Full Opinion

In the Court of Appeals Second Appellate District of Texas at Fort Worth ___________________________ No. 02-26-00521-CV ___________________________ TWANA SANDERS, Appellant V. FORT WORTH AREA HABITAT FOR HUMANITY, INC., Appellee On Appeal from the 96th District Court Tarrant County, Texas Trial Court No. 096-373085-25 Before Sudderth, C.J.; Kerr and Birdwell, JJ. Memorandum Opinion by Chief Justice Sudderth MEMORANDUM OPINION This case has become moot. Appellee Fort Worth Area Habitat for Humanity, Inc. filed this suit against Appellant Twana Sanders to enforce a residential real estate contract, and the appealed-from judgment ordered Sanders to specifically perform the contract by transferring her interest in the relevant property to Habitat.1 The judgment provided that, if Sanders failed to comply within a certain amount of time—and it is undisputed that she failed to comply—then Habitat could file the judgment and an affidavit of noncompliance in the property records as a muniment of title. And that is precisely what Habitat did. But given Sanders’s resistance to and appeal from the judgment, Habitat took a belt-and-suspenders approach to acquiring her interest in the property. While this appeal was pending, Habitat foreclosed on its lien on the property, purchased the property at auction, and obtained a foreclosure deed granting it “any interest [Sanders] may still own or claim in or to the [property] after th[e judgment].” In other words, to the extent that Habitat had not already acquired all of Sanders’s property interest via 1 According to Habitat, Sanders had agreed to sell it her property interest to avoid foreclosure, but she failed to complete the transaction. The judgment ordered Sanders to specifically perform the contract by delivering the relevant title documents within ten days, and if she did so, Habitat would be required to pay her a certain sum of money. But if Sanders failed to perform within ten days, Habitat would “owe [Sanders] no money for the Property” and would be entitled to “an immediate writ of possession.” 2 the judgment, it acquired whatever remained via the foreclosure deed. Then, based on this development, Habitat moved to dismiss Sanders’s appeal from the judgment as moot. When a case becomes moot on appeal, we are constitutionally and jurisdictionally barred from addressing its merits. Tex. Dep’t of Fam. & Protective Servs. v. Grassroots Leadership, Inc., 717 S.W.3d 854, 873–74 (Tex. 2025) (emphasizing that “our lack of jurisdiction over moot cases is a mandate of the constitution”). “One way mootness arises is if a ruling cannot ‘affect the parties’ rights or interests’ such that it ‘would be without practical effect.’” Id. at 875 (reiterating that “appellate courts do not decide cases in which no controversy exists between the parties” as “resolving [such] case[s] would generate an advisory opinion”). As Habitat points out, our resolution of this case would no longer have a practical effect. Habitat now holds legal title to the property on two independent bases: (1) the judgment-based muniment of title at issue in this appeal and (2) the foreclosure deed.2 Although Sanders urges us to allow her appeal to continue and rule on the judgment’s validity, such a ruling would make no difference—at the end of the day, Habitat Sanders does not “concede the validity of the [foreclosure] sale,” but she 2 acknowledges that it occurred and that the foreclosure deed conveyed—or at least “purport[ed] to convey”—“any interest [she] may still own or claim in or to” the property. 3 would hold title to her property either way.3 Id. (reiterating that a judgment must “actually affect the [parties], not merely vindicate a favored legal position” or resolve “a theoretical dispute”). The case before us is thus moot. Accordingly, following the Texas Supreme Court’s direction in Alsobrook, we vacate the judgment and dismiss the case for want of subject matter jurisdiction. Alsobrook v. MTGLQ Inv’rs, LP, 656 S.W.3d 394, 395 (Tex. 2022) (holding that court of appeals erred by dismissing moot appeal without vacating trial court judgment; reiterating that “when a case becomes moot on appeal, all previous orders are [to be] set aside by the appellate court and the case . . . dismissed”; and reasoning that “simply dismissing the appeal ‘would have the effect of affirming the judgment of the lower court without considering any assignments of error thereto’”); see Grassroots Leadership, 717 S.W.3d at 888 (vacating lower courts’ judgments and dismissing moot case without prejudice for want of subject matter jurisdiction). /s/ Bonnie Sudderth Bonnie Sudderth Chief Justice Delivered: October 29, 2026 Neither party claims that a recognized mootness exception applies. 3 Cf. Grassroots Leadership, 717 S.W.3d at 874, 883–84 (clarifying that “[a]ssessing mootness generally proceeds in two steps”—“ask[ing] if the case is moot on its face” and then, “[i]f the answer is yes, . . . ask[ing] if any ‘exception’ to mootness applies”— and going on to discuss “two primary and generally available ‘exceptions’”). 4