Full Opinion

TEXAS COURT OF APPEALS, THIRD DISTRICT, AT AUSTIN NO. 03-25-01006-CV Janice Lynne Hallas, Appellant v. Christopher Hallas, Appellee FROM THE 433RD DISTRICT COURT OF COMAL COUNTY NO. C2020-0951D, THE HONORABLE CHARLES A. STEPHENS II, JUDGE PRESIDING MEMORANDUM OPINION Janice Lynn Hallas seeks to appeal the Final Decree of Divorce that ended her mar- riage to Christopher Hallas. However, both Janice1 and her attorney told the trial court during an April 2024 hearing—with Janice under oath at the time—that she was waiving appeal. Christopher moves that we dismiss this appeal because of Janice’s waiver, which is one of the provisions of the parties’ Rule 11 settlement agreement. The parties dispute the scope of the appeal waiver, with Janice arguing primarily that the scope of the waiver is ambiguous. Even if Janice is correct that the agreement’s waiver provision is ambiguous, the trial court acting as factfinder found that Christopher’s understanding of the waiver was the correct one—that as part of the settlement agreement, both parties agreed to waive their right to any appeal of the trial court’s final judgment in the suit. We conclude that Christopher’s understanding is a 1 We refer to the parties by their given names to reduce confusion. reasonable one, given the record of the hearing during which the parties’ attorneys read the Rule 11 agreement into the record. The parties therefore reached an agreement that each would waive the right to appeal in this suit, and we must enforce that agreement by dismissing the appeal. If a party has waived the right to appeal in a suit via Rule 11 agreement, then we must enforce the agreement and dismiss the portions of the appeal that are subject to the waiver. See Emerson v. Emerson, 559 S.W.3d 727, 736, 737–38 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 2018, no pet.). Under Rule 11, agreements between attorneys or parties applicable to a pending suit are enforceable when the agreement is “made in open court and entered of record.” See Tex. R. Civ. P. 11; Emerson, 559 S.W.3d at 733, 734, 736, 737–38. Rule 11 agreements are contracts relating to litigation, so we interpret them under the same rules that we use to interpret contracts. Shamrock Psychiatric Clinic, P.A. v. Texas Dep’t of Health & Hum. Servs., 540 S.W.3d 553, 560 (Tex. 2018). Contract language that can be given a certain or definite meaning is unambiguous, and, in that situation, we interpret the contractual language as a matter of law. DeWitt Cnty. Elec. Coop., Inc. v. Parks, 1 S.W.3d 96, 100 (Tex. 1999); Title Res. Guar. Co. v. Lighthouse Church & Ministries, 589 S.W.3d 226, 232 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 2019, no pet.). But an ambiguity in the contractual language arises if, after the application of established rules of interpretation, the relevant language is susceptible to more than one reasonable meaning. See URI, Inc. v. Kleberg County, 543 S.W.3d 755, 765 (Tex. 2018); Title Res. Guar., 589 S.W.3d at 239, 241–42. When contract language is ambiguous, resolving its meaning is a question of fact for the factfinder. Title Res. Guar., 589 S.W.3d at 232. Christopher contends that the terms of the parties’ Rule 11 settlement agreement provide that (1) some of the issues in the suit were resolved by the parties’ agreement, (2) all re- maining issues were agreed to be submitted for decision by the trial court without aid of a jury, 2 and (3) both parties waived any right that they enjoyed to appeal the trial court’s ultimate judg- ment. For the evidence to support the creation of this Rule 11 agreement, Christopher points to the record of the parties’ April 11, 2024 hearing before the trial court. Janice agrees that the parties entered into a Rule 11 settlement agreement and that the terms of the agreement provide that certain issues were resolved by agreement and the rest were to be submitted to the trial court for decision without aid of a jury. But although she also admits that she waived her right to appeal concerning the issues that were resolved by agreement, she argues primarily that the record is ambiguous about whether she waived the right to appeal the trial court’s ultimate rulings on the issues that were submitted to it for decision. During the April 2024 hearing, Christopher’s counsel and Janice’s read into the record the parties’ Rule 11 settlement agreement. Amid that reading, and concerning the right to appeal, Janice’s counsel confirmed the