Full Opinion

NUMBER 13-26-00706-CV COURT OF APPEALS THIRTEENTH DISTRICT OF TEXAS CORPUS CHRISTI – EDINBURG IN RE SHELBY LYNNETTE WELCH ON PETITION FOR WRIT OF MANDAMUS MEMORANDUM OPINION Before Justices Silva, Peña, and West Memorandum Opinion by Justice West 1 By pro se petition for writ of mandamus, relator Shelby Lynnette Welch asserts that the trial court abused its discretion by failing to provide ten days’ notice of a hearing on relator’s Statement of Inability to Afford Payment of Court Costs. See TEX. R. CIV. P. 145. “Mandamus is an ‘extraordinary remedy’ that is ‘available only in limited circumstances . . . .’” In re Rogers, 728 S.W.3d 717, 719 (Tex. 2026) (orig. proceeding) 1 See TEX. R. APP. P. 52.8(d) (“When denying relief, the court may hand down an opinion but is not required to do so. When granting relief, the court must hand down an opinion as in any other case.”); id. R. 47.4 (distinguishing opinions and memorandum opinions). (per curiam) (quoting City of Houston v. Hou. Mun. Emps. Pension Sys., 549 S.W.3d 566, 580 (Tex. 2018)). “A writ of mandamus is available to correct a clear abuse of discretion for which there is no adequate remedy by appeal.” In re Lapuerta, 732 S.W.3d 548, 555 (Tex. 2026) (orig. proceeding). “A court abuses its discretion if no evidence supports the finding on which its ruling rests and if the court could reasonably have reached only a contrary conclusion.” In re AutoZoners, LLC, 694 S.W.3d 219, 223 (Tex. 2024) (orig. proceeding) (per curiam). We conduct a “benefits-and-detriments analysis” to determine if the relator possesses an adequate remedy at law. In re Auburn Creek Ltd. P’ship, 655 S.W.3d 837, 843 (Tex. 2022) (orig. proceeding) (per curiam). “Access to the civil justice system cannot be denied because a person cannot afford to pay court costs.” TEX. R. CIV. P. 145 cmt. Texas Rule of Civil Procedure 145 expressly provides that “[t]he declarant “must not be required to pay costs without an oral evidentiary hearing,” and “[t]he declarant must be given 10 days’ notice of the hearing.” Id. R. 145(f)(1). The “declarant may not be required to pay costs when these procedural requirements are not met.” In re Ramirez, 738 S.W.3d 594, 600 (Tex. App.—Corpus Christi–Edinburg 2026, orig. proceeding); see Strickland v. iHeartMedia, Inc., 668 S.W.3d 34, 36 (Tex. App.—San Antonio 2022, no pet.) (“A party who files a statement of inability to afford costs cannot be required to pay costs . . . unless certain procedural requirements have been satisfied.”); Emerson v. Holly Lake Ranch Ass’n, 603 S.W.3d 172, 174 (Tex. App.—Texarkana 2020, no pet.) (stating that “a party who files a Statement may not be required to pay court costs unless the trial court holds an oral evidentiary hearing, with proper notice given to the declarant”). 2 The Court, having examined and fully considered the petition for writ of mandamus, 2 the record, and the applicable law, is of the opinion that this original proceeding has been rendered moot. See In re Cont. Freighters, Inc., 646 S.W.3d 810, 813 (Tex. 2022) (orig. proceeding) (per curiam); Heckman v. Williamson County, 369 S.W.3d 137, 162 (Tex. 2012); In re Kellogg Brown & Root, Inc., 166 S.W.3d 732, 737 (Tex. 2005) (orig. proceeding). Specifically, the hearing date at issue in this original proceeding has passed. Accordingly, we lift the stay previously imposed in this case. We dismiss the petition for writ of mandamus as moot. Our ruling regarding this petition for writ of mandamus is without prejudice to any other matters that might be presented on this topic in the future. JON WEST Justice Delivered and filed on the 28th day of October, 2026. 2 On October 9, 2026, this Court ordered the real party in interest, Michael Craig Welch, and any others whose interests may be affected by the relief sought, to file a response to the petition for writ of mandamus on or before the expiration of ten days from the date of this order. See id. 52.2, 52.4, 52.8. However, the real party failed to comply. 3