary judgment. McKee responded, DISD replied, and the trial court denied the plea and the motions in orders dated October 27, 2025. This appeal followed. DISCUSSION 1. Issues In four issues, DISD contends the trial court erred by denying its plea to the jurisdiction and its motions for summary judgment. DISD argues that governmental immunity shields it from McKee’s claims because (1) McKee failed to initiate DISD’s official employee grievance process as required by § 554.006 of the Texas Whistleblower Act; (2) McKee did not report a violation of law; (3) McKee did not make a report to an appropriate law enforcement authority; and (4) McKee “did not experience any adverse personnel action because of his emails to UIL.” 2. Immunity from suit “Immunity from suit may be asserted through a plea to the jurisdiction or other procedural vehicle, such as a motion for summary judgment.” Alamo Heights Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Clark, 544 S.W.3d 755, 770 (Tex. 2018). When a plea to the jurisdiction challenges the pleadings, we determine if the plaintiff has alleged facts affirmatively demonstrating subject-matter jurisdiction. Id. If the plea challenges the existence of –7– jurisdictional facts, we look beyond the pleadings and consider evidence when necessary to resolve the jurisdictional issues. Id. A plea to the jurisdiction may mirror a no-evidence motion for summary judgment and assert that the plaintiff has no evidence of an element required to invoke jurisdiction. City of Austin v. Powell, 704 S.W.3d 437, 447–48 (Tex. 2024). Resolution of the jurisdictional issue may implicate both subject-matter jurisdiction and the merits of a claim. Alamo Heights, 544 S.W.3d at 770-71. Whether the trial court has subject-matter jurisdiction is a question of law that we review de novo. Tex. Dep’t of Parks & Wildlife v. Miranda, 133 S.W.3d 217, 226 (Tex. 2004). In conducting our review, we construe the pleadings liberally in favor of the plaintiff and look to the plaintiff’s intent. Id. at 226. We consider the pleadings and evidence pertinent to the jurisdictional inquiry. Id. at 226–27; Dallas Area Rapid Transit v. Carr, 309 S.W.3d 174, 176 (Tex. App.—Dallas 2010, pet. denied). The plaintiff has the burden to plead facts affirmatively showing the trial court has subject-matter jurisdiction. Miranda, 133 S.W.3d at 226. If the evidence creates a fact issue concerning jurisdiction, the plea to the jurisdiction must be denied. Id. at 227–28. 3. Governmental immunity and the Texas Whistleblower Act Governmental entities are typically immune from suit unless the state consents through an express legislative enactment. City of Fort Worth v. Pridgen, 653 S.W.3d 176, 181 (Tex. 2022). The Texas Whistleblower Act, TEX. GOV’T CODE –8– ANN. §§ 554.001–554.010 (TWA), provides a limited waiver of that immunity. Pridgen, 653 S.W.3d at 182. The TWA’s purposes are (1) to “enhance open government by protecting public employees from retaliation by their employers when an employee reports a violation of the law in good faith,” and (2) to “secure lawful conduct by those who direct and conduct the affairs of government.” City of Fort Worth v. Burke, 700 S.W.3d 819, 824 (Tex. App.—Dallas 2023, pet. denied). The TWA “provides a general remedy for retaliation based on the report of any violation of law” and “is a broad remedial measure intended to encourage disclosure of governmental malfeasance and corruption.” City of Waco v. Lopez, 259 S.W.3d 147, 154 (Tex. 2008). TWA § 554.0035 provides that “[a] public employee who alleges a violation of [the TWA] may sue the employing state or local governmental entity,” and “[s]overeign immunity is waived and abolished to the extent of liability for the relief allowed under [the TWA] for a violation of [the TWA].” Pridgen, 653 S.W.3d at 182 (quoting TWA § 554.0035). “Accordingly, the elements of a whistleblower claim are jurisdictional facts necessary for determining whether the plaintiff’s claim falls within the jurisdictional confines of § 554.0035.” Id. (internal quotations omitted). –9– Specifically, the TWA provides: (a) A state or local governmental entity may not suspend or terminate the employment of, or take other adverse