waiver, before the discussion moved on to other matters: [Christopher’s counsel]: My office will draft the decree pursuant to the Texas Fami- ly Law Practice Manual, Version III, within 21 days of the rendered decree. I be- lieve that the parties agree to waive appeal and that they are— The Court: You believe or they do? [Janice’s counsel]: We do, Your Honor, agree to waive the appeal and get this mat- ter resolved. [Christopher’s counsel]: They are asking that you render today—at least the under- lying divorce—and that the reserved matters be scheduled expeditiously next week at a time convenient to the Court. Mr. Kirkwood.2 [Janice’s counsel]: Judge, everything he said is correct. She would like her name to be reinstated. 2 Mr. Kirkwood is Janice’s counsel. 3 Janice then testified about the agreement. On direct examination, she testified that Christopher’s counsel had correctly stated the matters agreed to: Q. You heard [Christopher’s counsel] read into the record the partial agreement and the portions of the agreement for final decree of divorce, as well as the matters that will be handled by the Judge that were read into the record? A. Yes. Q. Do you agree that’s a proper division of your property? A. Yes. Q. Do you agree that the Court will handle remaining issues regarding reimburse- ment, potential reconstitution of the community estate, and attorneys’ fees to be awarded to both parties? A. That means by the Judge, right? Q. By the Judge. A. Yes. Then at the beginning of her cross-examination by Christopher’s counsel, Janice testified that she agreed to waive her right to appeal: Q. Mrs. Hallas, do you agree to waive your right to appeal? A. Yes. Q. Do you agree that the property division—even to the extent that it might be modified by the Judge here today or in a subsequent hearing—is a just and right division of the parties’ estate? [Janice’s counsel]: I was going to—well—just say yes. A. Yes. 4 Later during the hearing, the court announced, “The agreement is approved and rendered as an order of the Court effective immediately.” The trial court found that Janice had waived any right to appeal the court’s final judgment. In the judgment itself, the court expressed, “The Court FINDS the parties waived their right of appeal of the final judgment.” And after Janice perfected this appeal, she asked that the appeal be abated and the cause remanded to the trial court so that the court could issue written findings of fact and conclusions of law in response to her request for them. The court obliged, and in its findings and conclusions the court expressed its findings that the parties’ Rule 11 settlement agreement provided not simply for a waiver of the right to appeal the issues that the parties had resolved by agreement but more broadly for a waiver of the right to appeal that encompasses the issues that the parties had submitted to the trial court for its decision without aid of a jury: 13. The Court finds that on April 11, 2024, the parties each waived their right to appeal. 14. The Court finds that the parties further waived their right to appeal on any sub- sequent rulings in the case regarding matters that had not been resolved at the time of the Agreement on April 11, 2024. 15. The Court finds that the parties’ waiver of appeal included that the division of the community property was a just and right division. .... 36. The Court finds that on April 11, 2024, the parties agreed that items reserved, not then agreed upon, would be dealt with by the Court, and that such items were attorney’s fees awarded to a party to be paid by the other party and the Petitioner’s reconstitution of the community estate claim. 37. The Court finds that on April 11, 2024, the parties agreed to waive their right to appeal. a. More specifically: [Christopher’s counsel]: “I believe that the parties agree to waive appeal and that they are”—The Court: “You believe or they 5 do?” [Janice’s counsel] “We do, Your Honor, agree to waive the appeal and get this matter resolved.” --------- [Janice’s counsel]: [“]Judge, every- thing he said is correct. She would like her name reinstated.” 38. The Court finds that on April 11, 2024, at the conclusion of the attorneys[’] reading the agreement into the record, [Janice] was sworn in and completed the “prove-up.” 39. The Court finds that during the prove-up on April 11, 2024, [Janice] agreed that she heard what [Christopher]’s Counsel read into the record related to the vari- ous agreements, as well as what would be handled by the Court as read into the record. .... 