Full Opinion

In the Court of Appeals Second Appellate District of Texas at Fort Worth ___________________________ No. 02-24-00270-CV ___________________________ WALLY YAMMINE, Appellant V. PROPEL FINANCIAL SERVICES, LLC, AS AGENT AND ATTORNEY IN FACT FOR PROPEL FUNDING NATIONAL 1, LLC, HOME TAX SOLUTIONS, LLC, HK REO, LLC, CASEY LENDING, AND PROPEL NATIONAL FUNDING, Appellees On Appeal from the 348th District Court Tarrant County, Texas Trial Court No. 348-333220-22 Before Womack, Wallach, and Walker, JJ. Memorandum Opinion by Justice Womack MEMORANDUM OPINION Appellant Wally Yammine attempts to appeal from (1) findings of fact and conclusions of law issued pursuant to Texas Government Code Section 51.903 and (2) an order striking part of Yammine’s live pleading. We dismiss the appeal for want of jurisdiction. Yammine, “individually and as Trustee for 813 Opal Trust,” sued twelve defendants for wrongful foreclosure. One of the defendants, HK REO, LLC, filed a “Verified Motion for Summary Judicial Removal of Fraudulent Liens” pursuant to Section 51.903(a) of the Texas Government Code seeking an order finding three liens Yammine filed regarding the real property at issue in his wrongful-foreclosure claim to be fraudulent. According to the procedure set forth in Government Code Section 51.903, the trial court issued “Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law Regarding Instruments Purporting to Create a Lien” on March 6, 2024 (March Lien Findings). Tex. Gov’t Code § 51.903(c), (e). In addition, five of the defendants––appellees in this appeal––moved to strike as frivolous any claims in the “Plaintiff’s Original Amended Petition for Wrongful Foreclosure and Request for Temporary Orders” that were made by Yammine as trustee of the 813 Opal Trust. On May 2, 2024, the trial court signed an order striking “the claims asserted by 813 Opal Trust” (May Order). The trial court’s order noted “that the claims asserted by Wally Yammine, Individually are unaffected by this order.” 2 On June 14, 2024, Yammine filed a notice of appeal in the trial court. That notice of appeal referenced the dates of both the March Lien Findings and the May Order, but it did not specify in which capacity Yammine was filing the notice of appeal. The trial court clerk forwarded the notice of appeal to this court. See Tex. R. App. P. 25.1(f). A little over a year after filing his initial notice of appeal,1 Yammine filed in the trial court an “Updated Notice of Appeal”2 listing only the date of the March Lien Findings as the date of the ruling to be appealed. After reviewing Yammine’s later-filed appellant’s brief––which complained about only the May Order––in light of the appellate record, we sent the parties a letter informing them of our concern that this court does not have jurisdiction over the appeal because, (1) to the extent the March Lien Findings ruling is interlocutory, the notice of appeal was not timely filed; and (2) the May Order does not appear to be a final judgment or appealable interlocutory order. We warned the parties that unless a 1 Almost two months after Yammine filed his first notice of appeal, we administratively stayed the appeal after receiving Yammine’s suggestion of bankruptcy indicating that he had filed a Chapter 13 petition in the United States Bankruptcy Court for the Northern District of Texas. While the appeal was suspended in this court, Yammine filed in the trial court a notice stating that the bankruptcy court’s automatic stay had been “terminated” on December 19, 2024. Yammine did not file such a notice in this court. On Yammine’s motion, we reinstated the appeal on October 1, 2025. 2 This notice of appeal likewise does not indicate that Yammine filed it in any particular capacity. 3 response was filed showing grounds for continuing the appeal, we could dismiss it for want of jurisdiction. See Tex. R. App. P. 42.3(a), 44.3. Although Yammine filed a response, it does not show grounds for continuing the appeal.3 To the extent that Yammine has attempted to appeal the March Lien Findings, the notice of appeal was not timely filed because it was not filed within the timeframe for an accelerated appeal, regardless of whether the ruling is considered to be interlocutory or final and appealable. See Tex. R. App. P. 26.1(b) (requiring notice of accelerated appeal to be filed no later than twenty days after judgment or appealable order is signed), 28.1(a), (b) (providing that interlocutory appeals and “expedited” appeals are subject to accelerated-appeal due dates and that the filing of a motion for new trial does not extend those dates); see also Tex. Gov’t Code § 51.903(c) (requiring appellate court to expedite review of Section 51.903 findings); Morton v. Lakeview Loan Servicing, LLC, No. 02-24-00525-CV, 2025 WL 211373, at *1 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth Jan. 16, 2025, no pet.) (mem. op.) (noting that appeals from Section 51.903 findings are subject to the accelerated-appeal deadlines and dismissing untimely appeal). “A timely notice of appeal is necessary to invoke this court’s jurisdiction.” Armstrong v. Royal Affairs Ballroom, LLC, No. 02-25-00500-CV, 2025 WL 3181156, at *2 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth Nov. 13, 2025, pet. denied) (mem. op.). Therefore, we do not 3 Appellees filed a brief, in which they alternatively request that we dismiss the appeal for want of jurisdiction. 4 have jurisdiction over Yammine’s attempted appeal from the March Lien Findings. See id. We also do not have jurisdiction over Yammine’s attempted appeal of the May Order. Generally, appeals may be taken only from final judgments or interlocutory orders authorized by statute. Lehmann v. Har-Con Corp., 39 S.W.3d 191, 195, 200 (Tex. 2001). The May Order’s language indicates that it is interlocutory because nowhere does it state with unmistakable clarity that it is a final judgment as to all claims and all parties and because it expressly leaves pending Yammine’s claims in his individual capacity. See In re Elizondo, 544 S.W.3d 824, 827–28 (Tex. 2018) (orig. proceeding); Lehmann, 39 S.W.3d at 192–93. Likewise, the appellate record shows that Yammine’s individual claims remain pending. See Elizondo, 544 S.W.3d at 826; Phillips v. Blue Nail Enters., LLC, No. 02-24-00227-CV, 2024 WL 3822546, at *1 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth Aug. 15, 2024, no pet.) (mem. op.). Yammine has provided us no authority––nor have we found any––allowing for an appeal of an interlocutory order partially striking a pleading.4 See generally Tex. Civ. Prac. & Rem. Code § 51.014(a); In re Guardianship of Thrash, 610 S.W.3d 74, 78 (Tex. App.—San Antonio 2020, pet. denied) (holding that order striking pleadings was interlocutory and that no statute authorized an appeal); Because we are dismissing the appeal for want of jurisdiction, nothing in this 4 memorandum opinion should be construed as addressing the merits of Yammine’s underlying complaint. 5 Fudzie v. Williams, No. 05-12-00511-CV, 2012 WL 6685527, at *1 (Tex. App.—Dallas Dec. 21, 2012, no pet.) (mem. op.) (same). Because Yammine’s notice of appeal was not timely filed as to the March Lien Findings and because the May Order is neither a final judgment nor an appealable interlocutory order, we dismiss this appeal for want of jurisdiction. See Tex. R. App. P. 42.3(a), 43.2(f). We deny Yammine’s request to file an amended brief as moot. /s/ Dana Womack Dana Womack Justice Delivered: August 13, 2026 6