Full Opinion

NUMBER 13-26-00577-CV COURT OF APPEALS THIRTEENTH DISTRICT OF TEXAS CORPUS CHRISTI – EDINBURG JOHNNY PARTAIN, Appellant, v. THE STATE OF TEXAS, Appellee. ON APPEAL FROM THE 332ND DISTRICT COURT OF HIDALGO COUNTY, TEXAS MEMORANDUM OPINION Before Chief Justice Tijerina and Justices Silva and Cron Memorandum Opinion by Justice Silva On August 31, 2026, we handed down our memorandum opinion and judgment in this cause, which dismissed pro se appellant Johnny Partain’s appeal and vacated the trial court’s order he appealed. See Partain v. Guerra, No. 13-26-00577-CV, 2026 WL 2593698, at *1 (Tex. App.—Corpus Christi–Edinburg Aug. 31, 2026, no pet. h.) (mem. op.). The trial court’s order being appealed vacated a prior order from the trial court. See id. at *2. We held that the trial court’s order being appealed was void because it was rendered outside its plenary power. See id. at *3. We further held we lacked jurisdiction over the order being appealed because it was void. See id. (“When a party attempts to appeal a void order, the appellate court must vacate the order and dismiss the appeal.”). Thereafter, appellee the State of Texas filed a motion for rehearing requesting, among other things, that we grant rehearing, withdraw our August 31, 2026 memorandum opinion and judgment, and issue a substitute opinion dismissing Partain’s appeal without vacating the order being appealed. In its motion, the State argued, in part, that the trial court had the power to vacate an order that was rendered outside its plenary power. See Metro. Transit Auth. v. Jackson, 212 S.W.3d 797, 801 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 2006, pet. denied) (“A trial court may not set aside a judgment after the period of plenary power has expired, unless . . . the court signed the judgment after plenary power over the parties expired, as provided by [Texas Rule of Civil Procedure] 329b(f).”); TEX. R. CIV. P. 329b(f) (providing that a trial court “may at any time correct a clerical error in the record of a judgment and render judgment nunc pro tunc under Rule 316, and may also sign an order declaring a previous judgment or order to be void because signed after the court’s plenary power had expired”). We requested and received a response to the State’s motion for rehearing from Partain. See TEX. R. APP. P. 49.2. The State then filed a supplemental brief replying to Partain’s response. After examining and fully considering the State’s motion for rehearing, Partain’s response, and the State’s reply to Partain’s response, the Court is of the opinion that, in the interests of justice, the State’s motion for rehearing should be granted. Accordingly, 2 we withdraw our August 31, 2026 memorandum opinion and judgment, and we substitute the following memorandum opinion and accompanying judgment in its place. This matter is before the Court on its own motion. On August 7, 2026, Partain filed a notice of appeal attempting to appeal an order entered on July 1, 2026, in trial court cause C-0929-12-F. On August 14, 2026, the Clerk of the Court notified Partain that it appears he has attempted to appeal an order which is unappealable. Partain was further notified that if the defect was not cured within ten days, the appeal would be dismissed. See id. R. 42.3. The Clerk instructed Partain to cure the defect within ten days. See id. Partain failed to cure the defect. A final judgment or other appealable order becomes appealable on, and an appellant’s timetables run from, the date such a judgment or order is signed. See id. R. 26.1; Farmer v. Ben E. Keith Co., 907 S.W.2d 495, 496 (Tex. 1995) (per curiam) (“The appellate timetable does not commence to run other than by signed, written order, even when the signing of such an order is purely ministerial.”). Upon review of the documents before the Court, 1 it appears that the order from which this appeal was taken is not an appealable interlocutory order or a final appealable judgment. “[A] judgment is final either if ‘it actually disposes of every pending claim and party’ or ‘it clearly and unequivocally states that it finally disposes of all claims and all parties.’” Bella Palma, LLC v. Young, 601 S.W.3d 799, 801 (Tex. 2020) (quoting Lehmann v. Har-Con Corp., 39 S.W.3d 191, 1 The current cause is not the first appeal involving the parties or the underlying trial court cause. See Partain v. Compass Bank, Nos. 13-21-00038-CV, 13-21-00039-CV, 13-21-00040-CV, 13-21-00041- CV, 13-21-00042-CV, 13-21-00043-CV, 13-21-00044-CV, 2021 WL 2149825, at *1 (Tex. App.