personnel action against, a public employee who in good faith reports a violation of law by the employing governmental entity or another public employee to an appropriate law enforcement authority. (b) In this section, a report is made to an appropriate law enforcement authority if the authority is part of a state or local governmental entity or of the federal government that the employee in good faith believes is authorized to: (1) regulate under or enforce the law alleged to be violated in the report; or (2) investigate or prosecute a violation of criminal law. TWA § 554.002. The elements of a TWA § 554.002 claim are (1) that the plaintiff was a public employee, (2) that the defendant was a state agency or local government, (3) that the plaintiff reported in good faith a violation of law (4) to an appropriate law enforcement agency, and (5) that the plaintiff’s report was the but-for cause of the defendant’s suspending, firing, or otherwise discriminating against the plaintiff at the time the defendant took that action. Guillaume v. City of Greenville, 247 S.W.3d 457, 461–62 (Tex. App.—Dallas 2008, no pet.) (citing TWA § 554.001(1) and Tex. Dep’t of Human Servs. v. Hinds, 904 S.W.2d 629, 636 (Tex.1995)). A “law” is a state or federal statute, an ordinance of a local governmental entity, or a rule adopted under a statute or ordinance. Id. at 461–62 (citing TWA § 554.001(1). –10– 4. Reporting a “violation of law” to “appropriate law enforcement authority” under the TWA “[T]he waiver of immunity for claims under the [TWA] applies only to allegations by a public employee that adverse personnel action was taken against him after he made a good faith report of a violation of law to an appropriate law enforcement agency.” Mullins v. Dallas Indep. Sch. Dist., 357 S.W.3d 182, 188 (Tex. App.—Dallas 2012, pet. denied). “If either of these elements is lacking, there is no waiver of immunity and the trial court does not have subject matter jurisdiction.” Id. (emphasis added). In its second and third issues, DISD contends that the trial court should have granted its motion for summary judgment and dismissed McKee’s claims because McKee did not report a violation of law to an appropriate law enforcement authority. McKee responds that the summary judgment evidence raised a material fact issue on whether his “oral and written reports—taken together—reported violations of law” or, in the alternative, whether he held “an objectively reasonable, good-faith belief that he was reporting violations of law” to “an appropriate law enforcement authority.” In his amended petition, McKee pleaded that he “reasonably believed” the actions by the DISD coaches “constituted violations of both Texas state law governing public school enrollment, as well as specific UIL regulations based on and relating to Texas state law governing public school enrollment,” citing education code § 25.001(d), quoted above. That section is a subpart of the education code –11– section governing admission to public schools in Texas. TEX. EDUC. CODE ANN. § 25.001(a)–(j) (“Admission”). Subsection 25.001(b) is mandatory, providing that a school district “shall admit into the public schools of the district free of tuition a person who is over five and younger than 21 years of age on the first day of September of the school year in which admission is sought” if the person resides in the district with a parent or meets any of the circumstances listed in subparts (b)(1) through (b)(10). Id. § 25.001(b). Subsection 25.001(d) is an exception to this general rule, applicable to a person under age 18 who seeks to “establish a residence for the purpose of attending the public schools separate and apart from the person’s parent, guardian, or other person having lawful control of the person under a court order.” Id. § 25.001(d) (emphasis added). Under those circumstances, “it must be established that the person’s presence in the school district is not for the primary purpose of participation in extracurricular activities.” Id. McKee also pleaded that he reported violations of UIL regulations to the UIL. He asserted that “the reported conduct did constitute a violation of Texas laws” and that “the UIL was an appropriate