Full Opinion

Opinion issued August 27, 2026 In The Court of Appeals For The First District of Texas ———————————— NO. 01-26-00253-CV ——————————— MARCO RUIZ, JR., Appellant V. RAAMCO RBBC LLC, Appellee On Appeal from the County Civil Court at Law No. 4 Harris County, Texas Trial Court Cause No. 1270550 MEMORANDUM OPINION This appeal arises from a forcible detainer action brought by appellee Raamco Rbbc LLC against appellant Marco Ruiz, Jr. Appellant appealed the Justice Court’s judgment to the County Court, which subsequently rendered a Final Judgment (“judgment”) in favor of appellee awarding appellee possession of the subject property (“Property”) as well as damages and attorney’s fees. Appellant, proceeding pro se, then appealed the County Court’s judgment to this Court. As a threshold matter, we must consider whether the issue of possession has become moot and thus whether we have subject-matter jurisdiction over this appeal. Strange v. Deutsche Bank Nat’l Tr. Co. as Tr. for Registered Holders of Long Beach Mortg. Loan Tr. 2004-4, Asset-Backed Certificates, Series 2004-4, No. 01-23- 00575-CV, 2024 WL 1862860, at *3 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] Apr. 30, 2024, no pet.) (mem. op.) (appellate courts “lack subject matter jurisdiction to decide a moot controversy”). After eviction, an appeal from a forcible entry and detainer action becomes moot. Id. at *2, 5 (holding after eviction, appeal was moot and dismissal warranted because appellate court lacked jurisdiction); De La Garza v. Riverstone Apartments, No. 04-06-00732-CV, 2007 WL 3270769, at *1 (Tex. App.—San Antonio Nov. 7, 2007, no pet.) (mem. op.) (same) (citing Marshall v. Hous. Auth. of San Antonio, 198 S.W.3d 782, 787 (Tex. 2006)). The record reflects that appellant is no longer in possession of the Property. The supplemental clerk’s record indicates that the writ of possession was executed on March 18, 2026, during which time it was “found that [appellant] had vacated the premises.” See Holloway v. Revelstoke Venture, LLC, No. 02-23-00375-CV, 2024 WL 191221, at *2 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth Jan. 18, 2024, pet. denied) (mem. op.) 2 (dismissing appeal as moot where appellant no longer in possession of property and did not raise meritorious claim of right to possession). An evicted appellant may still pursue an appeal, however, if he advances “a potentially meritorious claim of right to current, actual possession of the property.” Strange, 2024 WL 1862860, at *4; see also Marshall, 198 S.W.3d at 787. Appellant has not proffered any right to possession of the Property. On August 7, 2026, we informed appellant that his appeal could be dismissed if he did not, within ten days of our notice, file a response addressing whether the appeal should be dismissed as moot. Appellant has not filed a response. Because the issue of actual possession is moot and appellant has not raised any potentially meritorious claim, we must dismiss the appeal and vacate the trial court’s judgment as to possession. See Marshall, 198 S.W.3d at 785 (holding that when appeal of forcible detainer action becomes moot, proper course is to dismiss appeal and vacate lower court’s judgment of possession). Although the issue of possession is moot, the trial court also awarded appellee damages and attorney’s fees. A dispute over attorney’s fees is a live controversy that may prevent an entire case from becoming moot. See Daftary v. Prestonwood Mkt. Square, Ltd., 399 S.W.3d 708, 711–12 (Tex. App.—Dallas 2013, pet. denied) (holding that even though issue of possession became moot when appellant vacated 3 property, “entire case was not moot because [appellant’s] claims for damages and attorney’s fees continued to present live controversies”). We dismiss the appeal for want of jurisdiction. See TEX. R. APP. P. 42.3(a), (c), 43.2(f). Because the issue of possession is moot, we also vacate the trial court’s judgment in part as to the issue of possession.1 We dismiss any pending motions as moot. PER CURIAM Panel consists of Justices Guerra, Gunn, and Morgan. 1 The remainder of the judgment including the award of damages and attorney’s fees shall remain in place. 4