Full Opinion

In the Court of Appeals Second Appellate District of Texas at Fort Worth ___________________________ No. 02-26-00399-CV ___________________________ IN THE INTEREST OF G.W. AND M.W., CHILDREN On Appeal from the 324th District Court Tarrant County, Texas Trial Court No. 324-711353-22 Before Birdwell, Bassel, and Womack, JJ. Memorandum Opinion by Justice Birdwell MEMORANDUM OPINION Appellant Mother attempts to appeal the trial court’s order terminating her parent–child relationship with only two of her children, G.W. and M.W.1 Mother filed her notice of appeal pro se despite having appointed counsel.2 Because the termination order is not a final judgment or an appealable interlocutory order, we dismiss this appeal for want of jurisdiction. We have jurisdiction to consider appeals only from final judgments and from certain interlocutory orders made immediately appealable by statute. See Lehmann v. Har-Con Corp., 39 S.W.3d 191, 195 (Tex. 2001); see also Tex. Civ. Prac. & Rem. Code § 51.014(a) (listing appealable interlocutory orders). A final judgment is one that “actually disposes of every pending claim and party” or that “clearly and unequivocally states that it finally disposes of all claims and all parties.” Lehmann, 39 S.W.3d at 205; see In re R.R.K., 590 S.W.3d 535, 540 (Tex. 2019) (“A judicial decree is final when it disposes of all issues and all parties in the record.”). Unless a statutory exception applies, an order that does not dispose of all pending parties and claims 1 To protect the identities of the children, we refer to them by their initials and to their family members by their relationship to them. See Tex. Fam. Code § 109.002(d); Tex. R. App. P. 9.8(b)(2). 2 After she filed her notice of appeal, Mother filed in this court a pro se letter “requesting an appellate attorney.” But we do not appoint lawyers to litigants. Further, the record indicates that Mother requested and was appointed counsel by the trial court. 2 remains interlocutory and unappealable until the trial court signs a final judgment. See Lehmann, 39 S.W.3d at 205. In January 2026, the Texas Department of Family and Protective Services (the Department) filed an original petition to modify a May 2023 final order in a suit affecting the parent–child relationship and to terminate Mother’s parental rights to her three children, R.M., G.W., and M.W. In its petition, the Department explicitly named R.M., G.W., and M.W. as the children who “are the subject of this suit.” Additionally, the petition provided the names of the two fathers of the children— Father M was listed as R.M.’s father, and Father W was listed as G.W. and M.W.’s father. Father W was determined to have been deceased. Regarding Father M, the Department requested that he be appointed as a possessory conservator of R.M. with supervised visitation and that he be ordered to pay child and medical support for the care of R.M. The Department also requested that “a relative” be named permanent managing conservator of R.M. Father M did not appear at the final termination trial. At the beginning of trial, the Department announced that it was not ready to proceed as to Father M and R.M. but that it “w[ould] still proceed as to [G.W.] and [M.W.]” After the Department presented its evidence and rested its case, the children’s guardian ad litem recommended that Mother’s parental rights to G.W. and M.W. be terminated. The trial court agreed and “grant[ed] the Department’s request for termination of parental rights as to . . . [M]other . . . and the two children [G.W.] and [M.W.]” 3 In its termination order, the trial court found that G.W. and M.W. were the “children [who] are the subject of th[e] order” and terminated the parent–child relationship between Mother and G.W. and Mother and M.W. The order did not mention Father M or R.M. Further, it does not appear from the appellate record that the trial court has severed the suit as to Father M or R.M or that the Department has abandoned its claims as to Father M or R.M., and a case transaction summary provided to this court by the trial court clerk likewise does not indicate that the suit has been severed or that the Department has abandoned those claims. On July 20, 2026, we notified Mother and her appointed counsel of our concern that we may not have jurisdiction over this appeal because the trial court’s termination order does not appear to be a final judgment or an appealable interlocutory order. See J.G. v. Tex. Dep’t of Fam. & Protective Servs., No. 03-23-00146- CV, 2023 WL 3932331, at *1 (Tex. App.—Austin June 19, 2023, no pet.) (dismissing appeal for want of jurisdiction because the order appealed from by the father of only one of the two children involved in the suit did not dispose of all issues and parties in the suit and thus was not final); In re T.R., No. 07-23-00075-CV, 2023 WL 3564956, at *1 (Tex. App.—Amarillo May 19, 2023, no pet.) (concluding that order in parental- rights-termination suit was not final and appealable because it terminated the parent– child relationship between appellant and only one of her four children who were the subject of the suit and holding that order became final when the trial court severed the suit as to that child); In re E.A.F., No. 14-13-00618-CV, 2013 WL 4945751, at *1 4 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] Sept. 12, 2013, no pet.) (holding that order terminating appellant’s parental rights was not final or appealable because it “d[id] not dispose of all parties and issues” and dismissing appeal for want of jurisdiction); In re Shaw, 966 S.W.2d 174, 177 (Tex. App.—El Paso 1998, no pet.) (concluding that termination order that was silent as to the father of one of the three children the subject of the suit was final and appealable because the department had abandoned its termination pleadings as to that father). We warned Mother that unless she filed a response by July 30, 2026, showing grounds for continuing the appeal, it could be dismissed for want of jurisdiction. See Tex. R. App. P. 42.3(a), 44.3. We have not received a response from Mother or from her appointed counsel. Accordingly, because the termination order from which Mother appeals is neither a final judgment nor an appealable interlocutory order, we dismiss this appeal for want of jurisdiction. See Tex. R. App. P. 42.3(a), 43.2(f).3 /s/ Wade Birdwell Wade Birdwell Justice Delivered: August 13, 2026 3 In addition to her pro se letter, Mother has filed other pro se documents requesting various relief from this court. But because Mother has appointed counsel, we do not consider those documents. See In re D.B., No. 02-18-00015-CV, 2018 WL 2324689, at *18 n.11 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth May 22, 2018, pet. denied) (disregarding appellant mother’s pro se motions because she was represented by counsel and thus was “not entitled to hybrid representation”). 5