Full Opinion

Opinion issued August 31, 2026 In The Court of Appeals For The First District of Texas ———————————— NO. 01-26-00339-CV ——————————— BYRON BREASTON, Appellant V. COX’S FOODARAMA, INC., D/B/A FOODARAMA, Appellee On Appeal from the 295th District Court Harris County, Texas Trial Court Cause No. 2023-50224 MEMORANDUM OPINION Appellant Byron Breaston, proceeding pro se, filed a notice of appeal from the trial court’s March 9, 2026 order. Appellee Cox’s Foodarama, Inc. doing business as Foodarama filed a Motion to Dismiss the appeal for lack of jurisdiction. Appellant filed a response. We grant appellee’s motion and dismiss the appeal for lack of jurisdiction. Background The underlying action proceeded to arbitration and arbitrator, Scott Link, entered a Final Award in favor of appellee on October 20, 2025. Appellant subsequently filed a Notice of Nonsuit with Prejudice (“nonsuit”), which the trial court granted by signed order on November 10, 2025. On January 20, 2026, appellant filed a motion to vacate the arbitration award. On February 13, 2026, appellant filed an amended motion to vacate the arbitration award. On March 9, 2026, the trial court signed an order stating that it “has no jurisdiction to hear the filed matter.” On March 30, 2026, appellant filed a notice of appeal challenging the trial court’s March 9, 2026 order. Discussion “[C]ourts always have jurisdiction to determine their own jurisdiction.” Heckman v. Williamson Cty., 369 S.W.3d 137, 146 n.14 (Tex. 2012) (internal quotation marks omitted); see Royal Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Ragsdale, 273 S.W.3d 759, 763 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 2008, no pet.) (holding jurisdiction is fundamental in nature and cannot be ignored). Whether we have jurisdiction is a question of law, which we review de novo. See Tex. A & M Univ. Sys. v. Koseoglu, 233 S.W.3d 835, 840 (Tex. 2007). A final judgment or other appealable interlocutory order is a prerequisite to appellate jurisdiction. See Jack M. Sanders Family Ltd. 2 P’ship v. Roger T. Fridholm Revocable, Living Tr., 434 S.W.3d 236, 240 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 2014, no pet.); see also Villarreal v. Zukowsky, 54 S.W.3d 926, 930 (Tex. App.— Corpus Christi-Edinburg 2001, no pet.) (“[A]ppeals may be had only from final orders or judgments, and interlocutory orders may be appealed only if permitted by statute.”). If an appeal is from an interlocutory order over which we lack jurisdiction, we must dismiss the appeal. Ragsdale, 273 S.W.3d at 763. Here, the trial court correctly declined to rule on appellant’s amended motion to vacate because its plenary power had expired by the time the motion was filed. Martin v. Tex. Dep’t of Family & Protective Servs., 176 S.W.3d 390, 393 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 2004, no pet.) (“[A] trial court retains jurisdiction for 30 days after signing a final order of nonsuit to rule on pending motions.”); see TEX. R. CIV. P. 329b(d) (limiting trial court’s plenary power to reinstate case to 30 days after final judgment). The order granting appellant’s nonsuit was signed on November 10, 2025. The trial court’s plenary power thus expired on the 31st day, or December 11, 2025. As such, appellant’s original motion to vacate, filed on January 20, 2026 and amended motion to vacate, filed on February 13, 2026, were presented to the trial court after it had lost its plenary power. 3 Further, appellant attempts to appeal from an order that is not appealable.1 “An order denying a motion to vacate is not a final judgment or an appealable interlocutory order.” Jenkins v. Jenkins, No. 02-23-00228-CV, 2024 WL 3611005, at *4 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth Aug. 1, 2024, no pet.) (mem. op.); see Moore v. Tex. Dep’t of Crim. Just., Institutional Div., No. 12-16-00313-CV, 2017 WL 104636, at *1 (Tex. App.—Tyler Jan. 11, 2017, no pet.) (mem. op.) (“[T]he order denying [appellant’s] motion to reopen is not a final judgment or appealable interlocutory order.”). In his response, appellant argues that this Court has jurisdiction over his appeal because it “arises from-post-arbitration [j]udicial proceedings affecting a final arbitration award” and is therefore “independently appealable” pursuant to “Chapter 171 of the Texas Civil Practice and Remedies Code.” To the extent appellant is suggesting that appellate jurisdictional timelines do not apply to him because the underlying action involves an arbitration award, we reject such premise. See generally Yazdchi v. Bennett Law Firm, P.C., No. 14-01-00928-CV, 2002 WL 1163568, at *1 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] May 30, 2002, no pet.) (mem. op.) (“The Texas Civil Practice and Remedies Code grants the right to appeal an order 1 Appellant does not challenge and has not filed a timely notice of appeal from the order granting his nonsuit, which is an appealable order. See Quanto Int’l Co., Inc. v. Lloyd, 897 S.W.2d 482, 485 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 1995, no writ) (nonsuit order triggers appellate deadline). 4 confirming or denying confirmation of an arbitration award.”) (citing TEX. CIV. PRAC. & REM. CODE ANN. § 171.098(a)(3); see also Ron v. Ron, No. 01-22-00731- CV, 2024 WL 5249159, at *5 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] Dec. 31, 2024, pet. denied) (mem. op.) (determining jurisdiction over trial court’s order confirming arbitration award). Because we lack jurisdiction to review the appealed-from March 9, 2026 order, we grant appellee’s Motion to Dismiss and dismiss the appeal for lack of jurisdiction. See TEX. R. APP. P. 42.3(a), 43.2(f). We dismiss any other pending motions as moot. PER CURIAM Panel consists of Justices Guerra, Gunn, and Morgan. 5