Full Opinion

NUMBER 13-26-00690-CV COURT OF APPEALS THIRTEENTH DISTRICT OF TEXAS CORPUS CHRISTI – EDINBURG IN RE CALHOUN COUNTY INDEPENDENT SCHOOL DISTRICT; CALHOUN COUNTY INDEPENDENT SCHOOL DISTRICT BOARD OF TRUSTEES; BILL SHRADER, IN HIS OFFICIAL CAPACITY AS PRESIDENT OF THE BOARD OF TRUSTEES; AND EVAN CARDWELL, IN HIS OFFICIAL CAPACITY AS SUPERINTENDENT ON PETITION FOR WRIT OF MANDAMUS MEMORANDUM OPINION Before Chief Justice Tijerina and Justices Cron and Fonseca Memorandum Opinion by Justice Fonseca1 By petition for writ of mandamus, relators Calhoun County Independent School District; Calhoun County Independent School District Board of Trustees; Bill Shrader, in 1 See TEX. R. APP. P. 52.8(d) (“When denying relief, the court may hand down an opinion but is not required to do so. When granting relief, the court must hand down an opinion as in any other case.”); id. R. 47.1 (“The court of appeals must hand down a written opinion that is as brief as practicable but that addresses every issue raised and necessary to final disposition of the appeal.”); id. R. 47.4 (explaining the differences between opinions and memorandum opinions). his official capacity as President of the Board of Trustees; and Evan Cardwell, in his official capacity as Superintendent, assert that the trial court abused its discretion in various respects by issuing a temporary restraining order on October 1, 2026. This Court granted relators’ emergency motion for temporary relief, stayed certain portions of the temporary restraining order, and ordered the real parties in interest, Brandy Boriskie, Melissa Gee, Lauren Griffith, Leslie Morris, Samantha Morales, Tammy Rigamonti, and Lacey Vasquez to file a response to the petition for writ of mandamus. See TEX. R. APP. P. 52.2, 52.4, 52.8, 52.10. After requesting a motion for extension of time, the real parties filed their response. Here, however, the temporary restraining order expired by its own terms as a matter of law on October 15, 2026. See TEX. R. CIV. P. 680. Once a temporary restraining order has expired, any challenge to the order is rendered moot. See In re Tex. Youth Football & Cheer Ass'n, No. 13-25-00508-CV, 2025 WL 3072606, at *1 (Tex. App.— Corpus Christi–Edinburg Nov. 3, 2025, orig. proceeding) (mem. op.); In re Perricone, No. 11-25-00078-CV, 2025 WL 1184127, at *3 (Tex. App.—Eastland Apr. 24, 2025, orig. proceeding) (mem. op.); In re L.A.-K., 596 S.W.3d 387, 396 (Tex. App.—El Paso 2020, no pet.). This Court cannot decide a case that has become moot. See Heckman v. Williamson County, 369 S.W.3d 137, 162 (Tex. 2012); In re Solaris Transp., LLC, No. 04- 25-00819-CV, 2026 WL 607279, at *1 (Tex. App.—San Antonio Mar. 4, 2026, orig. proceeding) (mem. op.). The Court, having examined and fully considered relators’ petition for writ of mandamus, the real parties’ response, and the applicable law, is of the opinion that this original proceeding is moot. See In re Kellogg Brown & Root, Inc., 166 S.W.3d 732, 737 2 (Tex. 2005) (orig. proceeding) (“A case becomes moot if a controversy ceases to exist between the parties at any stage of the legal proceedings.”); In re Nash, No. 05-25-01394- CV, 2026 WL 386241, at *1 (Tex. App.—Dallas Feb. 11, 2026, orig. proceeding) (mem. op.) (dismissing a moot original proceeding for want of jurisdiction). Accordingly, we lift the stay previously imposed in this case. See TEX. R. APP. P. 52.10(b). We dismiss this original proceeding as moot. YSMAEL D. FONSECA Justice Delivered and filed on the 26th day of October, 2026. 3