48. The Court finds that during cross-examination of [Janice] by [Christopher]’s Counsel on April 11, 2024, [Janice] agreed to waive her right to appeal. .... 50. The Court finds that during the prove-up on April 11, 2024, [Christopher] agreed to present the reserved items to the Court, including [Janice]’s reimburse- ment claims, any counterclaims [Christopher] may have, [Christopher]’s request for attorney’s fees, and determine which portion of [Christopher]’s pension is sep- arate and which is community property. .... 55. The Court finds that at the conclusion of the hearing on April 11, 2024, the remaining issues to be resolved included only possession and access of the child, attorney’s fees for both parties, reimbursement issues, [Christopher]’s pension, and the division related to the cars. Janice’s arguments in response to Christopher’s motion to dismiss this appeal focus on what was said at the April 2024 hearing. Janice argues primarily that the record of the Rule 11 agreement is ambiguous about the scope of the appeal waiver and thus ambiguous about what she and her attorney intended when they said what they said at the hearing. But even if she is correct that the Rule 11 agreement is ambiguous in this way, Christopher still prevails on his motion to dismiss this appeal. When con- 6 tract language is ambiguous, it is for the factfinder to resolve the ambiguity. See Title Res. Guar., 589 S.W.3d at 232. And despite her argument for the ambiguity, Janice has not challenged the trial court’s fact findings that the scope of the parties’ appeal waiver applied to all issues in the suit. We conclude that Christopher’s interpretation of the scope of the appeal waiver—that it reaches everything—is a reasonable interpretation of the record. Therefore, the evidence supports the court’s fact findings about the scope of the appeal waiver, and the parties’ Rule 11 agreement thus included as a provision that both parties would waive entirely their right to appeal in this suit. Janice makes several other arguments opposing dismissal, but none persuades us. She argues that the parties did not achieve a meeting of the minds about the essential terms of the Rule 11 agreement, a condition that would mean that there is no enforceable settlement agreement at all. See Fischer v. CTMI, L.L.C., 479 S.W.3d 231, 237 (Tex. 2016) (“To be enforceable, a contract must address all of its essential and material terms with ‘a reasonable degree of certainty and definiteness.’ Although it is difficult to say ‘just what particularity or refinement of terms is essential to meet the requirement of ‘reasonable degree of certainty,’ a contract must at least be sufficiently definite to confirm that both parties actually intended to be contractually bound.” (quoting Pace Corp. v. Jackson, 284 S.W.2d 340, 345 (Tex. 1955))). But the decision about whether the parties had a contractual meeting of the minds is judged by objective standards of what the parties said and did, not by their alleged subjective states of mind. See American Nat’l Ins. Co. v. Paul, 927 S.W.2d 239, 244 (Tex. App.—Austin 1996, writ denied). Janice’s argument in this regard is one based on her and her attorney’s subjective understanding; by contrast, her and her attorney’s words and actions, as shown by the record, objectively show an intent that Janice be contractually bound to the parties’ Rule 11 settlement agreement, including its appeal waiver. 7 Janice next argues that the settlement agreement’s terms are too indefinite to be enforced, an argument that again would leave the parties without an enforceable settlement, an outcome that Janice resists elsewhere in her written response to the motion to dismiss. “A court cannot enforce a contract unless it can determine what it is”—the parties “must have expressed their intentions in a manner that is capable of understanding.” Bendalin v. Delgado, 406 S.W.2d 897, 899 (Tex. 1966) (quoting 1 Corbin on Contracts § 95 (2d ed. 1963)). “Thus, to be enforcea- ble, a contract must be sufficiently certain to enable the court to determine the legal obligations of the parties thereto.” Id. Here, the record is sufficiently certain so that the parties’ legal obligations under the Rule 11 agreement can be determined. Next, Janice points to the record of a hearing from August 2025, arguing from it that once her attorney became aware that Christopher believed that