Full Opinion

Motion granted; Appeal Dismissed and Memorandum Opinion filed August 11, 2026. In The Fifteenth Court of Appeals NO. 15-26-00061-CV CITY OF DRIPPING SPRINGS, TEXAS, Appellant V. LAZY W DISTRICT NO. 1; BRUCE L. BOLBOCK, M.D.; AND BARBARA WIATREK BOLBOCK, Appellees On Appeal from the 274th District Court Hays County, Texas Trial Court Cause No. 25-1560-DCC MEMORANDUM OPINION Not long after Lazy W District No. 1 filed a motion to dismiss this appeal for lack of jurisdiction, the City of Dripping Springs filed a motion requesting that we abate this appeal “to allow the trial court to resolve all remaining matters, including Lazy W’s motion for attorney’s fees, take any other actions required for finality, and enter a definitively worded final judgment.” We granted the motion and abated the appeal for 60 days. Upon the expiration of that time, we issued a second order abating the appeal for the same reasons for an additional 30 days. The parties have now filed a “Joint Motion to Remand” this appeal to the trial court so that it may “conduct further proceedings to confirm the finality of its judgment,” which would include deciding Lazy W’s motion for attorneys’ fees and the Bolbocks’ counterclaims and attorneys’ fees. But those are the same grounds the City relied upon to justify its first requested abatement 4 months ago, and that request came 3 months after the trial court signed the summary-judgment orders the City seeks to appeal. It has now been 7 months since the trial court signed those orders, and yet it appears from the filings that the parties are no closer to securing a final judgment than they were when the City noticed its appeal in January. What’s more, the remaining tasks are not ministerial jurisdictional fixes, but instead involve motions, consideration of evidence, and probably hearings. In other words, continued litigation for an unforeseeable period of time.1 Accordingly, we will proceed to consider Lazy W’s still-pending dismissal motion.2 Although this Court is unique in the sense that it has exclusive intermediate appellate jurisdiction over those matters described by § 22.220(d) of the Texas Government Code,3 it is nonetheless subject to the same general rule that appellate review is limited to final judgments, subject to a “narrow exception” for interlocutory orders made appealable by statute.4 The summary-judgment orders the 1 See, e.g., Garcia v. Segway, Inc., 2024 WL 3748382, at *1 (Tex. App.—Amarillo Aug. 9, 2024, no pet.) (“[W]e may abate a premature appeal to allow the trial court to cure a jurisdictional defect, particularly when only the ministerial act of making a judgment final remains.”) (emphasis added). 2 Lazy W filed the motion on March 19, 2026. The City had ample time to respond but never did. See TEX. R. APP. P. 10.1(b). 3 See Kelley v. Homminga, 706 S.W.3d 829, 831 (Tex. 2025). 4 See Harley Channelview Props., LLC v. Harley Marine Gulf, LLC, 690 S.W.3d 32, 37 (Tex. 2024); CMH Homes v. Perez, 340 S.W.3d 444, 447 (Tex. 2011); Lehmann v. Har-Con Corp., 2 City seeks to appeal—which decided the parties’ competing motions disputing application of the doctrine of paramount importance to the City’s condemnation claim—are not immediately appealable under any statutory authority. The orders therefore must be final for this Court to have jurisdiction. Generally, a judgment issued without a conventional trial is final when it either (1) “actually disposes of all claims and parties,” or (2) “states with unmistakable clarity that it is a final judgment.”5 The orders here do not contain unequivocal finality language, nor do they actually dispose of all claims and parties, since the record reflects that, at the very least, Lazy W’s requests for attorneys’ fees and the Bolbocks’ counterclaims remain pending. Because there is no final judgment or appealable interlocutory order, we GRANT Lazy W’s motion and dismiss this appeal for want of jurisdiction.6 See TEX. R. APP. P. 42.3(a), 43.2(f). We DENY the portion of Lazy W’s motion requesting damages. We DISMISS the joint motion to remand as moot. PER CURIAM Panel consists of Chief Justice Brister and Justices Field and Farris. 39 S.W.3d 191, 192 (Tex. 2001); see also TEX. CIV. PRAC. & REM. CODE § 51.012. 5 In re C.K.M., 709 S.W.3d 613, 616 (Tex. 2025) (quoting Lehmann, 39 S.W.3d at 192–93)). 6 The City can challenge the interlocutory summary-judgment orders when they merge into a final judgment. See Bonsmara Natural Beef Co. v. Hart of Tex. Cattle Feeders, LLC, 603 S.W.3d 385, 390 (Tex. 2020). 3