law enforcement authority to investigate, regulate under and enforce such laws.” In the alternative, he pleaded that “at all material times, Plaintiff held a reasonable good faith belief that the reported conduct did constitute a violation of Texas laws and that the UIL was an appropriate law enforcement authority to investigate, regulate under and enforce such laws.” –12– “[W]hether the reporting of a violation of UIL rules and regulations to the UIL is a good-faith report of a violation of law to an appropriate law-enforcement authority is a jurisdictional question.” Galveston Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Jaco, 303 S.W.3d 699, 700 (Tex. 2010) (per curiam) (Jaco I). In Jaco I, the plaintiff alleged that he was demoted from his position as a high school athletics director because he reported UIL eligibility-rule violations to UIL officials. Id. at 699. The trial court denied the school district’s plea to the jurisdiction and the court of appeals affirmed, holding that the elements of § 554.002(a) of the Whistleblower Act were not jurisdictional. See id. The supreme court disagreed, citing its opinion in State v. Lueck, 290 S.W.3d 876, 883 (Tex. 2009), for the proposition that “the elements of § 554.002(a) can be considered to determine both jurisdiction and liability.” Jaco I, 303 S.W.3d at 699–700. The court reversed and remanded the case to the court of appeals “to determine whether, under the analysis set forth in Lueck, Jaco has alleged a violation under the Whistleblower Act.” Id. at 700. On remand in Jaco, the court of appeals concluded that a UIL residency rule was not a “law” as defined in the TWA. Galveston Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Jaco, 331 S.W.3d 182, 185–86 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 2011, pet. denied) (Jaco II). Therefore, an athletic director’s report of a high school football player’s violations of the UIL’s rules and regulations was not “an allegation of a ‘violation of law’ for the purposes of the Whistleblower Act.” Id. at 186; see also Harris Cty. v. Noriega, No. 14-24-00359-CV, 2025 WL 3458627, at *3–6 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th –13– Dist.] Dec. 2, 2025, no pet.) (mem. op.) (following Jaco II, concluding that Harris County’s code of conduct and personnel policies regarding false complaints of sexual harassment were not “laws” for the purposes of the Whistleblower Act). At oral argument, McKee conceded that under the court’s reasoning in Jaco II, his reports to the UIL were not allegations of violations of law for purposes of the TWA. But he argued that Jaco II is distinguishable because here, he offered evidence of his good faith, objectively reasonable belief, in light of his training and experience, that he was reporting violations of law. We disagree. As we have explained, the supreme court in Jaco I framed the “jurisdictional question” as “[w]hether the reporting of a violation of UIL rules and regulations to the UIL is a good faith report of a violation of law to an appropriate law-enforcement authority.” Jaco I, 303 S.W.3d at 699–700 (emphasis added). The court in Jaco II held it was not. Jaco II, 331 S.W.3d at 186. The court in Jaco II considered “whether, under the analysis set forth in Lueck, Jaco has alleged a violation under the [TWA].” Jaco II, 331 S.W.3d at 184. In Lueck, the plaintiff “was fired from the Texas Department of Transportation (TxDOT) after he sent an e-mail to the director of the Transportation Planning and Programming Division, reporting what he believed to be violations of state and federal law.” Lueck, 290 S.W.3d at 878. Lueck then sued his former employer, alleging that he “was fired because of his good faith reports of TxDOT’s violation of state and federal law.” Id. The supreme court held, however, that because Lueck “did not report a violation of –14– law, and his supervisor is not a ‘law enforcement authority’” as defined in the TWA, “Lueck’s pleadings affirmatively negate the trial court’s subject-matter jurisdiction.” Id. at 880. Similarly here, McKee did not report a violation of law and the UIL is not a law enforcement authority. See id.; see also Jaco II, 331 S.W.3d at 186. Instead, McKee