Full Opinion

Fourth Court of Appeals San Antonio, Texas MEMORANDUM OPINION No. 04-26-00503-CV IN THE ESTATE OF Pamela Ann BRIERS A/K/A Pamela A. Briers, Deceased From the Probate Court No. 1, Bexar County, Texas Trial Court No. 2024-PC1-04222 Honorable Oscar J. Kazen, Judge Presiding PER CURIAM Sitting: Lori I. Valenzuela, Justice Lori Massey Brissette, Justice Adrian A. Spears II, Justice Delivered and Filed: August 26, 2026 DISMISSED FOR LACK OF JURISDICTION This is an appeal from an order signed in a probate proceeding. The probate court signed the challenged order on April 10, 2026. Because appellant did not file a motion for new trial or other appellate-deadline-extending motion within 30 days of the signing of the challenged order, the notice of appeal was due on May 11, 2026, and a motion for extension of time to file the notice of appeal was due on May 26, 2026. See TEX. R. APP. P. 26.1, 26.3. Appellant filed his notice of appeal on June 24, 2026. In his notice of appeal, appellant represented that he did not receive timely notice of the challenged order. If a party has no notice of the trial court’s judgment, Texas Rule of Appellate Procedure 4.2 allows, in some circumstances, additional time for that party to file documents. See TEX. R. 04-26-00503-CV APP. P. 4.2; TEX. R. CIV. P. 306a. The deadline to file a motion for new trial and notice of appeal will run from the day a party receives notice of judgment, rather than the day judgment is signed, if the party (1) complies with the sworn motion, notice, and hearing requirements mandated by Texas Rule of Civil Procedure 306a(5); and (2) proves it received notice of the judgment more than twenty (but less than ninety-one) days after it was signed. See In re Lynd Co., 195 S.W.3d 682, 685 (Tex. 2006) (orig. proceeding) (citing TEX. R. CIV. P. 306a). Specifically, Rule 306a(5) requires the party alleging late notice of judgment to file a sworn motion with the trial court establishing the date the party or its counsel first learned of the judgment. See In re Lynd Co., 195 S.W.3d at 686 (citing TEX. R. CIV. P. 306a(5)). The clerk’s record does not reflect that appellant complied with Texas Rule of Civil Procedure 306a. Thus, the clerk’s record appeared to show that Rule 306a does not apply and that we have no jurisdiction over this appeal because appellant did not file a timely notice of appeal. While we recognize that appellant is proceeding pro se in the underlying probate proceedings and in this appeal, he is held to the same rules and standards as licensed attorneys, including the applicable rules of procedure. See, e.g., Shull v. United Parcel Serv., 4 S.W.3d 46, 52–53 (Tex. App.—San Antonio 1999, pet. denied). Accordingly, on July 9, 2026, we ordered appellant to show cause by August 10, 2026 why this appeal should not be dismissed for lack of jurisdiction. On August 7, 2026, appellant filed a response that again represented that he did not receive timely notice of the challenged order. Appellant’s response appears to contend that a claim of untimely notice, without more, is sufficient to trigger the protections of Rule 306a. He also represented that the challenged order is itself void and that it enforces an earlier void order, and he argued that a void order can be challenged at any time. On August 14, 2026, appellee filed a reply disputing appellant’s contention that he did not receive timely notice of the order. -2- 04-26-00503-CV We may not resolve the parties’ factual dispute about whether appellant received timely notice of the order. As we noted in our July 9 show cause order, that issue must be raised in the trial court through the procedures outlined in Rule 306a. See TEX. R. CIV. P. 306a; In re Lynd Co., 195 S.W.3d at 685–86. The clerk’s record does not reflect that appellant followed those procedures here, and his response to our show cause order does not contend otherwise. Because appellant did not take the necessary steps to extend his appellate deadlines under Rule 306a, his notice of appeal was due by May 11, 2026. See TEX. R. APP. P. 26.1. His June 24, 2026 notice of appeal was therefore untimely. See Perez v. Perez, 658 S.W.3d 864, 870 (Tex. App.—El Paso 2022, no pet.) (“Compliance with the provisions of Rule 306a is a jurisdictional prerequisite.”) (internal quotation marks omitted); see also Wells Fargo Bank, N.A. v. Weseman, No. 04-24-00470-CV, 2024 WL 4497984, at *3 (Tex. App.—San Antonio Oct. 16, 2024, no pet.) (mem. op.) (“Because Rule 306a does not apply, the appellate deadlines were not extended and [appellant] did not file a timely notice of appeal.”) Additionally, appellant’s contention that the challenged order is void does not permit us to exercise jurisdiction over this appeal. “Even if we were to assume that the trial court’s judgment here is in fact void, as [appellant] alleges, Texas courts have consistently held that a party cannot attack a void judgment in an untimely appeal.” In re E.B.S., No. 03-12-00705-CV, 2013 WL 6002784, at *1 (Tex. App.—Austin Nov. 7, 2013, no pet.) (mem. op.) (listing cases). “Because [appellant] did not timely appeal the trial court’s judgment, we have no jurisdiction over this appeal.” Id. For these reasons, we dismiss this appeal for lack of jurisdiction. PER CURIAM -3-