—Corpus Christi–Edinburg May 27, 2021, no pet.) (mem. op.). We take judicial notice of the appellate record of Partain’s prior appeals. See Douglas v. Am. Title Co., 196 S.W.3d 876, 877–78 n.1 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 2006, no pet.) (citation omitted) (“We may take judicial notice of our own records involving the same parties and subject matter.”). 3 205 (Tex. 2001)). The July 1, 2026 order being appealed vacated a prior order entered by the trial court on July 29, 2025, which, among other things, granted Partain’s motion to dismiss his case as moot. 2 “An order setting aside or vacating a judgment returns the parties to the position they occupied before rendition of the judgment and leaves the case as if no judgment had been entered.” Curry v. Bank of Am., N.A., 232 S.W.3d 345, 351 (Tex. App.—Dallas 2007, pet. denied). Thus, such an order does not actually dispose of every pending claim and party. See Bella Palma, LLC, 601 S.W.3d at 801. “To ensure parties are not made to guess what action a trial judge has taken concerning an order, courts have held that such an order is not a final judgment unless it also specifically includes language disposing of all the issues and parties in the case.” Curry, 232 S.W.3d at 351 (citation modified); see Bella Palma, LLC, 601 S.W.3d at 801. The July 1, 2026 order contains no language disposing of all the issues and parties in the case, and is thus not a final, appealable judgment. See Bella Palma, LLC, 601 S.W.3d at 801; Curry, 232 S.W.3d at 351. Furthermore, the July 1, 2026 order appears to be one issued pursuant to Rule 329b(f), which allows a trial court to declare, at any time, that its previous judgment or order was void because it was issued outside its plenary power. See TEX. R. CIV. P. 329b(f). “The Legislature has not provided a method 2 We note that both orders appear to have been rendered outside the trial court’s plenary power over the parties. However, the Rules of Civil Procedure permit a trial court to set aside a previous judgment that was rendered outside its plenary power at any time. See TEX. R. CIV. P. 329b(f); Metro. Transit Auth. v. Jackson, 212 S.W.3d 797, 801 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 2006, pet. denied). Thus, the July 1, 2026 order is not void if rendered outside the trial court’s plenary power, but potentially voidable. See Freedom Commc’ns, Inc. v. Coronado, 372 S.W.3d 621, 623 (Tex. 2012) (per curiam). (“[A]ppellate courts do not have jurisdiction to address the merits of appeals from void orders or judgments; rather, they have jurisdiction only to determine that the order or judgment underlying the appeal is void and make appropriate orders based on that determination.”). 4 to appeal from [orders issued under Rule 329b(f)], nor [do] th[ese] type[s] of order[s] constitute a final judgment.” In re Marriage of Trice, No. 06-00-00165-CV, 2001 WL 256323, at *2 (Tex. App.—Texarkana Mar. 16, 2001, no pet.) (dismissing appeal involving an order issued under Rule 329b(f) for lack of jurisdiction). We have not identified any statute permitting an interlocutory appeal of the July 1, 2026 order. See Harley Channelview Props., LLC v. Harley Marine Gulf, LLC, 690 S.W.3d 32, 37 (Tex. 2024). (“An appellate court has no jurisdiction to review an interlocutory order unless review is conferred by statute.”). Absent an appealable interlocutory order or final judgment, this Court has no jurisdiction over this appeal. Ogletree v. Matthews, 262 W.S.3d 316, 319 n.1 (Tex. 2007). Having considered the documents on file and Partain’s failure to correct the jurisdictional defect in this matter, we dismiss the appeal for want of jurisdiction. 3 See TEX. R. APP. P. 42.3(a). CLARISSA SILVA Justice Delivered and filed on the 30th day of October, 2026. 3 All pending motions are dismissed as moot. 5