reported to the UIL his concern that recruiting was occurring at two DISD high schools in violation of UIL rules. Although McKee has testified that he also raised concerns about residency requirements in his oral reports to the UIL, these verbal concerns were not reflected in the reports the UIL made to DISD when forwarding McKee’s emails. Nor did McKee reference the residency statute until his amended petition in this lawsuit in response to DISD’s plea to the jurisdiction. There is no evidence that DISD knew of McKee’s allegations about violations of the Education Code, or more generally, about residency requirements, at the time of the adverse employment actions that are the basis of McKee’s suit. “[E]mployees can be protected by the [TWA] for reporting only perceived— rather than actual—violations of the law . . . when their report is consistent with the subjective and objective prongs of the good faith standard.” Tex. Health & Human Servs. Comm’n v. Pope, 674 S.W.3d 273, 283 (Tex. 2023). However, “for an employee to report a violation of law, there must be a statute, rule, or ordinance that prohibits the action taken or requires action to be taken.” Id. at 288. “Put another –15– way, the employee must have a good-faith belief that a law, which in fact exists, was violated.” Id. (internal quotation omitted). As a sister court explained, Under the Act, a “law” means (a) “a state or federal statute;” (b) “an ordinance of a local governmental entity;” or (c) “a rule adopted under a statute or ordinance.” TEX. GOV’T CODE ANN. § 554.001(1) (Vernon 2004). An employee need not prove an actual violation of the law. Llanes v. Corpus Christi Indep. Sch. Dist., 64 S.W.3d 638, 642 (Tex. App.—Corpus Christi 2001, pet. denied) (citing City of Brenham v. Honerkamp, 950 S.W.2d 760, 763 (Tex. App.—Austin 1997, writ denied)). However, for an employee to sustain a claim under the Act, there must be some law prohibiting the conduct of which the employee complains. Id. In other words, “to recover under the Act, an employee must have a good-faith belief that a law, which in fact exists, was violated.” Id. at 643. City of Houston v. Cotton, 171 S.W.3d 541, 547 n. 10 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 2005, pet. denied). Further, “the [TWA’s] structure relies on the report being made to an ‘appropriate law enforcement authority’ with the power to enforce the law alleged to be violated or to investigate or prosecute criminal violations.” Pope, 674 S.W.3d at 283 (citing TWA § 554.002(b)). McKee’s reports to the UIL complained of two DISD schools whose coaches were allegedly recruiting players from private, non-school teams. On this record, we conclude that McKee failed to raise a fact issue on whether he made a good faith report of a “violation of law” to an “appropriate law enforcement authority.” See Mullins, 357 S.W.3d at 188; Pope, 674 S.W.3d at 283. Because these elements are lacking, DISD’s immunity was not waived and the trial court lacked subject matter –16– jurisdiction. See Mullins, 357 S.W.3d at 188. We sustain DISD’s second and third issues. See TWA § 554.002. 5. Disposition “[I]f a plaintiff fails to allege or show facts demonstrating a waiver of immunity after having a reasonable opportunity to conduct discovery directed to the issue and to amend the pleadings, then the case should be dismissed.” In re Tex. Bd. of Pardons & Paroles, No. 05-24-01213-CV, 2024 WL 4891065, at *2 (Tex. App.— Dallas Nov. 26, 2024, no pet.) (mem. op.) (citing City of Austin v. Quinlan, 669 S.W.3d 813, 823 (Tex. 2023)). Because McKee had the opportunity to conduct discovery and to amend his petition in response to DISD’s original plea to the jurisdiction but the amended pleading did not allege facts that would constitute a waiver of DISD’s immunity, the trial court should have dismissed McKee’s suit. See id.3 CONCLUSION We reverse the trial court’s October 27, 2025 Order denying DISD’s plea to the jurisdiction and render judgment dismissing McKee’s action for lack of jurisdiction. /Maricela Breedlove/ MARICELA BREEDLOVE JUSTICE 3 Given our disposition of McKee’s second and third issues, we need not address his first and fourth issues. See TEX. R. APP. P. 47.4. –17–