Janice had waived her right to appeal in this suit entirely, her attorney sought to correct the misunderstanding. At that months- later hearing, Janice’s attorney argued that the trial court’s draft final judgment should not refer- ence waiver of the right to appeal and explained Janice’s position: I do intend to appeal because I believe it was not a just and right division. I believe that when—because I have done this before. We waive appeal on the issues we agree to. We don’t waive appeal on the other issues that we don’t know the out- come of the case. That’s a problem for me, especially when this Court has shown no favoritism towards my client and has been outright adverse to her interests and has animosity towards me and my client in terms of its rulings where it basically stripped her of everything. So that’s—that’s why I would never—if we had clari- fied a little bit more I would never agree that we would just rely upon your ruling in this matter. That’s the problem we had. These statements are no evidence of the terms of the parties’ Rule 11 settlement agreement. That agreement was read into the record in open court during the April 2024 hearing, near the end of which the court “approved and rendered” the Rule 11 agreement “as an order of the Court effective 8 immediately.” Further, Janice’s attorney’s subjective understanding of the words of the Rule 11 agreement do not overcome the words themselves. Nor do the attorney’s statements revoke Janice’s assent to the Rule 11 agreement. See In re Est. of Spiller, No. 04-18-00522-CV, 2019 WL 2360100, at *2 (Tex. App.—San Antonio June 5, 2019, pet. denied). Finally, Janice seeks equitable relief from the settlement agreement by asserting the doctrine of mistake, in the forms of both mutual mistake and unilateral mistake. Her assertion of mutual mistake fails because there is no evidence that Christopher shared in the same mistake that Janice says that she made regarding the scope of the appeal waiver. See Samson Expl., LLC v. T.S. Reed Props., Inc., 521 S.W.3d 766, 779 (Tex. 2017) (“Mutual mistake . . . requires evidence showing both parties were acting under the same misunderstanding regarding the same material fact.”). And her assertion of unilateral mistake fails because there is no evidence either that Janice’s purported mistake is of so great a consequence that to enforce the agreement as made would be unconscionable or that her mistake was made regardless of the exercise of ordinary care. See James T. Taylor & Son, Inc. v. Arlington ISD, 335 S.W.2d 371, 372–73 (Tex. 1960) (“[E]quit- able relief will be granted against a unilateral mistake when the conditions of remediable mistake are present. These conditions generally are: (1) the mistake is of so great a consequence that to enforce the contract as made would be unconscionable; (2) the mistake relates to a material feature of the contract; (3) the mistake must have been made regardless of the exercise of ordinary care; and (4) the parties can be placed in status quo in the equity sense, i.e., rescission must not result in prejudice to the other party except for the loss of his bargain.”). In sum, we conclude that the record shows that under the settlement agreement, both parties waived their right to appeal the final judgment entirely. We thus must give effect to the parties’ agreement and dismiss Janice’s appeal. See Emerson, 559 S.W.3d at 736, 737–38. 9 We grant Christopher’s motion, lift the abatement in this appeal, and dismiss the appeal in accordance with the parties’ Rule 11 settlement agreement. We overrule Christopher’s request for just damages for a frivolous appeal under Rule of Appellate Procedure 45. See Armstrong v. Thomas, No. 03-24-00433-CV, 2026 WL 1250434, at *5 (Tex. App.—Austin May 7, 2026, pet. filed) (“‘Whether to grant sanctions for a frivolous appeal is a matter of discretion that an appellate court exercises with prudence and caution and only after careful deliberation in truly egregious circumstances.’ Having reviewed the record through the appropriate lens, we conclude that this appeal does not present ‘truly egregious circumstances’ for which we would award dam- ages.” (citation omitted) (quoting Ashraf v. Ashraf, No. 03-11-00467-CV, 2012 WL 1948347, at *9 (Tex. App.—Austin May 24, 2012, no pet.))). __________________________________________ Chari L. Kelly, Justice Before Chief Justice Byrne, Justices Kelly and Theofanis Dismissed on Appellee’s Motion Filed: October 14, 2026 10