Full Opinion

TEXAS COURT OF APPEALS, THIRD DISTRICT, AT AUSTIN NO. 03-26-00513-CV Robert Smith, Individually and as next friend of V.S., a minor child, Appellant v. Ascension Texas, D.B.A. Dell Children’s Medical Center, Kiran Jose, M.D., and Jacquelyn Lagrone, M.D., Appellees FROM THE 459TH DISTRICT COURT OF TRAVIS COUNTY NO. D-1-GN-25-006318, THE HONORABLE LAURIE EISERLOH, JUDGE PRESIDING MEMORANDUM OPINION Smith appeals from the trial court’s orders dismissing his healthcare liability claims against appellees Ascension Texas, D.B.A. Dell Children’s Medical Center (hereinafter, the Hospital), Kiran Jose, M.D., and Jacquelyn Lagrone, M.D. The Hospital and Jose filed a joint motion to dismiss, arguing that Smith’s claims were healthcare liability claims, see Tex. Civ. Prac. & Rem. Code § 74.001(a)(13) (defining “[h]ealth care liability claim”), and that Smith’s failure to timely file an expert report warranted dismissal of his claims and an award of attorney’s fees, see id. § 74.351(b). Lagrone filed a separate motion to dismiss seeking the same relief for the same reason. On May 20, 2026, the trial court signed an order granting the Hospital and Jose’s motion to dismiss and on June 1, 2026, the trial court signed an order granting Lagrone’s motion to dismiss. Neither order explicitly mentioned an award of attorney’s fees; however, the order granting Lagrone’s motion included the following interlineation striking through an express award of attorney’s fees: In general, this Court’s jurisdiction is limited to appeals in which there exists a final or otherwise appealable order or judgment. See id. § 51.012; Lehmann v. Har-Con Corp., 39 S.W.3d 191, 195 (Tex. 2001). Absent a conventional trial on the merits, a judgment “is final for purposes of appeal if and only if either it actually disposes of all claims and parties then before the court, regardless of its language, or it states with unmistakable clarity that it is a final judgment as to all claims and all parties.” Lehmann, 39 S.W.3d at 192–93. Because the trial court did not sign an order indicating with unmistakable clarity that it disposed of all claims and parties, we turn to whether the trial court’s orders actually did dispose of all claims and parties. See id. An award of costs and attorney’s fees is mandatory under Section 74.351(b) of the Civil Practice and Remedies Code, which is the provision under which Smith’s claims against 2 Lagrone, the Hospital, and Jose were dismissed. See Tex. Civ. Prac. & Rem. Code § 74.351(b). “[W]hen a party has proven that an award of attorney’s fees is mandatory[,] . . . the trial court must expressly dispose of the fee request to render a final judgment.” Sealy Emergency Room, L.L.C. v. Free Standing Emergency Room Managers of Am., L.L.C., 685 S.W.3d 816, 825 (Tex. 2024). Because the trial court’s orders did not explicitly dispose of appellees’ requests for attorney’s fees, on August 17, 2026, we informed Smith that it did not appear that the trial court had issued a final, appealable order, and that his appeal was therefore subject to dismissal. Smith filed a response, arguing that the trial court’s orders did dispose of appellees’ requests for attorney’s fees. He refers us to the reporter’s record, where the trial judge stated that “typically [she] would deny attorney’s fees in this case because we have a pro se here” but informed the parties that she would be taking the matter under advisement. Smith argues that this statement, coupled with the trial court’s striking through an award of attorney’s fees from the order granting Lagrone’s motion to dismiss, resolved all pending requests for attorney’s fees. Even if the trial court’s strike-through of an award of attorney’s fees on the order granting Lagrone’s motion to dismiss is an express denial of her request for attorney’s fees, we cannot interpret it as an express denial of the Hospital and Jose’s request for attorney’s fees. Smith suggests that it is, but he cites no authority indicating that the trial court’s denial of one party’s request for attorney’s fees constitutes an express denial of another party’s request for attorney’s fees, nor have we found any authority to that effect. The failure to address attorney’s fees when dismissing a case under Section 74.351(b) renders the order interlocutory and unappealable. See Smith v. Grays, No. 02-24-00294-CV, 2025 WL 1840475, at *2 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth July 3, 2025, no pet.) 3 (mem. op.) (“Because the trial court did not dispose of Dr. Grays’s request for attorney’s fees, it remains pending in the trial court, and the dismissal order is neither final nor appealable.”); Bernard v. Kadin, No. 05-21-00291-CV, 2021 WL 2943921, at *2 (Tex. App.—Dallas July 12, 2021, no pet.) (mem. op.) (“Because the appealed orders granted relief under section 74.351(b) and did not address attorney’s fees and costs, they are unappealable interlocutory orders.”). Because the trial court failed to expressly rule on appellees’ request for attorney’s fees, we conclude that the order being appealed is an unappealable interlocutory order. Accordingly, we dismiss this appeal for want of jurisdiction. __________________________________________ Maggie Ellis, Justice Before Justices Triana, Crump, and Ellis Dismissed for Want of Jurisdiction Filed: August 31, 2026 4